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by 
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" Estimating Life Loss for Dam Safety Risk Assessment" explores the need for a 
new life-loss model in dam safety risk assessment, historical foundations on which that 
model can be built, and issues that are critical for a successful life-loss model to address . 
After critiquing existing life-loss models, the work presents a summary of historical 
insights that were derived by characterizing flood events on the level of subpopulations at 
risk, using nearly l 00 carefully defined variables. Building upon both conceptual and 
historical insights, the work culminates by presenting the conceptual basis for a new life-
loss model that remains under development. 
Chapter I introduces the topic of dam safety risk assessment and the central role 
that life-loss estimation plays in that field. Chapter II discusses important preliminary 
considerations in model development. Chapter III provides a detailed review of previous 
life-loss models that pertained to floods, including a critique of each. Chapter IV explores 
the DeKay-McClelland model in detail and raises serious concerns regarding its future 
use. Chapter V defines nearly l 00 variables and their respective categories for use in 
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characterizing flood events. Chapter VI provides a detailed outline of historical insights 
that relate to flood events in one of 18 logical categories. Chapter VII proposes the 
framework for a new conceptual life-loss model-a model that is still under development 
and has yet to be refined or offered for testing-with sufficient details to indicate how it 
was developed and how it might be used. Chapter VIII provides a summary, conclusions, 
and recommendations for future research. Appendices A through D provide material 
related to over 900 pages of unpublished working documents developed while 
characterizing 38 flood events and nearly 200 subpopulations at risk. Appendix E offers a 
summary of existing software that, given additional development, might prove useful to 
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PREFACE 
Jeana, my youngest, looked up at me and asked, "Mommy, is this the end 
of time?" l said, "No, honey, the end of time will come with fire, not water." Just 
as I said that, a transformer hit the train trestle, and fire was shooting out 
everywhere, and then the railroad trestle came down in the water. That just about 
scared Jeana to death. (Deitz and Mowery, 1992, p. 184, quoting Barbara Spears 
who lived through the Buffalo Creek dam failures .) 
The water over the crest was more than l 0 ft in depth, and was rising at 
the rate of 18 inches an hour. The fall of the water was about 40 ft, and the roaring 
and surging that it produced can be better imagined than described. It was grand 
and awe inspiring, and nothing in my opinion could in any measure compare with 
it, except the falls of Niagara. 
While thus gazing with awe on a sight such as l had never before 
witnessed, l noticed a sudden commotion of the waters near the center of the dam. 
For a moment the water where the commotion occurred seemed to recede, but it 
was only for a moment. It then shot upward in a tremendous spout to a height of 
perhaps 50 ft as if in gleeful fury, and l saw that the dam was giving way. The 
commotion spread toward the east end of the dam, and there was a trembling of 
the earth. The mighty waters roared and plunged with an indescribable fury, and 
the river, which a moment before had presented a scene of graceful grandeur as it 
curved over the dam, was turned into a seething maelstrom, so awful and so 
terrible that nothing save the pen of a Dante or a Byron could do it justice. 
l was appalled and entranced. My feelings were such as l had never before 
and never again hope to experience. Suddenly above the dismal roar of the 
surging raging waters there came a cry. 'The dam is breaking, the dam is 
breaking." The sound of the cry was as dismal as that of the maelstrom, and 
people shuddered and their blood seemed chilled, although the sun shone wannly 
from a cloudless sky. When the break occurred the distance from the crest of the 
wave as it rolled over the dam to the water below was about 40 ft in height and of 
great width and length suddenly released from confinement, and you will have a 
faint idea of the scene that l witnessed at the great dam across the Colorado River 
yesterday morning, a few minutes before II o'clock. It was a scene that beggars 
all description, and as the waters plunged and roared and seethed and foamed they 
seemed to laugh in utter scorn at the futile attempts of man to bridle them. 
(McLemore, 1900, p. 252, describing the failure of Austin Dam in Texas. Some 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Dam safety risk assessment depends on credible estimates of life loss for 
hypothetical failure events in order to quantify risk and make decisions about the 
construction, rehabilitation, or removal of dams. Unfortunately, improvement in life-loss 
estimation has been one of the most intransigent aspects of the field , causing some 
decision makers to seriously doubt the credibility of analysts ' estimates. To attempt a 
significant step forward in our ability to model life loss, this report intends to do the 
following: 
I . Introduce the topic of dam safety risk assessment and the central role that 
life-loss estimation plays in that field. 
2. Discuss important preliminary considerations in model development. 
3. Provide a detailed review of previous life-loss models that pertain to floods 
and thoroughly critique each. 
4. Explore the DeKay-McClelland model in detail. 
5. IdentifY, define, and label variables that impact life loss and develop means 
by which they might be used to characterize events. 
6. IdentifY numerous historic flood wave events and thoroughly characterize as 
many as time allows, focusing on dividing the impacted populations into subpopulations 
whenever possible, and justifying every characterization in print for the reference of 
future researchers. 
7. Provide a detailed outline of historical insights that arise during the 
characterization process. 
8. If possible, propose a new life-loss model, with guidance on its 
implementation, that significantly advances the state of the art. 
9. Provide a final summary and offer recommendations for future research. 
Background 
High hazard, low frequency events have the potential to cause considerable 
damage to property and loss of human life. Some events are outside human control, such 
as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, and precipitation-induced floods. Some events are 
a direct result of human or engineering failures , such as airplane crashes, toxic chemical 
spi lls, or accidents at nuclear reactors. Dam failures generally fall in between these 
extremes, sometimes resulting from faulty design under otherwise favorable 
environmental conditions and sometimes failing despite superior engineering after being 
overwhelmed by an extreme flood, earthquake, or latent geotechnical defect. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to so overdesign every dam that no dam will ever 
fail. Theoretically, there always remains the possibility that a dam might have received a 
hidden and critical flaw during construction, that there is a latent weakness in the soil or 
rock supporting the dam, that the dam will deteriorate with time, or that a loading greater 
than previously anticipated might occur. On a practical level, there are insufficient 
disposable resources to improve the safety of every dam without limit. 
When one considers that many small, isolated dams have little potential for 
causing damage while others tower above densely populated regions and could kill 
2 
thousands if failure occurred, it makes sense to design some dams for a higher level of 
safety than others. A reasonable criterion governing the design requirements for a dam is 
the risk it poses to lives, property, the environment, or other considerations. Focusing on 
the most important criterion-the risk to human lives-risk depends on the likelihood of 
dam failure and the likelihood that lives will be lost given a failure. Annualized risk to 
human lives can be defined as follows, where the summation is over all failure modes: 
risk= L(probabi lity of any possible failure circumstance)*(expected number of 
fatalities attributable to that failure circumstance) 
Society has a vested interest in protecting lives by requiring due diligence from 
dam safety officials and engineers. One can be diligent by following strict, deterministic 
rules embodied in an engineering code, or one can seek to better understand the true 
nature of risk by quantifying it probabilistically. Generally, deterministic approaches 
have governed in the past, while probabilistic risk assessment has gained increasing 
credence and popularity over the past two decades. 
At the risk of oversimplification, deterministic approaches seek to surpass 
minimum standards with limited regard to the precise reduction in risk accomplished, the 
quickest or most economical means of reducing risk, or the order in which dam safety 
rehabilitation projects should be approached within a portfolio of dams. Instead, a dam is 
designated as adequate or inadequate based on a set standard, such as its ability to retain 
or pass the probable maximum flood without failure. Standards may be raised or lowered 
based on a dam's hazard classification (its ability to kill people or damage property) , but 
this classification is not strictly probabilistic and is usually limited to three categories. 
4 
Probabilistic risk assessment seeks to meet or surpass minimum standards by 
explicitly quantifying the risk associated with the status quo and each proposed 
rehabilitation alternative (including darn removal). In this case, the standard might not be 
the retention of a particular flood, but the minimization of risk to life, property, the 
environment, or other considerations. Whether this standard results in more or less risk 
than a deterministic approach depends on the criteria set by decision-makers. Regardless, 
a probabilistic approach requires detailed consideration of every conceivable failure 
mode and consequence, forcing analysts to consider the unique aspects of each darn, 
some of which might otherwise be overlooked. It also requires risk to be specifically 
quantified. This allows decision-makers to compare the rate and degree of risk reduction 
between alternative rehabilitation sequences, to perform detailed cost-risk reduction 
analyses, to prioritize darns within a portfolio, and to allocate limited funds where they 
will do the most immediate good. 
In many cases it can be demonstrated that enslavement to a deterministic standard 
will cause less risk reduction, reduce risk more slowly, or squander valuable resources on 
minimal risk improvements when compared to alternative solutions discovered during the 
risk-assessment process. However, it is important to remember that probabilistic risk 
assessment is simply one of many nonbinding tools to guide the choices of decision-
makers: risk assessment itself does not force any particular decision and it can be used 
harmoniously as a complement to more traditional, deterministic methods of darn safety 
assessment. 
Overview of Risk Assessment and the Need for 
Improving Estimates of Life Loss 
Dam safety risk assessment is like a stool that stands on three legs. These legs 
quantify the likelihood that various initiating events (hydrologic, seismic, 
structural/internal, mechanical , or human error) will occur; the likelihood that the dam 
would fail given these initiating events; and the likelihood that, given a failure, the 
resulting flood wave would result in various levels of damage. Analysts use event-tree 
models with either discrete branches or probability distributions to quantify the risk posed 
by each combination. Adding a seat to the stool involves modifying these event trees to 
explore the risk-reduction provided by various remedial upgrades. 
Quantifying the risk in this way helps dam safety decision-makers identify the 
potential vulnerabilities of a given dam, understand which vulnerabilities are most 
important, and identify which dams in a portfolio are most urgently in need of attention. 
It also allows decision-makers to compare the cost-benefit relationships for each remedial 
possibility and to target limited funds in ways that maximize the risk-reduction benefits 
in the shortest period of time. 
The meaningful quantification of risk depends on credible estimates of the 
damages that would result from each significant failure scenario. Loss of human life is 
generally accepted as the most important consequence so it often dominates dam-safety 
decisions. Unfortunately, the confidence with which life loss can currently be estimated is 
low. This high level of uncertainty applies to both statistical confidence limits and to 
expert opinion. As such, this single limitation is a critical hindrance to the credibility and 
value of dam-safety risk assessment results. Indeed, some would like to push the stool 
over on its weak leg and abandon probabilistic risk assessment all together. 
The Problem and the Primary Goal 
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Life-loss estimation is difficult because floods are remarkably unique and the 
dynamics that affect life loss are amazing complex. Fortunately, relatively few dams have 
caused life loss and the amount of life loss has often been lower than people might 
intuitively expect. Unfortunately, this makes good historical data on life loss rare and 
empirical studies challenging. However, whether a model is based on an analytical 
description of human-flood interactions or whether it is based on a regression equation 
derived from historic dam failures, confidence in the model must depend on its 
correlation to actual life-loss/flood-wave dynamics. Empirical research cannot be 
avoided. 
It would belie the inherent uncertainty endemic to dam failure life-loss estimation 
if this current work sought to offer a final solution. Instead, it is hoped that by expanding 
the database of historic dam failures, by offering detailed critiques of existing life-loss 
models, and by exploring new variables, a new model might be developed that can be 
used with greater confidence than has been possible in the past. Also, since the quality of 
any model will be limited by the quality of empirical information, a central goal of this 
work is to provide an extensive database with sufficient documentation to serve as the 
starting point for future research. In light of the evolving nature of this specialized field , 
this may be the greatest contribution of this report. 
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Important Terms and Symbols 
Chapter V defines nearly l 00 different variables that affect life loss. For now, 
however, it is important to introduce a few key terms that will be used frequently in the 
text. Loss of life refers to the number of people who perish. It has frequently been 
shortened to LOL in the past, but it will generally be shortened to L in this text to be 
consistent with conventions introduced later. The population at risk is the number of 
people who would get wet from a flood if they did not evacuate. The exact nuances of the 
phrase are not important at this point, but it has historically been shortened to PAR and 
will be written as Par in this text. The threatened population is a subset of Par that fails to 
evacuate before the flood wave arrives. It will be shortened to Tpar. Warning time is the 
time between the first warning to reach Par and the subsequent arrival of the flood wave. 
It will be coded as Wt. When a symbol is followed by the subscript i, the symbol refers to 
a subPar, Par;. Many of the symbols in this text, including Par, Tpar, and Wt, will be used 
for both the singular and plural forms of the underlying names. 
Organization of the Paper 
Chapters I and II present the nature of dam safety risk assessment, the important 
role life-loss estimates play within that field, theoretical considerations relevant to model 
development, and the difficulty of selecting an unbiased data set for regression analyses. 
Chapter Ill presents every important, flood-related life-loss model that had been 
developed or proposed up to 1998. The chapter describes the contributions and 
shortcomings of each model in detail and concludes with a summary of essential model 
components and considerations for representing those components. 
Until recently, the DeKay-McClelland regression equation DM-2d was the 
dominant li fe-loss equation in use. However, it has often been used in a manner 
inconsistent with its development and in violation of the assumptions that must be 
satisfied for its estimates to be considered reliable. Hence, Chapter IV explores this 
equation at length, raising important questions about its credibility and its usefulness. 
Chapter V provides an extensive list of variables that pertain in some way to life 
loss associated with dam failures or catastrophic flood waves. Although many of these 
variables were identified in some form by previous researchers (see Table 8 in Chapter 
Ill), this is the first time that most of them have been given specific names, symbols, 
definitions, and categories by which they can be coded. Other variables, especially those 
that show the greatest promise for estimating life loss, have been defined for the first time 
and play a critical role in the proposed model presented below. All the variables are 
summarized in easy-to-use reference guides in Appendix D. 
Chapter VI provides the historical and theoretical foundations on which one or 
more new models can be developed. Table 16 details the ways in which people perish 
during floods and Table 17 details ways in which people survive floods . Table 18 then 
o ffers a way to break issues that affect the rate of life loss into l8logical categories. The 
remainder of the chapter catalogues numerous historical insights that are useful for 
gaining a good understanding of the real-world dynamics within each category. These 
insights are supported by event characterizations fully recorded in unpublished working 
documents that underlie the examples and summaries in Appendix B and the master chart 
of characterized values in Appendix C; as well as by other failure events that have been 
studied but not yet characterized. 
Chapter VII presents important goals for a life-loss model, and seeks to approach 
these goals by presenting a new conceptual model and its related concepts. The second 
half of the chapter explores Table C.l in Appendix C to identify any statistical trends 
among key characterizing variables that might be useful in refining life-loss estimates. 
Chapter VIII presents a summary of the report, conclusions, and 
recommendations for future research. 
Appendices A through D provide material related to over 900 pages of 
unpublished working documents developed while characterizing 38 flood events and 
nearly 200 subpopulations at risk . A template was developed to standardize these 
characterizations, and they followed the guidelines and definitions presented in Chapter 
V. 
Appendix E offers a summary of existing software that, given additional 
development, might prove useful to life-loss estimation in dam safety ri sk assessment. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRELIMINARY CON SID ERA TIONS 
IN MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Attendant Circumstances and the 
Uniqueness of Flood Events 
10 
All else being equal, life loss following a dam failure would be largely determined 
by evacuation characteristics and flood dynamics. However, there are a number factors 
which contribute to the uncertainty inherent in any life-loss outcome. Many of these are 
not amenable to analysis at this time, but an awareness of the issues helps one understand 
how complicated and unique flood events can become. 
First, two phrases should be defined. Attendant circumstances are detrimental and 
usually transitory conditions that accompany a specific type of dam failure and that make 
life loss more likely. Susceptibility to loss of life is an inherent property of a community 
that is independent of transitory influences. Just as insurance companies recognize that 
certain categories of drivers are more susceptible to accidents than others, some 
communities are more susceptible to fatalities. Attendant circumstances and susceptibility 
to life loss combine to influence life-loss outcomes. 
To get a feel for the uniqueness of each failure event, one can begin with the 
cause of failure . The nature of the attendant circumstances for the three main failure 
modes- hydrologic, seismic, and internal-are likely to be quite different. A probable 
maximum flood (PMF) can loosely be defined as a flood resulting from the most runoff-
producing combination of meteorologic and hydrologic events that are physically 
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credible; that is, the worst flooding that can be expected to occur. Storm conditions 
capable of causing a PMF-level flood event may include hurricane-force winds, certainly 
would include local flooding, and would likely provide inhospitable environmental 
conditions including extreme darkness and risks of hypothermia. The risk of injury due to 
driving accidents, falling trees and limbs, live power lines, and airborne debris would be 
heightened. Power outages would be extremely likely, especially where wires were above 
ground, and they could be expected on a wide scale, requiring hours or days to repair. 
Evacuation notification would be hampered and evacuation itself could expose people to 
extreme hazards like flooding, falling trees, undermined roads, and accidents while 
driving in darkness without street lights in driving rain. Such conditions might make 
decision-makers reluctant to issue an evacuation order prior to the initiation of an actual 
dam breach. A delay would reduce people 's danger if no failure occurred, while greatly 
increasing their danger if a failure did occur. 
A seismic failure would expose the Par to a different set of hazards. Streets might 
buckle, individuals could become trapped in rubble or buildings in the path of the flood, 
power lines and gas mains might break causing fires and blocking streets, bridges could 
collapse, escape routes might become blocked, traffic lights would probably fail , and 
emergency crews would be delayed or overtaxed. 
A piping or internal failure is unlikely to experience any unusual attendant 
circumstances. 
Compounding the attendant circumstances surrounding a particular failure mode 
are the attendant circumstances associated with the timing of the event. Traffic hazards 
and potentially lethal cold could accompany a failure in winter. Evacuations are more 
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difficult at night than during the day due to difficulties in notifying families, the extra 
time individuals require to respond, and the extra hazards that come with darkness. 
Human response patterns are likely to be different when families are together (evenings, 
weekends, and holidays) than when they are apart (work hours). 
A community's susceptibi lity to life loss is governed by such factors as the size of 
the dam , the distance from the dam, the nature of early warning systems, the slope of the 
valley, the width of the valley, the location of the houses, the tendency of the population 
to be in the open or within buildings, barriers to evacuation like backyard fences, the age 
and mobility of the population, the height of structures, and numerous other factors. 
Significantly, traditional variables like flood depth and forcefulness , the size of 
the Par, and the warning time do not take attendant circumstances into account. Attendant 
circumstances have been lumped indiscriminately into single data sets in earlier efforts to 
estimate life loss from dam failure floods. 
The preceding introduction to the uniqueness of flood events suggests several 
lines of preliminary inquiry. 
I. Cause of dam failure: Can all dam failures be grouped into a single statistical 
population, or should dam failures be analyzed according to failure mode, attendant 
circumstances, or other refining criteria? What if the resulting data sets would be too 
small to be statistically useful? Can flash floods be included with dam failures in a 
common data set? 
2. Magnitude of storm: In light of the unique attendant circumstances found in 
extreme storms, does the weather influence loss of life, or just the size of the flood? In 
other words, is the expected loss of life due to a probable maximum flood (PMF) 
comparable to the loss of life expected from a flood of the same volume produced by a 
lesser storm over a larger basin? How can one reasonably predict the life loss in a PMF-
level event if no such event has been witnessed in the modem era? 
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3. Magnitude of seismic event: Can one expect loss of life following a 
maximum credible earthquake (MCE) to be the same as from a flood of the same volume 
following a sunny-day failure? How can one predict L in a MCE-level event if no such 
dam failure has been witnessed in the modem era? 
4. Effects of attendant circumstances on traditional variables: 
a) Flood forcefulness : Does woody debris deposited from a storm increase 
the lethality of a flood? Does rubble from an earthquake? Is it reasonable to 
assume that the lethality of a given velocity/depth ratio is the same for piping, 
hydrologic, and seismic failures? 
b) Size or location of Par: Do routine schedules (population distributions) 
apply during severe storms or shortly after seismic events, or will schools, 
campgrounds, and businesses be closed and empty? Do people swarm outside 
following severe earthquakes, placing themselves in greater danger? 
c) Warning time: Under what conditions do phone systems become 
jammed or severed and how does this affect the dissemination of warnings? Is the 
average warning time the important variable, the initial warning time, or some 
other characterization of warning time? 
5. Characteristics of Par: What effect do buildings play in sheltering Par? How 
do children, the elderly, the infirmed, recreationists, or those who speak a minority 
language impact estimates of life loss? What about false alarms or prior flood 
experience? 
6. The nature of probability: Is an empirically-based prediction necessary, or 
can expert opinion offer estimates of life loss with equal credibility? How would one 
become an expert? 
Delimiting a Data Set: When Should Fatality-
Free Failures Be Included? 
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More than 400 dams fai led in the United States from late 1985 to late 1994--most 
of them small and many unregulated-and less than 2% of these resulted in fatalities 
(Graham, 1998). A small dam failure or a partial dam failure is easy to overlook; without 
something spectacular, little public interest is aroused. Consequently, smaller dam 
failures may get ignored when L = 0, even iflife loss was highly probable. Recognizing 
this, where is the cutoff for dams that should be included in a data set as hazardous, yet 
yielding L = 0 by chance, versus those that were never truly hazardous? In other words, 
which zero-life-loss events should one include? 
Two dangers exist. If only dams with actual life loss are included in a data set, 
then the resulting regression equation is likely to overestimate expected life loss, fmding 
it at every tum. !fall dam failures are included in a data set, the number of zero-fatality 
events are likely to dominate those with life loss and skew an equation toward 
underestimation for truly hazardous events. Unfortunately, the dividing line is subjective. 
This section and the next will present bias-producing shortcomings to the data set 
produced by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). The reason is simple: 
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Beginning in 1986 and culminating in 1989, they produced the most prominent data set 
of lethal dam failures and flash floods . This data set was explored by Brown and Graham 
( 1988) and later expanded by DeKay and McClelland (1991, 1993b)--<levelopers of 
prominent life-loss models and equations that are presented in Chapters III and IV. 
The USBR (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989) has concluded that its equations 
are biased to overestimate life loss since the underlying data set excludes nearly all zero-
fatality events. To test this, they screened an extensive database of flash floods occurring 
in May, June, July, or August of 1983 and 1984. Beginning with all floods that caused 
loss of life, or at least $50,000 in damages, they then discarded events with unreliable 
estimates for Par. Combining the 66 that remained, Par numbered 25,000 and L 
numbered 25. Using the regression equations developed by Brown and Graham (U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), and assuming the cases would by typified by inadequate 
warning, their regression procedure would have predicted a total of 1,559 deaths for these 
66 events. Moreover, 86% of the flash floods resulted in no life loss. The USBR 
concluded that their equations were conservative. 
While their method raises questions of its own, such as the appropriateness of 
mixing flash floods and dam failures and whether they treated Wt in a realistic manner, it 
does highlight the difficulty in selecting the ideal data set. Ultimately, all data sets are 
potentially biased, leading to regression equations that are likely to be most accurate 
when applied to events like those in the data set. Hence, a data set can favor high-lethality 
events, low lethality events, or any subset in between. The bias may not be the level of 
life loss, but another factor like the relative length of warning times, the relative size of 
Par, the ease with which people evacuate, the time of day or night, the size of the 
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reservoir, or any one of dozens of other variables. Unless all possible variable 
combinations are included in the data set in a representative manner, bias is unavoidable . 
Recognizing this, several observations can help define the type of data set that 
best serves the practitioner. First, overestimation of life loss is undesirable because it may 
cause dam owners to spend money on safety improvements rather than more worthy 
projects. Underestimation of life loss is undesirable because it might lead to unsafe dams 
going without rehabilitation, needlessly increasing society's risk. However, slight 
overestimation is probably the lesser of the two evi ls. 
There are several possible ways to minimize the risk of bias. First, rather than 
arbitrarily adding zero-life-loss events to a data set, one could compile a separate 
database of such events and compare them to events with only a few deaths. It is possible 
that distinguishing characteristics will appear that will clarifY the boundary. Second, if 
relationships can be developed for which L has a linear relationship with the most 
important variables, bias will be minimized. Third, large Par could be broken down into 
subPar. If some of these subPar are examples of zero life loss, they might help define the 
boundary between lethal and safe conditions because it is known that the same event with 
different conditions was capable of taking lives. Fourth, if subPar are highly 
homogeneous, they can be grouped according to bins. In this way, the key conditions that 
lead to incipient life loss can better be identified and used to screen new subPar or global 
events. 
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Going Beyond the Data Set: When Should a Regression 
Equation Be Viewed as Inapplicable? 
As pointed out by Graham (1998) and DeKay and McClelland (1993b), the 
Bureau of Reclamation 's data set includes no dam failures caused by earthquakes, nor 
any dams above very large Par (greater than 10,000) for which warning time was near 
zero. It contains no failures due to PMF-level flooding, terrorist attacks, or landslides into 
the reservoir. No large, modem, concrete dams and few concrete or tall dams are 
included in the failure set, with only 7 exceeding 15 meters in height. Since they code Wt 
dichotomously with the highest value at 45 minutes, longer warning times do not enter 
directly into their equations. The USSR's data set was also limited to failures occurring 
after 1950 in countries with comparable levels of development to those in the U.S. 1 
Hence, the largest U.S. dam disaster-the failure of South Fork Dam near Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania, in 1889, in which 2,209 people died-was omitted; as was the largest non-
Biblical flooding disaster in world history, when China's Banqiao and Shimantan Dams, 
along with dozens of smaller dams, failed in 1975, killing at least 26,000 people and 
possibly more than three times that many. As more variables are considered, more unique 
failure scenarios are found to be missing or underrepresented. 
More recent western failures were also omitted either due to lack of data or 
because they were viewed as uncharacteristically unique. A classic example of the latter 
reveals the potential for a catastrophic dam failure to virtually annihilate significant 
1 Examples for which development levels are important include communication systems, flood 
control systems, transportation systems, construction standards for buildings; and construction, 
maintenance, and monitoring standards for dams. The USBR data set was also limited to cases having 
sufficient infonnation for parameter quantification (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989). 
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populations downstream. Consider Vaiont Dam in northern Italy on October 9, 1963. 
Wayne Graham describes this event in a draft report: 
A 270 million cu. m. landslide fell within 20 to 30 seconds into the lake formed 
behind the dam. The dam, at the time the world's second highest, did not fail. 
However, the effect of this huge mass of material that ran into the lake, which was 
almost at the maximum water level, was a gigantic wave of 50,000,000 cu. m. of 
water that, after rising for 250 m in height, poured both towards Longarone, 4 km 
downstream from the dam, and towards the lake, partly running over the towns of 
Erto and Casso. About 2000 people died as a result of this event. The fatality rate 
was about 94% in the community ofLongarone (1269 out of 1348 residents; U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 1989] which was about 2.0 kilometers downstream from 
the dam. At Belluno, about 16 kilometers downstream from Longarone, there was 
damage to more than 150 houses, however, the river dikes in most places 
prevented spillage into built-up areas. (Graham, !998, p. 4-2) 
The 875-ft high concrete arch dam, then the highest arch dam in the world, was 
overtopped by more than 300 ft, and up to 230 ft of water filled Longarone. Most of the 
79 survivors lived in a cluster of houses out of reach of the flood waters (U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, !989). Downstream, there were reportedly few fatalities in Bell uno, despite 
substantial property damage. Apparently, once the flood wave attenuated to a point where 
it resembled more moderate dam failures, and given the additional warning time provided 
by extra distance, life loss more closely approximated that found in the USBR data set. 
Nevertheless, about 700 people perished in communities other than Longarone, both 
upstream and downstream from the dam, so the cataclysmic nature of the failure mode 
proved consistently lethal in ways that are beyond the scope of most modem dam 
failures. 
An example of a large concrete dam that failed in the U.S., and which was 
excluded from the USBR data set, is St. Francis Dam. It failed at midnight under normal 
weather conditions when California was much less populated than it is today. The 57.3-m 
high structure, impounding 4.69 million cubic meters of water, failed due to structural 
defects, killing about 420 people and claiming lives for an unusually extended distance 
downstream. Although it is common for deaths to be restricted to the first 24 krn 
(Graham, 1998), 84 out of 150 people located 27 km from the dam at the California 
Edison Construction Camp perished-a fatality rate of 56%. Closer to the dam, death 
rates in isolated Par; were I 00%. Warning and evacuation efforts did not begin until a 
few hours after the dam had failed (Graham, 1998). 
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Such case studies remind us that the USBR data set is limited, covering only a 
narrow selection of failure modes, magnitudes, and attendant circumstances. DeKay and 
McClelland ( 1993 b) specifically advised that their equation should not be used for events 
like Vaiont and St. Francis Dams. The point of this extended discussion is that, at present, 
the empirical data available are not sufficiently comprehensive to justify rigid 
enslavement to any regression equation or set of equations that might be developed. If 
reason suggests that a hypothetical event will be unlike those underlying an equation, 
analysts must reserve the right to adjust their estimates accordingly. Analysts should 
never forsake reason in slavish reliance on a readily available formula. 
CHAPTER III 
HISTORIC METHODS FOR ESTIMATING LOSS 
OF LIFE IN THE EVENT OF A DAM 
F AlLURE OR A FLASH FLOOD 
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Historic methods for estimating the expected loss of life in the event of a dam 
failure fall into two main categories- those that are empirically based and those that rely 
on parameters considered to be theoretically important, but for which insufficient data 
exist to calibrate them empirically. Several models in each category deserve review. The 
dominant empirical approaches have been developed for the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation, first by Brown and Graham (1988), then by DeKay and McClelland 
(1993b). Brown and Graham (1988) built on the conceptual model developed at Stanford 
University by McCann et al. (I 985) for the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). Quite recently, B.C. Hydro of Canada has rejected the empirical models and 
developed a new conceptual model (Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach, 1998). While having 
some theoretical appeal , and offering promise, at the time of this writing the parameters 
in this model had not been sufficiently calibrated to yield results worthy of high 
confidence. These models, as well as several others, are summarized below. 
Ayyaswamy and Others 1974 
The model 
Colleagues at UCLA prepared four reports for the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission to evaluate the probabilities and potential consequences to ground-based 
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Par1 of dam failures, airplane crashes, catastrophic toxic chemical spills, and 
meteorites striking nuclear reactors. The first report addressed dam failure, focusing 
exclusively on "complete and instantaneous dam failure, with total release of the 
impounded water .... Dam failure is equated with the probability of an intensity IX or X 
earthquake [on the Modified Mercalli earthquake intensity scale] in the dam area" 
(Ayyaswamy eta!., 1974, p. 3). Earthquakes were emphasized due to their relative 
frequency in California, the location of II dams chosen for model application. 
The approach had five main components: I) a computer model to estimate the 
probability of a magnitude IX or X earthquake, 2) a flood routing methodology yielding 
travel time and inundation zones, 3) the use of census data to quantify Par during the day 
and during the night, 4) a curve expressing the evacuation rate, and 5) a mortality 
relationship based on flood depths. 
Recognizing that the model was breaking new ground, the authors considered the 
estimated risk to be a first approximation. They recognized that their computer model 
relied on uncertain frequency relationships and soil conditions, and that other earthquake 
models existed and could later be developed. They also noted that only 2 out of 18 dams 
in a previous study had failed completely when subjected to earthquakes, so the theory 
that a IX or X magnitude earthquake would necessarily cause an uncontrolled release of 
water was not valid (Duke, 1960). 
Details of the model can be summarized as follows. Flood routing relies on 
Manning 's equation, 
1Like "deer," Par will be used in this paper for the singular form (population at ri sk) and the plural 
form (populations at risk). The same will hold true for derivatives of Par like subPar, Par;, Tpar; Ptpar;, and 
other var iables like Wt. 
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using the Normal Depth Method with Manning 's-n values ranging from 0.05 to 0.11. 
Analysts must account for changes in the flow regime at obstructions in the channel. 
Where an upstream failure overtops a second dam, the subsequent outflow is predicted 
using equations for rectangular, broad-crested weirs. 
Once the flood depths are known, the fatality rate is considered to be I 00% 
wherever flood depths reach I 0 ft and 0% elsewhere. Hence, Par reflects the number of 
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individuals who could be submerged to I 0 feet if they did not evacuate. Since this can be 
greater during the day in a setting where businesses occupy the floodplain near the river, 
L is calculated separately for day and night failures. At the time the model was proposed, 
Par was estimated using the 1970 census tracks from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
To obtain L, analysts incrementally reduce Par by the percentage of people able to 
evacuate over increments of flood-wave travel time. They first develop an evacuation rate 
histogram based largely on experience. Numerically integrating this, they produce a 
smooth evacuation curve. Time is measured from the moment of failure (the time of the 
earthquake) until the wave reaches the center of each reach. The loss function is appl ied 
to that fraction of Par that fa il s to evacuate. Reaches are delineated using uniform 
increments of distance from the dam. 
Contributions 
This model broke new ground by attempting life-loss modeling for the purpose of 
assessing dam safety. It recognized the unique danger posed by large-magnitude 
earthquakes and it identified the five major components of almost all consequence 
models: 
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I. The likelihood a failure will occur, based on the probability various loadings 
will occur and that the dam will fail under each of those loadings; 
2. Flood mapping to define the flood zone; 
3. The quantification of Par by relating census data to the flood zone; 
4. The reduction of Par through an evacuation function dependent, at least in 
part, on the amount of warning time; and 
5. The application of a loss function to those who remain in the flood zone 
when the flood arrives. 
Importantly, the model recognizes that not all individuals who get wet will lose 
their lives and that the size of Par changes with the time of day. 
Shortcomings 
In the II cases to which the model was applied by the authors, losses ranged from 
II ,000 to 260,000 deaths, exceeding the historical record for dam failures in the United 
States by several orders of magnitude. While the model lacked both calibration and 
refinement, the high estimates for L should not be discarded out of hand. It is safe to say 
that few if any historical dam failures involved instantaneous dam failure due to an 
extreme earthquake at a large reservoir above a densely populated area. On the other 
hand, since the estimates generally exceed the historical life loss from the world's worst 
dam failure events, the model may be overly conservative even for instantaneous dam 
failures. This was a general trend in the early days of dam safety loss estimation. 
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The second, third, and fourth components of the model, numbered above, need 
refinement. Their method of flood mapping was based on unrealistic assumptions. 
Manning ' s equation assumes a steady-state flow condition, which bypasses the effects of 
attenuation, turbulence, and momentum that dominate instantaneous flood waves. 
Modem methods of flood routing using a dynamic model like DAMBRK or FLDW A V 
should yield more realistic results. 
With respect to their loss function, empirical functions are more defensible than 
an arbitrary fatal/nonfatal division at a depth of 10ft. 
While evacuation curves could be customized, the authors presented only one set 
(see Ayyaswamy et al. , 1974, p. 36-37). These curves assume that 50% of the population 
can be evacuated in the first hour, 75% within two hours, and that complete evacuation 
requires more than 10 hours. While this may be realistic for heavily urbanized areas, it is 
counter-historical for smaller communities and is probably overly conservative for the 
riverside swath likely to see depths over I 0 ft. In any case, the curves do not appear to 
have been empirically based. Also, warning time is assumed to be identical to wave travel 
time in all cases, which appears to be unrealistic for an instantaneous, earthquake-induced 
dam failure . 
None of these shortcomings reflect poorly on the authors, however, since they 
encouraged refinement of these results through future research. In their words, "the 
conclusions should therefore be regarded as mainly illustrative and very tentative" 




Friedman (1975) developed a broad model that could be applied to virtually any 
natural hazard: he addressed earthquakes, hurricanes, tloods, tornadoes, wind, and hail. 
He calculated a loss potential index based on four factors: l) a natural hazard generator 
used to determine the frequency of earthquakes or storms by section of the United States; 
2) local conditions that modify the severity pattern proposed by the natural hazard 
generator; 3) Par, defined as the number of persons exposed to the hazard and their 
geographic distribution based on an 85,000 point grid system crisscrossing the U.S. and 
input into a computer database from 1970 census data; and 4) the vulnerability of the Par, 
which is its susceptibility to life loss during an event of a given severity. These four 
factors represent the five common components identified under Ayyaswamy' s model: 
determination of the probability of a failure , mapping the flood inundation area, 
quantification of Par; modification of Par or a loss function to account for temporal , 
spatial, or local conditions; and application of a loss function. 
Recognizing that losses in natural hazards are not random with respect to time and 
place among a population, Friedman asserted that losses must be estimated over an entire 
area, rather than independently at individual sites. The natural hazard generator produces 
smooth contours across the U.S., but these are made more jagged through adjustments for 
local conditions. In this sense, if a community occupied more than one contour, Par 
would be effectively divided into subPar. 
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Friedman' s four model components interact collectively to generate a Loss 
Potential Index. Several types of qualitative interaction are illustrated in Table 1. 
Friedman did not consider dam failures directly, but he applied his model to 
general flooding and to flash floods by developing a computer simulation model for the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This information was then 
used in the development of the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program. He did not use 
the national grid system in his model to calculate Par; instead, he used the 1970 Census to 
determine the number of structures in each of 5,539 cities. He then determined the 
percentage of these that were located in the flood plain from HUD data collected by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the U.S. Geological 
Survey. He divided each floodplain into six zones representing different levels of hazard 
based on the return period of floods of various depths. The number of dwellings were 
Table I. Examples of qualitative relationships among Friedman's model components 
(adapted from Friedman, 1975, Table l-1 , p. 4. An • indicates that the 
example originated with Duane McClelland, who tried to follow Friedman's 
general logic pattern) 
Natural Hazard Local Loss Potential 
Generator Conditions Par Vulnerability Index 
weak good sparse low very low 
weak good moderately dense moderate low* 
weak good dense high moderate• 
moderate good sparse moderate low* 
moderate medium moderately dense moderate moderate 
moderate poor dense moderate high 
moderate poor moderately dense high high 
moderate medium dense moderate high 
Severe medium moderately dense high high 
Severe poor dense high very high 
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converted to Par by assuming each dwelling housed an average of 3.0 people, based on 
summary tabulations of the 1970 Census data. 
The loss function was based on the estimated number of buildings expected to be 
damaged. Using the annual flood tabulations of the American Red Cross, he assumed one 
casualty would follow every 170 damaged dwellings, or every 85 dwellings in the case of 
flash floods. Empirical studies of selected cities indicated that cities of different size 
showed no variation in the distribution of dwellings across flood zones. Every city and 
every zone was assigned the same ratio of commercial to residential structures as a first 
approximation. 
Contributions 
The greatest strength of Friedman's model is that it recognizes that losses will 
vary across the floodplain, so every city is divided into six subPar based on depths. This 
helps customize the model to local conditions. Each subPar has a unique risk since the 
probability of inundation decreases as the annual excedance probability (AEP) of floods 
decreases. 
Shortcomings 
Unfortunately, whi le monetary damages increase with depth based on 
relationships provided by the Federal Insurance Administration, the L functions do not 
distinguish between major and minor damages. Thus, while the loss functions are 
presumably based on historical records, there is no way to account for the relative 
forcefulness of a flood or the height of the buildings. 
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Friedman accounts for spatial distributions but not for temporal distributions. 
That is, there is no evacuation function, so no distinction is made between events having 
long or short warning times. Perhaps this was omitted because warning time can be much 
more nebulous in cases of general flooding than for dam failures. 
Petak and Atkisson 1982 
The model 
The natural disaster model developed by Petak and Atkisson ( 1982) can be 
generalized into a three-step procedure: I) quantification of a hazard curve for a region 
(AEP vs. intensity of event), 2) quantification of a vulnerability envelope or vulnerability 
probability distribution (expected structural damages vs. intensity of event at the location 
of the structure), and 3) an exposure distribution (how many of each type of structure, 
parcels of property, people, etc., are exposed to each intensity level). These three 
components-hazard, vulnerability, and exposure-are then related sequentially in an 
event tree to generate values for annualized risk. Ideally, the three components are 
integrated and automated via a computer model. 
They treated structural damage as fundamental. "Typically, estimates of other 
types of losses such as death, building content loss, unemployment, and homelessness 
were related to the expected levels of damage to buildings" (Petak and Atkisson, 1982, p. 
105). 
Although dam failures were not considered in isolation, they addressed riverine 
flooding by dividing the floodplain into regions according to frequency of flooding, as 
shown in Table 2. They apportioned the floodplain based on the work of previous 
authors, including Friedman (1975). 
Contributions 
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The strengths of this approach are twofold. First, this was one of the first 
empirical approaches since this method used data from actual natural disasters to predict 
the loss of life as a function of the expected economic damages due to flooding (or any of 
7 other types of disasters).2 Second, it recognized the importance of subPar, thus allowing 
L to vary with flood depths by adopting different empirical damage functions for each 
flood zone. Grigg and Helweg (1975) first reported the damage functions , but Petak and 
Atkisson modified them slightly. 
Shortcomings 
Although the approach was empirical, the available data were limited and not 
c haracteristic of dam failures . Instead of using flood data, they assumed that deaths from 
hurricanes were evenly divided between storm surges (the rising of a large body of water 
due to low local pressures and strong winds) and direct wind impacts. Flood losses were 
then assumed to follow the same patterns as those for storm surges: 0.0956 deaths per 
m illion dollars of damage to buildings 
The drawbacks to this approach are obvious. First, storm surges are a rising of 
seawater that can last for hours, that is generally not instantaneous but progressive, and 
that will be as wide as the local coastline, rather than confined to a channel and its 
floodplain. In other words, it is very different from a dam fai lure. Second, arbitrarily 
2 Earthquake, tornado, hurricane, severe wind, storm surge, tsunam i, wind. 
Table 2. Distribution of subPar by flood return period for the model by Petak and 
Atkisson (Petak and Atkisson, 1982, p. 117) 
Return Period of Fraction of Dwellings 
Hazard Zone Flood (years) in Each Hazard Zone 
A 2-5 0.135 
B 5-10 0.150 
c 10-25 0.200 
D 25-50 0.245 
E 50-100 0.270 
F more than I 00 1.000 
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dividing deaths due to flooding and wind into a 50:50 ratio undermines the validity of an 
empirical function. Third , assuming a linear relationship between economic damages and 
fatalities ignores the importance of variables like warning time, evacuation pathways, the 
height of buildings, and other factors affecting mobility. Fourth, economic damages make 
a poor surrogate for Par: not only are the number of people in an area not necessarily 
proportional to the economic damages, but a Par consisting of backpackers, tent campers, 
fi shermen, or rafters would not be included at all, even though they might face the 
greatest threat from a dam failure. The authors themselves acknowledged many of these 
shortcomings. 
McCann and Others 1985: Stanford/FEMA Model 
The model 
McCann et al. ( 1985) recognized the importance of dividing a population at risk 
into subPar. Their overall procedure can be summarized using the sequence of steps in 
Figure I. 
Route the flood wave to determine its depths and boundaries. =- Plot these 
on a topographic map. =- Superimpose the location and characteristics of 
all structures onto the map.=- Divide the map into zones [subPar] 
according to distance from the dam and maximum depth of inundation. =-
Apply a loss function to each subPar. =- Sum to determine total loss of 
life. 
Figure I. Sequence of steps for the Stanford/FEMA Model (adapted from McCann et 
al., 1985, Figure 6.1, p. 6-2). 
This model allows the use of any modem flood routing method, but a single 
method should be used consistently on all dams in a portfolio if a portfolio risk 
assessment is desired. McCann et al. advocated the use of the National Weather Service 
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(NWS) software program DAMBRK for those familiar with it, as it represented the state 
of the art in dynamic flood wave modeling in 1985. More recent versions ofDAMBRK 
are sti ll widely used today. This program requires inputs describing the inflow 
hydrograph, the reservoir topography, the height of the darn, the depth of the reservoir 
pool , channel cross sections and related topography of inundated areas, and an estimate 
of Manning's n values. Proposed alternatives to DAMBRK were the Soil Conservation 
Service 's dam break flood routing procedure, a simplified NWS dam break program 
called SMPDBK, and a method by the USBR (see McCann et al. , 1985, p. 6-5 to 6-6). In 
each case, the assumptions chosen-for example, the rate of breach development needed 
for SMPDBK-are stated to be less important than their consistent application across 
dams in a portfolio. 
Analysts draw lines of consistent depth on a topographic map of the inundation 
area, then cross-hatch these lines at set distances from the dam-say every mile. Matched 
pairs of the resulting closed polygons (one on each side of the river) are combined to 
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form subPar, though they need not be matched in pairs if the zoning is dissimilar3 Zones 
should be selected or subdivided as necessary to represent contiguously simi lar land use 
(primarily residential or primarily business). Analysts fill these polygons with coded 
symbols to locate structures. Life loss (L) is estimated with equations SF- I a and SF-I b 
and then summing across all subPar. 
L, = ¢(d,)* r, * P, (SF-la) 
L, =¢(d,)*r, • p, * N, (SF-lb) 
where ~(d;) =fraction of people losing their lives as a function of depth, 
r; = fraction of people present when the flood wave arrives at Par;, 
P; =population or number of residents in a Par;, 
N; =number of people occupying a zone during business hours, and 
p; = percent of time a given zone is occupied. 
Notice that the equations are identical, except that the first applies to a residential 
area and the second applies to a more transitory business district (or to a recreational area 
using the same logic). The concept is a simple definition: loss of life equals the number 
of people being flooded at each depth (r*P or r*p*N) times the percent who should perish 
at that depth [~(d)]. 
The percent who perish is a function of depth, tabulated in Table 3. The flooded 
are those who remain on the floodplain when the flood wave arrives, an estimate based 
3 If this is difficult to picture, consider that a straight reach resembles the neck of a guitar. Since 
lines of equal depth will roughly parallel the stream channel, the strings represent depth and the frets mark 
the distance from the dam. Each resulting rectangle represents a subPar. 
Table 3. 
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Values proposed by McCann et al. for ¢(d) (McCann et al., 1985, Table 6.2, 
p. 6-9) 







> 12 0.85 
on daily occupational patterns, evacuation estimates, the quality/timeliness of the flood 
warning system, the distance downstream or flood travel time, and the type of land use 
patterns. Table 4 offers suggested values. Analysts can modifY the suggested values to 
reflect his or her perception of the local conditions. Values for P, N, and p must be 
estimated from local records, observations, and conversations with local officials. 
Contributions 
This model provides great flexibility in assigning values to parameters by 
allowing the analyst to consider local conditions and to consider factors not explicitly in 
the equation, such as evacuation effectiveness and the quality of a flood warning system. 
The model also recognizes the variation in hazard faced by people in different locations, 
and the importance of subdividing Par without having to track individuals. 
Shortcomings 
The great shortcoming of the model is that the value of every parameter depends 
on subjective estimates without empirical calibration. This is compounded by the fact that 
a different fatality rate must be specified for each uniquely defined set of subPar. 
34 
Table 4. Values proposed by McCann et al. for r (adapted from McCann et al. , 1985, 
Table 6.3, p. 6-9) 
No Warning System I Good Warning System 
Distance from the Dam (miles) 
<10 20 30 50 < 10 20 50 100 
Typical Rural Area 1.00 0.80 0.20 0.10 0.70 0.40 0.10 0.00 
Typical Residential 0.70 0.50 0.10 0.00 0.50 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Area 
Moreover, how does one adjust a scale up or down when it is unknown whether the 
original scale is high or low? 
The model ' s creators suggested additional shortcomings. They acknowledged that 
travel time is a more meaningful way of dividing Par than distance downstream, but they 
chose distance out of convenience. Also, they recognized that life loss cannot be related 
to flooding depth alone; flooding velocity is equally or more important. Velocity was 
ignored, however, to simplify the model. 
Significantly, like developers of the previous methods, the authors of the 
Stanford/FEMA approach considered their model too simplistic to allow analysts to 
predict loss of life with high confidence or accuracy. In fact, they offered it only as a 
simplified, preliminary tool for those who had not yet developed procedures of their own. 
Subsequently, this model was slightly refined by the Institute for Water Resources 
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as is described later in this chapter. 
Pate-Cornell and Tagaras 1986 
The model 
Pate-Cornell and Tagaras ( 1986) suggested a general method for predicting life 
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loss based on adjusting a base casualty rate according to the efficacy of a warning system. 
Once again, the five main elements of most models can be identified: determination of 
the probability of a failure , mapping the flood inundation area, identification of the Par, 
application of a loss function, and modification of Par, that function , or its prediction 
based on temporal , spatial, or local conditions. 
They proposed that analysts use the average historical rates of darn failures unless 
local conditions and expert judgment allow more refined estimates. They give no 
guidance on routing the dam break, but they assume it is possible to distinguish two 
zones: the wave path (zone 1) and the inundation area (zone 2) . These are not defined, but 
the distinction is important to their model since the loss function assumes a 50% casualty 
rate in zone 1 and no casualties in zone 2, making zone 1 the only region containing life 
loss or a population at risk, depending on your perspective. The loss function is pseudo-
empirical in the sense that it is an intuitive estimate based on a review of failures like the 
one at Malpasset.4 
They suggest that Par in zone 1 should be reduced according to the quality and 
timeliness of any early warning system. Again they give no guidance, leaving the 
reduction up to the judgment of the analyst. 
This model bears cons iderable similarity to that first developed by Ayyaswamy et 
al. ( 1974). Here, instead of assuming a 100% fatality rate at depths of I 0 ft and 0% 
elsewhere, the assumption is a death rate of 50% in the main path of the flood and 0% 
4 Malpasset had a fatal ity rate of 50% only if zone I is defined so as to force this resu lt ; taking Par 
more broadly, a Par of about 6,000 people was inundated. In any case, the loss function appears to have 
been derived as a first-cut, intuitive estimate, and rates much higher than 50% have been observed in other 
failures, such as the failures of Vaiont or Stava Dams in Italy. 
closer to the peripheries. Both models allow Par to be reduced through evacuation. 
However, rather than calculating separate losses for day and night, Pate-Cornell and 
Tagaras suggest averaging Par over the two time frames. 
Contributions 
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The model emphasizes the importance of an early warning system in facilitating a 
timely and effective evacuation effort and in reducing the risk associated wi th a dam. The 
thrust of their work was to increase the benefit-cost ratios in economic analyses to justify 
the construction of dams and to support darn safety remediation projects. 
Shortcomings 
Like Ayyaswarny ' s model, this model relies on intuitive estimates of life-loss 
rates without true empirical support. The authors were not, however, attempting to offer a 
refined model. Rather, they were demonstrating the importance of incorporating risk 
when calculating benefit-cost ratios, thus providing justification for future model 
development and the implementation of early-warning systems. 
Institute for Water Resources ' Revision of the 
Stanford/FEMA Model 1986 
On pages 23-28, Lee at al. ( 1986) summarize and illustrate changes made to the 
Stanford/FEMA model by the Institute for Water Resources (!WR) within the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers. In brief, IWR replaced river miles as a surrogate for warning time 
with warning time itself. 
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Lee et al. (1986, p. 23) refer to the source as the !WR wi th the reference, 
"Institute for Water Resources (l986a)," under the apparently truncated title " Interim 
Procedures," but their draft report does not include a bibliography so no additional 
reference information is provided. According to personal conversations with Dr. David 
Moser ( 1998) at IWR, any changes made to the Stanford/FEMA model were made by 
Lee et al. (1986), and are contained in their report. The Australian National Committee 
on Large Dams ( 1994) supports this assertion when they mention 1986 risk assessment 
procedures under development at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that fell short of 
providing a life-loss estimate. 
Regardless of the source or nature of these historic model modifications, current 
practice within the Corps of Engineers is to estimate Par, but to stop short of making 
specific loss of life estimates5 While loss of life is referred to in Corps policy documents, 
it is completely omitted in practice. 
Brown and Graham: United States Bureau of Reclamation 
(Brown and Graham 1988· U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation 1986 1989) 
The model 
An official presentation of the methods developed within the USBR was 
5 The current Corps practice of omitting loss of life calculations was explained at a meeting in Los 
Ange les on August 14, 1998. The purpose of the conference was the second-stage of a demonstration risk 
assessment involving members ofrhe Los Angeles District , IWR, observers from other Corps offices 
around the country, and personnel from Corps headquarters in Washington D.C. 
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published as a technical memorandum in 1986.6 Subsequently, Brown and Graham 
published "Assessing the Threat to Life from Dam Failure" in 1988 and the method was 
formally repeated in 1989 with the publication of the 1989 interim guidelines, "Policy 
and Procedures for Dam Safety Modification Decisionmaking" [sic]. Reclamation 
intentionally "tried to build upon the Stanford/FEMA model ... by considering 
additional factors, and by developing an empirical basis for model coefficients" (Brown 
and Graham, 1988, p. 6). 
The method presents a five-step procedure: I) develop inundation maps for each 
combination of loading and dam-safety alternatives to quantify Par, 2) estimate 
corresponding warning times, 3) apply life-loss equations to generate baseline projections 
of life loss for each failure scenario, 4) adjust these baseline estimates using site-specific 
characteristics, and 5) compare each scenario 's life-loss estimate to that for the "no 
action" alternative to produce an incremental life-loss projection. 
In 1989, the incremental comparison was changed from "fix vs. no fix" to "failure 
vs. no dam" to reflect the difference between losses given a dam failure and those that 
would result were the dam not present at all. To minimize the number of separate failure 
analyses that are required, it is recommended that loading conditions and dam-safety 
alternatives should be grouped together or combined into a single increment whenever 
their disparate consequences are expected to show little difference. 
Several things suggest the importance of using local experts to help in the 
analyses: 
6 Lee eta!. ( 1986) apparently found the same information in a 1985 USBR report. but their 
bibliography was never included in their draft document so no further reference information was provided . 
1. Accurate estimation of Par in step 1 requires knowledge of dynamic 
recreational activities below the dam, fluctuations in Par with time, and other variations 
not necessarily captured in census data. 
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2. Estimates of warning time require not only knowledge of wave trave l time 
but also the routines of the dam keepers, the nature of the early warning system. possible 
pitfalls in the emergency action plan, and the accessibility of subPar for warning 
notification. 
3. Adjustments to the baseline life-loss estimates require subjective judgements 
based on loca l conditions. 
The life-loss equations rely on two independent variables: Par and warning time. 
Par should be subdivided into subPar whenever warning time is expected to vary 
significantly with distance. In this way, the river is divided into reaches of varying length 
based on judgments about the distribution of Par. For example, a fi sh hatchery at mile I, 
followed by a YMCA camp at mile 3, a popular fishing reach along miles 7-10, and a 
town at miles 20 through 21 would suggest four subPar, each with its own warning time. 
To account for seasonal or diurnal fluctuations in these subPar, each important 
time frame is assigned an average sub Pari value and associated with a P, value 
representing the probability that the failure mode will occur during the designated 
category of time. Notice that the P, value is not merely the proportion of the year 
represented by a time category, but represents the likelihood that the failure will occur 
during that time category. For example, if hydrologic failures are more likely during a 3-
month summer thunderstorm season, those 3 months will be assigned a P, value greater 
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than 0.25. The weighted Paru are then the product ofP1/Paru, where subscript i indicates 
the subPar in question and j identifies the time category in view. 
Warning time is the next important variable to quantify. Schematically, the 
conceptualization of the inputs to life loss can be presented in a flow chart like Figure 2. 
The calculation of warning time involves estimating the flood wave travel time to the 
midpoint of each Par; and adjusting that value upward or downward based on estimates of 
whether the breach is anticipated or detected after its development, and the time it takes 
to warn the Par; after detection. Together, this entails those parts of Figure 2 that lead up 
to "warning time for Par." 
In determining warning time, it is important to consider the processes of 
detection, notification of the proper authorities, decision-making, mobilization, and 
dissemination of a public warning on an event-specific basis. Is there a chain of 
command? Can each link be reached at a moments notice at all times? Does the darn 
owner have authority/responsibility to notify the public directly, or must that decision be 
passed on to local authorities? Is the failure mode under consideration likely to become 
evident hours or days prior to actual breach development? Will communication systems 
remain functional? Are means available to warn fishermen, campers, isolated residents, 
or other members of the Par cut off from mainstream communication channels? 
To calculate the baseline loss of life, each weighted Ptj*Par;i is entered into one of 
three empirical functions, and then all Lu are summed together. Equation BG-1 a is for 
warning times less than 1.5 hr and equation BG-1 b is for warning times greater than 1.5 
hr. Equation BG-1 c was not originally part of the model, but it was added in 1989 for 
cases with warning times less than 15 minutes and depths greater than 3ft. It makes no 
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Figure 2. Flow chart of variables affecting loss of life (reformatted from U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation, 1989, Figure l , p. lll-28). 
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difference whether the P,i values are applied to the subPar directly or to the unadjusted Lu 
results, so the functions are presented here without the P1 factors as Brown and Graham 
present them (Brown and Graham, 1988; U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989): 
Warning < 1.5 hours: LOL, = PAR;06 (BG-1a) 
Warning<: 1.5 hours : LOL, = 0.0002 *PAR; (BG-1b) 
Warning <15 minutes (depth > 3 ft): LOL; = 0.5 *PAR, (BG-1c) 
These relationships were developed by analyzing 23 cases of dam failure or flash 
flood that occurred since 1950 in North America or Europe and that were judged to be 
large-scale events for which relatively complete documentation was available. The 
specific events are li sted in Table 5. DeKay and McClelland (1993b) added Allegheny 
Table 5. The data set used by DeKay and McClelland in 1993, estimations using equations DM-2d, DM-3b, and DM-4 and the 
root mean square errors of each (includes material from DeKay and McClelland, 1993b, Table I, p. 197) 
Hours Predicted Loss of Average 
Warning Hours Life Eq. DM-4 Prediction 
(Wt) Warn ing Actual Predicted Predicted (Variables Used Eq. DM-2d 
Brown& (Wt) Flooding Loss of Loss of life Loss of life By Brown& and 
Locations Par Graham Continuous Force Life Eq. DM-2d Eq. DM-3b Graham) Eq . DM-3b 
I Allegheny County, PA, 1986 2,200 ---- 0 0 9 6 II 109 8 
2 Austin, TX, 1981 1,180 ---- I I 13 9 7 12 8 
3 Baldwin Hills Dam, CA, 19b3 16,500 1.5 1.5 I 5 9 6 20 8 
4 Bear Wallow Dam, NC, 1976 8 0 .0 0 I 4 5 II 5 8 
5 Big Thompson, CO, 1976 2,500 < 1.0 0.5 I 144 59 61 47 60 
6 Black Hills, SO, 1972 (Canyon Lake Dam) 17,000 < 1.0 0.5 I 245 174 184 129 179 
7 Bu alo reck Coal Waste Dam, WV, 1972 5,000 < 1.0 0.5 I 125 87 91 67 89 
8 Bushy Hill Pond Dam, CT, 1982 400 2-3 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Centralia, WA, 1991 150 ---- 0 0 0 I 2 26 I 
10 D.M.A.D. Dam, UT, 1983 500 1-12 6.5 0 I 0 0 0 0 
II Denver, CO, 1965 (South Platte River) 10,000 2 .33-4 3.17 0 I I I 0 I 
12 Kansas City, MO. 1977 2,380 <1.0 0.5 I 20 57 59 45 58 
13 Kansas River, KS , 1951 58,000 >2.0 3 I II 0 0 2 0 
14 Kelley Sames Dam, GA, 1977 250 <0.5 0.25 I 39 31 37 22 34 
15 Laurel Run Dam, PA, 1977 150 0.0 0 I 40 40 63 26 52 
16 Lawn Lake Dam, CO, 1982 5,000 0.0-1.0 0.75 0 3 5 9 43 7 
17 lee lake Dam, MA, 1968 80 0.0 0 I 2 26 44 19 35 
18 Little Deer CreeK Dam, UT, 1963 50 0.0 0 0 I I I 14 I 
19 Malpasset Dam, France, 1959 6,000 0.0 0 I 421 406 527 185 467 
20 Mohegan Park Dam, CT, 1963 1,000 0.0 0 0 6 4 7 72 5 
21 Northern NJ , 1984 25,000 >2 3 0 2 2 3 I 2 
22 Prospect Dam, CO, 1980 100 >5 7.5 0 0 0 0 0 
23 Shadyside, OH, 1990 884 --·· 0 I 24 127 176 67 152 
24 Stava dams, Italy, 1985 300 0.0 0 I 270 64 95 38 79 
25 Swift and (Lower} Two Medicine Dams, MT, 1964 250 <1.5 0.75 I 28 8 7 8 7 
26 Teton Dam, ID, 1976 (Dam through Wilford) 2,000 <1.5 0.75 I 7 25 23 26 24 
27 Teton Dam, ID, 1976 (Rexburg to American Falls) 23 ,000 >1.5 2.25 0 4 4 5 6 5 
28 Texas Hill Country, 1978 2,070 <1.5 0.75 I 25 25 24 27 24 
29 Vega De Tera Dam, Spain, 1959 500 0.0 0 I 150 89 127 50 108 
Root Mean Square Error 50 53 76 50 
a Not used in equation derivations (omitted as outliers) 
County, Pennsylvania; Austin, Texas; Shadyside, Ohio; Stava, Italy; and Centralia, 
Washington.' Brown and Graham divided the Teton failure into an upper and lower 
subPar. They considered the upper Teton subPar and Lawn Lake to be outliers and 
omitted them from their data set. 
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The authors treated warning time dichotomously and then trichotomously because 
they did not believe that warning time could be estimated with sufficient accuracy to 
justifY a continuous treatment. In both the dichotomous and trichotomous approaches, the 
cutoffs in warning time were not based on rigorous statistical analyses, but rather on what 
appeared to be reasonable divisions of the data set. 
According to Brown and Graham, equation BG-la has an R2 value of0.6, 
indicating that as warning time decreases, other factors besides the size of Par and length 
of warning time influence life loss. For greater warning times, equation BG-1 b has a 
reported R2 value of0.87, indicating a decreasing influence by other factors. The 
exponential nature of the first curve suggests that there are aspects of larger population 
centers (advantages in terms of warning dissemination and public safety resources, for 
example) that decrease the proportion oflives lost when warning time is less than 1.5 hr. 
Beyond 1.5 hr and when warning times are less than 15 minutes, these advantages 
disappear because evacuation either nears completion or has insufficient time to progress. 
The baseline estimates of L are meant only to represent a first cut. Central to the 
USBR method is the subjective adjustment of these values for each Paru based on the 
remaining elements in the flow chart of Figure 2. A summary of each variable subsequent 
to warning time follows. The reader is referred to the source documents for more details. 
7 Teton Dam failure was divided into 2 subPar. 
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I . Warning characteristics: Warning time is defined globally as the elapsed time 
between initiation of a public warning within Par; and the onset of flooding at that Par;,. 
Warning characteristics go further to describe the rate, extent, and believability/urgency 
of the warning dissemination. 
2. Par characteristics include descriptors such as age, mobility, prior awareness, 
experience, knowledge of how to respond, information networks, degree of family 
di spersion, attitudes, and prior false alarms or misinformation. 
3. Environmental conditions are local conditions such as heavy rain, darkness, 
earthquake damage or the like. 
4. Par decision to evacuate refers to the public response . 
5. Ease of evacuation is the combined effect of environmental conditions, 
distance to safety, availability of transportation, and the likelihood that bridges or 
bottlenecks will become impassable. 
6. Number of Par evacuated are those who escape prior to the arrival of the 
flood. 
7. Convergence is the movement of people into the flood zone, including safety 
officials, curiosity seekers, and those who return to help others or retrieve belongings. 
Convergence-related deaths are usually few in number, but are not uncommon. 
8. Par after evacuation quantifies the number present when the floodwaters 
arrive, either due to convergence or to evacuation shortcomings. 
9. Flood lethality is the potential of a flood to cause deaths, based on its depth, 
velocity, temperature, and debris load. 
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Adjustments to the baseline loss of life figures based on these additional 
considerations are left to the judgment of the analyst. However, the analyst should "lower 
the fatality estimates substantially if the floodwaters will be less than two feet deep and 
moving at less than three feet per second" (Brown and Graham, 1988, p. 15). At the other 
extreme, estimates should be raised to as high as a 90% fatality rate if warning time is 
near zero (less than 5 minutes) and the flood wave will destroy virtually every structure 
in the flood plain. 
In all cases, the results are presented as a range of likely outcomes. When no 
dominant variable suggests the direction in which a baseline estimate should be adjusted, 
the baseline estimate is taken as the expected value, and a high and low estimate are 
predicted based on the 95% confidence interval for each equation. For equation BG- I a, 
the confidence limits are found by changing the exponent to 0.5 and 0. 7. For equation 
BG- I b, the coefficient is changed to 0.00014 and 0.00022. Brown and Graham do not 
suggest confidence limits for equation BG-1c (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989). 
When one or more critical variables can be identified and significant uncertainty 
surrounds the variable(s), high and low estimates are derived based on selecting high and 
low estimates of each variable and performing a sensitivity analysis. When estimates of L 
appear to be extremely high or low, a most likely estimate can be displayed along with 
historic minimums and maximums from the data set for those cases which most closely 
resemble the one in question. 
Contributions 
There are many strengths to the USBR method. To begin with, it attempts an 
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empirical cali bration based on historic failure events. In this process, there is recognition 
that the historic cases are heavily influenced by factors beyond warning time and Par 
alone, creating a large variance about the expected values generated by the regression 
functions. Rather than claiming more confidence in the baseline estimates than is 
warranted, the method seeks to make reasonable adjustments to these estimates based on 
a case-specific consideration of other variables. Even then, the results are displayed as 
ranges or envelopes, rather than a single value, thus reducing any bias introduced by 
individual analysts. Perhaps the greatest strengths are the identification of pertinent 
factors that had previously been overlooked and the accrual of a data set upon which 
future work could be built. 
Shortcomings 
There are at least six shortcomings to the USBR method. First, although 
recognizing that warning time is critically important, the trichotomous treatment severely 
limits the precision with which loss of life can be explored. 
Second, the regression equations themselves lack sophistication. For example, it 
would be desirable to refine equation BG-1 a by including a multiplicative coefficient, 
and equation BG-lc appears to be an "eyeball" estimate based on very few data points 
with no formal statistical analysis. The use of round numbers for both coefficients and 
exponents makes it clear the estimates are not intended to be precise, although this is not 
unreasonable given the large variance in life loss, and given that the equations are 
intended only to yield a first-cut estimate. 
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Third, there is some question as to the basis for the reported R2 value for equation 
BG-1 a. A visual perusal of the graphs in the source documents might leave some readers 
feeling uneasy. Feeling uneasy themselves, another group within the USBR attempted to 
d~plicate the results to test the accuracy of the R 2 value. According to the internal 
memorandum, using the same data and excluding the same outliers, they generated the 
following refined equation with an R2 value of only 0.47 (Hyatt, 1985): 
LOL = 0.51* PAR062 (BG-2) 
They suggested that perhaps the reported value was an R value instead ofR2, or was 
based on a transformed variable, rather than L itself. In any case, even the reported R2 
value of 0.6 presents an incentive to this researcher to develop a more refined function. 
Fourth, while the equations are meant to be applied on a subPar basis, the only 
historic case that was subdivided was the Teton Dam failure, and then one of the two 
subPar was omitted as an outlier. This raises questions regarding whether the sum of the 
parts of an analysis is the same as a single application to the whole. In the case of 
equation BG-1 a, this is clearly not the case, since the life-loss relationship to Par is not 
linear. 
Fifth, the data set, while an excellent beginning, is noticeably small-especiall y 
after it is subdivided to form two or three distinct data sets for two or three different 
equations. As this set is appropriately expanded, it should generate more confidence in 
any resulting regression equations. Significantly, the USBR practice was to use the 
subsequent relationship developed by DeKay and McClelland (1991, 1993b) until 
recently, when another approach was developed by Graham ( 1999). Supported by USBR 
48 
funding, DeKay and McClelland (1991, 1993b) advanced Reclamation's work by 
expanding the data set and applying a more rigorous approach to regression analysis. 
Graham himself recommends the use of the DeKay-McClelland equation over the ones 
he helped develop, although he also recommends going beyond Dekay-McClelland and is 
actively developing new procedures (Graham, 1998, 1999). 
Sixth, the use of weighted Par;i should only be adopted if estimated life loss is 
linearly related to Par, which, for equation BG-1 a, it is not. 
A final comment bears mentioning that applies to any approach that seeks a mean 
estimate of annualized life loss rather than a probability distribution of life loss: The 
model yields only a point estimate of an average value that is itself uncertain and subject 
to confidence limits. Also, if estimated life loss (lives) is needed, as is the case if societal 
risk is to be characterized using charts that relate the frequency of events to the number of 
lives lost (F-N curves), then weighted Paru should not be used. 
The models 
Lee and Others for the Institute of Water Resources 
U.S. Army Corns of Engineers 1986 
Lee et al. (1986) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of 
Energy, prepared three methods for predicting loss of life from floods. Their focus 
included flash floods and dam failures, but was not limited to catastrophic events. The 
authors compiled additional information shedding light on the mechanisms resulting in 
life loss. For example, summarizing a variety of studies, they suggested the following 
circumstances for life loss: 
I. being trapped in a structure by rising water 
2. being swept out of a structure 
3. being in a structure that fails 
4. attempting to cross flood waters 
5. being caught in flood water while in the floodplain 
6. attempting to rescue others in flood waters 
7. attempting to drive across a flood-way 
8. attempting to boat or raft on flood waters. (Lee et al. , 1986, p. II , 
capitalization omitted) 
To these were added four reasons people drown: the flood stage is life-threatening, 
people receive inadequate warning time, they respond too slowly, or they do the wrong 
th ing. 
In addition to their three models, Lee et al. also extended the USBR model , 
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though their extension does not appear to have been adopted (or even recognized) within 
the USBR. Reintroducing the outliers Brown and Graham (U.S . Bureau of Reclamation, 
1986) excluded from their data set (Lawn Lake and Upper Teton), they estimated the 
case-study warning times to the nearest 15 minutes instead of dichotomously. Where 
insufficient data existed to estimate these directly, they set " less than 1.0 hour" to 45 
minutes and "more than 1.5 hours" to 75 minutes. The reason for reducing the values 
greater than 90 minutes to 75 minutes is not explained. Formulating a new approach to 
regression, they generated the following equation: 
log(L) = 0.671og(Par)- 0.014(Wt) (L-la) 
which reduces to 
L = e 067 1og( /'ur )-00 14 ( Wl) (L-Ib) 
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where L = li fe loss 
Par = population at risk, and 
Wt = warning time (Lee et al. (1986) used P and W in place of Par and Wt). 
This equation has an adjusted R2 value of 0.89, which is significant at less than the 
0.0001 level. 
For their own regression equation, Lee et al. assembled a new data set consisting 
of 4 7 floods , most of which resulted in loss of life, and all of which occurred in the 
United States between 1963 and 1985. When consistent with these selection criteria, 
cases from the USSR data set were included. Their approach was to compile a list of 
factors that might affect either the size of the threatened population (those remaining in 
the flood zone when the flood arrives) or the lethality of the flood; record these along 
with data on life loss and Par for the aforementioned floods; identify general trends, 
outliers, and lack of data within the data set; formulate alternative life-loss equations and 
calibrate them to the data; analyze each equation statistically to select the best one; and 
compare the results with those for the Brown and Graham (U.S . Bureau of Reclamation, 
1986) equations and the IWR adaptation of the Stanford/FEMA model (Lee et al., 1986). 
The form of the equations was limited in each case to 
(L-2) 
where the subscripts refer to reach i and flood zone j after the two-part division of 
subPar in the Stanford/FEMA model; 
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L = loss of life, 
P = population at risk, 
p = the probability of life loss of an individual in reach i and flood zone j, which 
is a function of vectors ~and y, 
~ = a vector of variables affecting the ratio of deaths to the threatened population 
(indicated with a bold x in Lee et al., 1986), and 
y = a vector of variables affecting the size of the threatened population relative to 
P (indicated with a bold yin Lee et al., 1986). 
This equation is an adaptation of the Stanford/FEMA equation 
L, = ¢(d,) • r; • P, or ;, =¢(d,)*r, (SF-I a) 
in which the variables ~(d;)*r; are replaced by an individual probability of survival, p, and 
subdivision by both reach (i) and zone (j) are made explicit. 
The variables considered for vector x were: 
I. number of residences damaged and the extent of economic damages 
2. depth of the flood (data available for only about half of cases) 
3. velocity of the flood wave (data generally unavailable) 
4. discharge (cfs; data available for about half of cases) 
5. breach of dam (I =breach, 0 =no breach) 
6. topography of the inundation area (I =wider floodplain, 0 =narrow canyon) 
7. special characteristics of the Par, such as very young or old 
8. unique facilities: hospitals, retirement homes, schools, recreation areas, etc. 
9. type of structures (data unavailable, not used) 
I 0. number of roads and bridges crossing the river in the inundated area (data 
unavailable, not used) 
The variables considered for vector y were: 
I. warning time 
2. experience or knowledge of flooding in the local area within 10 years (I = 
yes, 0 = no) 
3. existence of hospitals, retirement homes, schools, recreation areas or other 
unique facilit ies (each dichotomous, I = existence of such a facility , 0 =not present) 
4. day or night (I = day, 0 =night) 
5. time of day 
6. proportion of elderly and young (data unavailable, not used) 
7. effectiveness of the evacuation plan and system (coded after Sorensen and 
Neal in Lee et al. ( 1986) as needs improvement, fair, or good) 
8. evacuation traffic (data unavailable, not used) 
9. size of population 
I 0. urban vs. rural situations 
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After preliminary analyses, onl y six variables were found to be statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level when regressed individually against Land in stepwise 
refinements: L, Par, warning time; and dummy variables indicating previous experience 
with flooding within the last I 0 years, whether or not the area was urbanized, and the 
depth of flooding at peak stage. Lee et al. suggested several reasons why the others were 
not found significant: the sample was small; the variables affected L, but not sufficiently 
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to be significant when dummy coded and used apart from the more dominant variables; 
multicolinearity may have hidden their affect when used in stepwise regression analysis 
with the dominant variables; and a variable sometimes had a significant impact on one 
case, but not on the cases as a whole. 
Using these six remaining variables and experimenting with many different 
approaches, Lee et al. developed two regression equations, each based on a logistic (also 
called logit) equation. 
In general, the logit relationship can be expressed as follows : 
exp(/3) 
p = 
I + exp(/3) I + exp(- fJ) 
where ln( ___f!_J = p 
l-p 
(L-3a and L-3b) 
where p = a fraction between 0 and 1.0 (notice the use of lower case p here to 
distinguish it from P =Par used by Lee et al.), and 
fJ = a function of zero or more variables, their transformations and their 
coefficients, including a possible constant. This is sometimes designated 
by /]' x . In the text, the function's constant will be represented by Po. the 
subsequent coefficients sequentially by Pi. and the entire function will be 
indicated by p in bold type. 
Equations L-3a and L-3b are equivalent following manipulation; the left side of 
equation L-3b is called the logit transformation, while the middle and right side of 
equation L-3a are equivalent expressions for the inverse transformation, yielding the 
value of the proportion p directly . 
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The logit transformation is used most often when p represents the probability that 
an individual outcome will be a "success" during independent trials of a binomial 
experiment (Agresti, 1996). In the treatment by Lee et al., p was defined as LIP, 
representing the probability that an individual at risk dies given the conditions defined by 
the function ~- Put another way, LIP is the proportion of lives that would be lost in a 
given flood if each life were an independent Bernoulli trial. 
The two equations making the final cut are quite similar, except that the first 
omits urbanization as a dummy-coded variable and the second omits depth. The reason 
depth was not included in the second regression is that only 22 out of 4 7 cases in the data 
set provided sufficient information upon which a regression could be performed. 
Equation L-4 proved to be the equation Lee et al. recommended for use out of the two, in 
part because of the intuitive value of including a description of the flood, and in part 
because it slightly outperformed equation L-5 when applied to the data set in a semi-
Bayesian manner (see below). Notice that these two equations fulfill the requirements of 
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loss of life 
Par 
warning time in minutes (Lee et al. used W) 
experience with floods in the last I 0 years (I = yes; 0 = no) 
depth of flooding at peak stage (feet above flood stage) 
denotes an urbanized area (I = urban area with pop. 2: I 0,000; 0 = 
otherwise) 
As with any treatment of historical data, the model-developers were forced to 
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quantifY many variables using "a considerable degree of subjective judgement" (Lee et 
al. , 1986, p. 51). Like the regression by Brown and Graham, only the Teton Dam failure 
was divided into subPar, although it was intended that subPar be used in application. The 
model coefficients were determined using maximum likelihood methods. The 
corresponding !-statistics and levels of significance for each coefficient are presented in 
Table 6. 
The implications of using a logit transformation will be explored in detail in 
Chapter IV when critiquing the approach developed by DeKay and McClelland ( 1991 , 
1993 b). A few observations will be sufficient at this point. 
First, the logit transformation has the reasonable characteristic of restricting the 
proportion of life loss to values between 0.0 and 1.0. In contrast, using L or LIP directly 
in a regular least-squares regression without the transformation of LIP or p would permit 
values of life loss to exceed the Par or drop below zero in extreme cases. 
Second, Lee et al. treated the ind ividual as the fundamental dependent variable, 
effectively increasing the number of observations from 47 floods to 459,234 members of 
Table 6. 
Variable 
Regression !-statistics and levels of significance for the coefficients in 
equations L-4 and L-5 (Lee et al. , 1986, p. 58-60) 
Equation L-4 Equation L-5 
Coefficients in Level of Level of 
Sequence !-Statistic Significance !-Statistic Significance 
Po -31.5 0.0000 -1.8 0.0624 
PI 20.7 0.0000 15.3 0.0000 
P2 -6.6 0.0000 -8.3 0.0000 
Pl -7.4 0.0000 -10.6 0.0000 
P4 9.9 0.0000 3.2 0.0014 
Ps 2.6 0.0099 -1.86 0.0624 
Par. This has two dangers that were pointed out by DeKay and McClelland (1 991). By 
increasing the sample size in this manner, it increases the power of the statistical tests, 
allowing statistical significance to be discovered for variables that have very little real-
world impact. More fundamentally , such an analysis presumes independence and 
Bernoulli similarity for each individual encountering a large-scale flood event. Clearl y 
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this is not true, as the threat to life posed by a flood varies dramatically with space, time, 
the event, and the individuals involved. Fatalities are often clustered in a way that defies 
independence. On a practical level, the proportion of lives lost in events involving large 
Par will statistically dominate the proportion of lives lost in events threatening small Par. 
The fact that each individual is treated as a statistical observation means 
that past flood events with greater populations at risk are statistically more 
important when estimating the empirical function than flood events in which there 
were few people at risk .. . . Computationally, each individual, rather than each 
flood event, would carry equal statistical weight. (Lee et al. , 1986, p. 61) 
Lee et al. see this as a benefit, since every individual is treated equally. DeKay 
and McClelland (1993b), however, rightly point out that we are not distinguishing 
between individuals but between the unique mix of variable values that detine each event. 
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The event offers the critical information for evaluation, not each individual. Furthermore, 
it is important to accurately predict L in events involving both large and small Par. 
The implications of equations L-4 and L-5 are similar to those for the USBR 
formulations: L is nonlinear with respect to Par, L decreases with increasing warning 
time, and the influence yielded by the magnitude of Par decreases as warning time 
increases. Statistically, warning time is the most significant factor affecting L. Advancing 
the USBR method, several considerations which were used to adjust Brown and 
Graham's baseline estimates have been formally incorporated into the equations: prior 
flood experience within I 0 years can retard a community ' s response during evacuation 
due to overconfidence; the greater the urbanization, the more efficient the warning and 
evacuation procedures; and the deeper (more lethal) the flood waters, the greater the loss 
of life. Interestingly, urbanization was not found significant when depth of flooding was 
included. 
Lee et al. (1986) applied both of their equations to their data set, along with the 
USBR best estimate and upper and lower bounds, and the IWR version of the 
Stanford/FEMA model. This has been duplicated in full in Table 7 since it demonstrates 
the performance of each approach, and it identifies the complete data set under question. 
Though Lee et al. did not include a list of sources cited, they did include an appendix 
li sting sources for every case in this data set. 
In all fairness , several biases should be pointed out regarding the values reported 
above. First, only two of the three USBR equations were available to Lee et al. in 1986 
and no subjective adjustments were applied, so the estimates represent only a first cut. 
Likewise, the Stanford/FEMNIWR estimates were produced using the unadjusted tables 
58 
Table 7. Comparison of loss of life predictions as calculated by Lee et al. usi ng their 
own data set (Lee et al., 1986, p. 68; column headings have been modified, 
their order has changed, and the final row represents a calculation of the 
RMSE based on the data presented here and found in Lee's report) 
Lee ct Leeet USBR USBR Stanford 
al . Eq. al. Eq. Lower USSR Upper /FEMA 
# b>cation Actual L L-4 L-5 95% E:<pcctect 95% (IWR) 
I Teton (to Wilford) 7 3 15 45 96 205 1360 
2 Teton (Rex-Amer Falls) 4 10 34 3 5 5 39 10 
3 Gainesville, AL 5 2 7 0 0 0 2 
4 Jackson, MS 4 10 27 3 5 6 43 
5 Buffalo Creek, WV 139 120 142 63 145 332 3400 
6 Big Thompson, CO 139 4 18 50 109 239 1700 
7 San Francisco, CA 9 47 43 173 486 1361 6375 
8 Little Deer Creek, UT I 2 3 7 10 15 43 
9 Pike Co, KY 3 38 18 16 27 48 2 13 
10 Toccoa Falls, GA 38 38 18 16 27 48 2 13 
II Austin, TX 13 16 21 55 122 272 128 
12 Bear Wallow, NC 4 0 0 2 2 3 3 
13 SW Virginia 4 2 8 0 0 0 68 
14 Cheyenne, WY II 0 2 14 24 4 1 68 
15 Hill Country, TX 27 8 13 0 0 0 5 
16 Big Country, TX 6 2 8 0 0 0 3 
17 Mohegan Park, CT 6 I 4 0 0 0 2 
18 Denver, CO 6 37 35 3 4 5 37 
19 Millard Co, UT I I 4 0 0 0 2 
20 Schuylki ll River Basin 5 14 13 I 2 2 0 
21 Potomac River, D.C. area 27 8 II 0 0 0 0 
22 Wilkes Barre, PA I 3 I 14 20 22 0 
23 Harrisburg, PA I 29 33 I 2 2 17 
24 Johnstown, PA 85 49 39 224 660 1947 17000 
25 S. California 18 10 II I I I 0 
26 Santa Barbara, CA 20 3 5 0 0 0 0 
27 S. California 18 28 33 I 2 2 12 
28 Kansas City, KC, MO 12 6 22 7 1 166 388 750 
29 Old Creek Canyon, AZ 3 4 7 22 42 77 340 
30 Phoenix, AZ 10 18 23 I I I 0 
3 1 Tri-Cou nty area, PA 9 8 14 0 0 0 4 
32 Connecticut F lood, CT II 17 26 I I I 102 
33 Baldwin Hi lls Dam, CA 5 9 30 2 3 4 140 
34 Hono lulu 4 7 9 32 63 126 213 
35 Four Mile Run (Fairfax), VA I 4 5 22 42 77 106 
36 Tekamah Creek, NE 3 16 25 55 122 272 255 
37 North Hills, PA 8 33 38 100 251 631 2125 
38 Black Hi lls (Rapid City), SD 245 37 39 2 3 4 2040 
39 Tonto Creek, AZ 23 9 13 39 80 167 3 19 
40 James River, VA 5 9 4 7 10 II 0 
4 1 Brushy Hill Pond, CT 0 I 4 0 0 0 10 
42 Lawn Lake, CO 3 21 31 I I I 850 
43 Northern New Jersey 2 18 13 3 5 6 0 
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Table 7. Continued 
Leeet Leeet USBR USBR Stanford 
al. Eq. al. Eq. Lower USBR Upper /FEMA 
# Location ActualL L-4 L-5 95% Expected 95% (IWR) 
44 Phoenix, AZ 0 22 27 I I I 10 
45 Harrison Co, WV 2 12 19 45 96 205 170 
46 Lee Lake, MA 2 0 I 9 14 21 7 
47 El Dorado, NV 9 16 7 10 16 25 35 
Root Mean Square Error ---- 22 25 47 133 374 2810 
RMSE using data in !able 39 39 55 127 363 2792 
provided with that model. Second, equation L-4 cannot be applied directly to 25 of the 
cases since they were missing adequate information on depth. For these, Lee et al. 
arbitrarily assigned the mean depth found by averaging the depth over the 22 cases that 
could be quantified. For equation L-5 , in those cases where data were unavailable to 
dummy code the degree of urbanization, the equation was applied sequentially using a I 
and a 0 and then averaging the two results. Finally, since equations L-4 and L-5 were 
developed from this identical data set, they would be expected to show a reasonably good 
fit; if the USBR data set were used for testing instead, or an entirely new data set, a 
different equation might prove the better predictor. Significantly, the USBR equations 
were developed specifically for dam failures and flash floods that closely imitate dam 
failures; the types of flooding included by Lee et al. are broader, restricted to floods that 
are life-threatening but not necessarily localized or resembling a dam failure. 
The final row is the root mean square error (RMSE) calculated using the data 
presented in the report by Lee et al. and duplicated in Table 7. The likely exp lanation for 
the difference between the calculated values and those reported by the authors in the 
preceding row is that Lee et al. inadvertently misreported one or more values. Notice, for 
example, that cases 9 and I 0 (Pike County and Toccoa Falls) give identical estimates for 
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every method, despite the large contrast in actual life-loss values. In any case, the relative 
magnitudes remain unchanged: those reported by Lee et a!. will be presumed to be the 
correct RMSEs. 
With these caveats, the RMSEs indicate that equations L-4 and L-5 make 
comparable predictors and both surpass the performance of the USBR equations and the 
Stanford!FEMNIWR model. Interestingly, the lower bound of the USBR confidence 
interval made a far better predictor than the best estimate, indicating a tendency to vastly 
overestimate L in some cases. Without question, the Stanford!FEMA/IWR model is 
miscalibrated, allowing overestimation by up to three orders of magnitude. 
Despite the relatively low root mean square errors, Lee et a!. point out 
shortcomings of their own estimations. The variance in L from their equations ( cr = 20) 
was much less than for the actual case histories ( cr = 45). In their words, 
Loss of life in many of the more lethal floods, such as the Big Thompson, 
Colorado flood; the Johnstown, Pennsylvania flood; and the Black Hills, South 
Dakota flood, was significantly under-predicted by the empirical function .... On 
the other hand, the empirical function over-predicted some of the less lethal 
floods such as those in Denver, Colorado; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; North Hills, 
Pennsylvania; Lawn Lake, Colorado; Northern New Jersey; and Phoenix, 
Arizona. (Lee eta!. , 1986, p. 71 , semicolons have been added for clarity) 
To these could be added several more cases of dramatic overestimation, such as San 
Francisco, California; Pike County, Kentucky; and Tekamah Creek, Nebraska. These 
were balanced by 4 cases where actual life loss was in the twenties while the estimated 
life loss was less than l 0. 
Significantly, a similar pattern emerges to that found using the logit procedure 
developed by DeKay and McClelland (1993b): persistent overestimation when actual loss 
of life is less than I 0, a balance of over- and underestimation in the midranges of life loss 
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(I 0 to 40) and persistent and dramatic underestimation when L is high. There are reasons 
for this built into the logit transformation itself, as will be explored in Chapter IV. 
Finally, Lee eta!. proposed three models for calculating L, two of which depend 
on equation L-4 or L-5, with L-4 being recommended. To support these models, they 
provided detailed guidance on how to model the flood waves and calculate Par, Warning 
time, flood depths, and the other variables used in the model. Going beyond previous 
guidance, they also explored evacuation modeling. An overview summary looks like this, 
receipt of evacuation warning=> mobilization time=> vehicular travel time and 
queuing delay time=> time between clearance and hazard arrival 
where the middle two components comprise clearance time. 
The aggregate-empirical model 
The simplest model is the aggregate-empirical model. By way of overview, it 
entails: 
1. Establishing flood inundation scenarios using DAMBRK; 
2. Relating these to census tracts, enumeration districts, or data on individual 
blocks; 
3. Calculating a weighted average flood depth for each reach based on the 
proportion of Par inhabiting each flood stage within that reach (using automated 
software, if possible); 
4. Estimating warning time by using a rough estimate or by summing the times 
for hazard detection, hazard appraisal, threat determination, notification of officials, 
decision to warn, and completion of the first warning; and then using this sum to adjust 
the wave travel time (the difference in time between the peak stage at the dam and the 
peak stage at the centroid of the population distribution); 
5. Estimating the remaining variables in equation L-4 or L-5; and 
6. Applying the loss of life function of choice (either L-4 or L-5). 
The distinguishing characteristics of this model are that Par is subdivided only to the 
level of sequential reaches along the river and variables are applied to each reach as a 
whole, weighted according to the population distribution within each reach. 
The empirical-flood-travel model 
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The empirical-flood-travel model distinguishes Par; more finely by identifying 
separate inundation zones within each reach based on five land elevations and defining 
the model variables uniquely for each. This is consistent with the divisions used in the 
Stanford/FEMA model. Note that unless the flood wave rises rapidly, each zone will have 
a different warning time. To facilitate this more detailed analysis, the model anticipated 
software that had not yet been written. To this author's knowledge, the software was 
never developed. 
The flood-travel-evacuation model 
The flood-travel-evacuation model also depends on proposed software. Unlike the 
previous approaches, this model explicitly considers evacuation rates and avoids use of 
the empirical life-loss equation. Instead, zones are identified by choosing representative 
cross sections within each reach and plotting their elevations. By outputting flood 
hydrographs at each cross section, the flood wave travel time to each zone can be 
determined for each reach. The elevation and location of each road link and origin node 
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must also be determined by manually inspecting topographic maps. This transportation 
grid is entered into a traffic simulation network database, in particular the MASSY AC2 
traffic evacuation simulation model. Next, the traffic simulation program is run fo r a 
short increment, say 15 minutes. Checking each hydrograph for each cross section and 
each zone, any roads which lie below the levels of inundated at that point in time are 
closed. With these closures, the traffic model is again run on an incremental basis, and 
the hydrographs are again checked for additional road closures. This continues until the 
evacuated population reaches some asymptote, implying that, due to flooding, no more 
individuals can escape. Some will have been trapped at the origin nodes while others will 
have become blocked en route. Those who remain in the flooded zones as they are 
inundated constitute the threatened population. Life loss is estimated subjectively by 
multiplying this threatened population by a reasonable fractional coefficient. The flood 
event in question is then compared to a reference flood to determine the incremental 
losses. 
Since considerable guidance is provided by the authors for each of these models, 
the interested reader is referred to their report for more details. It is important to 
remember, however, that Lee et al. did not propose a single model, but three models, two 
of which required additional software development and one of which was independent of 
their regression equations. 
Contributions 
Overall , their contribution to the field of dam safety life-loss estimation was 
monumental, being solidly built on the pioneering works by McCann et al. (1985) and 
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Brown and Graham (1988). They completed the most rigorous statistical analysis of 
empirical evidence to date and introduced the less commonly understood approach of 
using a logit transformation. They attempted to explore Par on a scale small enough to be 
easily understood and to which values of characterizing variables would apply with 
reasonable accuracy. It is likely that their method did not gain prominence primarily 
because it depended on undeveloped software. 
Shortcomings 
Despite their pioneering work, the models developed by Lee et al. (1986) had a 
number of shortcomings: 
I. They treated the individual as the unit for regression, causing events with 
large populations to dominate the results. 
2. Some of the floods in their database were slow-rising, widely dispersed 
events, atypical of dam failures, although these may be useful for estimating incremental 
life loss by comparing the life loss from a dam failure to the life loss from non-failure 
flooding. 
3. Current definitions of warning time do not describe the average warning 
time, the extent to which a warning is propagated, the effectiveness of the message at 
mobi lizing a timely evacuation, informal types of warnings like sensory clues and shouts 
from neighbors, the time required to evacuate, or the excess evacuation time above the 
time required to evacuate. As such, it is a point estimate that says little about a particular 
event. 
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4. Since the events were treated globally, and since the equations are nonlinear 
wi th respect to population, estimates of life loss will be different when summed over 
subpopulations and will depend on how the global population is divided. 
5. The equations can misestimate by a large margin, even within the original 
data set. 
6. The equations have a built in bias to underestimate when loss of life is large 
and to overestimate when loss of life is small (see Chapter IV). 
Department of Water Affairs 
Natal South Africa 198 8 
This committee report summarized an investigation into the damage from dam 
breaches caused by September 1987 floods. The goal was to enable predictions regarding 
the probability, magnitude, damages, and life loss of a future dam failure. Among private 
dams, those breached included 199 shorter than 5 m and 187 taller than 5 m. Another 449 
dams were damaged. Apparently, 11 breached dams and 15 damaged dams were selected 
as a sample to survey. "Surprisingly, no significant downstream damage or loss of life 
was caused by any of the breached dams observed" (Jordaan et al., 1988, p.25). The 
report concludes: 
The damage to be expected due to the breaching of farm earth dams, 
caused by flooding, up to 12 meters high is negligible and no loss of life can be 
expected. There can, however, expected to be a potential for significant damage 
and loss of life for a medium sized dam for the flood conditions like those 
encountered here [sic]. (Jordaan et al., 1988, p. 30) 
In light of the small sample examined, the report concluded that the remaining cases 
should be reviewed when resources became available in order to form a probabilistic 
model for potential loss of life and damage from the failure of small dams. 
Abt and Others 1989 
The toppling experiment 
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Though not strictly an effort to quantifY life loss, the team of Abt, Wittler, Taylor, 
and Love (Abt et al., 1989) sought to define the envelope of depth*velocity relationships 
(called product numbers) that would topple individuals overrun by floodwaters. Since 
feeble individuals could not be safely tested in a flume, the lower curve of the envelope 
was defined using a cross-shaped, 5 ft tall, 117.5 lb, rigid-body monolith constructed of 
concrete-coated Styrofoam. The rectangular base was I ft wide and 6 in. thick, and it was 
placed broad-side into the current. 
The upper limits and body of the envelope were defined using 20 test subjects, all 
healthy, ranging in age from 90 to 201 lb, in height from 5 to 6ft, and in age from 19 to 
54. Fifteen subjects were under 31 years old and only two were female. No subjects wore 
loose clothing likely to trap the current. 
A recirculating flume was fitted with four surfaces: simulated turf, smooth 
concrete, steel, and a mixture of sand and pea gravel. Subjects were secured in the flume 
with a safety harness attached to a hoist. They were allowed to first acclimate themselves 
in flows of2 to 3 feet and a depth*velocity product number of about 6. The flows were 
then gradually increased while the subjects periodically tried to walk upstream, face 
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downstream, or walk crosscurrent. When they indicated a loss of stability, the experiment 
was terminated and repeated within I to 2 hr. 
Conc lusions insights and shortcomings 
A wide range of product numbers defined individuals ' tolerance limits: low of 
7.56 and high of22.84 for healthy adults; low of2.32 and high of4.21 for the monolith. 
Testing for a range was complicated by the fact that an infinite number of depth*velocity 
combinations are possible. Several conclusions from the study are presented here. along 
wi th commentary. 
I. Stability was not found to be a function of surface type for the four surfaces 
tested, but several surfaces common to floodplains and rivers were not tested: slippery 
clay, tall field grass, uneven surfaces, deep mud which either traps the foot or 
disintegrates on contact, river cobbles or boulders, or slippery coatings like moss and 
algae. 
2. Even in a controlled laboratory experiment, human stability in flood settings 
is difficult to quantify. The results from one individual to the next varied tremendously. 
Nevertheless, among the 20 subjects tested, there was a general trend toward larger 
individuals withstanding higher product numbers than those who were smaller. In an 
attempt to quantify this, the following regression equation was proposed: 
P.N. = {exp(0.222( wt • hr / I 000) + 1.088] 
where wt = weight and 
ht = height. 
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However, the R2 value was only 0.48, indicating that the relationship explains less than 
half of the observed variability. There was even substantial variation when a given 
subject was tested two to four times within 2 hr, something the proposed equation cannot 
explain without considering factors such as fatigue, practice, and random moments of 
imbalance. As a broad generalization, it is safe to say that most subjects lost stability 
when flows were 4 to 5.5 fps while depths were 2.75 to 3.5 ft deep (hip deep to mid-
abdomen). Higher velocities toppled individuals at lower depths-less than 2 ft for flows 
over 8 fps-and almost halflost stability in waist-deep water moving at 3 mph8 or less, 
the speed of a leisurely walk. 
3. Project bias was substantial. Seven areas were identified by the original 
authors. They are summarized here along with additional commentary. 
a) Subjects were willing to take higher risks in light of the safety harness. 
b) Practice improved performance. 
c) Fatigue may have negatively impacted subsequent tests. 
d) The tests did not simulate debris flows or poor lighting. Floods rich in 
mud would prove much denser, increasing the flood's momentum and increasing 
the subjects' buoyancy. Large floating debris can readily· knock waders into the 
current. 
e) Subjects carried nothing and tended to splay their arms wide fo r balance 
as water depths rose. An adult carrying a child might not perform nearly as well. 
Even if the adult did not fall , the child might be washed away by depth/velocities 
less than needed for toppling. 
8 3 mph = 4.4 fps. 
f) All tests involved water temperatures of 68-78°F. Performance would 
likely drop quickly in winter temperatures. 
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g) All subjects were in good health, and most were near the age of their 
athletic prime. Additionally, only two subjects were women, one of which scored 
the lowest product number. No subjects wore clothes likely to billow. 
h) The study did not test stability for those of very short stature. especiall y 
children. 
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that this study more closely represented 
the outer envelope of human stabi lity for average-sized adults than the middle. While the 
adrenaline that would accompany a real flood could improve performance, it is likely that 
the accompanying mud, debris, uneven ground, uncertain lighting, extra burdens. greater 
distances. and other handicaps would more than offset this effect for many individuals. 
It bears repeating that this study was not intended to directly suggest conditions 
that would lead to loss of life, but rather the conditions that would make a flood 
potentially dangerous. There are numerous examples of people being swept downstream, 
clinging to trees, climbing upon houses or floating propane tanks, or otherwise being 
swept some distance without perishing. On the flip side, if one is swept under branches, 
caught in a deep eddy, or trapped in some other manner, even an otherwise slow and 
shallow flow can tum deadly. 
Perhaps it is safe to say that, as a rule of thumb, a flow should not be considered 
life-threatening to most adults until it exceeds 2 ft deep and moves faster than a slow 
walk. For those of low mobility, such as the elderly, however, even this could prove 
dangerous: the monolith toppled in flows just under 2 ft deep when velocities ranged 
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from I fps to about 2 fps. Also, none of this is meant to imply safe flows for automobile 
crossings-a leading hazard in flash floods. 
DeKay and McClelland for the United States 
BureauofReclamation 1991 1993b 
The model 
Under funding by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, DeKay and 
McClelland9 (1991) added the failure ofStava Dam in Italy to Brown and Graham's 
(1988) data set and attempted a more rigorous regression analysis similar to that 
employed by Lee et al. (1986). The equation they developed in 1991 for life loss was 
merely one component of a broader goal: determining when dam failure warnings should 
be issued to minimize costs when a "reasonable" dollar value is assigned to human lives 
(DeKay and McClelland, 1991 , p. 15). 10 Since estimation of L has value apart from 
warning strategies, they presented a revised life-loss equation independent of the larger 
model in 1993. The revision followed the same regression procedures used in 1991 , but 
four new floods 11 were added to the data set, and certain values in the original data set 
9 To my knowledge, Duane McClelland is not immediately related to Professor Gary H. 
McClelland who oversaw the work of Michael L. DeKay within the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Colorado. At the time of this writing, Gary McClelland and Duane McClelland have never 
met. 
10 Recognizing that many take offense at the notion of putting a dollar value on human life (this 
author included), DeKay and McClelland (1991) distinguished between the immeasurable value of an 
identified life, and the value to society of reducing "the probability that any individual within the 
population at risk will live or die": what they termed a "statistical" life. Nevertheless, they stated that "any 
decision threshold that is established implicitly places a value on human life" (DeKay and McClelland, 
1991 , p. 9; italics were in the original), argued that this value should be made explicit, and went on to value 
a statistical human life at between $3 million and $5 million dollars. 
"In addition to Stava Dam which was added in 1991 , they added Allegheny County, PA, 1986; 
Austin, TX, 1981; Shadyside, OH, 1990; and Centralia, WA, 1991. 
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were updated in light of new information. 12 Until recently, this revised equation has 
generally been accepted as the best regression attempt to date, displacing the equations by 
Brown and Graham in recent practice within the USSR and overshadowing the work by 
Lee et al. (see, for example, Graham, 1998). 
DeKay and McClelland 's (1991) cost-minimization approach to warnings is not 
central to this study, so only their regression equations for estimating L will be presented. 
Chapter IV explores their model in detail, so only a brief summary is necessaty at this 
point. Table 5 presents the complete data set underlying their regression, including the 
specific variable values assigned to each case. 
As with Lee et al. ( 1986) a certain degree of subjectivity lies behind most variable 
estimates. This is most prominent with respect to warning times (Wt). When more 
specific estimates were not available, they modified those values reported by Brown and 
Graham (U.S . Bureau of Reclamation, 1989) in the following manner: when Wt was 
reported as less than a certain number (Wt < I hr), they divided the upper limit in half: 
when only a lower limit was reported (Wt > 2 hr), they added 50% to that lower bound; 
and when a range was reported, they chose the midpoint of the range. Another subjective 
variable was flooding lethality, renamed flooding forcefulness or Force in 1993. It was 
coded dichotomously: a I indicated that more than 15-20% of the structures that were 
inundated were destroyed or seriously damaged by the flood. Because damages were not 
12 The reasoning and sources underlying each revision is not included in their paper. but can be 
obtained upon request from the authors and is entitled "Appendix: Additions and Changes to the Bureau of 
Reclamation Data." 
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always known with great precision, DeKay and McClelland (199 1, 1993b) relied heavily 
on the expert judgement of Wayne Graham, who was most familiar with the data set. 13 
Like Lee et al. (1986), DeKay and McClelland chose a logit transformation to 
preclude the predic:ted levels of L from being negative or greater than I 00%. Unlike Lee 
et al. , however, they did not allow each individual to carry equal statistical weight. 
Instead, each case was considered a single data point, as in traditional least squares 
regression. From this perspective, p = L!Par represents the proportion of fatalities for a 
given failure event, rather than the probability of an individual dying in a binomial 
experiment. 
The forms of their final 1991 and 1993 logistic equations were, respectively, 
L(p) = ln( _p_) = - 1.650- 0.513ln(Par) -0.822(Wt) + 4.012(/etha/ity)- 3.0 I6(Wt)(lethality) 
1- p 
(OM- I; 1991) 
L(p) = ln( _p_) = -2.586-0.440 ln(Par)- 0. 759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force) 
1-p 
(DM-2a; 1993b) 
where L(p) = functional notation for the logit transformation of p, 
p =(loss of life)/Par 
Par= population at risk (DeKay and McClelland used PAR and Lee et al. used P) , 
13 It is likely that Wayne Graham has the most voluminous data tiles on U.S. dam failures 
resulting in loss of life of any ind ividual or institution in the world. My gratitude bears repeating for his 
willingness to allow me to copy those parts of his files I considered pertinent to my own research. Without 
his cooperation , this thesis could not have been developed in its current form. 
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Wt = warning time (), and 
lethality= Force, as defined above (represented herein by the symbol Fd). 
An effort has been made to preserve the notation chosen by DeKay and 
McClelland while introducing common symhols proposed later. It is later proposed that P 
replace p to conform to a convention in which all variables begin with a capital letter. 
Subsequent letters in a multi-letter symbol should be lower case so variables can rest side 
by side without confusion. Hence, Par has been chosen in preference over PAR; it is later 
suggested that Fd (dichotomous forcefulness) replace the terms lethality and Force; and 
Wt has replaced DeKay and McClelland's symbol WTp., (DeKay and McClelland, 1991) 
and WT (DeKay and McClelland, l993b). L also replaces the symbol LOL for loss of 
life . 
Using the right-hand form of equation L-3a to accomplish the inverse 
transformation, and multiplying through by Par to isolate L, equation DM-2a becomes 
L _ exp[- 2.586- 0.440ln(Par)- 0. 759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)] 
Par -I +exp[- 2.586- 0.440ln(Par)- 0.759(Wt) +3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)] 
(DM-2b) 
which in tum simplifies to 
Par 
L = (DM-2c) 
I+ exp[2.586 + 0.440 ln(Par) + 0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)] 
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Choosing an alternate form, this equation can be modified by pulling the first two terms 
in the exponent out front as (e2 586)(e0·4401n(P"')) and simplifying to yield their final 1993 
equation: 
L = Par (DM-2d) 
I+ 13.277(Par04 40 )exp[0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)] 
The corresponding equation based on the 1991 data set is 
L = Par 
I + 5.207(Par0 "' )exp[0.822(Wt)- 4.0 12(/etha/ity) + 3.016(Wt)(/ethality)] 
(DM-1d) 
Although the 1991 equation has a higher R2 value than the 1993 version (0.9357 vs. 
0.840), equation DM-ld has been superseded by equation DM-2d since equation DM-2d 
is based on the same data set with four additional cases and updated values. 
Finally, if desired, equation DM-2d can be expressed as the following two 
separate equations for a Force of 1 and 0, respectively. 
Par 
(DM-2d.1) 
1 + 13.277(Par0440 )exp[2.982(Wt)- 3.790] 
Par 
(DM-2d.2) 
1 + 13.277(Par0440 )exp[0.759(Wt)] 
Equation DM-2d can also be transformed for comparison to other equations. 
Recognizing that 1 in the denominator is almost always small compared to the other 
terms in the denominator, the I can be dropped, allowing the following simplification: 
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L"' 0.075(Par0560 )exp[- 0.759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)] (DM-2e) 
The main value to the approximation in equation DM-2d.l is that it reveals the close 
similarity between the results obtained by confining L to positive values not greater than 
Par (logit procedure) and the best equation DeKay and McClelland developed for their 
1991 publication using non-logit, least squares linear regression techniques, as follows: 
L "' 0.!39(Par0572 )exp(- 0.895(Wt) + 3.26~Jetha/ity)- 2.404(Wt)(lethality)]- 0.5 (DM-3b) 
This equation DM-3b was rejected because it could produce impossible estimates. 
It should be noted that the underlying form of equation DM-3b is 
ln(L + 0.5) =a+ bIn( Par)+ c(Wt) + d(lethality) + e(Wt)(lethality) (DM-3a) 
The reason for adding 0.5 to the dependent logarithm is to avoid the dilemma that the 
logarithm is undefined when L = 0. 
The significance of this logarithmic form is that the regression equation will 
attempt to closely match life-loss values when losses are comparatively small while 
allowing greater variance when life loss is large. To illustrate this, consider that Jn(200)-
Jn(\00) and ln(20)- Jn(\0) are identically equal to 0.7. In least squares analysis, these 
residuals of I 00 and I 0 lives, respectively, would be considered equivalent, generally 
leading to poor predictions whenever L is large. 
Incidentally, since the Jogit method also involves a Jog transformation, similar 
consequences hold for it as well. The full implications of the Jogit transformation will be 
explored in Chapter IV. 
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To explore the relationships used by the USBR, DeKay and McClelland also 
developed what they felt was "the best expression for loss of life that can be derived via 
standard regression techniques using only population size and warning time as 
predictors" (DeKay and McClelland, 1991 , p. C ll ). Like DM-3b, it was based on a log 
transformation of L. 
L = l.896(Par 0 "') exp[ -l.8l9(Wr)]- 0.5 (DM-4) 
In their 1993 work, they derived an equation using the same variables and a logit 
transformation, producing what they believed to be "the best expression for L(p) that can 
be derived using only WT and Par as predictors" (DeKay and McClelland, l993b, p. 
198). 





I+ exp[-0. I 46 + 0.478ln(Par) + l.518(WI)] 
At no time did DeKay and McClelland offer a regression equation based on using 
L as an untransformed dependent variable. 
Contributions 
DeKay and McClelland are to be commended for producing the best empirical 
equation to date . Since their approach makes the event the basis for regression rather than 
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the individual , they are using variable estimates consistently with the manner in which 
they were measured. This is a legitimate theoretical improvement over the assignment of 
global variables to the individual (see Lee et at., 1986). 
Although the equations by Brown and Graham (Brown and Graham 1988; U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 1986, 1989), Lee et at. ( 1986), and DeKay and McClelland 
( 1991, 1993 b) were all based on global Par rather than subPar, and although they all 
produced exponential and/or complex forms that are nonlinear with respect to the size of 
Par, DeKay and McClelland were the first to caution that the application of their equation 
to subPar would violate the principles under which their equation was developed. Since, 
proportionately, fewer deaths occur as Par increases, the more Par is subdivided, the 
greater the sum of all lives lost will become. Also, the regression assumes a high level of 
heterogeneity found in large Par 14-something lost when subPar are delineated based on 
homogenous traits. These issues and others are addressed in Chapter IV. 
DeKay and McClelland (1993b) recommended omitting Par with more than 3 hr 
of warning time and subdividing the remaining Par into a maximum of two groups if the 
groups can be distinguished by a significant change in flood forcefulness (i.e., changing 
from a canyon to a wide floodplain) . They also cautioned against applying their equation 
to cases outside the range of the data set, such as those considered by Ayyaswamy et at. 
(1974). 
14 Not only is L nonlinear with respect to Par in all three fonnulations, but the only case in any of 
the three data sets that was subdivided prior to regression analysis was the Teton Dam failure. In many 
cases, these floods swept through many distinct communities and Pari, causing great life loss in one area 
and very little in others as the warning time and nature of the flood/Par interaction changed. 
Shortcomings 
Shortcomings to the development by DeKay and McClelland will be treated in 
Chapter IV. 
The Australian National Committee on Large Dams 
Recommends the USBR Method 1994 
78 
As of 1994, the Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) 
recognized that life-loss estimations are an important part of dam safety risk analysis, but 
that "generally the Joss oflife issue has been avoided" (Australian National Committee 
on Large Dams, 1994, p. 5). In this historic review of dam safety risk assessment, they 
briefly cover the methods already developed by McCann eta!. ( 1985), the 1986 methods 
proposed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that stopped short of predicting the 
number of Jives lost (Lee eta!., 1986), the USBR procedures (U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 1989), and the DeKay and McClelland (1993b) improvements to the USBR 
procedures. 
Although they recognized that DeKay and McClelland (l993b) had improved 
upon the USBR equations, they recommended that the 1989 USBR approach be used and 
they included the key portions of that report as an appendix. The basis for this 
inconsistency is not clear, except perhaps that DeKay and McClelland offered only an 
equation, while the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's 1989 report outlined an entire set of 
procedures in great detail. In any case, it appears that AN COLD would not have been 
opposed to substituting the logit equation developed by DeKay and McClelland for the 
equations suggested by the USBR. 
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They make no mention of the models developed by Lee et al. (1986). 
B.C. Hydro 1995 
Recognizing that the current empirical developments rely on relatively small 
databases, Hartford and Kartha (1995) cautioned that judgment must be used in applying 
any equation to a specific dam that has yet to fail. This said, they recommended the use 
of the logit equation developed by DeKay and McClelland (l993b) using the general 
variable estimation methods outlined by the USBR. Following DeKay and McClelland, 
they would not allow more than two subPar, they subdivided Par only when there was a 
significant change in flood forcefulness or warning time, and they excluded from Par any 
individuals with more than 3 hr of warning time. They made a conservative deviation 
from both DeKay-McClelland and the USBR in their calculation of warning time, 
however, by assuming it is equal to the travel time of the flood. They also allowed further 
subdivision of Par in exceptional cases when they attempted more detailed risk analyses. 
B.C. Hydro 1997 1998 
The model 
The B.C. Hydro approach represents an attempt to move beyond the current 
regression equations and develop a model that tracks individuals in the flood via 
personalized probability distributions. Although "B.C. Hydro currently uses the methods 
of Brown and Graham and DeKay and McClelland to obtain an initial estimate" for life 
loss, "the existing methods of Brown and Graham and DeKay and McClelland were 
judged to be inadequate for B.C. Hydro 's needs." From the authors' perspective, 
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"predicting how people are going to react under conditions of dam break flooding is not 
simply a matter of putting a few numbers into a generic equation (appealing as it might 
be to engineers)" (Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach, 1998, p. 4-17). Underlying this 
sentiment is a desire to produce not just an average or expected value for life loss, but a 
probability distribution and a confidence description for that distribution. 
It should be recognized that the B.C. Hydro approach is still under development, 
especially with respect to variable estimation, but the essential framework is in place. The 
method was developed under the assumption of a seismically induced dam breach, but 
applies to any failure mode. The following pieces of information are needed: 
I. hydrographs, inundation maps, and velocities for each dam breach scenario; 
2. Par; 
3. approximate distribution of Par with time, distance, and elevation; 
4. effectiveness of the local warning systems; 
5. effectiveness of emergency response plans for industrial plants, schools, 
hospitals, individuals, etc. ; 
6. delay times due to shock or disbelief; and 
7. evacuation rates by car and by foot along known evacuation routes and 
distances (adapted from Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach, 1998). 
Essentially, the method breaks Par down into subPar that are located in individual 
buildings or locations called units. Each unit is quantified using census data. Average 
occupancy rates can be used, but specific estimates are preferred and are required for 
specialized structures like hospitals and schools. Using a computer algorithm, each Par; is 
then tracked based on a representative individual who experiences delay in awareness of 
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the approaching flood, must overcome shock and confusion once informed, must 
mobilize and begin to evacuate, and either makes it free of flooding or encounters flood 
waters while en route. If free of the flood , there is a certain probability of surviving based 
on traffic accidents and the like; if met by flood wat~rs, there exists a probability of being 
toppled, and if toppled a probability of surviving, based on the depth and velocity of 
flood waters at that location. Calculations continue until the flood wave reaches its peak 
along any given evacuation trajectory. Life loss is determined probabilistically for each 
Par; and summed over Par. 
Using the symbols presented by Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach ( 1998) Pari at 
each unit are defined by equation BC-1 . 
PARUNIT = TNRUNIT . OAFUNIT/11)WY (BC-1) 
The associated loss of life for each unit is defined using equations BC-2 and BC-3. 
P,IIRVIVING = (1- Pr ) * P, ," + Pr • Ps 1c 




ifWD < LTD 
ifWD>HSD 










=expected loss of life at a given unit (building or area), 
=number of people residing at the unit at the time of the flood, 
=probability of surviving the flood, 
= total number of residents occupying a unit, 
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OAFuNITrrowv =expected occupancy of the unit during the particular day, week, 







= probability of being toppled by the flood, 
= probability of surviving given that the individual successfully 
retreats to safe ground, 
= probability of surviving given that the individual was caught by 
the flood. 
= water depth, 
= lowest toppling depth, and 
= highest safe depth. 
Currently, key variables are quantified based on distance from the dam, a poor 
surrogate, but the modelers hope to change this over time. Notice that the probability of 
toppling is defined linearly between those depths that are known to be too shallow to 
topple anyone (Pr = 0) and those which will topple everyone (Pr = I). Theoretically, 
these depths will vary with flow velocities and the physical capabilities of the fleeing 
parties, both of which should be considered when selecting HSD and L TO. In this early 
stage of model development, however, HSD and L TO are varied only with distance from 
the dam. They are selected with the help of human stability curves presented in U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation (1989). Ps1c theoretically describes the probability of surviving 
flood waters as a function of flow velocities, individual physical abilities, and the 
efficiency of rescue operations, but like HSD and LTD, at this stage of model 
development it currently increases only with distance from the dam. 
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Modelers simulate a unique evacuation chronology for each PARUNIT in order to 
dynamically track the temporal interplay between the location of individuals along their 
evacuation route and the presence or depth of flooding. The Time to First Awareness of 
Flooding (T FAF) and any subsequent Time Delays (T DELAYS) prior to leaving a unit are 
combined with the subsequent Rate of Escap e (REsCAPE; measured as a rise in elevation) 
to place the PARUNIT at the appropriate depth when the flood arrives. If the representative 




where = the moment of time being considered, 
EL V PAR@UNIT = the elevation of the units representative member at time, t, and 
EL V UNIT =elevation of the unit calculated from a topographic map and 
confirmed using GPS equipment during site visits. 
The only variable needed to relate this evacuation process back to the life-loss 
equations presented above is the depth of water through which the representative member 
of PARuNIT is wading [WD(t)] . This is the difference between ELVrARUN n(t) and the 
River Stage Level (RSL(t)] obtained from dam breach simulation using a program like 
DAMBRK. 
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WD(t) = RSL(I)- ELVI'AR@UN/1' (1) (BC-6) 
Running the model using discrete increments of time from t = 0 to t = (the time of peak 
flooding at the unit) , RSL(t) is compared to ELEVPAR@UN IT at each time increment. The 
comparisons are terminated when ELEVPAR@UNIT rises above the peak RSL. If the 
representative person never wades through water deeper than LTD, she is assumed to 
escape floodwaters and has a PsrE probability of surviving. If she wades through waters 
greater than HSD, her PsuRvJVJNG drops to Psrc using the maximum depth ever 
encountered. However, since Psrc currently varies only with distance from the dam, not 
with depth, the maximum depth is irrelevant until the model is upgraded. If the maximum 
depth encountered falls between LTD and HSD, depth will be considered using equation 
BC-3c. 
Finally, the model formally recognizes the uncertainty involved in variable 
estimates by using a Monte Carlo simulation approach. There are two levels of 
uncertainty: the average value assigned to each variable and the specific value that holds 
true for a give unit on the day of the failure event. Though this was not done in sample 
variable tables in the article, Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach ( 1998) recommend 
producing either a range of possible values for each variable or a probability function for 
each. A probability distribution of life loss can then be produced for each type of failure 
event by rurming Monte Carlo simulations with the assigned distributions. 
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The distributions produced for each type of failure event can be combined into a 
single life-loss probability function by first weighting each event distribution by its 
frequency of occurrence and then summing them all together. Failure events differ by 
time of day, week, and year, as well as by the loading magnitudes leading to breach and 
the subsequent nature of the failure itself. The entire procedure entails assigning 
individual probability distributions to each branch of a life-loss event tree, running a 
separate Monte Carlo simulation on each event pathway that leads to life loss, and 
summing these terminal life-loss probability distributions. Typically, the terminal 
distributions will be weighted according to their frequency of occurrence through the 
structure of the event tree. 
Contributions 
There are obvious strengths to the approach proposed by B.C. Hydro , despite the 
fact that it is still under development. Theoretically, the model accounts for most of the 
elements affecting life loss, circumventing the nonlinearity problems inherent in applying 
equations developed for global Par to subPar. In this case, the sum of the parts should 
certainly equal the whole. Also, there is a certain emotional confidence or satisfaction 
that can be derived from using a model that evaluates life loss on a scale approaching the 
individual. Although census data do not allow modelers to track individuals with their 
unique psyche and physical capabilities, choosing individual buildings as units is much 
more refined than applying regression equations to entire cities or a series of 
communities for which many variables represent gross averages at best. Moreover, the 
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detail and time required to run the B.C. Hydro model can potentially satisf'y those who 
share the sentiments of Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach: 
The criticism that the model is too complex and has too many variables is, we 
feel, unreasonable. The logic structure is very straightforward and it has withstood 
expert review. We are confident that we can put the logic structure forward "with 
moral certainty" as the best way presently available to deal with this component 
of a risk analysis . . .. Dam safety is a serious business . .. . That risk management 
for dam safety doesn' t come cheaply or easily should not come as a surprise. 
However, we are duty bound to do the best that we can under the circumstances 
and demonstrate due diligence in making decisions about public safety. (Assaf, 
Hartford, and Cattanach, 1998, p. 4-24, 4-25) 
Shortcomings 
This said, there are serious shortcomings to this approach that have yet to be 
overcome. Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach believe the predictions currently lack 
credibility due to the large number of variables that must be estimated subjectively. They 
hope that this can be overcome through more detailed studies about the important 
variables and through calibration with historical case studies in order to back-test the 
model. They also recognize that the model explicitly accounts only for drowning deaths, 
ignoring deaths due to heart attacks, road accidents, and convergence losses from people 
not originally located in one of the units under study. Their response is that such deaths 
are likely random. This element could also be included to a certain extent through Ps!E· 
Apart from the concerns of the model ' s authors, there are shortcomings in the 
logic of the model itself. First, variables like Ps1c, LTD, and HSD are heavily dependent 
on the physical capabilities of the individual. Yet, the individual is never in view, only a 
representative individual assigned to each PARUNIT· Is LTD based on an infant, a small 
child, a healthy adult; those who are more feeble or immobi le due to age, illness, or 
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disabilities; or a representative composite of these? Since life loss is not based on degrees 
of death, it is highly unlikely that "average" or "representative" members of PARUNIT 
would topple or perish at the same rate as that found by combining the fates of the 
smaller or less capable with those of the larger or more capable. One solution might be to 
distribute characteristics of age, mobility, health, and size to the unit representatives 
according to the proportions in the real population. Unfortunately, this still neglects the 
dynamics found in families and among neighbors: the more feeble are likely to receive 
assistance, while the more able are often slowed or handicapped by the need to carry 
children or to help others. 
Second, notice that an error in estimating a probability is different than a random 
error. When summed across a large number of units, an erroneous probability distribution 
skews every result in the same direction. When distributions are multiplied together, 
errors can compound exponentially. Hence, the more complex the model (the more 
di stributions that must be considered) the greater risk there is for amplification of errors. 
Estimates that are based on regression using larger-scale units avoid this because the 
regression accounts for variance among individuals rather than assuming a skewed 
distribution and then summing the same error across a large number of units. 
Third, it will probably never be possible to provide dependable estimates for 
many of the variables needed for the model. This is because realistic field conditions 
cannot ethically be duplicated in the laboratory and many distributions (i.e., 
velocity*depth curves) are highly specific not only to each event, but to each location 
within each reach. 
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As an example of the coarse level at which variables must be estimated, the 
values Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach (1998) used for LTD and HSD, which lie behind 
PT, were loosely based on a human-stability curve presented in U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation (1989, seep. 111-112). This, in turn, was derived from the study conducted 
by Abt et al. (1989) described above. The USBR took the lowest velocity*depth product 
number found in that srudy (7.56 for a 90 lb female) and used it to plot a velocity vs. 
depth curve for which every coordinate pair has a product of 7.56. Presumably, this curve 
represents the boundary for L TD. 15 While not plotted by the USBR, the highest product 
number they reported ("over 22" for a 20 1 lb male) presumably underlies HSD. As 
mentioned before, these values presume ideal conditions: a uniform flume with no 
sudden waves, no eddies, the reassurance of safety equipment, no billowing clothing or 
shoes, no mud or debris, good lighting, no panic or fear, no need to carry children or 
precious belongings, warm water and weather conditions, no wind, solid ground with 
good traction that is free from dips or holes or obstacles over which one might trip, and 
healthy adults over 5 ft tall. Such conditions would not be expected in the field , nor 
would conditions be consistent across events or for every unit. One could not ethically 
duplicate true field conditions in a laboratory, and historical data are not likely to be 
sufficiently detailed or accurate to allow a refined analysis in the narrow range between 
LTD and HSD. 
"Although LTD is only a depth, it has been assumed that B.C. Hydro derived it based on first 
routing the flood to detennine the depth vs. velocity re lationships for the flood and then back-calculating 
the depth that yielded a product number of7.56 at each cross section downstream. 
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Even if one could know the true toppling-death distributions for every unit, 
current evacuation models cannot place people in sufficiently refined estimates of depth 
and velocity to make the distributions useful. This level of refinement would require that 
REsCAPE have a unique function for each PARUNIT· !fa custom equation is to be 
developed for each unit, the trajectory of escape must be estimated for each residence, a 
detailed chronology of elevations must be recorded, and a dynamic rate of progress along 
the path must be described. This, in tum, must be uniquely coded into a computer as a 
function of physical geography, human psychology, prior experiences with flooding, 
evacuation experience, the direction children will run and whether or not their parents 
will give pursuit, the paths residents know and travel, bottlenecks, the amount of warning 
time, environmental conditions, prior flooding, traffic accidents, and many other factors. 
If an individual must complete an evacuation by wading, a reduced rate of progress must 
be assumed from that point on. This also becomes a function of depth and velocities, 
requiring that very small time steps be used and that the evacuation function is updated 
with every time step. If a more generic function were developed that described only 
elevation changes (Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach used a uniform rate of 50 m per hour), 
it completely ignores the fact that most terrain does not rise at a uniform rate, residents 
may have to scramble down into gullies in order to gain elevation on the other side, and 
the rate of evacuation will vary dramatically along the length of the floodplain. 
Even if both toppling distributions and evacuation functions could be refined, 
current dynamic flood routing models cannot provide more than a coarse estimate of the 
depths and velocities at any particular location-far too coarse to target the narrow range 
between LTD and HSD. To complicate matters further, catastrophic floods are 
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characterized by unpredictable waves, pathways, and extreme variations in depth due to 
their turbulence, momentum, and debris load. 
Fourth, if the third point is true with respect to the range between L TO and HSD, 
then equation BC-3c can be discarded, equation BC-3b can be set equal to a value less 
than I to include all depths in which people might topple, and the entire method can be 
reduced to the flood-travel-evacuation model proposed by Lee et al. (1986). Since the 
B.C. Hydro model offers no new empirical relationships and no improved method for 
modeling evacuations, it would offer no advancements . 
Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach (1998) do depart from the flood-travel-evacuation 
model in one important respect. The entire B.C. Hydro model rests on the assumption 
that every member of Par evacuates on foot. Pr implicitly assumes an individual must be 
toppled to perish, and that this in turn is a function of human stability when standing in a 
flood. This is contrary to both intuition and history. When warning time is more than a 
few minutes, many individuals choose to evacuate by automobile; when warning times 
are so short that people do not expect to reach the hillside, they usually seek shelter inside 
of buildings, especially when there is an upper floor or access to the roof (insight from 
Appendix B). This leads to shortcomings five and six, below. 
Fifth, fatalities involving occupants of automobiles constitute an important source 
of deaths in flash floods and dam failures. To recognize this, the model would have to 
include REsCAPE for motorists and the probability that each P ARUNIT would seek to 
evacuate by automobile. These probabilities would be specific to the circumstances of 
each unit. Motorists that did not clear the flood zone would be subject to a 
depth*velocity*PrRAPPED IN AN AUTOMOBILE*Ps1c relationship. If it were desired to calculate 
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these types of relationships on the detailed level of LTD, HSD, and PT, the probabilities 
would have to be specific to each type of vehicle and to each setting (truck, RV, bus, 
compact, 4-wheel drive; off-road or on-road; bridge, intersection, elevated street, etc.). 
All of the concerns expressed under the third shortcoming again come into play. 
Sixth, while the B.C. Hydro model allows for people to be caught in buildings, it 
assumes they attempt to evacuate as soon as they can. When people are caught in 
buildings, the buildings are assumed to offer no shelter: the datum for flood depths 
remains the ground (ELVrAR@UNIT(t) = ELVuNrr) and Ps1c is applied as if the 
representative member ofPARUNIT is standing in the full force of the flow. There is no 
mechanism for determining whether it is safe higher in the building, whether occupants 
are likely to seek such havens rather than risking an open-water encounter, whether the 
building walls diminish the depths and velocities, or whether a building remains standing 
or is destroyed. Based on historical evidence, such considerations dominate life-loss 
dynamics in many floods, making the depth*velocity dynamics among waders a 
peripheral issue. 
Seventh, in real floods PT depends not only on the severity of the flood, but on the 
nature of the floodplain. Are there trees, telephone poles, rooftops, floating debris, or 
other aspects that might provide sources of refuge until emergency help can offer rescue 
ass istance? Although PT theoretically includes such considerations, Assaf, Hartford, and 
Cattanach omitted such factors when making their preliminary estimates. 
Eighth, the model currently has little empirical foundation, so there is no basis for 
accepting it in favor of the empirical equations it attempts to replace. 
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Ninth, the model is likely cost-prohibitive. Expensive research would be required 
to estimate uncertain variables with the accuracy needed for the model. The modelers 
also require analysts to confirm the elevation of every unit through site visits, presumably 
though the use ofGPS equipment. If the cost of risk assessment surpasses the costs of 
the most stringent, standards-based fixes, a life-loss model becomes mute. 
Conclusions 
Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach ( 1998) seek to improve confidence in life-loss 
estimates by proposing a more detailed approach to analysis. Unfortunately, in seeking 
greater detail without regard for historical trends or the reliability of key distributions, say 
by refining the concepts surrounding evacuation as described above, the increased 
complexity of the model is more likely to propagate errors and increase uncertainty than 
to improve predictions, defeating the purpose for the model. It is likely, with the 
mounting levels of uncertainty, that an application of the model to a portfolio of dams 
must either sacrifice detail or consistency. 
Graham and USBR Presently: DeKay and 
McClelland 1993 and Graham 1998 
As mentioned earlier, the recent practice of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation was 
to use DeKay and McClelland 's logit equation DM-2d in place of those by Brown and 
Graham (U.S Bureau of Reclamation, 1989). The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has 
recently started to use a new method developed by Graham ( 1999) that was not available 
when this review was prepared. 
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Tabular Comparison 
The methods for estimating loss of life have evolved not only with respect to their 
methodology and the level of detail considered important, but also with respect to the 
variables considered most influential or useful. Table 8 attempts to provide an overview, 
listing the variables identified by each set of authors, the ones they selected for use in 
their models, and the ones used for secondary refinement following an initial estimate. 
Since most of the models do not allow for subjective refinement, the latter category 
applies only in limited cases. Graham ( 1998) has not proposed a new model, but he 
continues to refine our understanding of the life-loss mechanisms, so key variables he has 
identified in recent publications are listed in the final column. 
A degree of interpretation was necessary in describing each variable since authors 
often use different words to describe quite similar or identical concepts. It is also easy to 
overlook a variable briefly mentioned by an author but omitted from his or her model. 
Every effort has been made to be complete and accurate, but this list should be viewed as 
a representative overview that has not been confirmed by the authors themselves. 
Summarv: Major Existing Aporoaches to 
Stanford/FEMA model 
(modified by the Institute 
for Water Resources) 
Life Loss and Their Limitations 
This approach uses an irregular grid to divide the inundation zone into 
subpopulations based on land use, warning time, and depth of flooding. Individual 
Table 8. Predictive variables recognized as important by the authors of existing life-loss models in dam safety 
Brown and Assaf, 
McCann etal Graham Lee et al. DeKay and Hanford, and 
• I = identified by the author(s), M = used Petak and (1985) Pate-Come\\ (1988) ( 1986) McClelland Cattanach Graham 
di rectly in lhe mode l, A= used to adj ust the Ayyaswamy Fried man Atk isson Stanford/ and Tagaras U.S.B.R Corps of ( 1993b) (1998) (1998) 
model estimation et al. (1974) (1975) (1 982) FEMA (1986) ( 1986. 1989) Engineers U.S.B.R B.C. Hydro U.S.B.R 
Variable I' M' A' I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I 
dam/reservoir/breach sizes • • • • • • • 
inundation mapping • • • • • • • • • • 
depth of flooding • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
velocity of flow • • • • • • • • • 
peak discharge • 
force exerted by flow • • • 
flood lethality • • • • 
damage to structures • • • • • • • • 
types of structures • • • • • • 
floating debris • • • 
water temperatures • • • 
environmental conditions • • • 
adjusted for flash flood • • 
Par • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
subPar by time of day • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
subPar by time of week or year • • • • • • • • • • • 
subPar by distance • • • • • • • • • 
subPar by depth • • • • • • • • • 
subPar by travel time • • • 
subPar by warning time • • • • • 
subPar by flood forcefulness • • 
subPar by unit (residence, etc.) • • 
a lerts • 
warning time • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
rate event threatens dam • • • • 
Table 8. Continued 
Brown and Assaf, 
McCannet al Graham Lee et al . DeKay and Hartford, and 
• I = iden1ified by the aulhor(s}, M = used Petak and (1 985) Pate-Cornell (1 988) (1 986) McClelland Cauanach Graham 
directly in the model, A = used to adjust the Ayyaswamy Friedman Atkisson Stanford/ and Tagaras U.S.B.R Corps of (199Jb) (1998) (1998) 
mode l estimation et al. (1974) (1 975 ) (1982) FEMA (1986) ( 1986. 1989) Engineers U.S.B.R B.C. Hydro U.S.B.R 
Variable I* M* A* I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I 
monitoring capabilities • • • • 
threat recognition time • • • • 
decision process to warn • • • • • • 
flood warning system • • • • • • • • 
warning rate , extent, effect • • • • • 
prior awareness • • • • 
psychological impressions • • • • 
personal mobilization time • • • • 
vehicular travel time • • 
queuing delay time • • 
evacuation rate • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
rate of elevation gain • • 
ease of evacuation • • • • • 
success of rescue attempts • • • 
convergence • • • • 
topography • • • • • • • • • • • • 
zoning • • • • • • 
# of bridges crossing river • • 
future development • • • • 
urban vs. rural • • • 
demographics in floodplain • • • 
age • • • 
mobility • • • • 
special facilities or groups • • • • • 
experience in floods/evacuation • • • • • 
Table 8. Continued 
Brown and Assaf, 
McCann ct a1 Graham Lec et al DeKay and Hartford, and 
• I = identified by the author(s), M = used Petak and (1985) Pate-Cornell (1988) (1986) McClelland Cattanach Graham 
directly in the model, A = used to adjust the Ayyaswamy Friedman Atkisson Stanford/ and Tagaras U.S.D.R. Corps of (199lb) ( 1998) (1998) 
model esti mation eta!. ( 1974) (1975) (1982) FEMA (1986) ( 1986, 1989) Engineers U.S.B.R. B.C. Hydro U.S.S.R. 
Variable I* M' A* I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I M A I 
know-how • • • • 
in formation networks • • • • 
family dispersion • • • 
anitudes • • • 
fa lse alanns/misinfonnation • • • • 
availability of sensory clues • 
antecedent depths & velocities • 
act ivit ies of Par L • 
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structures are marked on a map. A fatality rate is then assigned to each unique 
combination of depth, warning time, land use, warning effectiveness, and other variables. 
Shortcomings can be summarized as follows: 
1. Rates of life loss must be subjectively estimated without an empirical basis. 
2. The number of life-loss rates that must be estimated is equal to the number of 
uniquely defined subPar, which grows exponentially as more characterizing variables are 
considered. 
3. Historically, life loss has not been primarily a function of depth in isolation 
from velocities. 
Brown and Graham CUSBR) 
Empirically based life-loss equations are a function of the size of the population at 
risk and a trichotomous division of warning time. Initial estimates can be adjusted based 
on subjective considerations. 
Shortcomings can be summarized as follows: 
1. Their trichotomous treatment of warning time risks subjective 
oversimplification. 
2. The regression equations lack refinement. 
3. The equations are intended to be applied to subpopulations but were 
developed using global populations. Since one of the three equations is nonlinear with 
respect to population size, the resulting life-loss estimates may vary depending on how a 
population is subdivided. 
4. These equations were based on only 23 flood events, each quite unique. 
5. The equations can misestimate by a large margin, even within the original 
data set. 
Lee and others (Corns of Engineers) 
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Using 47 flood events, Lee et al. (1986) developed a logit relationship in which a 
logit transformation of the fraction of lives lost was regressed against the warning time, 
the peak depth of the flood, and dichotomous treatments indicating whether or not the 
population was urbanized and had experience with flooding. 
Shortcomings can be summarized as follows: 
I. They treated the individual as the unit for regression, causing events with 
large populations to dominate the resu lts. 
2. Some of the floods were slow-rising, widely dispersed events, atypical of 
dam fai lures. 
3. Since subpopulations were not considered separately, the peak depth of 
flooding did not pertain to most people in the flood. 
4. Current definitions of warning time do not describe the average warning 
time, the extent to which a warning is propagated, the effectiveness of the message at 
mobilizing a timely evacuation, informal types of warnings like sensory clues and shouts 
from neighbors, or the time required to evacuate. 
5. Since the events were treated globally, and since the equations are nonlinear 
with respect to population, estimates oflife loss will be different when summed over 
subpopulations and will depend on how the global population is divided. 
6. The equations can misestimate by a large margin, even within the original 
data set. 
DeKay and McClelland CUSBR) 
After adding four new cases to the data set used by Brown and Graham (U.S. 
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Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), Dekay and McClelland (1993) developed a regression 
equation using a logit transformation of the fraction of lives lost against the population at 
risk, warning time, and a dichotomous description of high or low flood forcefulness. 
Until recently, this was the most widely accepted and applied equation. 
For shortcomings see Chapter IV and the last three shortcomings under Lee et al. 
above. 
B.C. Hydro (under development) 
This model assigns a representative individual to every structure in the flood zone 
based on census data and specifies the elevation of every structure and every unique path 
of evacuation by foot. Using a computer algorithm and time steps, representative 
individuals are tracked as they try to evacuate on foot until they either encounter the 
flood or escape. If the flood overtakes them, probability distributions determine whether 
or not they are toppled and, if toppled, whether or not they drown based on the depth and 
velocity at each location. These probability distributions are incorporated using Monte 
Carlo techniques and subsequently summed across the population. 
Shortcomings can be summarized as follows: 
I. The model accounts only for deaths due to drowning. 
2. People who do not have average physical capabilities (children, elderly, 
disabled, etc.) do not have the same probability distributions as a representative 
individual. 
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3. The model assumes all deaths occur by toppling while fleeing on foot. Mo~t 
historical flood-related deaths do not fall in this category. 
4. The model does not allow for evacuation by automobile. Inclusion of this 
component would only exacerbate other shortcomings of the model. 
5. Buildings are treated no differently than unsheltered areas in the open 
floodplain , ignoring their critical historic role in providing shelter. 
6. The model currently ignores the benefits of trees and other refuges in the 
floodplain. 
7. The model potentially propagates errors exponentially by multiplying highly 
uncertain probability distributions and then summing across a large number of 
individuals, progressively increasing bias. 
8. The model requires unobtainable details. One must have confidence in a 
unique evacuation pathway and rate curve for every residence, toppling distributions for 
every combination of depth and velocity, and drowning distributions for every flow 
pattern downstream of someone who topples. Such statistics are currently unavailable, 
cannot be duplicated in the laboratory, and are highly case-specific, varying with such 
things as the warning time, warning effectiveness, sensory clues, terrain, ground cover, 
turbulence, sediment load, debris load, and experience with evacuation. Moreover, the 
dynamics of a catastrophic flood wave are highly unpredictable, especially away from the 
channel center, undermining the precision assumed for toppling and drowning 
distributions. 
9. The model does not use historic rates of life loss to validate its results. 
I 0. The model is cost prohibitive. 
Global Insights from Historic Models 
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To date, a truly satisfying theoretical model has not been proposed. A consistent 
level of refinement has been attempted in empirical models, but they have not yet reached 
the point where they can be used to predict life loss with high levels of confidence. 
The summary of major existing approaches, above, provides a good global 
critique of current model shortcomings. As for contributions, every useful dam-failure 
life-loss model addresses the following components: 
I. The probability of failure given assorted loadings. It is preferable to consider 
every conceivable loading, breaking the loadings into ranges with similar consequences. 
2. Flood routing that yields credible estimates of travel times, depths, and 
velocities . It is preferable if these can be approximated at every point and not merely as 
large-scale averages. 
3. Quantification of Par. It is preferable to be able to subdivide this into subPar 
with common attributes, describe the distribution of Par in the flood zone, and assign 
different values to Par according to temporal variations in the time of day, week, and 
year. 
4. Warning time. It is preferable if this accounts for the detailed chain of events 
that must occur before a message can first be disseminated on a mass scale. It is also 
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preferable if the analysis describes not only the difference in timing between the first 
warning and the arrival of the flood, but also the rate of warning propagation, the extent 
to which the warning penetrates a community, and the ability of the message to mobilize 
an evacuation without causing panic. 
5. Evacuation. It is preferable to identify not only the number of people who 
escape flooding based on the warning time, but where the remainder are located when the 
flood arrives and whether or not those locations provide a degree of safety. 
6. Loss functions that describe the rate of life loss in every unit that has been 
defined, whether this is on the level of Par, subPar, or locations within subPar. It is 
preferable for these functions to be validated empirically so that they can be used with 
confidence. Chapters IV and VII present desirable and undesirable characteristics of a 
life-loss estimation model. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A DEEPER LOOK AT THE DEKAY-
MCCLELLAND MODEL 
The DeKay-McClelland Equation 
Equation DM-2d is popularly referred to as the DeKay-McClelland equation, or 
the D-M equation, for short. It was first presented in Chapter lll using a combination of 
symbols originally used by DeKay and McClelland (1991, 1993b) and symbols used in 
Chapter V. In like manner, equations L-3b and L-3a, the logit transformation and the 
inverse transformation, respectively, were introduced using symbols favored by DeKay 
and McClelland (1991 , 1993b) or Lee et al. (1986). To avoid confusion and to prepare the 
reader for the modeling ideas presented herein, symbols justified in Chapter V will now 
be used exclusively. 
Hence, 





p = exp(p) 
I + exp(p) I + exp(-p) 
(L-3a) 
L = Par (DM-2d) 
I +exp(2.586 + 0.440 ln(Par) + 0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Fd) + 2.223(Wt)(Fd)j 
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where P =proportion of lives lost= L!Par, 
L =number of lives lost, 
Par = population at risk, 
Wt = warning time, and 
Fd =dichotomous forcefulness (0 or I, with Fd = I meaning that 15-20% of the 
buildings in the flood zone receives major damage or is destroyed). 
A comparison of approaches 
Table 5 presents the data set used by DeKay and McClelland in 1993 after they 
updated the variable estimates supplied by Brown and Graham (1988). Columns 7, 8 and 
9 contain the life loss predicted using equations DM-2d, DM-3b, and DM-4, respective ly 
(see Chapter III). Most of the remaining data come from DeKay and McClelland ( J993b. 
Table I, p. 197). As a reminder, equation DM-2d is the equation DeKay and McCle ll and 
( 1993b) offered to compute life loss-their final equation based on a logit transformation 
(equation L-3b). Equation DM-3b was the best equation DeKay and McClelland ( 1991 ) 
could develop using least-squares linear regression techniques without using a logit 
transformation. They produced the equation in 1991 before the case values were updated 
and before they added the final four events to the data set. Equation DM-4 was the best 
equation DeKay and McClelland (1991) could develop without using a logit 
transformation and while limiting themselves to the two independent variables used by 
Brown and Graham ( 1988)-population at risk and warning time. It was also developed 
using the truncated 1991 data set. The final column is the average of columns 7 and 8. 
The purpose of including the final three columns is to assess the relative benefits 
of using a logit transformation. The root mean square error (RMSE) for each equation is 
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reported at the bottom of the table. As can be seen, even though equation DM-2d is the 
only equation based on this exact set of data, its RMSE is little better than that for 
equation DM-3b. A casual perusal of the individual estimates also makes the equations 
appear comparable. Clearly the poorest equation is equation DM-4, indicating that Force 
is an important concept to include in an equation. The conclusion is that the logit 
transformation offers little inherent benefit apart from constraining P to fall between 0 
and 1.0, the primary purpose for which it was chosen (DeKay and McClelland, 1991 , 
1993b). 
Duplication of results 
As an exercise, a logit regression was performed on the data set in Table 5 using 
Excel. As expected, the same equation was obtained as was reported by DeKay and 
McClelland (1993b). A derivation of the equation DM-2d is presented later in this 
chapter. 
Implications of the oredicted 
life-loss curves 
To understand the trends in life loss predicted by equation DM-2d, it is helpful to 
graph P against Par for Fd = I (Figure 3) and Fd = 0 (Figure 4) while holding Wt 
constant. Graphing P against Wt while holding Par and Fd constant produces a second set 
of graphs (Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
P as a function of Par 
Considering the figures sequentially, Figure 3 demonstrates a sharp nonlinearity 
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than 100. Figure 4 demonstrates the same pattern when Fd = 0, only with less than one-
tenth the life loss. Conceptually, these curves suggest one or more implications: 
I. Warnings are disseminated more effectively when Par is large (unlikely, 
since small Par are often clustered closely together and for a large Par it takes more time 
to knock on more doors). 
2. Evacuation is more efficient when Par is large (unlikely, since small Par tend 
to be closer to the hillside and do not need to worry about traffic congestion). 
3. The effectiveness of rescue efforts is proportionally superior in larger 
population centers (true, but not a dominant historical factor, as noted in Chapter VI). 
4. Large Par tend to include areas that are either more distant from the river or 
more distant from the dam than small Par with the same Fd value, resulting in longer 
average warning times for a given initial warning time and lower average levels of flood 
forcefulness that are masked by the dichotomous treatment of Fd. This frequently takes 
the form of a relatively wide floodplain, where inundation is shallow and velocities are 
smaller, located some distance from a dam up a canyon. 
Based on this analysis, the last reason appears the most reasonable and bears 
greater scrutiny. Essentially, it claims that the shape of the curves follows from 
limitations in the variables rather than from any inherent property of Par size. If a Par is 
small-a house, a campground, or a small canyon community-two things are likely to 
be true. First, the hillsides are likely to form a steep, narrow valley causing the general 
level of flood forcefulness to trend toward destruction over mere damage and toward the 
upper limits of Fd = 0 or Fd = I. Second, the warning time is likely to closely 
approximate the average warning time (Wtavg). If a Par is large-a series of small 
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communities over many miles of narrow valley or a larger city subject to dispersed 
flooding across flat terrain-and the warning is disseminated more rapidly than the 
flood ' s rate of travel, opposite trends are likely from those above. Wtavg will be notably 
greater than Wt, a higher percentage of buildings will escape destruction than for small 
Par, and flood forcefulness will trend toward the lower limits ofFd = 0 or Fd = I. 
The significance of these insights should not be underestimated. Among those 
events used to develop equation DM-2d, only the Teton failure was divided into subPar, 
and these subPar were still not very homogenous. In light of the extreme nonlinearity in P 
vs. Par and the method underlying development of the equation, DeKay and McClelland 
(1993b) cautioned that their equation should not be applied on a subPar basis (see 
Chapter lll). 
A simple illustration will demonstrate why. Assume that a dam at the head of 
long, narrow valley fails , destroys phone cables, prevents word from getting out for 
nearly an hour, and blocks access to the upper two-thirds of the valley. Wt = 0 minutes, 
Fd = 1, Par= I ,000 across six small communities in I 0 miles, and L = ISO. Deaths are 
concentrated in the first 3 miles because passing motorists and sensory clues propagate 
informal warnings down the valley, making Wtavg > 0 minutes . Also, virtually every 
structure is destroyed in the first 3 miles, a larger percentage of structures are subject to 
only major damage in the center of the valley, and the wave has attenuated to a 100-year 
flood in the wider tail of the valley, causing widespread but minor damages. According to 
Figure 3 and equation DM-2d, P = 0.138 and L = 138 as long as at least 15-20% of the 
people live in houses that are destroyed or experience major damage and the centroid of 
Par is above the lowest third of the valley. 
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Now let us treat the six small towns as separate subPar, assuming Wt = 0 for the 
first four communities that are inaccessible, but Wt = l hr and 2 hr for the final two 
communities moving downstream. Fd = l for the first four communities and Fd = 0 for 
the last two. 
l. If the size of the communities, moving downstream, are Par1 = 25, Par2 = 75, 
Par3 = 450, Par4 = 50, Pars= 200, and Par6 = 200, then L = 139. 
2. If, instead, Par 1 =50, Parz = I 00, Par3 = 350, Par4 = 150, Pars = 150, and Par6 
= 200, then L = 161. 
3. If, instead, Par1 = 200, Parz = 200, Par1 = 450, Par4 = I 00, Pars= 25 , and Par6 
=25, thenL =2 12. 
4. If every two communities were treated as a subPar, then life loss in the final 
example would beL = 172. 
5. If every town in the final example were divided exactly in half based on 
upstream and downstream neighborhoods, then the 12 subPar would yield L = 266. 
6. If the subPar were estimated based on each residence in the final example, 
life loss would approach 700. 
7. If Par barely qualifies for Fd = l because 75% of the residents live 
downstream where damages are uniformly minor, then one distribution might be Par1 = 
50, Par2 = l 00, Par3 = 50, Par4 = 50, Pars= 500, and Par6 = 250, resulting in L = 88. 
8. If this final redistribution is analyzed as a single, global Par, the greater 
damage upstream still results in Fd = I, but based on the distribution of Par, Wt = l hr, 
resulting in L = 8. 
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This example is telling. Depending on the size of the units to which equation DM-
2d is applied and the distribution of the population, the predicted value of L can range 
from about 8 to about 700, or 0.8% to 70% of Par. Given the third distribution of Par 
presented above, the estimate ofL can range from 138 to 700 (14% to 70% of Par), 
depending exclusively on how an analyst chooses to group Par into subPar. In the final 
distribution, the estimate of life loss was increased I I fold simply by dividing Par into 6 
subPar. 
As these examples illustrate, the estimate of L will increase dramatically as Par is 
broken into smaller subPar, and L will change with identical numbers of subPar 
depending on how the analyst groups the population. The impact of these changes varies 
depending on the size of Par, on the size of the subPar, and on the impact any divisions 
have on the various Wt; and Fd;. It follows that it is impossible to stipulate a standardized 
use of subPar that impacts every dam in a portfolio in a consistent manner; and for a 
single dam, estimates can clearly be grossly inaccurate. 
Moreover, the equation itself cannot be used with confidence on events that do 
not closely resemble the dominant patterns in the original data set. Returning to our 
original example, equation DM-2d will estimate L = 138 when it is applied to a 1000-
member subPar with Wt = 0 and Fd = I. But what if, instead of six villages spread over 
I 0 miles, there was a single town immediately below the dam? What if every structure 
was instantly destroyed, with no major damages and no minor damages? Would life loss 
still be 138, or would it approach 1000? Historic failures like the ones at Vaiont Dam and 
the Stava Dams in Italy demonstrate the latter. 
DeKay and McClelland (1993b) recognized these shortcomings and suggested 
that Par should not be divided unless population centers are dramatically different, and 
then no more than 2 subPar should be adopted. They also cautioned that the equation 
should not be applied to situations without representation in the data set. 
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Returning to the initial assertion that the problem with non-linearity is an artifact 
of the way the variables for Wt and Fd are defined, a model that defines subPar 
homogeneously with respect to concepts of warning and flood forcefulness would avoid 
these problems. If so, such a model could be applied to any size of subPar the analyst 
found convenient and to any type of failure for which representative subPar existed in the 
data set. This has been attempted in Chapter VII. 
P as a function of Wt 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 demonstrate that equation DM-2d produces a relationship in 
which Pis also nonlinear with respect to Wt for any given size of Par and a fixed value 
for Fd. The figures are nearly identical except that the proportion of lives lost is an order 
of magnitude higher when Fd = I. 
The general pattern shown in these graphs makes sense. Rates of life loss will 
follow the rates at which people are trapped by the flood . This rate drops as people 
successfully evacuate. Evacuation rates will generally begin in a semi-linear fashion and 
then decrease with time since those who remain are those who find evacuation most 
difficult. 
Historically, there are often a few stragglers who refuse to evacuate, so it is 
appropriate that the curves converge slowly toward 0 (see Chapter VI). However, it is 
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likely that the curves generated by equation DM-2d converge toward 0 too slowly. The 
basis for this assertion is historical research and recognition that DeKay and McClelland 
did not quantify Wt with high precision. 
As recorded in the fourth column of Table 5, Brown and Graham (1988) 
estimated Wt using half hour increments or larger ranges. These estimates were 
necessarily vague based on the sparseness of the historical record and the difficulty in 
representing Wt for spatially diverse Par. For this reason, Brown and Graham chose 
regression equations based on only three increments of Wt. DeKay and McClelland 
( 1993a) modified some values of Wt based on their own research, but for the most part 
they mechanically subdivided the ranges provided by Brown and Graham so they could 
treat Wt as a continuous variable. When Wt was reported as less than a certain number 
(Wt < I hr), they divided the upper limit in half; when only a lower limit was reported 
(Wt > 2 hr), they added 50% to that lower bound; and when a range was reported, they 
chose the midpoint of the range. 
An attempt has been made during the current research to refine estimates of 
warning time, including the average warning time (Wtavg), the warning provided by 
sensory clues (Sc), and more precise estimates ofWt. The results are presented in 
Chapters VI and VII and in Appendix C. 
Comparing P as a function of 
Wt for Fd = 0 and Fd = I 
Figure 7 reminds us to distinguish between a model and the real-life situations it 
is attempting to predict. When Wt exceeds about l. 7 hr, equation DM-2d predicts lower 




a. 0 .004 1---------~.._,.- -+------------------1 
oL 
0.5 1.5 2.5 
Wt (Warning Time In Hours) 
_._Forcefulness, F 0 _,._Fc::or=ce"'tu"'ln=es=s•, F""'=""1"1 
3.5 
114 
Figure 7. Equation DM-2d: The curves with Fd =I and Fd = 0 cross at about Wt = 1.7 
hours . 
= 0). However, the differences are minor and both curves converge to essentially the 
same values. If viewed from this perspective, the model implies that after 1.7 hr, 
evacuation approaches a standstill and fatalities occur among the holdouts, through 
convergence, or due to unusual circumstances that are largely unrelated to flood 
forcefulness. 
Confidence intervals 
Michael DeKay computed 95% confidence intervals for each of the data points 
the equation produces when applied to the underlying data set. These were reported by 
the ANCOLD Working Group on Risk Assessment (Australian National Committee on 
Large Dams, 1998) and are presented in columns 6 and 8 of Table 9. Figures 8, 9, and 
Figure I 0 present the intervals graphically according to the size of each range. As can be 
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Table 9. Table of flood wave events underlying equation DM-2d, variable values, 
historic life loss, estimated life loss using equation DM-2d, and 95% 
confidence intervals for each estimate (Australian National Committee on 
Large Dams, 1998) 
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Bushy Hill Pond Dam, CT, 1982 400 2.5 0 0 0 0 6 
Bear Wallow Dam, NC, 1976 8 0 I 4 0 5 8 
Little Deer Creek Dam, UT, 1963 50 0 0 I 0 I 10 
Centralia, WA, 1991 150 0 0 0 0 I 20 
Denver, CO, 1965 (South Platte River) 10000 3.17 0 I 0 I 24 
Northern NJ, 1984 25000 3 0 2 0 2 45 
Mohegan Park Dam, CT, 1963 1000 0 0 6 0 4 61 
Teton Dam, 10, 1976 (Rexburg to American Falls) 23000 2.25 0 4 0 4 67 
Lee Lake Dam, MA, 1968 80 0 I 2 2 26 71 
Swift and [Lower] Two Medicine Dams, MT, 1964 250 0.75 I 28 0 8 88 
Allegheny County, PA, 1986 2200 0 0 9 0 6 100 
Lawn Lake Dam, CO, 1982 5000 0.5 0 3 0 5 104 
Laurel Run Dam, P A, 1977 150 0 I 40 3 40 128 
Austin, TX, 1981 1180 I I 13 I 9 137 
Kelley Barnes Dam, GA, 1977 250 0.25 I 39 2 31 170 
Baldwin Hills Dam, CA, 1963 16500 -u I 5 0 9 200 
Stava Dam, Italy, 1985 300 0 I 270 5 64 243 
Teton Dam, 10, 1976 (Dam through Wilford) 2000 0.75 I 7 2 25 326 
Texas Hill Country, 1978 2070 0.75 I 25 2 25 333 
Vega De Tera Dam, Spain, 1959 500 0 I 150 7 89 387 
Kansas City, MO, 1977 2380 0.5 I 20 4 57 640 
Shadyside, OH, 1990 884 0 I 24 9 127 646 
Big Thompson, CO, 1976 2500 0.5 I 144 4 59 662 
Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam, WV, 1972 5000 0.5 I 125 6 87 1074 
Black Hills, SO, 1972 17000 0.5 I 245 10 174 2538 
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Figure 8. The 95% confidence intervals for data points from Table 5 for which the 
range does not exceed L = 90. The tick marks indicate the estimate produced 
by equation DM-2d. 
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Figure 9. The 95% confidence interval for data points from Table 5 for which the range 
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Figure 10. The 95% confidence interval for data points from Table 5 for which the range 
exceeds L = 600 but does not exceed L = 3,500. The tick marks indicate the 
estimate produced by equation DM-2d. 
seen, the intervals are extremely large and often exceed I 0 times the size of the life-loss 
estimate itself. 
These confidence intervals suggest that the predictive authority of equation DM-
2d is small. In most cases, the true mean life loss for a given event has a 95% chance of 
falling anywhere between about 0 and a value 10-20 times greater than the estimate 
produced by the equation. The sensitivity ofP to the size of the range is greatest when Fd 
= l ; i.e., when life loss is typically of greatest concern. Clearly, a model with smaller 
confidence limits would be desirable, but in the absence of such a model , it may be 
preferable to express the expected value from the DeKay-McClelland equation as a 
range, or as a probability distribution, rather than as a point estimate. 
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Implications of the DeKay-McClelland 
Logit Transformation 
Derivation 
It is helpful to review and expand upon the derivation of equation DM-2d in 
Chapter III. The linear form underlying this equation is 
L(P) = In(_!_)= a + bln(Par)+c(Wt) +d(Fd) +e(Wt)(Fd) 
1-P 
(DM-2) 
Following a standard least squares regression on the data set used in 1993 and fitting 
equation DM-2 with the resulting coefficients produces equation DM-2a. 
L(P) = In(_!_)= -2.586- 0.4401n(Par)- 0.759(Wt) + 3.790(Fd)- 2.223(Wt)(Fd) (DM-2a) 
1- P 
To isolate P, one can take the exponent of both sides, 
p 
- = exp[- 2.586- 0.4401n(Par) - 0.759(Wt) + 3.790(Fd)- 2.223(Wt)(Fd)] 
1-P 
multiply both sides by 1-P, isolate terms with P on one side of the equation, and factor 
out P to yield equation DM-2b: 
P= L 
Par 
exp[- 2.586-0.440 ln(Par)- 0. 759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)] (DM-2b) 
I+ exp[- 2.586-0.440 In( Par)- 0. 759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)] 
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Recognizing that 
DM-2b reduces to 
L I 
Par I + exp(2.586 + 0.440 1n(Par) + 0.759(Wt) - 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)] 
Isolating L leads to equation DM-2c 
L 
Par (DM-2c) 
I+ exp(2.586 + 0.440 In( Par) + 0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)] 
This equation can then be modified by pulling the first two terms in the exponent out 
front as (e2586)(e0·4401"(Par)) and simplifying to yield the final equation DM-2d. 
L = Par (DM-2d) 
I+ 13.277(Par0 440 )exp[0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)] 
Logistic regression 
Targeting L(P), not P or L 
While the DeKay-McClelland equation has a R2 value of0.840 1 (DeKay and 
McClelland, 1993 b), it is important to remember that this value measures the fraction of 
the variability explained by the regression equation for the transformed variable, 
1 The R2 value for the corresponding regression equation derived using the shorter, unmodified 





where P = L!Par. This R2 does not address the ability of the equation to predict life loss 
itself or the proportion of lives lost. The implications are important because during 
regression, as Par grows, the equation can overestimate or underestimate the loss of life 
by ever greater amounts with minimal impact on the final choice of equation coefficients. 
To explain this, pretend for a moment that the left-hand side of equation DM-2 is 
P instead of L(P). During the least-squares analysis, it is not the absolute magnitude of 
life loss that is considered but the ratio of life loss to population at risk. The regression 
algorithm seeks to minimize the sum of the squares of the residuals, which are here 
defined as the difference between the ratio L/Par predicted by the equation and the true 
value in the data set. A large residual in terms of L might be a very small residual in 
terms of P if Par is large. When comparing two cases, it is possible for one to have a 
smaller residual with respect to P while having a much larger residual in terms of L, 
shifting the resulting predicted value in the opposite direction than it would go if L were 
the dependent variable. 
Using an example from the data set, consider the two cases presented in Table 10. 
Bear Wallow Dam had Par= 8 and L = 4, resulting in P = 0.5. Equation DM-2d predicts 
a loss of life of 4.574, resulting in P = 0.572. The residual in terms of L is 0.574 and the 
residual in terms ofP is 0.072. Now consider the Big Thompson flash flood. Par was 
considered 2,500, the actual L = 144, and the predicted L =59. The actual and predicted 
P-values are 0.0576 and 0.0236, respectively, producing a P-residual of -0.034. Ignoring 
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Table 10. An example of the effect of using the ratio Pas the dependent variable in the 
regression equation in place of L when one Par is large and another is small 
Actual Estimated Residual 
Failure Event Par L L Residual Using P Using L 
Bear Wallow 8 4 4.574 4.574/8-4/8 - 0.072 0.574 
Big 




By what percent does the abso lute value of 
the larger differ from the absolute value of 112% 14,700% 
the smaller? 
the sign of the terms, the residual based on Pis actually better than that for Bear Wallow 
by about half (0.034 vs. 0.072), but the residual for Lis 85, or nearly !50 times that for 
Bear Wallow (85 vs. 0.574). 
The actual regression dynamics are more complicated than this because the left 
side of equation DM-2 is not P but a transformation or function of P. This can potentially 
make the residuals with respect to L even less important. 
Consider two Par of comparable size presented in Table II. On paper, the failures 
of Lee Lake Dam and the connected dams at Stava were quite similar in the sense that Wt 
= 0 and Fd = I for both of them and their Par values were close enough for the nonlinear 
effects in Figure 3 to be relatively small. In reality, however, the failure at Stava was one 
of the worst dam disasters on record while the failure at Lee Lake was unexceptional 
among floods with life loss. Hence, the actual loss of life in each case was very different 
from the predicted value and in opposite directions. 
What is important is the impact of choosing L(P) instead of P or L as the 
dependent variable. In order to minimize the sum of squared residuals, the regression 
algorithm seeks to balance high and low misestimates in a way that the majority of their 
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Table 11 . An example of the effect of using the ratio Pas the dependent variable in the 
regression equation in place of L when Par are comparable, but L have 
different orders of magnitude 
Actual Estimated L(P) p L 
Failure Event Par L L Residual Residual Residual 
Lee Lake Dam 80 2 26 -2.933 0.30 24 
Stava Dams 300 270 64 -3.503 -0.69 -206 
By what percent does the absolute value of the larger 
19% 130% 758% 
differ from the absolute value of the smaller? 
absolute values tend to cluster in the same range. As indicated in the last row of Table 11 , 
this has been accomplished with respect to the dependent transfonnation, L(P). The 
residuals differ in magnitude by only 19%. However, this is at the expense of balance in 
P, which differs by 130%, and almost total disregard for the values ofL, with one 
residual being 7.58 times larger than the other. As a consequence, rather than a true 
difference of268 fatalities between the events, the equation predicts a difference of only 
38 without sacrificing a high R2 value in the transformed domain. 
Basis for error in ranking risk 
within a portfolio of dams 
The logit transformation will be explored in more detail shortly, but for now it 
should be noted that the biases generated by the form of equation DM-2 have serious 
ramifications for dam safety risk analysis. The cost to save a (statistical) life is the 
difference between the annualized cost of a safety remediation measure and the 
annualized economic benefit of risk reduction to property, divided by the incremental 
reduction in the annualized risk of life loss brought about by the safety remediation. As 
such, it is a measure of the cost-effectiveness of a risk-reduction alternative that can be 
used to prioritize remedial measures across a portfolio of dams. Assume for a moment 
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that the Stava Dams and Lee Lake Dam had equal probabilities of failure and that the cost 
of remedial measures and economic risk reduction to prevent these failures would have 
been identical. Furthermore, ignore for a moment alternative failure scenarios and safety 
measures to reduce life loss during a failure event, such as early warning systems and 
emergency action plans. Under these constraints, the comparative cost to save a life 
between these two dams would have depended solely on the number of fatalities expected 
from each failure. Based on the logit model as illustrated in Table 11 , the dams at Stava 
might have been prioritized for safety improvement just ahead of Lee Lake Dam within a 
portfolio of dams: only 2.5 times as many people would have been expected to die at 
Stava, rather than the 135 times as many that actually perished. 
One can take this a step further and consider the more realistic case where the 
probability of failure is different for each dam in a portfolio. If the Stava dams had a 
probability of failure of2* 1 o-5 per year, and Lee Lake Dam was just slightly more likely 
to fail at 6* I o-5 per year, their respective annualized life-loss risks would be: 
Stava dams: (2*10-5/year)•(64lives) = 0.00128lives/year 
Lee Lake Dam: (6•J0-5/year)•(26lives) = 0.00156lives/year. 
Such levels of annualized life-loss risk are generally considered 'unacceptable, but Lee 
Lake would be concluded to have a higher annualized life loss than Stava even though 
the true annualized life-loss risk was 45 times greater, as indicated below: 
Stava dams: (2•I0.5/year)•(270 lives)= 0.0054lives/year 
Lee Lake Dam: (6* 10"5/year)•(2lives) = 0.00012 lives/year. 
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To show that this is not an isolated danger, consider the Shadyside2 flash flood in 
1990. As for the Stava dams and Lee Lake Dam, Wt = 0 and Fd = 1. With a Par three 
times larger than at Stava (Par= 884), the predicted life loss at Shadyside rises to 127, 
but L was actually only 24. With an L-residnal over 100, this is the largest overestimation 
in the data set. Treating Shadyside as a dam failure, the probability of fai lure at the Stava 
dams would have to be twice as great as for Shadyside before Stava would get ranked as 
an equal hazard. Given twice the annualized life-loss risk of failure, the true historical 
annualized life-loss risk at Stava would have been 2,250% greater than at Shadyside: 
(2 *270/24)* 1 00%. 
Significantly, given equal probabilities of failure , Shadyside would also be ranked 
ahead of the Buffalo Creek coal waste dam failure, the Big Thompson flash flood , and 
the Vega de Tera Dam failure in terms of annualized life-loss risk. In each case, the true 
historical annualized life-loss risk for these events was an order of magnitude greater than 
at Shadyside. The five cases under discussion are summarized in Table 12, where they 
have been ranked in ascending order based on predicted annualized life-loss risks. The 
relative historical annualized life-loss risks are presented in column 5, where the 
annualized risk under equal probability of failure is given as a percentage of the dam 
perceived to be most at risk.3 Notice that the true annualized life-loss risk of the fifth-
ranked dam would be 6 times greater than that of the first-ranked dam. The annualized 
risk for the fourth-ranked dam would be more than 11 times greater. Par is shown in the 
2 There were actually flash fl oods on three watersheds that caused loss of li fe. Two of the rivers-
Pipes Creek and Wegee Creek near the town of Shadyside, Ohio--were combined by DeKay and 
McClelland !993a into a single event with a single Par. 
3 In this case, a flash fl ood. 
125 
Table 12. Selective comparison of perceived annualized risk based on estimated L and 




Likelihood of Dam 
Estimated Actual Failure Compared Residual 
Failure Event Rank L L to Top Ranked Using L Par 
Shadyside I 127 24 100% 103 884 
Vega de Tera 2 89 150 625% -61 500 
Buffalo Creek 3 87 125 521% -38 5.000 
Stava 4 64 270 1,125% -206 300 
Big Thompson 5 59 144 600% -85 2.500 
final column to demonstrate that this danger holds across the spectrum of population 
sizes. 
Bias due to the nonlinearity of 
L(P) with respect to P and L 
Now that the importance of the form of the regression has been demonstrated, the 
mechanics of the logit transformation should be explored. Figures II and 12 illustrate the 
general behavior of the function L(P); ln[P/(1-P)]. 
As illustrated in Figure II, the function L(P); ln[P/(1-P)] is synunetric about 0.0. 
approaching -<Xl as P approaches 0 and <XJ as P approaches 1. This logaritlunic shape 
grows rapidly in the tails with the result that a very small change in P will result in a very 
large change in the residual, L(Pest ima~ed)-L(Phiswric) , when Pis very small or very large. 
This is demonstrated in the relatively parabolic shape to the curve in Figure 12. There, 
the residuals of the transformations L(P2)-L(P 1) are graphed against the midpoint of 
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Figure 12. Graph demonstrating the unequal weight given to residuals L(Pest ;rnete)-
L(Ph;st0 ,;,). Given evenly spaced values for P, the residuals ofL(P) will be 
much larger when Pis near 0 or 1 than near 0.5. 
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the ?-increment chosen, but for a given increment, the rate of increase steadily increases 
nearer P = 0 and P = I. Thus, events for which the ratio L/Par is very small or very large 
dominate the the regression as the algorithm seeks to minimize the sum of the squared 
residuals. The result is a biased regression equation. 
Consider two data points with Par of I ,000. Event A had L = 2, P = 0.002, and 
L(P) = -6.2126; Event B had L = 150, P = 0.150, and L(P) = -I. 7346. Now let us say the 
regression equation predicts L = I for Event A, resulting in P = 0.001 and L(P) = -6.9067. 
Thus, the residual for Event A, based on L(P), is -0.694. 
Now the regression algorithm seeks to "balance" residuals-allowing some to 
grow in order to reduce others- to minimize the sum of their squares. In the name of 
balance, what predicted L value will yield the same residual of 0.694 for the second event 
with P = 0.15? There are two options, since squared residuals are insensitive to sign. It 
can underestimate the life loss by 69 or it can overestimate life loss by Ill : L = 81 and L 
= 261. Both yield logit residuals with absolute values of 0.694. 
Of course, it is unlikely that exactly balancing these two residuals will minimize 
the sum of squares from a larger data set, but notice two things. First, an underestimate in 
L of 69 has the same effect on the L(P)-residual as an overestimate of Ill . As illustrated 
in Figure 12, for a given change in L(P), one will always have a larger change in P when 
moving toward P = 0.5 than when moving toward P = 0 or P = I . This becomes more 
pronounced the closer P comes to 0 or I. Hence, L = 3.99 also yields a residual of0.694 
for Event A, even though it is twice as far removed from L = 2 as L = 1.00 is from L = 2. 
Second, the variance in L balloons asP approaches 0.5. The range I < L < 4 for 
Event A is bounded by the same residuals as is 81 < L < 261 for Event B. 
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Contrary to the independence of a single data point, when a data set is dominated 
by values that fall on one side of 0.5 or the other, prediction of P-values between 0.5 and 
this dominant set will tend to be skewed in the direction of the set. The reason for this is 
that near 0 or l , a small error in P produces a very large error in L(P). Thus, to minimize 
the overall deviations in L(P), the regression algorithm biases the equation to predict the 
most extreme values ofP the most accurately, even if this requires skewing less extreme 
estimates in the direction of the most extreme values. The extreme values, in tum, will 
tend to skew toward 0.5, although these deviations will be small. 
lt is important to remember that "extreme values" near 0 or l and " less extreme" 
values closer to 0.5 are relative concepts: lt is their relative magnitudes that matter, not 
their absolute magnitudes. Also, the magnitude of L matters only as it relates to Par 
through P. 
Consider events number l , 16, and 27 in Table 13. Bushy Hill Pond Dam had Par 
= 400 and L = 0. Because the log of 0 is undefined, by convention L is set equal to 0.5 
and P = l /(2*Par) . In this case, P = 0.0013 and equation DM-2d estimates L = 0.32, 
resulting in P = 0.0008 and an L(P)-residual of 0.44. 
In contrast to this excellent estimate of L, equation DM-2d underestimates L by 
71 people for the Black Hills flash flood. Nevertheless, the L(P)-residual is actually 
smaller in this case (0.35) because the P-values are an order of magnitude larger (Phistoric = 
0.014, Ppredicted = 0.010). The absolute magnitude of the P-values is still small-despite 
the fact that this event had the third largest life loss in the data set-because Par is very 
large ( 17,000). 
Table 13. DeKay's and McClelland's data set, arranged in ascending order of historical L (adapted from DeKay and McClelland, 
1993b, Table I, p. 197) 
I 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 
Actual L Actual L 
When When Predicted Loss •Residuals 
Predicted Predicted Actual Loss of Life Predicted L Residuals Using L(P)= 
Event Locations Pa< High Low of Life (Rounded) Eq. DM·2d Using L ln[P/(I·P)J 
I Bushy Hill Pond Dam, CT, 1982 400 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 -0.44 
2 Centralia, WA, 1991 ISO 0 0 I 1.2 1.2 0.91 
3 Prospect Dam, CO, 1980 100 0 0 0 0.003 0.0 -5 01 
4 Denver, CO, 1965 (South Plane River) 10,000 I I I 1.2 0.2 0.17 
s D.M.A.D. Dam, UT, 1983 500 I I 0 0.018 -1.0 -4.04 
6 Little Deer Creek Dam, UT, 1963 50 I I I 0.7 -0.3 -0.42 
7 Lee Lake Dam, MA, 1968 80 2 2 26 26.1 24.1 2.94 
8 Northern NJ, 1984 25,000 2 2 2 2.2 0.2 0 .11 
9 Lawn Lake Dam, CO, 1982 5,000 3 3 5 6.1 3.1 0 .70 
10 Bear Wallow Dam, NC, 1976 8 4 4 s 4.6 0.6 0.29 
II Teton Dam, 10, 1976 (Rexburg to American Falls) 23,000 4 4 4 3.8 -0.2 -0.06 
12 Baldwin Hills Dam, CA, 1963 16,500 5 5 9 8.7 3.7 0.56 
13 Mohegan Park Dam, CT, 1963 1,000 6 6 4 3.6 -2.4 -0.52 
14 Teton Dam, to, 1976 (Dam through Wilford) 2,000 7 7 25 24.8 17.8 1.27 
IS Allegheny County, PA, 1986 2,200 9 9 6 5.6 -3.4 -0.48 
16 Kansas River, KS, 1951 58,000 II II 0 0.2 -10.8 -4 .00 
17 Austin, TX, 1981 1,180 13 13 9 8.8 -4.2 -0.39 
18 Kansas City, MO, 1977 2,380 20 20 57 57.0 37.0 106 
19 Shadyside, OH, 1990 884 24 24 127 127.4 103.4 1.80 
20 Texas Hill Country, 1978 2,070 25 25 25 25.3 0.3 0.01 
21 Swift and [Lower] Two Medicine Dams, MT, 1964 250 28 28 8 7.6 -20.4 -1.39 
22 Kelley Barnes Dam, GA, 1977 250 39 39 31 30.6 -8.4 -0.28 
23 Laurel Run Dam, PA, 1977 150 40 40 40 40.3 0.3 0.01 
24 Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam, WV, 1972 5,000 125 125 87 86.9 -38.1 -0.37 
25 Big Thompson, CO, 1976 2,500 144 144 59 58.6 -85.4 -0.93 
26 Vega De Tera Dam, Spain, 1959 500 150 ISO 89 89.0 -61.0 -0.68 
27 Black Hills, SO, 1972 17,000 245 245 174 173.8 -71.2 -0.35 
Table 13 . Continued 
Event Locations Par 
28 Stava Dam, Italy, 1985 300 
29 Malpasset Dam, France, 1959 6,000 
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Arithmetic Mean L· Residual for L > 120:- -79.5 
Arithmetic Mean L-Rcsidual for L > 25: - -56 .2 
Arithmetic Mean L-Rcsidual for L <- 25:- 8.5 
Arithmetic Mean L-Rcsidual for L < 10 2.2 
Mean overestimation ofL:- 13.7 









If P were a less extreme value near 0.5, L would be allowed to vary even more. 
Specifically, ifL = 8,500 while Par= 17,000, such that P = 0.5. L could be estimated 
anywhere between 6,660 and I 0,340 without exceeding the L(P)-residual of 0.44 for 
Bushy Hill Pond. More to the point, the algorithm treats a life-loss range of 0.32-0.78 
when Par= 400 and L = 0.5 as equivalent to a life-loss range of 6,660-10,340 when Par = 
I 7.000 and L = 8,500: The L(P)-residual for every endpoint has magnitude 0.44. 
By contrast, when Par is very large and L is small such that Pis very small , the 
L(P)-residuals grow rapidly with small changes in L. Equation DM-2d underestimates 
life loss for the Kansas River flood by less than II fatalities . However, a very large Par 
(58,000) combined with a small number of deaths (II, estimated at 0.2) produces very 
small values for P (Ph;stodc = 0.000189, Ppredkted = 0.000003). The L(P) residual in this 
case is 4.00, more than 5 times greater than for Bushy Hill and the Black Hills combined. 
To emphasize the previous points, the smaller P becomes, the more likely L will 
be overestimated. For Kansas River with Par = 58,000, L = II , and P = 0.00019, the 
ranges 0.2-11 and 11-594 are both bounded by an L(P)-residual of 4.00. Also, asP 
becomes smaller, the regression algorithm tolerates less and less deviation in L. At P = 
0.000 I 9 and an L(P)-residual :5 4.00, Kansas River allows 0.2 < L < 594, or a spread of 
nearly 600. Under identical conditions except P = 0.5, Kansas River would allow 1.043 < 
L < 56,956, or a spread of nearly 56,000. 
Bias due to trends in the data set 
Considering the values in Table 5, P-values are generally less than 0.5 (o nl y Stava 
Dam has a P-value greater), dan1 failures with low life loss tend to have very low P-
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values, and failures with large L-values tend to have P-values relatively closer to 0.5. 
Thus, based on the reasoning above, one would expect equation DM-2d to predict events 
with small L-values fairly accurately but with a bias towards overestimation. Events with 
L-values in the midrange might defy an easy trend, but events with large L-values would 
most likely show a clear trend toward dramatic underestimation. 
One might also expect equation DM-2d to predict P more accurately when Par is 
large than when Par is small. This follows from the tendency in the data set for large Par 
to have the smallest values for P- the basis for the nonlinearity displayed in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4. This also leads to a tendency to put the greatest weight on those events that are 
least hazardous (large Par and small expected life loss). As such, equation DM-2d is least 
credible when applied to high-hazard events or to small Par, either of which is likely to 
produce relatively large values for P. 
Not surprisingly, all of this describes the pattern reflected in the residuals with 
respect to Lin the data set. Indeed, without undergoing a rigorous analysis of variance 
(AN OVA), clear trends are readily apparent from a perusal of Table 13. The events are 
sorted in ascending order by the number of lives that were lost, as shown in column 5. 
Columns 3 and 4 duplicate these values, but column 3 lists only those events for which 
the equation ' s estimates are high (P moves toward 0.5), and column 4lists only those 
events for which the equation' s estimates are low (P skews toward the most extreme 
values). Columns 6 and 7 list the estimates for L produced by equation DM-2d. Columns 
8 and 9 present the residuals with respect to Land L(P), respectively. Various footnotes 
and mean values are found at the bottom of the table. 
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Columns 5, 7, and 8 indicate that prediction levels generally fall within a few 
lives of the true value when historic fatality rates were less than I 04 Of the 15 
predictions in this range 67% are overestimates, skewing P toward 0.5. Of the 12 floods 
with L s; 5, 75% are overestimated. The magnitude of prediction error in these ranges is 
small--often indiscernible after rounding. The arithmetic average error is 2.2 over the 15 
cases that comprise the lower half the data set with respect to historic life loss. 
Predictions for floods with L = I 0-40 show a fair bit of scatter. There are eight 
floods in this range. L is overestimated for half and underestimated for hal f, though the 
magnitudes of the over-predictions dominate. Unlike failures with L below I 0, in this 
mid-range the L-residuals are characterized by large variance. While the arithmetic mean 
L residual is 8.8, the average absolute magnitude of the residual (ignoring signs) is 23. 1. 
There is no way to judge the transition point between dam failures within the mid-
range and high-range of life loss since no data exist for failures with 41 < L < 124. 
However, the six remaining failure events all fall within the high range and L is 
underestimated in every case, usually by a large margin. Considering all events with 
actual L greater than 25, the arithmetic mean L-error is -56. This increases to -80 for the 
six worst catastrophes. For these six, only 59% of the actual life loss is recognized by 
equation DM-2d. 
A quick perusal of the largest and smallest Par indicates that errors in P are 
generally much smaller when Par is large. Likewise, P and L are most accurate when 
4 A va riation of at least 1-3 might be expected at all levels of life loss due to convergence deaths or 
other isolated fatal ities which might be considered unique or random in nature. 
these values are smallest, meaning the equation is least accurate in predicting L when 
large numbers of people are expected to die. 
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As a global summary of the entire data set, 14 cases overestimate loss of life by 
an average of l3.61ives while 15 cases underestimate loss of life by an average of35.2 
lives. There are two cases in which an overestimation ofL reflects an underestimation of 
the logit variable L(P). In both cases the actual L was zero and the value used for P is 
calculated by convention asP= l/(2*Par) (DeKay and McClelland, 1991). 
All of the characteristics discussed in this chapter would be expected to hold true 
when the equation is used to estimate future outcomes. 
Shortcomings of the DeKay-McClelland 
Model as Currently Applied 
Before discussing the shortcomings in detail, it bears repeating that the DeKay-
McClelland model represents the most rigorous empirical approach to date. As such, it 
was the preeminent life-loss method until recently and its authors should be commended 
for their contributions to the state of the art. 
The model's most problematic shortcomings arise not from any error in statistical 
analysis, but from a misunderstanding of life-loss dynamics and misuse of the model by 
dam safety risk professionals. Neither author had a background in fields related to dam 
safety, hydraulics, hydrology, or emergency management. In their words, "our approach 
is primarily data-driven rather than theory driven. We try to be reasonable in our choice 
of variables and the forrn in which we express them, but we adhere to no particular theory 
regarding the causes of flood fatalities" (DeKay and McClelland, l993b, p. 193). 
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The most obvious contradiction between the model and true life-loss dynamics is 
that the model treats an entire Par as a single entity with a single warning time and a 
consistent mix of damages to structures. Recognizing the logical dissonance that this 
causes, dam safety risk professionals have tended to apply the equation to more 
homogeneous subpopulations, isolating canyon communities from valley communities 
and those far from the dam from those close to the dam. However, the more the model is 
applied to homogeneous subpopulations, the more the approach violates the assumptions 
governing its derivation and the more suspect the results become. 
This and other foundational weaknesses have been explored in great detail in the 
preceding sections. Hence, this section is intended only as an outline summary, with 
additional insights that were derived through historical analysis and reasoning. To keep 
the following comments brief, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the contents of 
this chapter and the section on the DeKay-McClelland model in Chapter III. Support for 
additional insights is provided in the subsequent chapters and appendices. 
Life loss is nonlinear 
with respect to Par 
l. An application of the model to subPar increases the estimate of L. 
2. Every unique division of subPar will yield a different estimate ofL. 
The model was developed using 
heterogeneous Par rather than 
homogeneous subPar 
I. The current practice of applying the model to subPar applies the equation to 
populations unlike those in the data set. This, in tum, produces unreliable results. 
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2. Wt and Fd do not represent the average conditions experienced by individuals 
within a global population. As such, Wt and Fd have limited value when one compares 
two or more dissimilar events. 
3. Wt and Fd do not represent or quantify those who are most at risk. 
4. Making assumptions about evacuation rates based on the interplay between a 
point value like Wt and L is potentially misleading and can make it appear that 
evacuations proceed slowly when, in fact, Wt; may be very small or nonexistent for those 
who perish. 
The model uses Wt rather than 
excess evacuation time (E) 
I. Wt is generally larger than Wtavg and takes no account of the dissemination 
rate or the percentage of people reached. 
2. Wt does not describe whether those who receive a warning are most at risk or 
least at risk. 
3. Wt takes no account of the urgency or believability of the message. A NWS 
scrawl at the bottom of a sitcom does not have the same potential to mobilize an 
evacuation as a fireman at the door or the fearful sight and sound of an approaching wall 
of water. 
4. Wt takes no account of the time of day or night, whether families are together 
or separated during work hours, and other facto rs that affect a population's response 
patterns. 
5. Wt is independent of the time required for evacuation. 
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6. In summary, it is the excess evacuation time (E)-the time required to clear 
the flood zone minus the time available to clear the flood zone-that determines whether 
people are likely to escape a flood. Wt is independent of the distance to safety, the 
mobility of the population, the time of day or night, the urgency of the message, and 
other factors that determine the representative time needed for evacuation. As such, Wt, 
by itself, has limited usefulness when comparing dissimilar events. 
7. Together, these factors mask the benefits of improved warning dissemination 
and urgency while emphasizing only the timing of the first notification. 
The model makes no distinction 
between day and night 
Darkness and sleep can dramatically hinder the ability of a population to detect 
sensory clues, share them with neighbors, and prepare their families to run for safety. 
This is most important when Wt is small. Since the data set underlying the model is a mix 
of day and night events, the regression equation cannot be fully trusted to apply to either. 
As a dichotomous variable 
Fd is too coarse for refined 
estimates of life loss 
I. It is unrealistic to expect the same rate oflife loss regardless of whether 20% 
or 100% of the buildings receive at least major damage. Indeed, life loss is likely to grow 
faster than the rate of damages because a higher damage rate implies a flood with greater 
depths and velocities at every structure. 
2. Based on the events used in developing the equation, the model implicitly 
assumes that every Par is sufficiently heterogeneous to force the rate of housing damages 
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toward the lower limits of Fd ~ 0 and Fd ~ I. As such, the model "fits" only a limited 
type of event/population. 
a) The model does a poor job of predicting life loss for its own data set 
when a case falls outside of this expected range- that is, when damages are 
extreme. 
b) The equation is unsuited for application to Par or subPar with 
homogenous damages. This is in direct contradiction to the way analysts prefer to 
use the equation, since they tend to isolate communities closest to a dam from 
those downstream. 
c) The equation is unsuited for application to the most lethal flood events, 
such as the failure at Yaiont, Italy. 
According to Fd the same number oflives 
should be lost when a building receives 
major damage as when it is destroyed 
The model obscures the large difference in life loss when buildings are obliterated 
compared to when they retain a form of haven. Historically, this difference is so 
pronounced that this oversight may be the model 's greatest shortcoming. 
Sometimes Par is aggregated 
across many watersheds 
I. This kind of flooding is atypical of a dam failure . 
2. Life loss is usually limited to the most dangerous reaches or watersheds, but 
because Par is expanded to include watersheds with milder flooding, housing damages 
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tend toward the lower limits ofFd = 0 or Fd = I and estimates ofP conform accordingly 
(see above). 
3. Examples from the data set (see Table 13): Allegheny County flash floods , 
Black Hills flash floods, Kansas City floods, Northern New Jersey flash floods , Texas 
Hill Country flash floods, and Shadyside flash floods (although for Shadyside, Wegee 
Creek and Pipe Creek were so similar they could be combined with no dilution offd). 
Sometimes L has little 
relationship to Par 
I. By combining subPar into a single Par, Par can be quantified in a way that 
has little or no relationship to the number of people who are most at risk and the nature of 
the flooding they experience. 
2. Examples (see Table 13): 
a) All nine deaths in Allegheny County occurred among a small band of 
motorists traveling on a single stretch of road along Little Pine Creek. 
Nevertheless, DeKay and McClelland ( 1993a) quantified Par based on the number 
of residences that were damaged in every watershed in the county. 
b) During the Austin, Texas, flash floods in 1981, II out of 13 deaths 
occurred to motorists at low water crossings. The crossings were located in five 
different watersheds, they were mostly distant from areas with housing damages, 
the motorists were not evacuees, and in many cases the victims did not even live 
in the state. Nevertheless, DeKay and McClelland (1993a) quantified Par based 
on the number of residences that were damaged-residences that were mostly 
evacuated before the flooding reached lethal proportions. 
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c) None of the 25 deaths during the Kansas City floods involved people 
trapped in buildings because the water rose slowly enough for people to walk 
away without hurrying. The victims were those who faced the flood after it 
reached dangerous proportions-motorists, pedestrians, people who came to 
watch the flood, and people who experienced fatal medical emergencies like heart 
attacks. Nevertheless, DeKay and McClelland (1993a) quantified Par based on the 
number of residences that were damaged across many different watersheds. 
3. Examples like this argue for the importance of treating different categories of 
Par or subPar uniquely. That is, subPar in campgrounds, automobiles, boats, homes, or 
other locations may not all share the same traits with respect to warning dissemination, 
evacuation, flood exposure, and life loss . 
Some variables were assigned values 
inconsistent with the best evidence 
This is a matter of judgement and the availability of relevant historical 
documents . It is likely that future researchers will refine estimates made as part of this 
study, as well. However, Table 14 shows the most important differences between the 
values used by DeKay and McClelland (1993b) and those chosen as part of this study 
after careful research and full documentation in Appendix B. 
The logit procedure is biased 
I. Due to the nature of the logit transformation and the values in the data set, the 
regression algorithm seeks to predict P most accurately when P is smallest and least 
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Table 14. Values used by DeKay and McClelland (1993b) (D-M) and those indicated 
by current research (M) in which Wt was quantified only for subPar, but the 
symbols > and < indicate if the global value is at least 15 minutes higher or 
lower than the value used by DeKay and McClelland. The co lumn for Wt in 
minutes reflects the subPar most representative of Par as a whole. The most 
significant differences are highlighted in bold 
M 
sub-
D-M M D-M M D-M M Par D-M M 
Wt Wt Wt 
Event L L Par Par (hr) (hr) (min) Fd Fd 
1 
I Allegheny County, PA, 1986 9 9 2,200 1,700 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Austin, TX, 1981 13 13 1.180 1, 196 I < 30 I I 
3 Baldwin Hills Dam, CA, 1963 5 5 16,500 16,500 1.5 > 105 I I 
4 Bear Wallow Dam, NC, 1976 4 4 8 4-7 0 0 0 I I 
5 Big Thompson , CO, 1976 144 145 2,500 2.500 0.5 0 0 I I 
6 Black Hills. SO, 1972 (Canyon Lake Dam) 245 237 17,000 12,375 0.5 I > 45 I I 
7 Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam, WV, 1972 125 139 5,000 3,171 0.5 --- --- I I 
8 Bushy Hill Pond Dam, CT, 1982 0 --- 400 --- 2.5 --- --- 0 ---
9 Centralia, WA, 1991 0 --- !50 --- 0 --- --- 0 ---
10* D.M.A.D. Dam, UT, 1983 I --- 500 --- 6.5 --- --- 0 ---
II Denver, CO, 1965 (South Platte River) I --- 10,000 --- 3.17 --- --- 0 ---
12 Kansas City, MO, 1977 20 25 2,380 3,000 0.5 < I S I I 
13* Kansas River, KS, 1951 II --- 58,000 --- 3 --- --- I ---
14 Ke lley Barnes Dam, GA, 1977 39 39 250 140 0.25 < 0.33 I I 
15 Laure l Run Dam, PA, 1977 40 --- !50 --- 0 --- --- I ---
16 Lawn Lake Dam, CO, 1982 3 --- 5,000 --- 0.75 --- --- 0 --- 1 
17 Lee Lake Dam, MA, 1968 2 2 80 123 0 0 0 I I I 
18 Little Deer Creek Dam, UT. 1963 I --- 50 --- 0 --- --- 0 ---
19 Malpasset Dam, France, 1959 42 1 --- 6,000 --- 0 > --- I ---
20 Mohegan Park Dam, CT, 1963 6 --- 1,000 --- 0 > --- 0 ---
2 1 Northern NJ, 1984 2 --- 25,000 --- 3 --- --- 0 ---
22* Prospect Dam, CO, 1980 0 --- 100 --- 7.5 --- --- 0 ---
23 Shadys ide, OH, 1990 24 24 884 547 0 0 0 I I 
24 Stava dams, Italy, 1985 270 270 300 300 0 0 0 I I 
25 
Swift and [Lower] Two Medicine Dams, 
28 --- 250 --- 0.75 --- --- I ---MT, 1964 
26 
Teton Dam, ID, 1976 (Dam through 
7 --- 2,000 --- 0.75 --- --- I ---
Wilford) 
27 
Teton Dam, 10, 1976 (Rexburg to 
4 --- 23 ,000 --- 2.25 --- --- 0 ---American Falls) 
28 Texas Hill Countty, 1978 25 --- 2,070 --- 0.75 --- --- I ---
29 Vega De Tera Dam, Spain, 1959 !50 !53 500 415 0 0 I 0 I I 
• Not used in equation derivations (ornined as out liers). 
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accurately when Pis largest. Also, P will tend to skew high when it is smallest and skew 
low when P is largest. 
a) Within the data set, the model tends to predict L with high precision and 
a slight bias toward overestimation when L < I 0. 
b) Within the data set, the model consistently underestimates L by wide 
margins (an average of 80 fatalities for the six worst cases) when L > 125. 
c) There is no distinct trend in underestimation or overestimation in the 
mid-ranges of life loss, but the precision falls in between that for (a) and (b) 
above. 
2. These trends occur because the data set is dominated by cases in which P < 
0.5. If it were dominated by cases in which P > 0.5, the direction of bias would reverse. 
3. There is a tendency to predict P most accurately when Par is large because in 
such cases P is usually small. 
4. During regression, the regression algorithm thus tends to put greater weight 
on those events that are least hazardous (large Par and small expected life loss) . As such, 
equation DM-2d is least credible when applied to high-hazard events or to small Par, 
either of which is likely to produce relatively large values for P. 
The data set is biased 
I. When compared to flash flood deaths during a given year, the USBR found 
that their data set was biased toward the most extreme cases, thus tending to overestimate 
L when applied to less extreme cases (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989). 
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2. When compared to the most extreme historical events such as the failure at 
Vaiont, Italy, the data set is biased to underestimate L by assuming Fd reflects a mix of 
major damage, destruction, and up to 80% minor damages. 
3. As long as heterogeneous Par are treated globally and in a marmer for which 
L is nonlinear with respect to Par, there is little basis for selecting a data set free of bias. 
Moreover, the direction of the bias depends on the event to which the equation is applied . 
4. Using the current approach, this can be avoided in only one of two ways: 
a) by reducing Par to homogeneous subPar and then developing a unique 
life-loss equation for each class of subPar that can be compared across events; or 
b) by dividing the existing data set into homogeneous subsets and then 
developing a unique life-loss equation for each class of Par that can be applied 
only to Par with the same traits. 
5. Ln both cases (4a and b, above), more variables than Wt, Fd, and Par would 
need to be considered. That is the burden of Chapters V-VIII and the Appendices. 
CHAPTER V 
CHARACTERlZA TION OF CASE HISTORIES 
Introduction 
Pumose for characterizing events 
A great many variables theoretically influence life loss from a dam failure. 
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Undoubtedly, any model which included as many of these as could be conceived (and 
their thousands of corresponding interaction terms) would be unwieldy in the extreme. 
Moreover, the number of data points necessary to calibrate such a model or for a complex 
statistical regression to be meaningful grows exponentially with each new variable that is 
considered. Due to the limited number of catastrophic floods that have occurred and the 
still more limited information that is available on these floods, any regression involving 
more than a handful of variables appears doomed from the outset. 
Nevertheless, there is great value in seeking to identify as many variables as 
possible and to quantify them for as many historic flood events as possible when 
sufficient information is available. Not only does this help a researcher to identify the 
handful of variables that are most useful for prediction, but the process itself forces the 
researcher to think in new ways and to explore new kinds of information that can 
potentially shed light on the dynamics that affect life loss in catastrophic floods. 
Several potential benefits follow: 
I. As was indicated in Chapters III and IV, those variables that have been most 
popular in the dominant life-loss models-in particular the DeKay-McClelland (1993b) 
variables Wt, Fd, and Par--have serious shortcomings when comparing dissimilar flood 
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events. It might be possible to define new temporal relationships, exposure terms, subPar, 
or other variables that could prove more useful as comparative and predictive tools. 
2. The use of new variables may provide insight into traditional variables. For 
example, Brown and Gratunn (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), Lee et al. (1986), and 
DeKay and McClelland (1991, !993b) all developed life-loss relationships that are 
nonlinear with respect to the size of the population at risk. Yet, intuitively, if every 
individual in a population faced threats that were identical in every way (same depth and 
velocity of water, identical locations, same warning time, same time needed to evacuate, 
identical rescue assistance, etc.) one would expect a consistent percentage of individuals 
to perish, regardless of whether I 0, I 00, or 1,000 individuals were in that population. 
Granted, the threat to individuals is likely to vary with population size, both favorably 
(rescue resources may be more readily available) and adversely (evacuations may take 
longer), but it may be possible to define new variables that minimize these differences 
based on the size of the population alone. Likely reasons for the nonlinear trends that are 
nearly eliminated by focusing on homogeneous subPar are presented in Chapter V. 
3. Even if variables cannot be used directly in a regression equation, perhaps 
because of a paucity of diverse data points, key variables or combinations of variables 
may help an analyst to adjust an estimate upward or downward based on reasoning and 
historic precedence. 
4. Uncommon variables may prove useful in distinguishing among failure 
categories; in suggesting more than one regression equation based on these failure 
categories; in suggesting order-of-magnitude probabilities to use as a check against the 
results of a regression equation; and in suggesting a reasonable range for confidence 
limits. 
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5. By fully characterizing each event, it is possible to gain an intuitive feel for 
each event. This helps an analyst determine when a new event falls outside of the 
experience of the data set, which events a new event is most likely to resemble, and 
where the range of life loss is most likely to fall. This provides a reality check for an 
estimate produced by a regression equation. As an alternative approach, it also allows an 
analyst to select a handful of events that are most similar to the one in question and to 
customize a new regression equation based on this select group or to use the select group 
to craft a representative probability distribution. 
6. Modern GIS, census data, and flood inundation modeling allow for 
increasingly refined estimates of Par and subdivision of Par by community, location, 
distance, depths, velocities, housing damages, and other distinctions, making many 
variables potentially useful. This contrasts with the problems associated with the use of 
global Par by Brown and Graham (1988) (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), Lee et al. 
(1986), and DeKay and McClelland (l993b) (see Chapter IV). 
7. Some risk analysts are more familiar with the application of an equation to 
hypothetical events than they are with the historical events from which the equation was 
derived. By presenting event characterizations with full written support, it presents an 
immense quantity of source material in a more readily digested package. 
8. Past characterizations have not been readily accessible to future researchers, 
making it difficult for others to evaluate or build on their work. By fully documenting 
each characterization, it allows other researchers to dispute the characterizations or to 
refine them as they see fit. 
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9. Detailed characterizations may prove useful for research into aspects of 
catastrophic floods other than life loss and far improving the effectiveness of emergency 
warning and evacuation procedures. 
I 0. Empirical approaches based on regression or calibrated parametric models 
are preferable to purely analytical equations because their validity is founded on historic 
reality and patterns oflife loss are sufficiently complex that they defy uninformed 
intuition. 
Method of collecting event histories 
As indicated in the introduction to Chapter VI, source material for dam failures 
and flash floods is not always easy to obtain. As such, the best source of information is 
those who have dedicated many years to building files on such events. The majority of 
the documents examined in this study were copied from the personal files of Wayne 
Graham in the Denver office of the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Additional 
source material was obtained from a branch of the National Performance of Dams 
Program called the Center on the Performance of Dams at Stanford University. These 
files covered more events, but contained less material than Graham's. In some cases, 
information was obtained from other sources. 
Every event for which at least a passing reference was obtained is listed 
alphabetically in Table A. I of Appendix A. This table includes the name and location of 
every event, its date, an approximate magnitude of life loss, and the nature of the flood 
(i.e., dam failure, dyke failure, flash flood, broad flooding, sea surge, etc.). 
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There was not time to characterize every event for which files were gathered, so 
Table A. I also indicates which events have been characterized in Appendix B, which 
files are lacking enough information to be useful, which files are likely to be useful for 
characterization in their current form, which events are likely to prove useful following 
additional research, and the manner in which certain events were used by DeKay and 
McClelland ( 1993a). 
Since the files gathered were dominated by dam failures, and since flash floods 
are much more common than dam failures, flash floods remain a largely untapped 
direction for future research. Indeed, within a one-week period of the current composition 
(August 1999) news has been obtained of two flash floods . One was in Utah and one was 
in Switzerland that killed at least 18 people. 
Characterization of events 
Characterizing variables 
The first step was to define as many characterizing variahles as was practical that 
describe a flood event or that might have a direct bearing on life loss. Initially, there were 
about 55. It should be emphasized that it was never intended that all of these variables 
would be used for prediction. Rather, it was hoped that they might provide a fuller 
understanding of the dynamics of life-threatening floods-especially the life-loss 
dynamics-and that by exploring new avenues, a narrower set of characteristics might 
prove useful as predictive aids. 
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As events were analyzed, it became apparent that those characterizing variables 
that might prove most useful for prediction had yet to be defined. Through an iterative 
process, the number of characterizing variables under consideration grew to nearly I 00. 
The characterizing variables most relevant to loss of life were originally broken down 
into five broad categories: populations at risk, flood characteristics, spatial and temporal 
relationships between Par and the flood, and circumstances that attend the flood . For 
clarity, there was value in dividing the fourth category into circumstances that are 
temporary, delivered by nature, and those that are human in origin and thus typically 
more permanent. Those variables that were late additions have been included as a sixth 
category since they were not fully characterized for every event. This also flags them for 
special consideration. 
Some of the variables, like those that describe the type and dimensions of a dam, 
were included primarily to paint a picture of the event and to provide information on the 
failure itself, with their predictive potential being secondary. Such information might 
facilitate research into the probabilities of failure and the likelihood that such failures will 
be detected in a timely manner as the data set is examined and expanded over time. 
The 55 variables that fill the five categories must be characterized in one of four 
ways: by assigning a quantitative value (such as velocity), by designating a relative rank 
(such as degree of urbanization), by selecting a category (such as dam type), or by 
recording a description (such as the location of fatalities or a description of the housing 
damages). The last type of variable is a means of record keeping to assist in 
characteri zing one or more variables in the other categories. 
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In the language of statistics, the second and third type of variables are called 
categorical variables, with the second being known as ordinal variables and the third 
being known as nominal variables. Once placed in a regression equation, statisticians 
sometimes call the dependent or Y variable the response variable and the independent or 
X variable an explanatory variable (Agresti, 1996). In this text, all variables will be 
called characterizing variables or simply variables, to indicate that they characterize an 
event. As subsets, a variable becomes a predictive variable if it is later found useful for 
that purpose, or a dependent variable if it is the basis for regression. L(P) is an example 
of a dependent variable described in Chapter IV. 
Nomenclature 
To facilitate the unambiguous use of symbols in equations and in the text, each 
variable is signified using a single capital letter or a capital letter followed by one or more 
lower case letters. In some cases, letters or numbers can be written as subscripts if it 
makes a symbol easier to read. For example, Par; refers to one or more specific subPar 
(Par can be singular or plural, based on context). Par3 is the third subPar defined for a 
specific event. 
Generally, an ordinal variable is assigned one of the following levels: N =.!'{one, 
L = l,ow, M =Medium or Moderate, H =High, V = Yery High, orE= Exceptionally 
High. The precise nuance or meaning of each of these gradations is specific to each 
variable. Indeed, "low," "medium," or the other words associated with the symbols listed 
above are often poor grammatical companions to the variables that follow, so they are 
defined more thoroughly in each case. Nevertheless, to avoid the need to memorize or 
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reference a separate set of symbols for every variable, gradations are limited to these six 
symbols. Most ordinal variables use only part of this range, but the sequential hierarchy 
of the symbols is maintained to minimize confusion. 
Every nominal variable has a unique set of symbols. The reader should consult the 
sections that follow whenever the precise nuance, criteria, or definition of the coding of a 
variable is in doubt. 
Comprehensive List of Characterizing Variables 
Their Coding and Their Definitions 
Populations at risk 
Population at risk (Par) 
Technically, Par should identify the number of people for whom a dam failure is 
hazardous in the sense that their lives are truly in jeopardy. Recognizing this, the 
Australian National Committee on Large Dams (1994, p. 114) defined Par as "all those 
persons who would be directly exposed to floodwaters within the dam break affected zone 
if they took no action to evacuate" 12£}. The italicized phrases were the key 
modifications to previous definitions. By using "directly," they excluded those who 
might be safe from calm waters due to the elevation of their property or perhaps a second 
story. They also excluded those who might be injured by evacuating motorists after they 
cleared the flood zone. By including "within the dam-break affected zone" they were 
referring to another teclmical definition: 
Dam break Affected Zone: That zone of flooding where the changes in 
depth and velocity of flooding due to darnbreak are such that there is potential for 
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incremental loss of life [sic]. [They then refer to depth-velocity charts such as 
might be developed using study results from Abt et a!. ( 1989) discussed in 
Chapter III of this thesis.] The Dambreak Affected Zone is in any case limited to 
those areas where dam break causes a rise in level of floodwaters greater than 300 
mm [about I ft]. (Australian National Committee on Large Dams, 1994, p. II 0) 
As reasonable as such a definition might appear, it is impractical for several 
reasons. First, as any fisherman who has waded a stream soon discovers, the momentum 
of floodwaters has a direct bearing on his threat to life. Most healthy adults could safely 
wade through stagnant water several feet deep, while less than a foot of rapidly moving 
water can sweep a car from a road and plunge it into fatal waters downstream. Since the 
depth and momentum of water changes rapidly based on local variations in slope, contour 
maps are inadequate tools to define hazardous regions on this scale. Second, the hazard 
posed by water varies among individuals. Small children or infants, the elderly, those 
who are disabled or physically disadvantaged, those who cannot swim, or those with fear 
of water might perish in situations posing little threat to others. 
In light of these uncertain factors , the term Population at Risk becomes somewhat 
misleading and challenging to define . In order to include all hazardous regions, the 
population must be defmed so expansively that only a portion of the Par would truly be at 
risk of death in most cases; given sufficient warning and evacuation, none of the Par 
would risk death apart from the dangers inherent in emotionally charged situations and 
the evacuation itself. Traditionally, Par has been defined as broadly as possible to include 
all those who, given no warning and without moving, would get their feet wet from the 
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flood (i.e., Dekay and McClelland, 1993b; U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989 1 ; Lee et al. , 
"Get their feet wet" has usually neglected any increase in elevation provided by 
buildings (Lee et al., 1986, made this explicit; see footnote). If such elevations are 
included, one can face dilemmas: A woman who is gardening is swept away by 2 or 3 ft 
of water while her husband remains dry cooking dinner in the elevated kitchen and her 5-
year-old daughter scrambles to escape the torrent of water pouring through the open 
basement window. If such elevations are neglected, there is still the risk that people will 
enter the flood zone from outside or while crossing it from an island inside. Moreover, 
dam break studies cannot fully account for the effects of channel scour, debris dams, 
variations in channel geometry, bridge failures, road and berm washouts, dispersion, or 
other vagaries on the direction and pattern of a dynamic flood wave, making even the 
most refined analysis lacking. 
Identifying historic Par is no easier. Without the aid of GIS or detailed census 
data, Par must often be estimated using evacuation figures, statistics on housing damages, 
by viewing aerial photographs, by counting dots that represent structures on maps, or by 
other forms of approximation. However, for historical floods these methods generally 
rely on the actual dimensions or affects of the flood and so they may provide better 
estimates than a computer simulation of inundation. 
1 "All individuals who, if they took no action to evacuate, would be exposed to nooding of any 
depth" (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989, p. 11!-25). 
'"A person is at risk if he or she would be touched by the nood water at peak stage if he or she 
were to stand outside" (Lee et al., 1986, p. 6). 
154 
What we want is a definition of Par that when used predictively is most likely to 
match the definitions implicitly used for historic events. DeKay and McClelland ( 1993b, 
p. 196) defined this as "the number of people that were evacuated or the number of 
people that would have been evacuated had there been any warning." However, this is 
highly subjective and may include areas much larger or much smaller than the flood 
itself. Also, Par has seldom been quantified in this manner; most of the Par in Appendix 
B are quantified based on the number of buildings with at least minor damage. Such 
damage is a function of the depth and velocity of a flood near its peripheries. 
By way of a solution, Par can be defined using a trichotomous approach to 
flooding and a modification to the ANCOLD definition. The three categories recognize 
the diverse nature of flooding, defining it in a manner that reflects the likely patterns 
underlying the calculations of Par in the case studies. In general terms, the definition by 
Lee et al. (1986) should be adopted for Par inhabiting terrain that is steep or close to the 
dam: "A person is at risk if he or she would be touched by the flood water at peak stage if 
he or she were to stand outside" (Lee et al., 1986, p. 6). At the other extreme, in areas 
where a flood consists of a nearly stagnant backwater, Par should include only those who 
would be exposed to flooding greater than or equal to 1.5 ft in depth. When flood 
characteristics fall between these extremes, Par should include only those exposed to 
flooding greater than 6-12 inches deep, based on a convenient contour. The depths 
surrounding a single Par should vary according to all three of these criteria as the area 's 
topography and relationship to the river change. 
To standardize these criteria and give them justification, the divisions can be 
refined with the help of depth-velocity curves that indicate the conditions needed to 
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sweep away humans and automobiles; and with assumptions regarding the depths likely 
to mobilize a voluntary evacuation. The sections that follow convert the three general 
guidelines in the preceding paragraph to three standardized rules, each followed by 
supportive reasoning. 
In flooded areas where the lateral slope exceeds 0. OJ and the velocity at depths of 
I ft exceeds 3 fps, a person is a member of the Par if they would be touched by the flood 
while standing outdoors on the ground prior to evacuation. If the lateral slope is greater 
than 0.01 , a one foot rise in flood depths will not encompass a new row of houses, but 
those houses within the flood will extend to depths of I ft. At velocities of 3 fps, these 
depths would likely inspire evacuations and cause minor housing damage. 
For perspective on these relationships, as water nears 2 ft deep, a monolith 
simulating a feeble adult can be consistently toppled in flow velocities ranging from 1.18 
to 2.16 fps (less than half of walking speeds). At the other extreme, wearing safety 
harnesses in a laboratory flume, very healthy adults can be toppled in water between 1.6 
and 2.0 ft deep with velocities ranging throughout the 4.5 to 8.5 fps range (see Abt et al., 
1989, or Chapter III). Including all ages and all levels of health, it is likely that many 
people-especially children--could be toppled between these extremes in the far less 
ideal conditions of a sudden flood surge. Once toppled, people can be swept toward the 
center of the channel. Thus, flows as shallow as I ft deep can be dangerous if they 
approach I 0 fps and flows that are 2 ft deep are potentially lethal to an important fraction 
of the population even when velocities are moderate. 
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Safety officials who do not know how high a flood will rise would probably 
include all such areas in an evacuation plan3 Moreover, depths in this range will pile 
mud and debris in yards and possibly flood ground floors, causing minor housing 
damages. In both cases, such areas would likely be included in historic Par. 
In flooded areas where velocities are less than I fps at depths of 2ft, a person is a 
member of the Par if they would stand in water greater than 1.5 feet deep while standing 
outdoors on the ground prior to evacuation. In contrast to the high velocity, narrow flood 
anticipated above, a leisurely flood crossing a wide floodplain will form backwaters that 
pose little hazard to li fe. Two questions arise: At what depth are lives endangered and at 
what depth are houses damaged? 
The answer to the second question might be the point when an automobile can be 
carried toward treacherous water. The U.S. Bureau Reclamation (1989) presents a graph 
derived from a study conducted by Simons, Li, and Associates, Inc. (1984) for the City of 
Boulder Colorado. The study attempted to determine the depth-velocity combinations 
necessary to move an automobile downstream. Interestingly, the graph of such a 
relationship is almost vertical: at a depth of 1.25 ft, a flood must travel at I 0 fps to move 
a car, while at a depth of 1.9 ft, a car can be moved by the slightest current. At walking 
speeds (4-5 fps), the depth is close to I .5 ft. 
Even where average depths and velocities are low, a flood can generate an 
unexpected current across low spots that funnel the water. Motorists who are swept away 
3 Remember that Par includes far more people than are likely to die, except in the most extreme 
events. In order for a regression equation to apply to future est imates of life loss, current definitions of Par 
must be as expans ive as historic definitions. Evacuation plans wou ld be particularly expansive for fast. 
vio lent floods, probably extending to the limits of flooding or beyond. 
\57 
while attempting to cross a road with seemingly minor flooding is a leading cause of 
death in fl ash floods. Thus. quiescent floods with depths of about 1. 5 ft have the potential 
to endanger lives in select locations. At these same depths, houses would be damaged 
even in stagnant water. Hence, Par should always extend to depths of 1.5 ft, no matter 
how calm the flood. 
in flooded areas where velocities fall between the extremes of the two previous 
rules, a person is a member of the Par if they would stand in water greater than 1 foot 
deep while standing outdoors on the ground prior to evacuation. These floods fall 
between the extremes of a quiescent backwater and a raging torrent. Many people would 
not evacuate if water did not enter their homes or rage swiftly across their yard. Nor 
would they be at measurable risk. As such, only those who have water lapping at their 
door should be considered-somewhere between about 12-18 inches. Based on the 
scale of most flood maps, any contour that sets fl ooding close to I ft would be 
sati sfactory. 
In summary, when the lateral slope exceeds 0.0 I and the veiocity at depths of I ft 
exceeds 3 fps , the geographic boundaries of the Par extend to the edge of the flood. When 
velocities are less than I fps at depths of 2 ft, the geographic boundaries of the Par extend 
inland to points where the flood drops below 1.5 ft. In all other flood conditions, the 
geographic boundaries of the Par extend inland to points where the flood drops below 6 
to 18 inches, or I ft for convenience. Par includes all those present in the geographic 
boundary after the dam fails and prior to the arrival of a warning. 
Although these rules are intended to standardize analysts' approaches and 
conform them to the definitions most likely to underlie the quantification of Par in the 
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present study, they can be violated if such violation will more closely conform to the 
patterns in this present study. For example, if a long, public building had a second or 
third story entrance high above a flood. but the first floor was far down slope where it 
faced high-velocity flooding, the analyst might want to exclude those on the second or 
third floors from the Par if the structural integrity of the building was not expected to be 
threatened. 
Threatened population (Tpar) 
Recognizing that Par includes many individuals who will never be threatened by 
flood waters due to evacuation-and conversely that convergence of curiosity seekers 
and safety workers on a floodplain can increase counts beyond the members of Par- the 
threatened population is defined as all those present in the flood inundation area when the 
flood wave arrives. 
The same depth and velocity relationships apply for Tpar as for Par. That is. in 
general, once flooding exceeds about a foot, anyone trapped in a building or wading 
across the floodplain becomes part ofTpar, but the first 6-12 inches of flooding can be 
ignored. 
SubPar (Par;) 
Par should be subdivided whenever there is a clear change in a major 
characterizing variable and there exists sufficient historical evidence to characterize Par; 
individually. The exact information required will depend on the components of any 
proposed model , but information regarding the size of the subPar, the life loss within that 
subPar, some measure of the warning time applicable to that subPar, and a description of 
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the flooding characteristics or damage characteristics within that subPar are essential. It 
is also highly desirable to know how many people successfully evacuated prior to the 
flood's arrival, the average time required for evacuation, and the circumstances or 
locations where individuals either perished or survived the flood. Most variables must be 
characterized anew for every subPar and may be subscripted for ease of reference. The 
goal is to produce subPar that are as homogenous as possible and that can then be 
grouped with like populations from diverse events to obtain a historic frequency 
distributions for key variables like L. 
Threatened subPar (Tpar;) 
Tpar; is the same as Tpar, but it is specific to a subPar (Par;). 
Life loss (L) 
L refers to the number of deaths of any kind and at any location that can be 
attributed directly or indirectly to flooding, without regard to whether or not the deaths 
would have occurred had the dam not failed under the same loading. 
In some cases, flood victims are never recovered and are listed as missing rather 
than dead. When victims remain on the list of missing in the most recent reports. they are 
included in L under the assumption that they most likely perished; if not confirmed 
fatalities, they perished in the minds of all who knew them, with comparable local effect. 
Expected life loss (Le) and 
historic life loss (Lh) 
In predictive applications, L refers to the expected life loss (mean life loss) as 
generated by a predictive model, without adjustment. When predictive models are applied 
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to historic case studies, the historic L can be distinguished from the expected L by using 
Lh and Le, respectively. In such cases, Lh or Le should be substituted for L in the 
definitions below (Lha, Len, etc.). When the context is clear, Lalone should be used. 
Adjusted life loss (La) 
When making an estimate, if the investigator finds reason to adjust the expected 
value of L. this adjusted value has the symbol La. 
Natural channel (never a 
dam) life loss (Ln) 
This is the expected L given that the dam had never been built and the same 
loading (earthquake, storm) occurs. Unless the dam that fails is relatively new, Ln 
generally assumes less flood plain development and different recreational patterns than 
after a dam has been in place for many years. Ln is a construct that is counter-historical. 
except in the case of flash floods on dam-free rivers. 
Life loss given dam removal (Ldr) 
Dam removal is often considered as a risk mitigation option. This variable 
assumes the dam is removed, sediment issues are resolved, and the channel through the 
reservoir is restored shortly before the failure loading occurs, using the then-current level 
of flood plain development and channel geomorphology. 
No failure life loss (Lnf) 
Lnf indicates the number of deaths that would have occurred had the dam not 
fai led given the same initiating conditions. In the event of internal failures with no 
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unusual loading conditions, Lnf is always zero. In other types of failures, it may be 
difficult to quantify Lnf from the case descriptions themselves, so it must be estimated in 
some other manner. In some instances, case studies or established methods involving 
flash floods or earthquakes may prove useful. 
Incremental life loss (Li =Lin or Lidr or Linr) 
Despite our best flood mitigation efforts, floods claim many lives every year. ln 
some cases, such as where a downstream channel constriction creates an elevated 
tail water, a dam failure may add little height to the ensuing flood wave, thus contributing 
little to the ensuing life loss.4 The incremental loss of life (Li) is limited to those deaths 
that would not have occurred without the failure. 
Even after a failure determining the incremental life loss is often challenging and 
sometimes impossible, since it is difficult to known how many lives would have been lost 
without a failure. There are, however, several possible baseline cases against which to 
compare. 
If Lin= L-Ln, Lin discounts the fact that the existence of a darn, historically , 
probably lead to increased recreational activity and its flood control benefits likely 
promoted flood plain development. Indeed, it may be the irrigation benefits that allowed 
a community to develop in the region at all. Such a comparison contrasts quite dissimilar 
scenarios, making the darn owner responsible for the growth in downstream population. 
but ignoring both the many benefits the darn provides and the lives the dam potentially 
'For example, when Rapid City in the Black Hills of South Dakota flooded in 1972. flooding was 
so severe that when Canyon Lake Dam fai led, the reservoir pool was only about a foot higher than the 
tail water. It has been suggested that of the 245 fatalities. perhaps only 33 can be directly attributed to the 
extra flooding caused by failure of the dam (Graham, 1998). 
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saved during previous flooding events. When comparing developed nations with dams to 
less developed nations without dams, one could even argue that the relative prosperity 
that dams have helped bring about has saved lives by reducing poverty and disease. 
On the other hand, if a dam has not yet been built, comparing L to Ln seems to be 
the most natural approach to a dam's hazard potential. 
For existing dams, if Lidr = L-Ldr (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), 
comparisons are more direct, since standards of living, past benefits, and levels of 
development are the same in each case. One has a useful measure to help determine 
whether the dam should be kept or removed. It should be noted that the number of 
fatalities might actually be lower given a dam failure over against the same event rushing 
through the valley without a dam in place. While a dam failure will unleash a wave of 
larger volume, if the failure does not progress rapidly, the peak may be dampened 
compared to a natural flash flood. Also, if monitoring of the dam may allow adequate 
warning time and the dam delays the onslaught of flooding , lives can potentially be saved 
through evacuation. 
One drawback to this definition of Li is that it ignores the future affects on 
recreation and flood plain development caused by removing the dam. Even if Ldr were 
redefined to be a current removal with a future population at risk, there is no way of 
knowing how far into the future a failure might occur, making it difficult to adequately 
define any growing disparities between L and Ldr in terms of Par. Also, like Lin, 
comparing L and Ldr for a future event ignores the lives potentially saved through flood 
abatement and economic development due to keeping the dam prior to failure. 
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The third possible definition is Linr = L-Lnf. This definition is useful in 
comparing the status quo against various versions of the dam following proposed 
improvements; or in comparing various designs of a dam yet to be built. This comparison 
may be used to guide future decisions or to evaluate past decisions. Like Lid,, Linr cancels 
the shared historical benefits or harms of the two scenarios, focusing attention on the 
isolated event of interest. It has the advantage that any differences in flood protection or 
floodplain development are likely to be minor. A tremendous practical benefit is that the 
two scenarios depend on similar hydrologic data. 
None of these definitions prove adequate for every purpose. Clearly, if 
rehabilitation alternatives are being considered, the Linr has many advantages for existing 
dams, but in any risk assessment or liability investigation, removal of the dam must be 
included as one of the policy alternatives. In that case, the Lid, seems imperative. !fa dam 
has yet to be constructed, Lin is the only increment that gives due consideration to not 
constructing the dam at all. For some dam owners, the choice of analysis may hinge on 
legal liability considerations, in which case any or all three may prove important. 
Proportion of lives lost (P) 
P, like the other variables, can be specific to a global population at risk (Par) or to 
a subPar, with the latter relationship designated by a subscript: P = L/Par and Pi= L/ Pari. 
Fatality type (Ft) 
Ft helps define the manner in which a flood proves lethal. It categorizes the 
dominant types of death according to their nature or locality. Ideally, the associated 
number of deaths should accompany each symbol. 
N none. 
C campers, including recreationists hiking/walking/standing near the river. 
W those in the river when the flood wave appears: waders and swimmers. 
B those on the river when the flood wave appears: rafters and boaters. 
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L those in or on a lake when the flood wave appears: boaters and swimmers. 
E employees of the dam owner who are at the dam for construction, repairs, 
monitoring, failure prevention, etc. Note that this category will overlap 
with some of the others. 
Af = automobile occupants killed by flood waters. 
Aa = those killed in an automobile accident during evacuation. 
D = general drowning deaths in areas with buildings. Note that it may be 
impossible to distinguish deaths in buildings, automobiles, and on the 
floodplain here. 
Sf = slope failure at or very near the dam itself. 
0 = other= non-drowning deaths other than auto-related or slope failure near 
the dam: mudslide associated with the flooding and not the dam failure 
itself, suicide, heart attack, exposure, disease, etc. 
U Unknown mix. 
Locations of deaths 
The location of a death is generally considered the place where an individual was 
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overcome by flood waters, in contrast to the location where the body was recovered. In 
general, it associates the death with a particular Par;. When more detail is available, it 
locates the victims in buildings, in automobiles, in the open, etc. 
Flood charactenstics 
Flood type (Fit) 
Fit is the source of the flood. In some cases, more than one source is involved. 
D = dam failure. 
Dy = failure of a dyke-whether it be a sea dyke or a levee-thus being similar 
in some respects to a long dam. 
Ff a flash flood, meaning the flood wave is sudden and fast rising or a wall of 
water. 
F flood, meaning a widespread event that crumot be described according to 
the other categories in this list. 
Ts = a tsunami or tidal wave. 
S a sea surge. 
H flooding caused by a hurricane and distinguished from F or Ff in that the 
deaths are not necessarily a result of the flooding . 
Gb = a glacier burst. 
0 = other types of flooding difficult to categorize, such as when a storage tank 
or water tower bursts. 
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Peak velocity (V) 
V is the peak velocity for a given Par; . It may require an approximation based on 
eyewitness accounts of the approaching flood wave or an average value based on post-
failure flood routing or known travel times. 
Maximum depth (D) 
Since rivers vary greatly in depth, the maximum depth in the center of the channel 
has little comparative value from one case to another. Dis thus the maximum depth on 
land for a given Par;. D should be the greatest flooding depth that could have been 
witnessed by any member of Par;, whether or not they were present or survived. This 
would generally be estimated using high water marks on buildings or trees, or the height 
of a wall of water (variable Ww). The datum will be somewhat subjective, but should be 
the lowest point at which a member of Par; might have originally occupied. 
Peak volumetric flow rate (Qp) 
Qp is the maximum volumetric flow rate experienced at the location of a specified 
Par or subPar during the duration of the flood. 
Bankfull volumetric flow rate (Qb) 
It is desirable to quantify the magnitude of a flood in a way that discounts the 
flow in the main channel to quantity the rate at which water actually flows across the 
floodplain. A flow of 30,000 cfs in a very large river might never top the banks, while 
such a flow in a tiny mountain creek would likely cause considerable damage to 
bordering communities. This normalized measurement is found by subtracting the 
bankfull flow rate from the peak discharge (Qp-Qb). 
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While a simple concept, Qb is not so easily defined. Floodplains are rarely flat 
with a clear channel rim. Superelevation can cause the outer bank to flood before the 
inner bank. Quite often, communities are constructed on surrounding hills, terraces , or a 
higher floodplain created during an earlier flow regime, which can make the narrow 
floodplain directly next to the river difficult to discern. In mountainous areas, V -shaped 
valleys can obscure the floodplain altogether. Compounding this, there can be natural 
levees or low spots produced by previous channels that crisscross a river valley (Leopold, 
1997). 
Physically, the geomorphology of streams are governed by their flow regimes. 
Hence, "nearly all stream channels, whether large or small, will contain without overflow 
approximately that discharge that occurs about once a year. Higher flows" occurring once 
every 2 to 5 years, will overflow onto the floodplain (Leopold, 1997, p. 64). Generally 
speaking, Qb is equaled or exceeded 2 to 4 days per year, with a return period of about 
1.5 years. This holds true whether the high flows are from rainstorms or spring snowmelt 
(Leopold, 1997). 
This suggests several methods for estimating Qb. The ideal method is to use a 
known stage-discharge relationship at a low point within the subPar. Short of this, a 
reasonable estimate for Qb can be made be interpolating the 1.5-year return flow off a 
flood-frequency diagram for the area in question. Since the mean annual flood has an 
average recurrence interval of2.3 years (Leopold, 1997), the mean annual flood would 
provide a reasonable approximation. If flows for only a few specific return periods are 
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already known-say the 5 and 10 year floods-these place a boundary on Qb from which 
reasonable estimates may be possible. Similarly, a few stage-discharge values may 
suggest a reasonable range for Qb. Even typical or average flows for a river suggests 
something about its size, pointing toward an order of magnitude for Qb. 
The preceding discussion highlights that it is generally not critical to calculate Qb 
with high precision. This holds true because there is already great uncertainty as to what 
multiple of Qb is needed to reach the first person, there is great variation between subPar 
as to the general steepness of slopes beyond the riverbank, and, most importantly, since 
Qb is often one or two orders of magnitude smaller than Qp, a rough estimate is all that is 
needed to refine Qp-Qb. In light of this, Qb can usually be estimated without extensive 
hydrologic calculations . 
Maximum width (W) 
Qp, Qb, and Ware necessary to compute Dv for a given Par;. An alternative to W, 
also designated Wmax, is to use the minimum width (Wmin) or some representative average 
width (Wavg)· When W alone is used, it is assumed that it is Wmax· 
Destructive velocity (Dv) 
The variable Dv was first proposed by Graham ( 1998). 5 Graham did not provide a 
name for the variable, but the symbol was derived from the relationship depth*velocity. 
By definition, Dv =(Discharge above bankfull)/( width of flooded region)= (Qpeak-
Obankrull)/width. This has units of (distance)2/time or depth*velocity . 
' Graham ' s symbol was DV, meaning depth*velocity, as explained in the text. The name 
·'destructive ve locity" was chosen here because the variable combines an average depth with an average 
velocity to describe the destructive potential of the flood wave and this preserves Grahams general symbol. 
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Since velocity alone tells little about the potential of a flood wave to cause 
destruction, the flow 's depth is a critical component. By using the entire volumetric flow 
rate and dividing it by the flood width, the resulting variable automatically averages 
across variations in depth and velocity, providing a description not only of the entire 
flood wave, but also of its interaction with Par;. In general, since populations tend to 
spread further from the river as a valley widens, the more dispersed Par;, the wider the 
flood and the smaller Dv becomes compared to the same flow rate in a narrow canyon. If 
one were to use (maximum depth)*(velocity) instead, it would provide only a point 
estimate at the center of the channel, describing little about the flood's total magnitude 
and how it interacts with Par;. 
Since no temporal variation is included in this variable, it should be quantified 
using maximum values, whether or not the maximum width corresponds with maximum 
flow. Since depth and velocity are indirectly included in this variable, they need not be 
treated separately, except as they vary with time. This is the purpose of Rand Ww below. 
Nevertheless, D and V are included in case Dv cannot be adequately quantified. 
Since one could use Wmax, Wmin, or Wavg to quantify Dv, Dvmin corresponds toW. 
max (because maximum W minimizes Dv), Dvmax corresponds to Wm;n, and Dvavg 
corresponds to Wavg· 
Maximum rise rate (R) 
Flood waves that cause common sorts of fatalities must generally rise fast enough 
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to trap people unawares or overtake them as they seek to flee 6 R refers to the steepest 
portion of the rising edge of the outflow hydrograph. 
Quite often, floods resulting from darn failures or severe flash floods rise 
instantaneously as a wall of water. Since this peak rise rate is infinitely fast and thus not 
quantifiable in the same way, "Ww" should be entered to indicate that the next variable 
applies instead. 
R should also be treated as an ordinal variable as follows: 
M moderate (can walk away from the flood waters if not lingering). 
H high = rapid (requires immediate, rapid action to avoid being trapped). 
V very rapid (difficult or impossible to outpace waters, even with immediate 
evacuation on foot or by automobile). 
Ww =wall of water (indicates the rise rate is instantaneous and can only be 
quantified by measuring the height of the wall of water). 
Wall of water (height of) (Ww) 
Ww is usually based on eyewitness accounts and/or flood routing. When more 
than one value is suggested, those figures which are deemed most credible should be 
averaged. In cases where the flood wave does not pile up in a wall , one should enter a 
"0," indicating that it must be described using the variable R above. 
Often, eyewitness accounts of Ww are based on the in-channel depth of Ww, 
which may exceed Don the bank. Hence, Ww ~D. 
6 An exception to this might be when water crossing a road appears safe, but subsequently sweeps 
an unsuspecting motorist downstream. Even in this case, however, fatalities are more likely when the water 
rises unexpectedly during the crossing. 
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Damage and destruction (Dd) 
The number of structures destroyed, seriously damaged and damaged to any 
extent should be recorded by category of structure and degree of damage, when avai lable. 
Note that this variable is essentially a detailed record for quantifying F and Ls. 
Forcefulness (F = Fp, Fd, F5, or Fpar) 
Dekay and McClelland (1991 , 1993b) developed F. Originally, it was intended to 
represent the proportion of Par actually subjected to potentially lethal flooding7 by 
dividing the number of residences destroyed or seriously damaged by the sum total of all 
residences experiencing any damage at al l. This is defined here as Fp for proportional 
forcefulness. 
As reasonable as Fp may at first appear, it is not easy to define in a consistentl y 
meaningful way. The force required to damage or destroy shacks, mobile homes, frame 
dwellings, brick houses, and large commercial buildings is quite different. Even within a 
given category, it will vary across centuries and countries depending on the building 
codes. 
In contrast to a the forcefulness of a flood, its potential lethality may be better 
captured by including all occupied structures, 8 since a structure that experiences little 
harm generally provides a safer haven than one that is damaged. 
7 Forcefulness was originally called Flooding Lethality or lethality for short (DeKay and 
McClelland, 199 1 ). Presumably, since the variable measures the force of the flood on buildings and does 
not take account of the temporal considerations that influence lethality, the more accurate tenn was adopted 
in 1993 (DeKay and McClelland, 1993b). 
8 i.e ., exclud ing barns, outhouses, chicken-coops and the like, but including RVs in campgrounds. 
mills, businesses, power plants, and other structures occup ied for many hours each day. 
The importance of each structural category varies with occupational cycles and 
with the relative proportion of each type of structure in the flood zone. This point 
becomes critical when considering Pari located at a campground or along a stretch of 
river frequented by rafters or fishermen; in such cases, there may be virtually no 
significant structures at all! 
For consistency, this study will follow Dekay and McClelland (1991, 1993b), 
focusing exclusively on residences. Not surprisingly, Dekay and McClelland found Fp 
difficult to quantify using historic data, so they turned to Fd. 
172 
Fd is dichotomous forcefulness wherein forcefulness is high (1) or low (0). To fill 
in historical gaps, Dekay and McClelland (1991 , 1993b) relied heavily on the expert 
judgment of Wayne Graham. Fd is conceptually identical to Fp, with the dichotomous 
dividing line between about 0.15-0.2. To update the Dekay and McClelland definition. Fd 
= 1 is definitively set at Fp <! 0.2 based on all available evidence and, in the case of Pari 
without buildings, the destruction that would have been likely if frame residences were 
physically present. 
F 5 goes a step further, subjectively dividing Fp into five even ranges: 
L low (0-0.2). 
M medium (0.2-0.4). 
H high (0.4-0.6). 
v very high (0.6-0.8). 
E exceptionally high (0.8-1.0). 
Fpar is the number of habitable structures of any type that are damaged severely 
or destroyed, divided by Pari. 
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Height of the dam (H) 
Ideally, His measured from the streambed and not the bottom of the foundation. 
Height of the reservoir pool 
at failure (Hp) 
Ideally , Hp would be measured from the tail water of the dam, but this is unlikely 
to be available historically, so it is defined in relation to the dam height. Sedimentation 
within the reservoir is ignored, since it is the distance of fall that is of most interest . 
Given overtopping, the depth of overtopping is added to the height of the dam. In the 
absence of overtopping, the distance to the reservoir pool below the dam crest is 
subtracted from the height of the dam. 
Breadth of the dam (B) 
B is the distance between abutments at the dam crest. 
Volume of release (Vol) 
Vol is the volume of impounded water at the time of failure that is subsequentl y 
released during the failure event. It does not include additional inflows into the reservoir 
after failure has begun in earnest. 
Rate of failure (Rf) 
Not strictly a rate, Rf is the number of minutes it takes until at least 80% of the 
breach has developed from the time failure begins in earnest. The reason 80% is used is 
to distinguish the main breach from the residual erosion which may continue throughout 
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the failure event and the minor erosion which precedes catastrophic failure . Rf may be 
thought of as the "most rapid" 80% of the failure. 
To help standardize eyewitness accounts, when a failure is described as nearly 
instantaneous (i.e., "as an explosion," "quicker than you can write these words"), Rf 
should be assigned a value of0.5 minutes. If the failure is a very rapid erosion or slope 
failure but falls short of near-instantaneous, it should be assigned 5 minutes unless 
evidence suggests a more precise value. 
Area of final breach (A) 
A is measured perpendicular to the direction of flow when the breach is fully 
developed. For consistency, it is measured to the top of the original dam crest unless the 
breach does not extend to the top. 
Spatial and temporal relationships 
between Par1 and the flood 
Summary of month/day/year, hour, 
and day of the week (T) 
The variable T is simply a designation for the complete textual record of the time 
of failure. Aspects ofT are coded symbolically to facilitate analysis using Td, Tw, Ty, 
and Ts, described in the subsequent sections. 
Time of day (Td) 
Code Td as follows: 
N = night (most people are asleep; II :30 PM-6:00AM). 
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S separation (most families are separated by school or work; 8:00 AM-6:00 
PM on weekdays). 
H home (most families are together; 6:00-8:00 AM, 6:00-11:30 PM; 
weekends, holidays, and when Par; is dominated by recreationists and it is 
not night). 
Notice that this variable says something about the lighting conditions, the ease of 
warning notification, the time required to begin an evacuation, and whether or not 
families are together. 
Time of the week (Tw) 
Tw is coded dichotomously: 
Wend = weekend 
Wday =weekday. 
Time of the year (Ty) 
Ty is simply the month, coded as 1-1 2, beginning with January and ending with 
December. 
Time of the season (Ts) 
Ts indicates the season of the failure . It has relevance to environmental 
conditions such as the temperature of the air and water, the lighting conditions. and the 
will ingness of people to leave their homes. Here. the variable is coded dichotomously: 
S summer (May-October). 
W winter (November-April). 
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Warning time (Wt) 
Wt (also known as the initial warning time) is defined as the difference in time 
from when the first warning is given of a dam break or of an impending dam break and 
the time when the leading edge of potentially lethal flood waters first arrive at the leading 
edge of Par; from the failure. "Potentially lethal flood waters" are described under Par, 
above. A flood is generally considered potentially lethal once it exceeds l-2 ft in depth. 
' 'First warning" is the warning that first reaches a member of Par;, is intended for 
dissemination, and encourages evacuation. As such, contrary to previous definitions of 
Wt (i.e. , U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), Wt does not necessarily begin with a public 
safety official. 
Individual warning time (WI;) 
Wt; is the increment of time from when an individual first receives news that the 
condition of the dam warrants evacuation and the floodwaters gain lethal potential at the 
location where the individual was when the news was received. The news can come from 
any source, official or otherwise, human or environmental. 
This is the same as Wte below, except Wte can be extended as one tries to outrun 
the flood. 
Individual escape time 
(warning time for escape) (Wt,) 
Wt, is the increment of time from when an individual first receives news that the 
condition of the dam warrants and the floodwaters reach lethal potential at the place to 
where the individual has fled or the location where the individual exits the flood zone. 
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This is the most meaningful definition of warning time because it is the only one that 
measures the full time it takes to be overrun by the flood wave. Unfortunately, unless it 
can be accurately estimated on a case-by-case basis, it has little practical value. 
Average warning time (Wtavg) 
Ideally, the Wtavg would rely on Wt, in place ofWt;, but realistically Wtavg must 
be the lesser of Wt; and Sc averaged across the population. In practice, it will be an 
approximate estimate of the average interval members of Par; have from the time they 
first become aware of the danger until the time the flood waters reach the ground above 
which they occupied at the time of awareness. 
Wtavg is based on warnings from any source, including sensory clues, and so Wtavg 
is never less than Sc, but it can be more than Wt. Wtavg includes informal warnings from 
passing motorists or neighbors, but it considers warnings only after they are clearly 
understood and viewed by the general population as credible. For example, motorists 
honking their horns might alert people that something is happening, but it would not be a 
warning until shouts or sensory clues made the danger comprehensible. Likewise, 
officials might advise a population that a dam is in danger of failing (making Wt long) 
but if there has been a history of false alarms, the population might not mobilize until a 
more credible warning is initiated (making Wtavg much shorter). 
Building types by percent (Bt) 
Bt represents a community profile within the flood zone. It is coded as follows: 
N none. 
T tents . 
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Sh = shacks or flimsy buildings. 
M mobile homes or RVs. 
R residential homes. 
C one story commercial or corrunercial ofunknov:n height. 
H commercial over one story. 
Lm = structures with less mobile populations (hospitals, nursing homes, schools). 
Development (Dev) 
Along with Bt and Gf, Dev helps profile a community. Dev measures the degree 
of urbanization, and is coded as follows : 
N none (rural, communities under I 00). 
L low = small town. 
M medium = suburban. 
H highly urbanized; large city, densely populated, potentially tall buildings. 
Goodness of fit (Of) 
Of is a spatial variable that describes the variance in exposure faced by members 
of Par; by indicating their spatial homogeneity or heterogeneity with respect to the river. 
It is called goodness of fit because it suggests the degree to which other variables 
accurately represent individual members of Par;. A low (poor) Gf implies that many 
individuals are exposed to a lower degree than group variables imply and a high (good) 
Of implies that the entire Par; is well represented. Note that Gf provides a measure of 
development/urbanization, proximity to the river, and uniformity within a community-
issues also addressed by variables E, We, Dev, and Schvq. Gf is coded as follows: 
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L low= poor (a large, urban area; multiple communities over a long reach of 
river; wide flood plain; mix of canyon and open plain; variable va lues 
would suggest excessive danger more often than not if applied on the 
individual level). 
M moderate= satisfactory (a typical small town or mountain community with 
some residences near the river and some on higher ground or in the hills; a 
series of small communities with similar warning time; a wide flood plain 
with urban/suburban development among which the flood rises slowly). 
H high= good (all of Par; reside within a narrow flood path; small canyon 
community clustered along the river; campgrounds; very small Par in a 
similar location, such as a few cars at a flooded road). 
V very high= very good (a huge wave which submerges an entire community 
without warning; a wave which annihilates virtually every structure wi thin 
the area of Par; ; no basis for saying some members of Par; are less exposed 
or safer than others and no time to escape before the flood arrives). 
Outdoors (0) 
0 is a dichotomous variable, defining whether or not at least a significant 
minority of persons are outdoors. This has bearing on when sensory clues might be 
picked up, the rate at which people are likely to run for high ground, the rate a short 
warning might spread, and the level of protection available if escape cannot quickly be 
obtained. Tents are considered outdoors. A fairly subjective variable, guidelines would 
suggest: 
indoors (winter, work hours, night). 
0 outdoors (summer, recreationists, campgrounds). 
One would expect this variable only to have relevance when warning time is 
extremely short. 
Sensory clues (Sc) 
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Even without an official warning, individuals might have several minutes notice 
of an approaching flood wave if there are visual or auditory clues, such as breaking trees 
or the sound of thundering water. Using testimony of survivors, the average length of this 
warning should be quantified in minutes, using zero when virtual ly everyone was 
surrounded before the flood was detected (this is more likely at night). 
Preparedness (Pr) 
Pr defines the degree to which a Par; is prepared to evacuate at least half an hour 
before Wt officially begins. The scale ranges as follows: 
N none (not aware of the potential for danger 0.5 hr before Wt begins). 
L low (aware the safety of the dam is in question, but it is not considered 
serious). 
M moderate (alert to the potential for evacuation or experienced in 
evacuation). 
H = high (expecting to evacuate and concrete steps toward that eventuality). 
This variable considers qualitative factors like previous news reports regarding 
the dam, false alarms, evacuation rehearsals, alerts that fa ll short of warnings, experience 
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of the community with flooding, and other aspects of testimony to define how quickly a 
community would likely respond to an official warning. 
Warning effectiveness (We) 
We describes how effectively a warning campaign mobilizes a community for 
evacuation. Ideally, it would include the percentage of Par; receiving a warning, the rate 
the warning propagates, and the effectiveness of the warning in initiating prompt 
evacuation (its believability and urgency). However, since these aspects are not readily 
quantifiable, We often resembles a categorical form of Tpar: 
N no official warning. 
L low (fewer than 50% receiving or believing a timely warning). 
M moderate (up to 90% receiving and believing a timely warning). 
H high (virtually complete evacuation before the flood wave arrives). 
Evacuation subPar (Eparj) 
Epari are subsets of Par; in which the subsets are characterized by the same 
representative evacuation time (defined next). These Eparj need not have equal numbers. 
and the number of groups can be one or more depending on the degree of heterogeneity 
within a given subPar. 
Representative evacuation time (Retj) 
Defined for use in calculating E (below), Reti is a categorical variable used to 
typifY the number of minutes it would take to evacuate each Epari without the evacuation 
being interrupted by the arrival of the flood. It does, however, take into account the 
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degree of urgency felt by the evacuees. Reti does not include warning delays as a warning 
propagates through a community, but it does include the time required for a warning to 
propagate through a given building. For example, if a mother is awakened by the sound 
of an approaching flood or an official knocking at her door, Reti includes the time 
required for her to recognize the danger, awaken her husband, throw on minimal clothing, 
gather her sleeping children, decide what possessions to grab and where to go, warn a 
neighbor or two if she feels there is time, and run with her family across the floodplain to 
the safety of the hillside. Since E is based on Wtavg, each building leader in Epari 
theoretically receives a warning at the same moment. 
Reti are based on the likely choices of individuals, even if those choices are not 
the most expedient. For historic events, Reti considers actual evacuation times and delays 
among Tpar. Retj extends when individuals reenter the flood zone to retrieve a belonging, 
to reach their family , or to help others. Important considerations include Td (whether 
people are asleep or awake and whether families are together or separated), the distance 
of buildings from the edge of the flood zone, barriers such as fences or streams, the travel 
distance to safety by road, the likelihood of congestion or transportation bottlenecks, 
whether prior flooding has blocked roads or bridges, the availability of personal or mass 
transportation, the time individuals will take to gather important possessions and warn 
others, the urgency of the warning and the perceived threat of the approaching flood, the 
anticipated time remaining before the flood arrives, and the general mobility of the Eparj. 
Are there nursing homes, hospitals, schools, retirement communities, populations with 
language barriers or high levels of distrust, or other populations in the flood path that 
might need extra time to evacuate? 
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The section on evacuation rates in Chapter VI provides many insights regarding 
the factors that have influenced Reti during the events characterized in Appendix B. Still 
greater detail is provided under Reti for each of the events in the unpublished version of 
Appendix B. Table 15 provides a starting point for estimating Reti. 
Excess evacuation time (E) 
(ease of evacuation) 
When an individual's evacuation time is less than Wte, he or she escapes the 
flood . !fan individual's evacuation time is greater than Wt.,, he or she must find a refuge 
or fi ght the flood to survive. The margin of safety reflecting the average excess 
evacuation time is the ease with which a population can evacuate. It can be positive or 
negative. Hence, E is the difference between the time needed fo r evacuation (Retj) and 
the time available (Wtavg). both of which are averages. 
For practical reasons, E should be defined using a larger scale than the individua l. 
It can be normalized as follows : 
:t Epar1 * (Wtm•g - ReI) 
E, = -''"-'---------
Par, 
Reti and Epari were previously defined. When Epari is equivalent to a homogeneous 
subPar, the equation reduces to Wtavg-Reti. When E is negative, it means the average 
evacuation time needed was greater than the time available. 
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Table 15. Representative evacuation times (Retj) for a single household on foot, 
neglecting the effects of barriers like fences and streams 
Range of 
Width Outdoor Evacuation Times 
of the Distance Dev for a Family Ret; 
Flood to Safety (N, L, Sense of Mobility (minutes) (minutes) 
(ft) (ft) M,H) Urgency (L, H)* Day Night Day Night 
1,000 300 N-M High H 0.5-3 1-6 l 2 
1,000 300 N-M High L 2-10 4-15 4 6 
2,500 1,000 N-L High H 3-6 4-10 4 7 
2,500 1,000 M-H High H 3-10 4-15 6 8 
2,500 1,000 N-H High L 3-10 5-15 6 8 
5,500 2,500 M High H 5-20 5-30 10 15 
5,500 2,500 N-M High L 10-30 10-30 15 20 
5,500 2,500 M-H High 
L-group 
20-180 30-180 45 60 
home 
*L implies one person with limited mobility living with one or more others with nonnal (H) mobility. The 
final row is an exception, where a nursing home or similar facility is in view. 
Natural circumstances that 
attend the flood 
Failure mode (Fm) 
Fm can be coded using the following symbols: 
I = internal. 
lp = piping. 
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le = embankment failure: sliding, overturning, foundation failure , or blowout 
with normal water levels. 
F = flooding. 
F flooding (dam failure not present or not relevant). 
Ff flash flood (no dam failure). 
Ff/D = dam failure contributes little volume to a dominant flash flood. 
Fo failure due to overtopping or spillway washout. 
Fe embankment failure: slumping, sliding, overturning, foundation 
failure, or blowout during overtopping or reservoir elevations 
significantly higher than those for which the dam was designed to 
ordinari ly operate. 
S = seismic failure . 
Sp = piping or other gradual development fo llowing an earthquake. 
Se = a rapid embankment fai lure during or shortly after an earthquake. 
G = gate failure not leading to dam breach. 
L = landslide not leading to dam breach. 
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Attendant circumstances (Ac) 
Ac refers to conditions that attend a flood, the presence of which can increase the 
fatality rate of the event. Examples include an earthquake, extreme weather conditions 
such as snow or ice, hurricane-force winds, extreme prior flooding, or a downed radio 
tower. 
It should be noted that power failures , darkness when Td = N, and rain are 
common features of many floods , and the latter two are already noted in the variables Td 
and MI. As such, they should only be included under Ac if their impact was exceptional. 
Attendant circumstances should first be described, then corporately assigned a 
subjective rank based on the impact the circumstances had on variables like Wt, E, and R. 
These ranks are: 
N none. 
L low impact. 
M moderate impact . 
H heavy impact. 
Magnitude of loading (M) 
M is a description of a storm over the watershed, the magnitude of an earthquake 
as experienced at the dam site, the size of a flood wave from an upstream dam failure, or 
some other narrative description of the loading which leads to darn failure. Descriptions 
including peak rainfall rates and depths and their return period would be typical. 
Although most hydrologic failures are likely to be coded as E, internal failures during fair 
weather are more likely to fall in one of the other categories. Also, one purpose of M is to 
provide a baseline against which Ml can be compared to determine whether local 
residents experienced the severity of rai nfall that led to a hydrologic failure . M should 
then be coded as follows: 
N no external loading (i.e., an internal failure). 
L low = small (loading is common; could be expected every few years). 
M moderate (loading is infrequent; once every 5-15 years). 
H high = large (loading is uncommon; could be expected once every 15-50 
years). 
V very large (loading is quite rare; could be expected once every 50-1 00 
years). 
E exceptionally large (loading is difficult to imagine; more rare than 1/ 100 
years) . 
Magnitude of local loading (MI) 
Ml is coded in the same manner as M, but it pertains to the local conditions 
experienced by Par prior to the flood wave arrival. 
Human circumstances that 
anend the flood 
Darn type (Dt) 
It is possible that Dt can be combined with variables like H, V, Fm, and Rfto 
categorize the potential lethality of a reservoir or to fac ilitate future studies into the 
likelihood that a particular type of dam will fail. Dt should be identified as follows: 




R rock fill. 
M masonry. 
c concrete gravity. 
A concrete gravity arch. 
Rescue resources (Rr) 
Rr include such things as rescue helicopters, the availability of the National Guard 
or another branch of the military, paid or volunteer firefighters or police officers located 
close to the Par; , emergency management and evacuation personnel, communication 
systems not dependent on utilities susceptible to damage or network overload, earth-
moving equipment, utility vehicles, and boats. 
Sometimes a community can prove extra heroic, with volunteer rescuers either 
increasing or decreasing the rate of life loss. Due to its mixed implications and difficulty 
of measurement, heroism should not be included as a separate rescue resource. However, 
rescues often involve simple tools like garden hoses and human chains, and these should 
be recognized as rescue resources . Rr provides a way of normalizing failures , whether 
they were in remote or readily accessible areas, and whether they occurred before or 
during the modem era. 
This variable is probably most relevant when floods are expansive in large, 
metropolitan areas. It is significant that the evacuation plan for the City of Sacramento. 
California, which is below Folsom Dam, indicates some areas as "evacuation areas" and 
others as "rescue areas." 
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R can be categorized as follows: 
N = none (rescuers are prevented from assisting until the next day; victims are 
overwhelmed so quickly that no rescue attempts are feasible). 
L !ow= limited (rescuers are able to help some people, but they are mostly 
limited to hand tools: ropes, rowboats, floating debris, human chains, etc.). 
M medium= modem (modem communication, transportation, and rescue 
resources are available locally, at least in moderate supply; generally 
reflects the state of development present in urban areas of the USA after 
1950). 
H high = exceptional (large numbers of military or rescue workers stationed 
nearby, immediate access to many local helicopters, an abundance of boats 
in the community; plenty of floating debris, trees, tall buildings, or hills to 
sustain victims until they can be rescued; modem wireless communication 
systems; state-of-the art early-warning and evacuation system). 
Detectability (Det) 
Det ranks the extent to which there are signs of imminent failure more than 3 hr 
before the dam begins to breach or the degree to which the breach could be predicted by 
monitors at the dam. 
N no signs of trouble. 
L low (one or more minor changes at the dam, but would not lead the typical 
dam monitor to anticipate failure). 
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M moderate (sufficient changes to consider altering the reservoir operation as 
a precaution, but would not lead a typical monitor to expect failure within 
the year). 
H high (evidence demanding immediate attention, as it suggests a dam failure 
is not unlikely if no action is taken). 
V very high (darn failure appears probable or imminent and can not be readily 
avoided). 
Striking characteristics and 
valuable quotations (Schvq) 
Schvq is a narrative summarizing those aspects of the failure which stand out, 
might be fairly unique, or are not adequately described in the variables above. This might 
include eyewitness descriptions of the event. 
To code this variable, it should be viewed as a general description of how well the 
overall set of variables describes the event: 
L = low= poor (existing variables do a poor job of fully capturing the unique 
attributes of this flood event) . 
H high= good (existing variables do a good job of fully capturing the nature 
of this flood event). 
Important variables brought to light 
during characterization of events 
Pre-failure warning time (Wtpf) and 
post-failure warning time (Wtpof) 
Wtpf indicates the full length of Wt when it begins prior to failure. Wtpof does 
not start until failure begins. Hence, if Wt begins an hour before failure and the flood 
travels for 30 minutes, Wtpf = Wt = 90 minutes and Wtpof = 30 minutes. 
Wall of water weighted 
by the ri se rate (Wwr) 
In order to combine events with and without a wall of water, the depth can be 
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weighted according to the ri se rate. Hence, Wwr = Ww or, if Ww = 0, Wwr =aD when R 
= V, Wwr = bD when R = H, and Wwr = l ft when R = M. In these equations, a and bare 
constants less then l that reduce D appropriately to account for extra evacuation time 
during slower rise rates. Their values should be specified, but they may be adjusted if it 
improves the usefulness of Wwr. 
Basis of Par (Bpar) 
When warnings proceed fa ilure, or people anticipate a failure, evacuation can 
proceed in two distinct phases: part of Par evacuates as a precaution and part of Par 
remains behind to see what happens. In such cases it is sometimes convenient to treat 
those who remain behind as Par, since more is known about this group, and to 
characterize every variable accordingly. For example, Wtavg would be based on the 
warnings that the second group takes seriously and Retj would measure the time needed 
to evacuate once they chose to do so. Bpar indicates whether the true Par; is in view or 
whether Par; is redefined to include only the remnant who delay to see what will happen. 
Bpar is coded as follows: 
Pre = pre-evacuation, meaning before any evacuations have begun. 
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Post = post-evacuation, meaning Par is based on those left behind after the first 
group leaves and Tpar is based on those who become trapped in the flood. 
Par type (Pt) 
Pt refers to the physical environment surrounding a given subPar or fraction of a 
subPar. When recording the codes for Pt, each symbol should be listed separately and, 
when possible, tagged based on its percent of Par;. When the components of Par are not 
known, Pt should be designated U. 
C campers, including recreationists hiking/walking/standing near the river. 
W those in the river: wade fishermen, swimmers, rescue workers, etc. 
B those on the river: boaters and rafters. 
L those in or on a lake: boaters and swimmers. 
E employees who are at the dam for construction, repairs, monitoring, failure 
prevention, etc. Note, it may be desirable to reclassify this Pt as D, W, or 
another overlapping category for purposes of analysis . 
Af = automobile drivers or passengers. 
T people occupying a train. 
D those who, prior to evacuation, are in or near buildings. This corresponds to 
general drowning deaths in town. These people might encounter the flood 
while indoors, while evacuating on foot, or while evacuating in a vehicle, 
but generally speaking, they were quantified based on structural damages 
and the mode or place of death may not be known. 
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U unknown mix. Whenever possible, subPar should be broken down into pure 
Pt (C, W, B, L, Af, or D) to faci litate characterization and analysis. 
Proportion of the threatened 
population (Ptpar) 
Ptpar is similar toP, except that it is the ratio L/Tpar. 
Evacuation nonsuccess factor (Ef) 
Efis the proportion of Par remaining in the flood zone when the flood arrives: Ef 
= Tpar/Par. Tpar and "flood arrival" are defined in such a way as to ignore trivial 
flooding that does not greatly hinder free movement (generally 6-12 inches for waders 
close to the hillside and lesser depths for those evacuating by automobile) . 
Havens: safe havens (Sh), chance havens 
(Ch), pseudo-safe havens (Psh), 
aerated havens (Ah), and 
compromised havens (Co h) 
Havens are discussed at length in Chapter VI based on historical insights. Each 
variable is described below. 
Safe havens CShl. Sh may or may not be flooded, but they represent places of 
shelter in which deaths have historically been extremely rare. When deaths occur, they 
generally involve young children or persons of limited mobility who cannot swim and are 
trapped in an area without another person of average abi lity to assist them. Safe havens 
include the following: 
I . An upper story with sufficiently shallow flooding that occupants are not 
washed out a window and can float on a bed or stand freely. These conditions are 
generally maintained when the flow does not rise more than one foot above the 
windowsills in the highest story (about 3 ft above the floor) and the building is not 
destroyed. 
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2. Quiescent flooding that does not trap people without air. When flooding is 
relatively quiescent, people readily keep their heads above water by treading water, 
standing on stationary platforms such as counters, floating on beds, or by clinging to 
floating furniture . If such flooding does not persist to the point where it would lead to 
extreme hypothermia or exhaustion, a relatively safe haven is maintained even when 
waters come within I ft of a flat ceiling or 2 ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling, whether or 
not the ceiling is elevated. 
3. An attic that is accessible from within a house or trailer home. 
4. A rooftop: The important point is not that safe havens in buildings are 
equally easy to reach, but that if some people can reach them, they preserve a means of 
shelter that is likely to reduce life loss across a subPar compared to situations in which 
every building is obliterated. Means of access might include an internal or external fire 
escape, a roof door, or a dormer window. During 191h century floods, there were many 
examples of people using a bedpost or other sturdy object to poke a hole in a ceiling or 
wall to reach shelter. Similar access to a roof might be possible through many attics 
today. People have also been kno"'n to climb objects like drainpipes or trellises, or to 
intentionally use the current to float up to the roof while they cling to such objects. 
However, when rooftops must be accessed through highly unreliable means and people 
must apparently rely on chance to be successful , they should be treated as chance havens. 
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5. A stout tree that is easy to climb, taller than the flood , and not toppled. 
6. Any island or region that experiences shallow flooding during the peak of the 
flood, such that depths are easy to resist while standing or clinging to convenient anchors 
like telephone poles or lampposts (depths of l-5 ft, depending on the velocity) . 
7. The hillside beyond the flood if a member ofTpar; can readily drive or wade 
to it while the flood is still shallow, or if they can reach it directly from the roof or an 
upper story. 
Chance havens CChl. If debris does not crush or fatally wound flood victims, it 
can provide a means of floatation that has saved many lives. Debris is defined as a chance 
haven rather than a safe haven because its availability and pathway cannot be readi ly 
predicted, its benefits are unreliable, and it can directly cause life loss when not a benefit. 
Ch are refuges in the flood , including other types of havens, that are reached 
primarily by chance or whose benefits are highly unreliable. As such, they contribute 
significantly to the variance in fatality rates across similar events. 
Ch fall into at least five categories: 
I . Rafts and floatation aids: severed rooftops, mattresses, propane tanks, logs, 
etc. 
2. The roofs of floating buildings: Because it is both more difficult and more 
dangerous to reach and remain on a rooftop after a building begins to drift, lurch, spin. or 
sink, rooftops should be treated as chance havens whenever a building drifts more than 
I 00 yards. Although somewhat arbitrary, choosing I 00 yards seeks to standard ize the 
approach of ana lysts in a way that seems to reflect the trends in the historic events 
analyzed in this study. Based on historic damage patterns and life loss, buildings that drift 
less than I 00 yards are more appropriately considered pseudo-safe havens most of the 
time. This is explored more in Chapter VI. 
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3. Stationary structures: any immobile refuge that is reached while drifting , 
including rooftops, upper-story windows, aerated havens, treetops, overhanging branches, 
debris dams at bridges that allow victims to walk to dry land, and the shore itself. If 
people must rely heavily on chance to reach a largely inaccessible roof, this would also 
constitute a chance haven. 
4. Aquatic havens: any location from which shore can be easily reached, such 
as a lake or a quiescent backwater, without fighting high velocities. 
5. Wading havens : These are rare, falling in the narrow range of depths and 
ve locities that are too high to be considered safe havens and too low to consistently 
sweep people away. Due to debris, waves, and unpredictable turbulence, such chance 
havens would not typically last long (see Figure 13 shown later) . 
Pseudo-safe havens CPshl. Psh are safe havens on or in buildings that become 
reclassified once the building begins to drift. They are a hybrid between safe havens, 
which are static and predictable, and chance havens, which depend on the whims of the 
current and the debris load. They exist only among a subset of buildings with major 
damage (see Loss of Shelter). As indicated above and in Chapter VI, rooftops are 
considered chance havens (Ch) rather than pseudo-safe havens when a building drifts 
more than 300 ft . 
Aerated havens CAhl. Ah are typically found only when parts of stationary 
buildings are torn away (the upper end of Ls = M). They are those pockets of protection 
formed by the remaining walls, floor, counters, etc. , that provide a place for survival if 
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the occupants are fortunate enough to have been located in that portion of the building. 
They are not safe havens because their locations depend in part on chance, and great 
strength, stamina, and good fortune may be required to resist being swept away in the 
face of increased exposure. However, they are not chance havens because they are most 
likely to form in locations where people are most likely to seek shelter-that is. in the 
most protected sections of temporary safe havens. For those who occupy an Ah, survival 
would generally be more likely than for those already in the open current and less likely 
than for those in a safe haven. 
Comoromised havens CCoh). This simply places Psh and Ah in a single category. 
These two havens are likely to be highly variable with respect to life loss, wi th rates 
similar to safe havens when the haven is modestly compromised and with rates 
approaching that in the open flood when the haven is severely compromised. 
Loss of shelter (Ls) 
Ls apportions Par; based on the loss of safe havens (Sh) , pseudo-safe havens 
(Psh), and aerated havens (A h) in or on buildings. As such, it is a refinement of 
forcefidness (F) and similarly relies on damage and destruction (Dd) for guidance. 
However, unlike F or Dd, Ls records the proportion of Par; associated with four levels of 
shelter loss: 
L =low loss of shelter= no structural damage or minor structural damage limited 
to flooding on the first floor. 
M =major loss of shelter= major structural damage. 
H = high (complete) loss of shelter= total destruction. 
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Mh = highly uncertain whether Ls = M or H. 
To expound on each of these categories, it is important to realize that Ls is not the 
same as economic damages. Lives are lost within buildings when occupants fall into 
water in which they cannot swim; become trapped underwater as a room fills to the 
ceiling; get struck by large, external debris penetrating from outside; get struck or trapped 
underwater as the building breaks apart; or get washed through a wall or out a door or 
window into open water. As such, the critical question is not the degree of economic 
damages or whether a building should later be condemned, but whether or not a structure 
maintains an accessible safe haven, pseudo-safe haven, or aerated haven for the duration 
of a flood. 
It follows, that loss of shelter is not synonymous with the definitions used by the 
American Red Cross or other agencies to define housing damages. Ls = L implies 
relatively safe havens on every floor, Ls = M implies complete loss of a safe haven on the 
first floor, and Ls = H implies complete loss of all safe havens, pseudo-safe havens, and 
aerated havens, including any accessible rooftop. Since loss of a safe haven is generally 
accompanied by structural damage, traditional categories of minor and major damage 
generally agree with Ls = L and Ls = M when they are based on structural damages and 
not mere water damage. By contrast, Ls = H only if no accessible, aerated pockets of 
protection remain, regardless of whether a building floats off its foundation or is later 
condemned. 
The following refinements, based on historical observations, should be kept in 
mind (largely copied from Chapter VI): 
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I. Ls = L. Almost every room has a counter, desk, couch, table, chair, bookcase, 
bed, dresser, piano, or other piece of furniture that can provide an elevated platform or a 
floatation device during a flood. When a flood is relatively quiescent, with few 
exceptions, these objects and a little swimming allow people to keep their heads above 
the water surface even when the flood nears the ceiling. While elevated ceilings could 
pose a special problem, a flood reaching such depths without causing major damage 
would necessarily be very calm, making it easier to cling to floating furniture, tread 
water, or hang onto rafters. This has been demonstrated in commercial buildings. Hence, 
Ls = L when there is minor structural damage and the flood does not encroach within a 
foot of the first-floor ceiling or within 2ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling. 
2. Ls = M. If the highest accessible floor (including an accessible attic) is filled 
with water beyond I ft of the ceiling, but the flood does not crest an accessible roof, Ls = 
M rather than H because an accessible safe haven remains. If walls are ripped off but 
portions of walls and floors or counters remain to shelter occupants from the main current 
or to provide something to which they might cling, the loss of shelter is major; but if only 
trivial structural members remain such that all shelter is lost, the dwelling is destroyed. 
A building is destroyed any time it is torn apart and submerged in the flood . 
However, if a building floats off its foundation and maintains an accessible pseudo-safe 
haven for the duration of the flood, Ls = M. 
3. Ls =H. !fa rooftop is inaccessible, a building is destroyed when the top floor 
or accessible attic is completely submerged. If a rooftop is accessible, the building is 
considered destroyed only if the flood or flood waves wash across the crest of the roof to 
an extent likely to wash people into the flood. Since the momentum of the flood riding 
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the slant of the roof will cause waves to run up, this elevation is generally on the order of 
a foot or two below the roofs crest. 
4. Ls = Mh. Ls = Mh means that, based on uncertainty, analysts view Ls = M 
and Ls = H as having roughly equal probabilities. lt is a category that applies primarily 
when estimating Ls for hypothetical floods. Based on the current state of the art, it is 
unlikely that analysts will be able to predict the boundary between Ls = M and Ls = H 
with great precision. Ls = Mh is a subset of the pseudo-chance zone defined below. 
Weighted loss of shelter (Lsw) 
Historical analysis is greatly facilitated when Ls is homogeneous-that is, when 
Ls = H 100%, M 100%, or Ll 00%. When Ls is mixed, however, life-loss trends can still 
be explored by placing the overall mix of damages on a scale from 0 to 1. The scaled 
value is called the weighted loss of shelter. The weights assigned to each type of damage 
(L, M, and H) should correspond to the relative historical lethality observed among 
structures with each category of damage. These relationships can be determined from 
cases for which Ls was homogeneous. 
Theoretically, Ptpar; = L/ fpar; should tend to increase as safe havens are removed 
by the flood. Thus, when every structure is swept away and destroyed, Ptpar; should be 
greatest and such structures should be given full weight (WH = 1). If one relies on 
average values across homogenous subPar, the correct weight for Ls = M would be WM = 
(avg. Ptpar; for Ls = MlOO%)/(avg. Ptpar; for Ls = HIOO%). In the same way, the correct 
weight for Ls = L would be WL = (avg. Ptpar; for Ls = L!OO%)/(avg. Ptpar; for Ls = 
HI 00%). A weight of zero applies if the average ratio oflife loss is zero. 
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Lsw = l*(Ls =H)+ WM*(Ls = M) + WL *(Ls = L) where Ls = H, Ls = M. and Ls 
= Leach represent the percentage ofTpar; (or Par; if the distribution ofT par; is unknown) 
associated with structures in the respective damage categories. 
Flood zones: safe zones (Sz), 
compromised zones (Coz), 
chance zones (Cz), and 
pseudo-chance zones (Pcz) 
When one includes the open current and depths in which successful wading is 
highly dependent on chance, a flood can be divided into four zones with unique life-loss 
distributions. Each zone is described below. 
I. Safe zones (Sz) . This includes all safe havens. These provide a high degree of 
safety and a consistently low rate of life loss. Havens that have been only mildly 
compromised have similar life-loss characteristics and so should be included. The 
proportional life-loss distributions in safe zones should closely approximate that for Ls = 
L. 
2. Compromised zones (Coz). That central portion of compromised havens that 
have not been purposely classified as safe zones or pseudo-chance zones. Because the 
tails are accounted for under pseudo-chance zones and safe zones, the proportional life-
loss distribution should closely resemble that when the severity of structural damage for 
Ls = M is in the central 60%-80%. 
~. Chance zones (Cz). The places where people are submerged or face the open 
flood, and all chance havens that might be reached while drifting. The proportional life-
loss distribution in chance zones should closely approximate that for Ls = H. 
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4. Pseudo-chance zones (Pcz). There is a range of depths*velocities, unique to 
each type of building, for which it is unclear whether a structure is most likely to be 
destroyed, float far downstream, or experience severe damage that leaves only aerated 
havens. In such cases, L = Mh, meaning L = M or L =H. Similarly, there is a range of 
depths*velocity for which it is highly uncertain whether people will topple or be able to 
wade. Combined, these locations comprise the pseudo-chance zones. The proportional 
life-loss distribution for pseudo-chance zones should closely approximate a combination 
of the relevant portions of the proportional life-loss distributions for Ls =Hand Ls = M. 
Zone densities (Zd): safe zone density (Szd), 
compromised zone density (Cozd), 
chance zone density (Czd), and 
pseudo-chance zone density (Pczd) 
Density represents the distribution ofTpar; among flood zones based on 
topographic, structural, and hydraulic considerations as they interface with flood routing 
and the rise rate of the flood. The word "density" refers to the number of people who 
have access to a category rather than to the physical dimensions of flood zones 
themselves. Access includes the physical ability to move to a location and sufficient time 
to get there before being cut off by the flood. 
Density is predicated on the historic pattern that most members of Tpar; will seek 
out the safest haven they can reach in the time available. A more expansive list of 
insights and justifications can be found in Chapter VI. The result of these insights is that 
we can apportion Tpar; among the flood zones its members are most likely to occupy by 
apportioning the accessible physical havens and by associating them with the average 
number ofTpar; likely to be nearby based on census data. Accessibility is cut off if the 
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flood rises too quickly, but this is rarely a concern when Ls = M, the usual case in which 
densities are widely distributed. 
Thus, Szd, Cozd, Pczd, and Czd each represent the number of people expected to 
be in each of the corresponding flood zones. People can be expected to choose Sz, Coz, 
Pcz, and Cz in that order, as they are available. People should be assigned to the highest 
level that persists for the duration of the flood, with the understanding that they are only 
assigned to Cz if the haven they previously reached ceases to exist. 
Life loss zones (Lsz, Lcoz, Lpcz, Lcz) 
Zones oflife loss are analogous to L;, except that they are specific to the zones sz, 
coz, pcz, and cz. 
Proportion of lives lost in zones 
(Prsz, Prcoz, Prpcz, and Prcz) 
The proportion of lives lost in each zone is analogous to Ptpar;, except that it is 
specific to one of the zones sz, coz, pcz, or cz. Note that "proportion" is designated with 
Pr instead of the traditional P in order to avoid confusion between the pseudo-chance 
zone (Pcz) and the proportion of lives lost in the chance zone (Prcz). 
Tools For Researchers 
Appendix D contains several tools that can help readers and researchers keep 
track of the many variables presented above and some of their subtleties. Table D.l is an 
alphabetical list of every variable in Chapter V. Table 0.2 is a summary table of every 
variable, their names, their symbols, the codes used for nominal and ordinal variables, a 
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brief description of each code, and the units. An abbreviated version of Chapter V and a 




INSIGHTS FROM HISTORlC FLOOD EVENTS 
Modes of Death and Means of Survival 
According to a thorough study of the unpublished subPar characterizations, deaths 
have historically occurred in the overlapping contexts presented in Table 16. People have 
survived catastrophic floods through the means presented in Table 17. 
Pieces of the Life-Loss Puzzle 
This section lists qualitative insights from historic case studies that have sufficient 
support that they were evaluated to be highly reliable. Many but not all of the case studies 
are thoroughly characterized in working documents that underlie the summary in 
Appendix B. In those working documents, the observations are carefully supported by 
reference to several hundred source documents, subsets of which are listed at the end of 
each event to which they pertain. 
Only a modest effort has been made to index these insights to the events 
underlying Appendix B for the following reasons: 
I. Dozens of statements from survivors, eyewitnesses, and researchers from 
many different events support most of the observations. 
2. While the working documents underlying Appendix B include careful records 
of source materials, such statements were often not critical in characterizing the cases and 
so they were only summarized or not recorded. 
Table 16. Means by which people die in a catastrophic flood 
" 0 I...·: 




Mode of Death 
I. Lethal blow when struck by or crushed between large/sharp 
debris. 
2. Trapped underwater within a stationary structure. Water pressure 
often seals doors. 
3. Pulled underwater by an undertow or sinking raft while riding a 
mobilized house, vehicle, boat, roof, mattress, or other floating 
refuge. 
4. Mobilized home drifts, then disintegrates through collisions, 
exposing occupants. 
5. Pinned underwater after drifting against a tree, pole, house, fence, 
rock, etc. 
6. Held underwater by sw ift and violent undercurrents. 
7. Insufficient strength to swim across swift and violent currents 
before tiring. 
8. Buried in sediment carried by the flood. 
9. Overtaken by a wall of water wh ile driving out of a canyon instead 
of climbing the slope. 
I 0. Water-born plagues in countries lacking modern water-treatment 
facilities. 
II . Lethal blow from a collapsing structure. 
12. Lethal blow when driven violently into a pole or other obstacle. 
13. Baby or young child swept out of adult's arms while adult wading. 
14. Fall off a raft (usually a roof, vehicle, or matTress) and unable to 
swim adequately. 
15. Motorists attempt to cross a flooded road/bridge and wash into 
deeper water, where trapped. 
16. Unexpected wall of water washes vehicle off a road or bridge. 
17. Climb on top of a vehicle, only to be washed away as the water 
nses. 
18. After evacuating, return to the flood zone for a belonging and 
swept away. 
19. Enter flood to try to rescue or warn family, friends, or strangers. 
20. Firefighters or other evacuation officials caught by the flood. 
21. Delay evacuation to grab money, boots, pet, or other valuable. 
22. Struck by debris while clinging to a pole, causing injury and 
knocking loose. 
23. Wading through shallow flood and step into a submerged creek, 
culvert, etc. 
24. Buried by a slope failure at/near the dam following drawdown. 




























Table 16. Continued 
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Mode of Death 
25 . Undercu tting causes roadway to collapse as veh icle passes 
overtop. 
26. Due to poor visibi lity (night, rain, fog, sharp curve), drive into a 
washout. 
27. Weight of train causes bridge to collapse during flood conditions. 
28 . Vehicle is moved down a street in shallow water. then washed into 
a deep, water-filled pit. 
29. Come to watch flood, then surrounded and swept away. 
30. Trapped, lacerated, or strangled by flood-borne barbed wire, 
power lines, etc. 
31. Hypothermia. 
32. Explosions caused by boilers, transformers, smelters, etc. 
33. Burned in fire caused by natural gas, broken power lines, lanterns, 
etc. 
34. Fall from a high window during evacuation. 
35 . Electrocution when live power lines break. 
36 Swimmer pulled under by an unexpected undertow in a reservoir 
following a flood. 
37. A boat on a reservoir is capsized and pulled under at the mouth of 
a tributary. 
38. Boaters are washed downstream at great ve locity until they crash 
or capsize. 
39. Heart attack or other fatal condition caused by fear and exertion 
during the fl ood. 
40. Lethal shock after the flood due to lost family, community, or 
financial security. 
41 . The depression associated with losses or the guilt associated with 
"undeserved" survival causes a loss in the will to live and death 
within days, months, or years. This includes suicides, but also 
marked changes in activity leve ls, rapid deterioration (especially 
among elderly), and behavioral diseases like alcoholism, drug 
addiction, and patterns of self-destruction. 
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• Relative Frequency is coded as follows: L ~ low (wou ld expect only in an atypical or extreme event), M 
= medium (com mon , but probably not a dominant mode if many died), H ~ high (one of the dominant 
modes if many died). These are subjective categories based on historical accounts of fatalities. 
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Table 17. Means by which people survive when faced with a catastrophic flood 
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0 ~ c 0 
Mode of Survival ::E::E 0:: > Ci . 
I. Run up nearby hillside, keeping dry or splashing through early flooding. . . . . . . H 
2. Run upstairs to a second or third story. . . . . H 
3. Stand on a couch, counter, piano, refrigerator, table, dresser, or cupboard. . . H 
4. Climb a tree before or after being swept downstream. . H 
5. Washed into calm or shallow water, where can climb onto shore. . H 
6. Grab an overhanging tree branch near shore and pull self to safety. . H 




8. Drive laterally out of the flood zone. . H 
9 Outpace an advancing flood, driving down a narrow canyon. . H 
10. Wash out into the relatively calm waters of a lake or reservoir and then . . H swim to shore. . . 
II. Climb onto roof (via upstairs window or by poking hole through from . M 
below). 
12. Swim to a roof or drift there on a mattress, log, board, or propane tank. . . . M 
13. Float indoors on a mattress or buoyant furniture, or stabilize someone less . . M capable on such a raft. 
14. Cling to a telephone pole, lamppost, fence, etc. in water 6-ft deep or less. . M 
15. Baby or small child thrown to someone on shore by wader who can't 
M . 
move. 
16. Ride a floating house, roof, or other raft until it piles up in a debris dam 
M 
behind a bridge, then walk across roofs and debris to dry land. 
. . 
17 Rescued by a helicopter while on a roof, second story, tree, car top, or 
M 
island. 
. . . 
18. Rescued by boat. . . . . M 
19. Pulled/carried to safety by a human chain, rope, or larger/stronger person. . . . . M 
20. Pulled ins ide a second-story window after drifting near there. . L 




22. Dug out of mud after wave passes, with help of dogs and rescue crews. . L 
• Relative Frequency is coded as follows: L ~ low (wou ld expect only in an atypical or extreme event), M 
~medium (common, but probably not a dominant mode if many survived), H ~high (one of the dominant 
modes if many survived). These are subjective categories based on historical accounts of survivors. 
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3. The most pertinent information was discovered iteratively as more and more 
events were characterized. 
4. While reading through events to identify those most easily characterized, 
insights were gleaned or reinforced from events not found in Appendix B. 
5. When an insight was recorded under Schvq or another variable because it 
was considered significant, new, or particularly cogent, it was generally not repeated 
under subsequent subPar for the sake of efficiency. 
6. This section is intended only as a summary and not as a substitute for the 
unpublished subPar characterizations and the hundreds of source documents underlying 
them. 
7. The volume and complexity of the presentation in the unpublished event 
characterizations would make full indexing a daunting task. 
When indexed to indicate a useful example, the citations take the form(#.#). The 
first number indicates the number of the event and the second number indicates the 
number of the subPar associated with that event. If only the first number is given, it refers 
to a pattern found in more than one subPar during that event, or to notes recorded in an 
introductory summary to the event as a whole. If an event rather than a number is 
indicated (i.e., South Fork Dam, Johnstown, 1889), it simply means that the applicable 
event was reviewed in detail, but was not formally characterized with a written record. 
Each index number refers to a specific subPar named in Appendices B and C. 
Appendix C provides a summary table of the values assigned to every characterizing 
variable for every event formally characterized. Appendix B provides an alphabetical list 
of those events. A common numeric code(#.#) accompanies the subPar names in both 
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appendices for easy cross-referencing. The remainder of Appendix B provides examples, 
excerpts, and bibliographic information from the formal characterization of each subPar, 
focusing primarily on insights recorded under the category "Striking Characteristics and 
Valuable Quotations (Schvq)." 
Given that a life-threatening event has occurred, pieces to the life-loss puzzle can 
generally be stored in one of the puzzle boxes presented in the first column of Table 18. 
The second column in Table 18 indicates important questions or descriptions pertaining 
to these topical puzzle boxes, and the third column indicates the variables from Chapter 5 
that are most relevant to each box. Chapter VI opens each puzzle box in tum, lays the 
puzzle pieces out in detail, and attempts to fit most of the pieces together using 
qualitative and historically based observations. Because one of the goals for this chapter 
is to help researchers understand which variables play the most crucial roles and how 
these variables interact in complex ways, each section heading includes relevant variables 
in parentheses from column three of Table 18. 
Type of failure CFm M Dt Ty Ts) 
Flash floods 
Modem radar, combined with flood-prediction algorithms, are still imperfect in 
consistently predicting major flash flood events before they occur, although significant 
improvements have been made. Human operators are also prone to error or misjudgment. 
In some cases, there is a reluctance to issue a warning because the computers frequently 
detect fa lse anomalies (l.l). 
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Table 18. Issues influencing the rate of life loss 
Category Description or Governing Question(s) Variables 
I Type of a) Breach - hydrologic, seismic, or internal Fm, M, Dt, Ty, Ts 
Failure b) Uncontrolled Release = mechanical or human error 
c) Drawdown ~ upstream slope failure 
d) Displacement ~ landslide displacing the reservoir 
2 Delectability Do people detect the likelihood of a failure? Det, Dt 
3. Warning How much time does each person have to evacuate after Wt, Sc, 0, We, Td, 
Times and becoming aware of the danger, and how mobilizing is the Wt"'' Pt, Ft, Fit 
Effectiveness message? 
4. Evacuation What proportion of people can clear the flood zone before Ef, Pr, Td, Tw, Ts, 
Rates they are endangered or trapped? Ml, Pt, Dev, Ret 
5. Excess Evac. How much extra time do people have to evacuate before E, Ef 
Times they are endangered or trapped? 
6. SubPar Type Where are people located? What is significant about each Pt, Ft 
and location and people's associated behavior? 
Evacuation 
Modes 
7. Homogeneity Have the subPar been defmed in such a way categories 5- Par;, Pt, Gf, Ls, Fp, 
of SubPar I 0 apply homogeneously to each? F,, Schvq 
8. Flood What are the hydraulic characteristics of the flood among Fit, V, D, Qp, Qb, 
Dynamics Tpari? W, Dv, R, Ww; Dt; 
H, Hp, B, Vo l, Rf, A 
9. Loss of Shelter What are the structural damages and to what extent do Bt, Ls, Dd, Sh, Psh , 
these expose Tpari to the flood dynamics? Fp, Fd, F,, Fpar, Pt 
10. Safe Havens, Safe Havens : How accessible are refuges in which Tpar; Sh, Ch, Psh, Ah, 
Chance can seek protection? Coh, Pt. Bt, R, Ww. 
Havens, Chance Havens: How likely is it that debris and obstacles D1ocat. Vlocat. Sc, 
Pseudo-Safe will save lives rather than cause deaths? Wt"''' E, Schvq 
Havens, and Pseudo-Safe Havens: If buildings float, are they likely to 
Aerated stay intact or be destroyed? 
Havens Aerated Havens: When a building has major damage, do 
accessible pockets remain that are more dangerous than 
safe havens, but that nonetheless facilitate survival? 
II. Flood Zones Is there time to reach a safe zone? If so, what is the Sz, Cz, Pcz, Coz, 
and Zone distribution ofTpar; among flood zones that have unique Szd, Czd, Pczd, 
Density historic distributions of life loss? Cozd 
12. Lethality Rate When not protected, how many people can float to safety Ptpar;, Ls, Pt , Ft; L, 
Outside Safe on debris, wash to shore, walk across a debris dam , or P;, Tpar;; Ln, Lnf, 
Havens otherwise escape the flood? Lin, Linf 
13. Lethality Rate Can this be equated with the lethality rate on land, where Ls, Pt, Ptpar; Sh, 
in Safe Havens damages are minor, or to some other function? Psh 
14. Lethality Rate This wou ld include stress-related deaths of evacuees and Ft, Schvq 
on Dry Land the relatives of vict ims. 
15. Life-Saving How many members ofTpar; can be rescued? How does Rr, Sh, Psh, Ch, 
Interventions this affect the rate of life loss? Ptpar1 
16. Complications Are there unique circumstances that increase or decrease Ml, Ac, Td, Ts 
or Aberrations the life loss in this particular event? 
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Table 18. Continued 
Category Description or Governing Question(s) Variables 
17 Post-flood Does the loss of friends, family, jobs, financial attainment, Schvq 
psychological or emotional peace of mind hinder the ability of people to 
trauma live life in a healthy manner or cause premature death? 
18. Applicability of Historic Events to Future Events: Logic Behind a Proposed Model 
In many areas, flash floods and hydrologic failures due to intense thunderstorms 
are much more likely during the summer. This is also when tourists are most likely to be 
present-especially outdoor recreationists in or near streams. 
Sabotage 
Sabotage has not been common outside of wartime, but it has occurred often 
enough to be an important source of failure. Dams breached through sabotage or war-
time bombing include the following: Eastover Mining Company Sludge Pond, Kentucky, 
1981 (20); Mohne Dam, Germany, 1943 (killed 1,200); Eder Dam, Germany, 1943; and 
the Dnjeprostroj Dam, Soviet Union, 1941 (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1983). 
Unsuccessful attempts at bombing or sabotage include the Peruca Dam in Croatia, blasted 
by retreating Serbian forces, 1993 (Engineering News Record, 1993); and the Ordunte 
dam during the Spanish Civil War. German forces visited the Aswan dam with the 
intention of studying how to destroy it, but this was never accomplished (Gruner, 1963). 
The most destructive intentional breach occurred in 1938 when Chiang Kaishek tried to 
stop the Japanese army that was invading China. He dynamited a hole in the 
southern levee of the Hwang-Ho River. The effect on the Japanese is not reported, but the 
flood destroyed thousands of villages, half a million Chinese peasants drowned, and 




Historically, there have been virtually no lives lost due to a dam failure caused by 
an earthquake. Interestingly, failure by sabotage is usually ignored in dam safety risk 
assessments (although it is sometimes included in a relative vulnerability assessment, it is 
impossible to estimate the likelihood of initiation of sabotage) and failure by an 
earthquake is often considered one of the greatest hazards, especially if a sudden failure 
mode is plausible. 
Importance of type of failure 
The nature of a darn failure is irrelevant to life loss, except as it influences the 
nature of the resulting wave, season, and the warning characteristics. There are two 
exceptions to this : 
I. When people are killed by the failure of the slope itself (II). A dam can 
threaten workers following a sudden drawdown if the drawdown results in a failure of the 
embankment while workers are present (II. I). 
2. When the loading is also local. Examples include an earthquake that blocks 
evacuation routes and traps people in buildings; and a severe storm that blocks 
evacuation routes (South Fork Dam, Johnstown) or hinders the awareness of sensory 
clues (29). 
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Detectability CDet Dt) 
Several insights are worth noting: In many cases, the Par near a dam has been 
aware that the dam was unsafe (17). When a safety concern has been detected, there has 
generally been a relucta.'lce to issue a warning until failure is viewed as highly likely or 
inevitable. Based on modem improvements in dam engineering, monitoring, and safety 
awareness, many clues that were not properly interpreted in the past would be recognized 
as serious safety concerns if they manifested today, but still reluctance by public officials 
and owners might result in delays. 
Warning times and effectiveness 
CWt Sc 0 We Td Wt~ Pt Ft Fit) 
As the number of variables listed in the heading indicates, there are a large 
number of possible perspectives one can take regarding the timing and effectiveness of 
warnings. It is useful to examine historical insights for a number of these in detail. 
Warning time 
The following insights are worth noting: 
I. The initial warning time (Wt), whether restricted to official sources or 
defined to include any human source, says nothing about the percentage of people 
warned, the urgency or effectiveness of the warning, the rate of warning propagation, the 
average time available for evacuation, or the time needed to evacuate. As such, it is 
informative regarding the response rate of officials, but it provides little information 
regarding the reduction of Par; to Tpar;. As an extreme example, Wt for the Bangladesh 
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3. Those who have prior experience with extreme flooding, other natural 
disasters like tornadoes, or who have participated in evacuation drills, are more likely to 
evacuate promptly and via a safe route (15.1) 
4. When the magnitude of an approaching flood is greater than officials or 
residents expect, it can be difficult to get people to believe the seriousness of the danger 
and to evacuate. This is especially true when the most severe events in memory caused 
only nuisance flooding or when a flash flood is preceded by mild local weather (15.1 , 
16 .1). 
5. The likelihood that people will evacuate increases with the number of 
warnings they receive and the number of different sources from which they receive them 
(15.1 ). 
6. Even though a county or dam owner has an emergency action plan, few may 
be familiar with it, fewer still may be able to relate it to the real-life dynamics of a 
catastrophic flood, officials may be ill-prepared to actually put it into practice in a timely 
manner, and the names and telephone numbers of key contacts may not have been kept 
up-to-date. In some cases, a plan may depend on a single person or a small set of persons 
who are unavailable or incapable of responding at the time of the disaster ( 16.1, 34.1 ). 
7. Those most difficult to warn are usually motorists and outdoor recreationists. 
8. Historically, NWS flash flood warnings appear to have had a limited ability 
to mobilize evacuations when presented as a crawl across the bottom of the TV screen or 
a brief auditory message. There are several reasons: 
a) Warnings often lack urgency or cover a sufficiently broad area that 
listeners figure it pertains to other locations. 
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b) Readers of a crawl figure if a serious danger was imminent, it would not 
be presented as a crawl. 
c) Recipients figure that if a true emergency existed, warnings would be 
confirmed by other sources. 
d) Not everyone is watching TV or listening to the radio. 
Sensory clues 
All of the following sensory clues (Sc) have alerted people to danger: 
I. A loud roar, resembling an amplified version of thunder, ocean waves, an 
earthquake, or a crashing airplane. 
2. The sight of an approaching wall of water, which can often resemble fire , 
smoke, or fog from a distance because of the way light reflects off the spray that rises. 
This is usually covered in front and above by debris, including houses, logs, trees, and a 
thick mat of earth. In some cases, the debris is so dense that it completely hides the water 
from view. 
3. The sound of cracking trees and telephone poles. 
4. The sound oflogs, trees, and boulders bouncing off the canyon walls. 
5. The sound of houses exploding into a shower of boards as they are ripped 
from their foundations and smashed one against another. 
6. The sound of a creek growing louder and louder when a flood rises slowly. 
7. The sight and sound of exploding power stations or transformers. 
8. The buzz of electricity from snapping power lines. 
9. Power lines swinging vio lently from upstream disturbances. 
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10. Railroad tracks snaking violently. 
II. An advance, fast-rising flood, filled with debris, that precedes a wall of water 
by 2-30 minutes. The first warning might be shallow flooding in the house. 
12. The sight of neighbors moving vehicles to high ground or congregating on 
the hillside. 
13. The obscure warning of motorists racing by while honking their horns. 
14. Pets becoming agitated. 
15 . Power outages. 
16. Dead phone lines. 
The following conditions can mask sensory clues: 
I. Heavy rain and hail tend to drive people indoors and mask both visual and 
auditory clues (22, 29). 
2. A strong wind. 
3. No wall of water, but a fast-rising flood at night that rises with little sound 
(18). 
4. The darkness of night can hinder visual clues and obscure auditory clues, but 
floods are often loud enough to wake people at night. Nevertheless, even when there is a 
loud wall of water, a fast-rising leading wave can surround a home before the greater 
wave is perceived (I 6.2). 
Average warning time 
Individual warnings provide a basis for an average warning time (Wtavg)· These 
individual warnings can arrive by any of the following modes: 
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I. sensory clues, 
2. telephone calls from neighbors or authorities before a flood nears the area 
(i.e. , before the phone lines go dead), 
3. passing motorists honking their horns and shouting warnings out the window, 
4. shouts from fleeing neighbors, 
5. family or friends who stop by on foot or in an automobile, 
6. the radio, 
7. the TV, 
8. CB rad ios, 
9. fire fighters or police officers who drive through neighborhoods with 
bullhorns or who go door to door, and 
I 0. a self-appointed Paul Revere who races from door-to-door or business to 
business delivering a quick warning with the intention that it be passed along. 
The following insights and subtleties regarding the average warning time (Wtavg) 
should be noted: 
I . In a long, narrow river valley, when a wall of water progresses slower than 
people can drive, there will typically be motorists or residents who detect the flood 
through sensory clues and who flee downstream in an automobile. If they can gain 
distance, these motorists may stop along the way to warn residents or to pick up family 
and friends. At the least, they will typically tum on their lights, honk their horns, and 
possibly shout quick warnings out their windows. Such warnings do not always 
communicate the approaching danger effectively, but they generally prompt a curiosity 
that alerts other residents to sensory clues or alternate forms of warning. This allows 
220 
many to run up a nearby hillside or to evacuate by automobile. Such actions generate a 
chain reaction, as more vehicles evacuate, people warn their neighbors, or people notice 
the swarm of unusual activity outside their windows. This contagious process can 
mobilize the better part of a community, saving countless lives, even in the absence of 
warnings by public officials. However, it is by nature much more random than a fo rmal 
evacuation plan implemented by trained public officials. As such, when many houses are 
rapidly destroyed, the chances that at least some people will remain ignorant of the 
approaching danger and fall victim to the flood remains high (30). The Buffa lo Creek 
dam failure provides an excellent example of this process as it worked itself out over 15 
miles (see Wt, Wt,8, and Sc in the unpublished working documents for event 17). 
2. Wired telephone service is quickly lost in virtually every catastrophic flood 
and so should not be counted on to propagate a warning at the last minute. 
3. Power is quickly lost or intentionally turned off in virtually every 
catastrophic flood , eliminating the usefulness of most last-minute radio or TV broadcasts. 
4. No cases provided information on the use of wireless telephones in 
disseminating a warning, but during disasters wireless exchanges can quickly become 
overloaded, blocking communication traffic . 
5. Although Wtavg characterizes Wti more closely than does Wt, it does not 
characterize those with the shortest Wti. As such, Wtavg may appear large even though a 
significant percentage of the subPar receives little or no warning. This is especially true 
when Par type are mixed: i.e., a river reach that includes residents watching the evening 
news and those who are sleeping in isolated campsites (16.2). 
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6. Wtavg, like Wt and Sc, lasts only until the flood reaches a level of potential 
lethality . This is defined conservatively such that only trivial flooding is permitted. Once 
a house is surrounded by water or people in the floodplain have to wade, the stopwatch 
on warning time is read. Evacuation after this point is defined as reaching a safe haven. 
Evacuation rates CEf Pr Td 
Tw. Ts Ml Pt Dev Ret) 
The fo llowing list provides important historical observations and insights 
regarding evacuation rates: 
I . When the inundated area is not more than about 1,000 ft wide, most houses 
have a back door within 300ft of safety . If the danger is clearly understood, it generall y 
takes 0.5-3 minutes for a family to evacuate during the day, and l-6 minutes at night, 
depending on how many people must be gathered, how quickly they expect the flood to 
arri ve, how extreme the weather is outside, and whether or not they linger, get dressed, 
grab possessions, or warn neighbors. These ranges must be extended slightly when the 
danger does not immediately register (6.1). Average values (the representative evacuation 
time, Ret) are on the order of 1-2 minutes during the day and 2-4 minutes at night. During 
the day, a large wall of water can provide a Wt.,g of 1-4 minutes based on sensory clues, 
explaining why some very destructive floods have killed a small percentage of Par when 
Wt = 0 minutes (30). 
2. Frequently, healthy individuals slow their evacuation to help others-
neighbors, strangers, aged parents, a disabled relative, babies, children. In some cases, 
they all perish together (6.1). 
222 
3. It is not uncommon for people to delay or tum back to grab a pocket book, 
pair of boots, coat, clean clothes for a child, or some other valuable of minor importance. 
Sometimes people will return after reaching high ground. They can also delay to grab a 
pet orto release pigs or horses ( 17, 18, 18.25, 29). Many people have died due to such 
delays. 
4. Strong rains, bitter cold, and other extreme weather conditions can slow an 
evacuation, but people will quickly run outside if they expect a towering wall of water to 
crash into thei r house at any moment. 
5. Spouses who work outside the flood zone may run or drive into the flood 
zone to try to reach their families before the flood arrives, even if there is insufficient 
time to reach home or to evacuate once there. This increases the Ret and can greatly 
increase life loss (29). 
6. When workers are concentrated in a factory , warnings can often be 
propagated within seconds or minutes with a high degree of credibility and urgency (29). 
7. Fences can prove formidable barriers to evacuation on foot, slowing escape 
or preventing it altogether. In some cases, elderly adults have thrown children over fences 
while they were forced to face the flood (6.1 ). 
8. There is a small percentage of people who refuse to evacuate, even in the face 
of clear, urgent, door-to-door warnings (8 .1 , l8 .3a). 
9. Evacuation warnings are generally less effective prior to dam fai lure since the 
magnitude of the flood is not known and it is uncertain when or if a flood wave will 
actually appear. Hence, the evacuation rate prior to failure can be much slower than after 
failure(l7,23.l , 35). 
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I 0. Sometimes people believe a dam might fail , or even has failed, but believe 
the flood will do no more than nuisance flooding at their home. Under such 
misapprehensions, even the sensory clues of a leading, fast-rising, debris-filled flood may 
not produce a rapid evacuation (15, 17.12, 22, 29.9). 
II. Evacuation rates will vary with the expected travel time of the flood. That is, 
people who can evacuate in seconds or minutes may take much longer if they think they 
have half an hour or an hour. 
12. The last four points limit the effectiveness of many evacuations. causing the 
trend line of E vs. Ef (Ef= Tpar/Par) to approach an asymptotic value slightly above zero 
as E increases (see Figure 14 for historic examples, shown later). 
13 . Most people who evacuate on foot in narrow valleys choose a reasonably 
direct route toward safety, moving laterally toward the nearby hillside. 
14. When evacuees panic, they can freeze in their tracks, jump out of upper story 
windows, or overlook the closest hillside and run parallel to the river, sometimes toward 
the flood ( 17, 18, 26.2, 29). Some panicked individuals have run toward the river to cross 
a bridge to run up the hillside on the opposite side. While cases of panic are uncommon, 
they can infect an entire group, resulting in great, unnecessary life loss (29). 
Excess evacuation times CE ED 
Because the representative evacuation time (Ret) is based on escaping the flood 
zone, and since warning times for Wtavg stop increasing once 6-12 inches of water crosses 
the floodplain, the excess evacuation time (E) says something about the likely size of the 
threatened population (Tpar;) but it says nothing about the ability of people to reach safe 
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havens ( 18). Likewise, E says little about the ability of people to wade to safety or escape 
with the help of rescuers during the early stages of flooding (18.21 ). 
When E is small or negative, safe havens provide the best alternative to 
evacuation. For example, when people dwell on an island that is submerged by a fl ood. 
there may be patches of relatively high ground that allow people to safe ly stand in 
shallow water (a safe haven) while their houses are washed away. The same can hold true 
fo r any location cut off from the edge of the flood by bridges, barriers, or distance. In 
such cases, because people may seek shelter outside of buildings on higher ground. high 
loss of shelter does not reflect the nature of the flood experienced by the residents. 
Expecting Ptpar; to approach 1.0, one might be surprised to find the life loss approaching 
zero (18.21). 
E is the only measure of time that describes the likelihood that people will 
successfully evacuate. Wt, Wtavg, and Sc say something about the time available for 
evacuation and Ret describes the time needed to evacuate, but only E describes the 
difference between the two. In the same way, Sc and Wtavg indicate whether peopie are 
likely to reach a safe haven only when these values are compared to the time required to 
get there. 
SubPar type and evacuation 
modes CPt Ft) 
The rate of life loss varies significantly among Par type since it is a function of 
where people are located when the flood reaches lethal proportions. Apart from where 
people are located when they learn about a failure , the excess evacuation time, their 
modes of evacuation, and the local loss of shelter also influence their locations. Issues 
affecting lethality are presented or expanded upon toward the end of this chapter. The 
subsections below present insights specific to each Par type. 
Residential vs. commercial vs . seasonal 
Each of these words defines a type of community with unique temporal 
characteristics . 
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Residential neighborhoods. During school, work, and commuting hours, the 
population in residential areas should not be based on the average occupancy, since a 
large percentage of both adults and children wi ll not be home. The same holds true during 
camping holidays, weekends in the summer when people are likely to be away from 
home, and popular shopping times. 
Commercial districts. Depending on the nature of the local businesses, 
commercial districts can be largely vacant outside of work hours and especially at night, 
on Sundays, and on holidays. 
Seasonal areas. In some cases, a subPar will consist almost exclusively of tourists 
or recreationists. Examples include campgrounds (3), fishermen (2), and resort 
communities (32). In such cases, the subPar will fluctuate in size based on the season and 
whether it is a weekend or holiday, so the likelihood of a dam failure should also be 
estimated on a seasonal basis. 
Buildings 
Those who are caught while running from a building toward the hillside benefit 
from being among buildings only if the buildings shield them or provide a chance haven 
as they are washed downstream. 
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Automobiles 
The likelihood of people being in a vehicle rather than at home or at work is much 
higher during regular commuting hours and much lower at night. 
People often choose to evacuate by vehicle when it is safer, shorter, and quicker 
to run up the hillside. There are several reasons for this: 
1. A vehicle may have great monetary value, so there is a desire to remove the 
vehicle from the flood zone. This is apparent when people risk their lives to drive a 
vehicle a short distance up a hillside ( 17.14) or when they refuse to abandon a stalled 
vehicle while it is still safe to wade (!). 
2. A vehicle is associated with speed, which is desirable during an evacuation. 
3. A vehicle provides a means by which a family can reach food and shelter 
once their house is flooded. 
4. Many people are conditioned by habit to drive rather than to walk or run. 
5. A vehicle helps transport those with limited mobility. 
Additional historical insights pertaining to motorists and their passengers are 
enumerated below: 
l. Motorists who become stalled in water are usually reluctant to leave their 
vehicles. While flooding is minor or moderate, they may decide to climb on top of the 
vehicle or remain inside while it drifts. Thus, slow-rising floods that provide ample time 
for evacuation can prove lethal: the window for evacuation is lost and the flood continues 
to rise or a sudden wall of water sweeps through (1.1, 25.2). 
2. Water through which people can wade is often capable of washing a vehicle 
downstream (9.3, 23.1). As sediment coats a road surface and the weight of a vehicle is 
reduced through buoyancy, friction between the tires and the road is reduced 
considerably. 
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3. Many automotive fatalities are a result of motorists choosing to cross a 
flooded bridge or roadway, either because the flood appears shallow or because the 
motorist does not realize what a small depth/velocity combination is needed to move an 
automobile into deeper/swifter water (8). In the common scenario where a motorist 
hesitates and then chooses to venture across a flooded roadway, the resulting subPar is a 
form of convergence. In such cases, variables like Wt, Wtavg, and E have little or no 
relevance (23 . I) . 
One does not see a steady stream of vehicles swept away at the same river 
crossing because after the first vehicle begins to float, other drivers stay clear. However, 
the same crossing can sweep more than one car away if it is isolated and the first 
automobile disappears from view before a later motorist arrives (8.3) . 
4. Variables like Dv and Qp only apply at bridges after a vehicle is swept into 
the channel, since most of the water passes beneath the bridge. 
5. A unique danger exists to motorists who might plunge dozens of feet when a 
section of roadway that has washed away is hidden by darkness, rain, fog, or a blind 
corner (27.1). 
6. Excavations, ditches, canals, and other topographic depressions can turn an 
otherwise shallow flood into a death trap by slowly washing motorists into a place from 
which they cannot escape (9.3). 
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Campgrounds 
The size of subPar in campgrounds varies dramatically with the season, generally 
swelling in the summer and peaking on summer holidays and weekends, so the comments 
under seasonal subPar apply here . Campgrounds are somewhat unique in that official 
warnings are especially difficult to deliver to outdoor recreationists and recreationists 
may have fewer opportunities to find shelter than those in other surroundings may. See 
the section on the lethality rate outside of safe havens. 
In the river (waders and swimmers) 
Few people wade or swim more than an hour after dark, so this type of subPar can 
be ignored at such times. 
See the section on the lethality rate outside of safe havens. 
Along shore (hikers and the curious) 
Few people hike or watch floods more than an hour after dark, so this type of 
subPar can be ignored at such times. 
See the section on the lethality rate outside of safe havens. 
Boats 
When on a river, boaters face increased risks due to the difficulty of delivering an 
offic ial warning and the increased evacuation time most boaters would require. See the 
section on the lethality rate outside of safe havens. 
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Trains 
Depending on the depth of flooding and whether or not a train is moving, a train 
is most similar to either a mobile home (as was the case near Johnstown when South Fork 
Dam fai led in 1889) or an automobile, though in both cases less buoyant. The impact of a 
crash can cause deaths even when people stay dry ( 19). 
Homogeneity of subPar CPar;,_f!, 
CGf Ls Fp F1 Schvql . 
Descriptive variables are generally point estimates (i.e., D, V, Dv, and Wt) or they 
are based on a representative average across a subPar (i.e., Sc, Wtavg, and E). The more 
homogeneously each subPar is defined (i.e, with respect to Pt, Ls, location, warning 
times, etc.), the more closely a point estimate or average value can characterize every 
member of Par. That is, homogeneous subPar reduce the variance of characterizing 
variables applied to each individual. 
Although each flood is highly unique, it is possible to compare statistically 
dissimilar Par using statistically simi lar subPar when those subPar are defined 
homogeneously and one focuses on Tpar; to reduce temporal variations. These two 
steps-reducing Par to homogeneous subPar and Par; to Tpar;....:...allows one to 
characterize the hazard to a population primarily by variables like Ls, D, and V. 
Flood dynamics CF!t V D Op Qb W 
Dv R Ww· Dt· H Hp B Vol Rf Al 
It is possible to make a large number of generalizations regarding the dynamics of 
extreme floods. The following list enumerates those aspects of flood dynamics that are 
most important: 
230 
I. Catastrophic floods are violently turbulent. They often strip the clothing off 
both those who perish and those who survive. Victims can be so mangled and caked with 
mud that friends and relatives do not recognize them. Sometimes bodies are dismembered 
or so disfigured that it is impossible to tell the victim's sex (32.1). The main current 
generally makes normal swimming difficult or impossible. Many people die because the 
current pulls them under or prevents them from reaching the surface. If a person is driven 
into an object such as a house, tree, rock, fence, or telephone pole, the current has 
sufficient force to pin the person underwater and even bury them in sediment. 
2. l n open currents, people who die usually do so because they are held 
underwater, tire trying to fight turbulence, or are injured through a violent collision with 
stationary or mobilized objects-all functions of high velocities. 
3. The peak flow rate of a dam break flood wave typically follows the leading 
edge by at least a minute, and floods often rise in progressive surges or waves. It follows 
that fatal depths are often less than the peak depths and the depths encountered while 
people seek out safe havens, including wading to shore, are usually much less than the 
peak depths. It also means that those farther from the river may have precious extra 
seconds to evacuate compared to those closer to the river (22.2). 
4. Depth is principally important as it works with velocities to provide the 
needed moment and momentum to topple people and buildings, to allow high velocities 
and turbulence to develop, and to trap people underwater by crashing down from above. 
Thus, if people are able to swim, the velocity of a flood is more important to life loss than 
its depth; velocity is the killer and the depth is the accomplice (18.13). As an example, 
over 50% of the campers died when 3 ft of water raced across the Aras alluvial fan (3 ), 
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but all those who drifted free of currents in the depths of Lake Mohave were amazed at 
how easy it was to swim to shore (22.4, Eldorado Canyon). In the same way, it is likely 
that over half of the town of Rivadelago survived the total destruction of their homes, 
without warning, at night, because the Vega de Tera flood was immediately dissipated in 
the deep, quiescent waters of the lake just downstream (36). 
5. The ratio of serious injuries to deaths varies greatly by event, making 
generalizations difficult. In some events, people either die or escape relatively unharmed 
(22). In other events, the number of people admitted to emergency rooms might be 
several times greater than the number of deaths ( 17). As a rule, if a flood is extremely 
lethal, destroying all safe havens, there are few injuries because people either evacuate or 
die (35). 
6. Extreme scour and deposition-on the order of a few feet to over I 0 ft-is 
common in extreme floods. In some cases, the river channel may permanently shift to 
flow where buildings once stood (3, 15, 18.3a, 36). 
7. In some cases, the flow forms vortexes that can drill deep holes into the 
ground (18.3a, 12 ft deep). 
8. Catastrophic floods are characterized by an unusually large debris load: Earth 
from the failed embankment and canyon walls, cobbles and boulders, forest litter, felled 
trees, roofs and sharp boards from shattered houses, floating mobile homes, vehicles of 
all shapes and sizes, barbed wire and boards from fences , telephone poles, propane tanks, 
railroad cars, railroad ties, etc. Consider the following examples: 
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a) The Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood picked up enough dirt and gravel 
from bare canyon walls that its leading edge sprayed out gravel and appeared to 
have a viscosity comparable to freshly mixed concrete (22.7) . 
b) The Stava embankments had sufficient volume in relation to the 
reservoirs that the resulting flood contained approximately 50% sediment (32.1 ). 
Extremely high sediment loads are common when tailings dams fail (17). 
c) When the Bayless Pulp & Paper Company Dam failed , it picked up 
700,000 cords of logs from the pulp mill, completely blanketing the floodwater to 
the point that some observers high on the hillside could not see the water when 
the flood passed through Austin, Texas (8). 
d) The Buffalo Creek flood was typical of a wall of water passing through 
sequential communities. It was characterized by every conceivable item on the 
floodplain, but it was dominated by automobiles, splintered boards, shattered 
houses, and houses that were still intact, riding high above the flood and being 
pushed before it by a wall of water that was black with mud from the 
embankment (17). 
e) The Mill River Dam failure provided an example of a flood that passed 
through forested valleys between communities. Consider the following quote 
from a young boy: 
A great mass of brush, trees, and trash was rolling rapidly toward 
me. I have tried many times to describe how this appeared; perhaps the 
best simile is that of hay rolling over and over as a hayrake moves along 
the field, only this roll seemed twenty feet high, and the spears of grass 
in the hay rake enlarged to limbs and trunks of trees mixed with boards 
and timbers; at this time I saw no water. (Sharpe, 1995, p. 97) 
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9. If the flood is not slow rising and it passes through a canyon or narrow 
va lley, debris tends to concentrate at the leading edge of the flood, slowing the wave and 
causing it to pile up as a wall behind a loose, mobile debris dam. 
I 0. A narrow constriction can also cause a surging wave to mount up into a wall 
of water (22. I). 
I I. A wall of water will tend to ride a winding canyon like a bobsled, sloshing up 
one side and then another. Often it is described like a snake riding the canyon walls (6. 1, 
17). Superelevation differences of 10-20 ft have been observed, representing roughly 
30%-80% of the flood 's peak depth ( I 7, 22.2). When a tributary enters another river at a 
sharp angle, the flood can wash far up the opposite shore before moving downstream ( 17, 
3 5). The turbulent nature of these behaviors can send a finger of water out to snatch one 
house away from between two others or leave houses untouched at an elevation below 
houses that are destroyed ( 17, 22). 
12. Because a wave must generally be slowed to pile into a wall of water and 
debris, such a wall will often sweep a fast-rising, debris-filled flood before it as the 
mobi le wall leaks and sections break away to travel at unhindered velocities . This can 
provide an important sensory clue, giving residents precious seconds or minutes to run or 
wade to safety before the wall of water arrives (I 7.6). 
13. Debris dams tend to form behind bridges, reversing attenuation and causing 
the wave to rise in height. If the bridge or dam fails catastrophically, the renewed wall of 
water will be higher and the peak flow rate will be greater than if the temporary dam had 
not formed. As debris dams form and fail , a flood wave can be slowed and renewed over 
and over as it moves through many miles of canyon or narrow valley ( I 7). 
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14. When a series of small dams dot a river (common when mills are plentiful 
and factories depend on water power), the sequential dam failures increase the volume of 
the flood and compensate for attenuation through valley storage. 
15 . When a wave is renewed, valley storage forces the peal< flow rate to follow 
an exponential decay pattern, approaching a limiting value (16, 18, 26, 29, 31, 35). As the 
flow rate decreases, average depths and/or velocities will also decrease. Since Qp is a 
functi on of the product of average depths and velocities, depths and velocities decay 
much more slowly than Qp. Of course depths and velocities can increase at the expense 
of the other if the average slope or cross-sectional area changes (26, 22.1 ). 
16. Obstacles like train cars, buildings, and sturdy trees that support a debris dam 
can divert a flood and protect regions behind them (17. 7, 18.8, 29.1). When the terrain is 
reasonably flat, a debris dam or building can also turn a flood and send it in an 
unexpected direction, such as down a side street between a row of buildings. 
17. In a row of buildings or connected apartments roughly parallel to the 
direction of flow, the leading units can buffer those downstream, resulting in 
progressively less damage (18 .5). 
18. A row of buildings will buffer buildings inland ( 18.8). 
19. Parameters like Dv and Qp represent areas near the channel far better than 
areas near the flood's fringes (18.Jb). Dv and Qp grossly misrepresent a subPar when the 
subPar is a finger of the flood or a quiescent backwater (16.6, 18.13 ). 
20. As Par; grow in size, W and hence Dv become less representative. 
2 1. When Par; is heterogenous, point values like D and V generally describe only 
those areas nearest the channel, even if those areas are a small fraction of Par;. 
235 
22. Dt, H, Hp, B, Vol , Rf, and A are relevant to life loss only insofar as they 
influence variables like Det, Wtavg, R, Ww, V, and D and the underlying probability that 
a structure will fail. As such, they are at best surrogates in a life-loss equation and should 
largely be ignored. They do, however, offer the possibility of checking or calibrating the 
accuracy of flood inundation modeling. 
23. When E is very small or negative, the rise-rate is a critical factor that 
determines whether people are likely to be trapped or washed away. Slow-rising floods 
do not generally pose a threat to people in their homes since occupants can readily 
evacuate, but motorists reluctant to leave a parked or stalled vehicle can linger to the 
point that evacuation becomes impossible (25). An extremely fast-rising flood that does 
not pile into a wall can trap more people than a wall of water if the former provides fewer 
sensory clues (18). However, once the flood has arrived, a wall of water is imposs ible to 
avo id , but a fast-rising flood may provide the few seconds or minutes necessary to wade 
to shore before it prevents wading. 
24. Current definitions of forcefulness (F = Fp, Fd, F 5) mask the most important 
factor differentiating rates of life loss by combining structures with major damage and 
total destruction into a single category. When buildings are destroyed, most people 
remaining in those buildings die, but when buildings have major damage, the fatality rate 
varies widely depending on the frequency with which safe havens remain. On average, 
the historical fatality rate in buildings with major damage has been closer to that observed 
in buildings with minor damage (Ptpar = 0) than to that in buildings that have been 
destroyed (Ptpar "' 0.8-1.0). 
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As an example of how F masks this distinction, consider the contiguous subPar 
18.12a and 18.12b. Every building in 18.12a was destroyed and every building in 18 .1 2b 
had major damage, making Fp = Fd = I in both cases. The fatality rates diverged 
significantly, however, as expected, with P1&.J2a = 1.0 and P1s 12b = 0.013. 
25. The following real-life behaviors of flood waves are difficult to model with 
current software: 
a) The effects of debris dams in creating and renewing the depths of a wall 
of water ( 17). 
b) The effects of debris dams in protecting areas from damage (29.5). 
c) The effects of debris dams and buildings in changing the direction of 
flow. 
d) The selective inundation of a crashing flood as it ricochets off 
alternating sides of a canyon with superelevation differences exceeding I 0 ft ( 17, 
22). 
e) The ability of a wave's momentum to carry it out of the channel and 
along a new course when it encounters a bend. 
f) The ability of a wave to rocket out of a constriction like water from a 
fire hose and miss adjacent areas that would be flooded if the flood had less 
momentum (6.1, 26). 
g) The reduction in velocity caused by mobile and stationary debris ( 17). 
h) Differences in depth, velocity, and arrival time between a wall of water 
and its leading fast-rising flood ( 17). 
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26. The force of the current makes it extremely difficult to regain one' s footing 
after being swept off one's feet. Consider the words of a rescue worker who fell while 
wading under a safety rope: "I have a new respect for water. It was an incredible force . 
Words can ' t describe it. .. . Your foot leaves the ground and you're gone." (Kaiser, 1995, 
p. A I) . Fortunately, his fellow firefighters grabbed him before he drifted away. 
27. The type of failure (Ft) is relevant only insofar as it affects aspects of 
warning and the dynamics of the flood wave itself. For example, the Vaiont failure (35) 
was extremely unique. The dam itself did not fail, but a large portion of the mountain slid 
into the reservoir and sent a massive wave 325 ft over the top of the dam. Despite the 
source of the wave, a flood with similar hydraulic characteristics might be expected half a 
mile below a tall, concrete gravity or arch dam that suddenly burst (31), or below an 
earthen, rockfi ll, or mine-waste dam perched high on a very steep slope (32). 
28. Given identical volumes and no warning, an expansive flood is safer than a 
narrow flood for two primary reasons. First, as a flood spreads laterally, three factors 
combine to greatly reduce the flood 's local velocities: a) Depths decrease through volume 
spreading so that a wall of water cannot be sustained. b) A wide floodplain implies a 
relatively flat downstream slope. As momentum carries the flood laterally, the slope 
becomes even smaller. c) Buildings near the river absorb the flood's energy, buffering 
each successive row of buildings. Second, as velocities and depths drop, loss of shelter 
shifts from H to M, and then to L. This greatly increases the number of safe havens, 
chance havens, and the survival rate ( 18). 
Loss of shelter CBt Ls Dd Sh 
Psh Fp Fd F~ Fpar Pt) 
Loss of shelter vs. economic damages 
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lt is important to realize that Ls is not the same as economic damages. Lives are 
lost within buildings when occupants fall into water in which they cannot swim; become 
trapped underwater as a room fills to the ceiling; get struck by large, external debris 
penetrating from outside; get struck or trapped underwater as the building breaks apart ; or 
get washed through a wall or out a door or window into open water. As such, the critical 
question is not the degree of economic damages or whether a building should later be 
condemned, but whether or not a structure maintains an accessible safe haven or pseudo-
safe haven for the duration of a flood. 
It fo llows that loss of shelter is not synonymous with the definitions used by the 
American Red Cross or other agencies to define housing damages . Instead: 
I. Ls = L implies relatively safe havens on every floor. 
2. Ls = M implies complete loss of a safe haven on the first floor. 
3. Since loss of a safe haven is generally accompanied by structural damage, 
traditional categories of minor and major damage generally agree with Ls = L and Ls = 
M when they exclude damage to furniture from water and mud. 
4. Ls = H implies complete loss of all safe havens (including accessible 
rooftops) and loss of every aerated pocket of protection. If an aerated pocket of protection 
remains, L = M even if a building floats off its foundation or is later condemned. 
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An anchored house may be tom apart, so a house that is securely anchored to a 
chimney or foundation can provide a more dangerous refuge than one that is free to float 
(17). 
When a house floats off i:s foundation and is mobilized downstream, several 
things can happen to it. It can sink or be sucked underwater by an undertow; waves can 
break it to pieces; it can collide with a stationary object like a tree or the jutting end of a 
house and break apart; the roof can sever off and form a raft; it can collide with another 
floating house or a debris dam and explode in a shower of boards; it can jam in a debris 
dam and form part of a bridge to safety, or it can drift a short distance and run aground. 
It is useful to examine the three classifications of Loss of Shelter (Ls) 
individually. 
Ls = H: total destruction 
A house can be destroyed in many ways. It can: 
I. be slowly battered to pieces by waves and debris, 
2. be obliterated in an instant by a towering wall of water, 
3. collapse on itself, especially if it is made of stone or brick, 
4. pop up like a cork and float off its foundation, then disintegrate through 
collisions downstream, or 
5. float a while and then sink. 
A building can be destroyed even if the water surface elevation is well below the 
elevation of the top story (18.7, 29.2, 29.7). However, a house is destroyed only when all 
safe havens, pseudo-safe havens, and aerated pockets of protection disappear during the 
flood. During or after destruction, any of the structural members, especially a severed 
rooftop, can provide a chance haven. 
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If a rooftop is inaccessible, a building is destroyed when the top floor or 
accessible attic is completely submerged. If a roof is accessible, the building is 
considered destroyed only if the flood or flood waves wash across the crest of the roof to 
an extent likely to wash people into the flood. Since the momentum of the flood riding 
the slant of the roof will cause waves to run up, this elevation is generally on the order of 
a foot or two below the roofs crest ( 18.1 0). 
Ls = M: major damage 
1fthe highest accessible floor (including an accessible attic) is filled with water 
beyond 1 ft of the ceiling, but the flood does not crest an accessible roof, Ls = M rather 
than H because an accessible safe haven remains (18.15). 
People have survived by huddling in a back corner, sitting on a counter, or hiding 
in a cupboard when two walls and most of the floor have been washed away ( 18). Hence, 
if walls are torn off but portions oftbe structure remain to shelter occupants from the 
main current or to provide something to which they might cling, the loss of shelter is 
major; but if only trivial structural members remain such that all shelter is lost, the 
dwelling is destroyed. 
A building is destroyed any time it is torn apart and submerged in the flood. 
However, if a building floats off its foundation and maintains an accessible pseudo-safe 
haven for the duration of tbe flood , Ls = M. 
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A building just inside the edge of the flood can experience major damage when a 
leading wall of water or sudden surge tosses large debris such as logs or millstones 
through the walls. These, in tum, can injure or kill those that are inside (6: 1) . 
Ls = L: minor damage 
Almost any room has a counter, desk, couch, table, chair, bookcase, bed, dresser, 
piano, or other piece of furniture that can provide an elevated platform or a floatation 
device during a flood. When a flood is relatively quiescent, with few exceptions, these 
objects and a little swimming allow people to keep their heads above the water surface 
even when the flood nears the ceiling. While elevated cei lings pose a special problem, a 
flood reaching such depths without causing major damage is necessarily very calm, 
making it easier to cling to floating furniture, tread water, or hang onto rafters. This has 
been demonstrated in commercial buildings with two-story ceilings (18). Hence, Ls = L 
when there is minor structural damage and the flood does not encroach within a foot of 
the first-floor cei ling or within 2ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling. 
Safe havens chance havens pseudo-safe 
havens and aerated havens (Sh Ch Psh 
Ah Coh Pt Bt R Ww. Dlocal.....Ylocal, 
Sc. Wt~,E.Schvgl ---
Safe havens 
Havens that are safe for most people under most circumstances can be predicted 
based on flood mapping, a survey of building heights, and estimates of which trees and 
buildings will remain standing. Safe havens include the following: 
I. An upper story with sufficiently shallow flooding that occupants are not 
washed out a window and can float on a bed or stand freely . These conditions are 
generally maintained when the flow does not rise more than one foot above the 
windowsills in the highest story (about 3 ft above the floor) and the building is not 
destroyed (18.23, 18 .24). 
242 
2. Quiescent flooding that does not trap people without air. When flooding is 
relatively quiescent, people readily keep their heads above water by treading water. 
standing on stationary platforms such as counters, floating on beds, or by clinging to 
tloating furniture. If such flooding does not persist to the point where it would lead to 
extreme hypothermia or exhaustion, a relatively safe haven is maintained even when 
waters come within I ft of a flat ceiling or 2 ft of the peak of a sloped cei ling, whether or 
not the cei ling is elevated. Although it would be highly variable by context, the safe 
haven would be lost after the flood remained at such high elevations for more than 0.25-2 
hr, the general range in the historical record ( 18). 
3. An attic that is accessible from within the bouse or trailer (26) . 
4. A stationary rooftop, if it is accessible from the bouse and waves do not wash 
over the top (18). 
5. A stout tree that is easy to climb, taller than the flood , and is not toppled. 
6. Any island or region that experiences shallow flooding during the flood ' s 
peak, such that depths are easy to resist while standing or clinging to convenient anchors 
such as telephone poles or lampposts (depths of 1-5 ft, depending on the velocity: 18 .2 1, 
18.25). 
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7. The hillside beyond the flood if a member ofTpar; can readily drive or wade 
to it while the flood is still shallow, or if they can reach it directly from the roof or a 
window(l8.2 , 18.13, 18.21). 
Chance havens 
If debris does not crush or fatally wound flood victims, it can provide a means of 
floatation that has saved many lives. Debris is defined as a chance haven rather than a 
safe haven because it cannot be readily predicted, its benefits are unreliable, and it can 
directly cause death by wounding flood victims or trapping them underwater. Chance 
havens can contribute significantly to the variance in fatality rates across similar events. 
Beyond floating debris, given the right circumstances, chance havens also include 
safe havens, pseudo-safe havens, aerated havens, and areas of low velocity within 
swimming distance of shore. Chance havens thus fall into four categories: 
I . Rafts and floatation aids: Severed rooftops, mattresses, propane tanks, and 
logs are the most commonly mentioned in stories about survivors (18. 7). 
2. The roofs of floating buildings: Because it is both more difficult and more 
dangerous to reach and remain on a rooftop after a building begins to drift, lurch, spin, or 
sink, rooftops should be treated as chance havens whenever a building drifts more than 
I 00 yards. As indicated above, if people must rely heavily on chance to reach a largely 
inaccessible roof, this would also constitute a chance haven. 
3. Stationary havens: Any immobile haven that is reached while drifting, 
including rooftops, upper-story windows, treetops, overhanging branches, debris dams at 
bridges that allow victims to walk to dry land, and the shore itself. 
4. Aquatic havens: Any location where shore can be easily reached without 
fighting high velocities, such as a lake or a quiescent backwater. 
Pseudo-safe havens 
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Pseudo-safe havens are safe havens on or in buildings that become reclassified 
once the building begins to drift. They are a hybrid between safe havens, which are static 
and predictable, and chance havens, which depend on the whims of the current and the 
debris load. They exist only among a subset of buildings with major damage (see Loss of 
Shelter). 
As indicated above, rooftops are considered chance havens (Ch) when a building 
drifts more than the length of a football field. Predicting whether a floating structure will 
maintain a pseudo-safe haven or be destroyed requires an estimate of its trajectory, the 
duration over which it can float, and the likelihood of a high-velocity collision. While 
these apparently depend in part on chance, some useful historic patterns generally hold 
true. Since pseudo-safe havens only apply in the narrow range of depths and velocities 
between the lower-end of major damages and the point where buildings are destroyed by 
the currents themselves, the following scenarios are comprehensive: 
I . Currents capable of destroying anchored houses have usually destroyed 
floating houses or eliminated the safety of their havens. Very few people have survived 
by riding a house more than a short distance. 
2. Mobile homes tend to float in modest depths and velocities, but being single 
story, a pseudo-safe haven is maintained inside only until water rises more than a foot 
above the windowsills. In swift water or depths over 6 ft, this condition will generally not 
last long as the water pressure bursts open windows and doors and waves and debris 
batter holes in the walls. 
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3. Houses and mobile homes near the edge of a flood that float only a foot or 
two off the bottom tend to travel less than 300ft before they run aground or stack t:p 
against other houses, trees, or barriers. In such cases, the safety of the haven is generally 
preserved and the survival rate is comparable to that for stationary safe havens. 
4. Those who have survived after riding a house or mobile home more than a 
few hundred yards have usually scrambled onto the roof or lodged in a debris dam where 
they could walk across the shattered roofs of former houses to dry land. In both cases, the 
pattern required chance havens and should be treated as such. 
5. Concrete, stone, and brick structures do not generally float, at least for long. 
The same would hold true of most large, commercial buildings. 
Rooftops as havens 
To reiterate and to clarifY, rooftops fall into one of the following three categories, 
depending on circumstances. 
Safe havens. When accessible and dry, rooftops are safe havens. The important 
point is not that safe havens in buildings are equally easy to reach, but that if some people 
can reach them, they preserve a means of shelter that is likely to reduce life loss 
compared to situations in which every building is obliterated. Means of access might 
include an internal or external fire escape, a door to the roof, or a dormer window. During 
19'h century floods, there were many examples of people using a bedpost or other sturdy 
object to poke a hole through a ceiling or wall to reach shelter (18). Similar access to a 
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roof might be possible through many attics today. People have also been known to climb 
objects like drainpipes or trellises, or to intentionally use the current to float them up to 
the roof while they cling to such objects. However, when rooftops are generally 
inaccessible and people must rely on chance to reach them, they should be treated as 
chance havens. 
Chance havens. A rooftop is a chance haven any time a person washes there from 
upstream, access depends largely on chance, the rooftop severs from the underlying 
building, or the building drifts more than 300ft downstream. 
Pseudo-safe havens. A rooftop is a pseudo-safe haven if a person reaches the roof 
through an access largely free of chance and the building floats off its foundation and 
travels less than 300 ft without being overtopped. 
Aerated havens 
An aerated haven can remain when part of a stationary building is torn away and 
the flood does not rise more than a few feet above the floor or the highest counter (Ls = 
M). The following types of events can reduce safe havens to aerated havens: 
I . when another building floats past and tears of an ell or smashes a wall (29). 
2. when a log or trees crashes through a wall (6.1). 
3. when a house at the edge of a flood is cut in half by a wall of water ( 17, 35 .1) 
4. when a house is well-anchored and progressive waves break apart the walls 
most upstream or closest to the channel ( 18). 
5. when a central chimney or other anchor supports an attached portion of the 
floor ( 18). 
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Aerated havens are not safe havens for the following reasons: Their locations 
depend in part on chance, making them more difficult to target in advance by building 
occupants. Great strength, stamina, or good fortune may be required to overcome the pull 
of the current. Since they are open to the current, people must cling to fixed objects like 
counters and doorframes rather than floating furniture. 
Aerated havens are more dependable than chance havens because building 
occupants are likely to gravitate toward them before the building is tom apart. That is, 
aerated havens are most likely to form where temporary safe havens appear safest-
downstream or inland from the battering currents and debris. 
For those who occupy an aerated haven, survival would be more likely than if 
they were trapped underwater or swept downstream, but less likely than if the safe haven 
had not been tom apart. 
Flood zones and zone densities ISz Cz 
Pcz Coz Zd Szd Czd Pczd Cozd) 
Flood zones 
Recalling that dry land is considered a safe haven or a chance haven after the 
flood arrives, there are three types of havens in which members ofTpari survive floods: 
safe havens, compromised havens (pseudo-safe havens and aerated havens), and chance 
havens. People have also been known to survive after being buried in mud (32.1 ), but 
such cases are rare and can probably be neglected. When one includes the open current 
and depths in which successful wading is highly dependent on chance, a flood can be 
divided into four zones for the purposes of life-loss estimation: safe zones (Sz), chance 
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zones (Cz), pseudo-chance zones (Pcz), and compromised zones (Coz). Each of these is 
discussed below. 
Safe zones include all safe havens. These provide a high degree of safety and a 
cor.sistently low rate of life loss that approaches or equals zero. The distribution of life 
loss should closely approximate that for Ls = L. 
Such locations should be relatively easy to predict based on flood mapping except 
in the uncertain range where safe havens may become compromised havens. Fortunately, 
havens that have been only mildly compromised have similar life-loss characteristics to 
safe havens (one is still on the far left of a curve like Figure 13 shown later), so one need 
not be overly conservative when making estimates. For example, if one is not sure 
whether a building will float or not, but it is reasonably certain that it will at least 
maintain a pseudo-safe haven by quickly running aground, it should be treated as a safe 
zone. 
Chance zones include the places where people are submerged or face the open 
flood , and all chance havens that might be reached while drifting. This set includes places 
where Ls = H, campgrounds, and the floodplain when it is not a safe haven. The 
distribution of life loss should closely approximate that for Ls = H. 
Like safe zones, chance zones should be relatively easy to predict, except in the 
narrow range where buildings might be severely damaged or drift far down stream 
without being destroyed. These are dealt with next. 
Pseudo-chance zones fall in that narrow range of depths* velocities for which it is 
unclear whether a building is likely to be destroyed, float far downstream, or maintain 
aerated havens. 
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One approach to estimating life loss in pseudo-chance zones would be to combine 
the most relevant portions of the life-loss distributions for Ls = H and Ls = M. Thus , the 
inherent uncertainty underlying the zone prediction is recognized by using a distribution 
that incorporates that uncertainty into its form ulation. This topic will be approached in 
more detail in Chapter VII. 
Compromised zones are that central portion of compromised havens that have not 
been intentionally classified as safe zones or pseudo-chance zones. Thus, omitting the 
portions likely to be classified elsewhere, the life-loss distribution should closely 
resemble the central60%-80% of the distribution for Ls = M. 
Zone densities 
Zone density (Zd) represents the di stribution of flood zones among Tpar; based on 
topographic, stntctural , and hydraulic considerations as they interface with flood routing 
and the rise rate of the flood. The word "density" refers to the fraction of people who 
have access to a category rather than to a spatial measurement. Access includes the 
physical ability to move to a location and sufficient time to get there. 
While it is not possible to predict the exact pathway of an individual, history 
suggests that most Tpar; will seek out the safest haven they can reach in the time allowed. 
While some will reject a safe haven in a building only to be swept away whi le crossing 
the floodplain, this occurs primarily when E is positive and the vast majority of buildings 
are destroyed (29). That is, those fleeing must believe that their building will be 
destroyed and that there is enough time to reach the hillside when, in fac t, there is not 
enough time. This is a very specific set of circumstances that inherently limits the number 
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of such cases. More importantly, the cases are most likely when a wall of water is large 
enough to destroy most buildings, making them a small fraction of the total life loss in 
the event. As such, it is not critical to treat them separately. 
Generally, it takes far less time to reach an upper floor than to evacuate the flood 
zone for several reasons: there is little need to get dressed or to grab belongings, the route 
is a matter of habit requiring little planning, one can avoid extreme weather conditions, 
one can continue moving after flooding blocks escape outside, people most often sleep 
upstairs, and the trip takes only about 5-30 seconds to complete for an entire family. Even 
when a flood is rising in the first floor, the walls often provide adequate shelter to allow 
people to wade, swim, or ride the current to the top of the stai rs (18). As an indirect 
example, although the trailer homes in subPar 26.3 were swept off their foundations and 
often destroyed within minutes of the flood's onslaught, the numerous descriptions by 
survivors indicate that there was a short window of time when families gathered together 
and sought shelter before the trailer walls were destroyed. 
The result is that most people reach the safest zone that is accessible and temporal 
considerations apply primarily to reducing Par; to Tpar;. This author is aware of only four 
historic contexts in which people have not reached a safe haven when it existed on an 
upper floor of the house they occupied: 
1. They chose to attempt to evacuate and were washed away in the open 
floodp lain (29). 
2. They were asleep or awake while downstairs at night. Without any sensory 
warning, the flood burst through the windows, walls, or doors with such turbulence that it 
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made it impossible to wade or swim to the stairway before they were swept away or the 
room was flooded to the ceiling ( 18.20). 
3. A flood similar to the one just described but with slightly less violence and 
speed overcame someone with limited mobility, such as an invalid, a young child, or a 
baby that was swept out of its parent's arms. It should be noted that adults and children 
with limited mobility are more likely to sleep downstairs, placing the most vulnerable in 
the place of greatest danger ( 18.18). 
4. The ground floor had no ready access to the floors above (18 .23). 
In some cases, people open a door, begin to run or wade for the hillside, or try to 
climb into a car in an attempt to evacuate. When they realize the flood is rising or 
approaching too quickly to make it, they turn around and run upstairs (17, 18.1). 
We can apportion Tpar; among the flood zones its members are most likely to 
occupy by apportioning the physical havens that are accessible. As indicated above, 
access to a haven is rarely limited by temporal consideration when the haven is in the 
building that people are occupying, so temporal considerations can often be ignored. 
When a region includes buildings, the subPar should be defined homogeneously with 
respect to evacuation times so that Tpar; can be distributed according to the average 
occupancy rate in each type of structure present. Each flood zone is exclusive of the 
others such that the safe zone density (Szd) + the compromised zone density (Cozd) + the 
pseudo-chance zone density (Pczd) + the chance zone density (Czd) = 1.0. 
As an example of the assignment of zone densities, if a subPar consists entirely of 
two-story buildings that will sustain major damage or be destroyed and half of those 
buildings are on ground high enough to maintain a safe haven, then Szd"' 0.5. This value 
252 
might increase if an additional row of mobile homes was located in a buffered backwater 
where they were expected to float a short distance inland. This value would decrease if 
the flood was expected to rise so quickly and with so little sensory warning that a portion 
of Tpar; would be unable to reach the second story. If some of the buildings were frame 
houses and 30% of the buildings were expected to either float more than 300 ft 
downstream, lose second-story walls, or flood 4-6 ft deep in the second stori es with high 
velocity currents, Cozd"' 0.3. If it was thought that half of this 30% might be destroyed. 
then Cozd"' 0.15 and Pczd"' 0.15. That leaves Czd"' 0.2 for buildings that are almost 
certain to be destroyed. 
Since rooftops are much less accessible than upper floors , one would want to treat 
them accordingly in a model. One way to do this is to first estimate how many rooftops 
are accessible using emergency means, then estimate the times needed to reach the 
rooftops and eliminate any rooftops that cannot be reached before wading is prohibitive 
on the highest floor. As a simplified approach, any rooftops that cannot be reached within 
2 minutes from the ground floor or within 5 minutes from an upper floor should be 
eliminated. Those eliminated but not flooded become chance havens instead. 
Attics should be treated as described above for rooftops, except that they do not 
generally provide chance havens. 
When safe havens consist of high ground, they provide a convenient alternative to 
pre-flood evacuation when E is small or negative. For example, when people dwell on an 
island that is submerged by a flood , E may be quite negative due to the length of time 
required to get off the island. However, there may be patches of relatively high ground 
that allow people to safely stand in shallow water (a safe haven) while their houses are 
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washed away nearby. The same can hold true for any location cut off from the edge of the 
flood by bridges, barriers, or distance. In such cases, the loss of shelter does not reflect 
the nature of the flood experienced by the residents, since the residents are not located 
arnong the structures(l8.2l).It should only be assumed that residents evacuate to such 
locations when E is small or negative, Ret is greater than a couple minutes, and houses 
have more than minor damage or are single story. 
Trees are probably the most difficult safe haven to predict. However, people do 
not generally climb trees unless they are in the open and there is insufficient time to reach 
a building or the hillside. As such, trees generally play a significant role only in 
campgrounds and other outdoor settings, where their concentration should be given due 
consideration (3). People occasionally climb trees when a flood overtakes them while 
they are running across a floodplain, but the flood must rise in the very narrow range that 
prevents wading but does not cause toppling. Hence, more often than not, trees play an 
important role among dwellings only as chance havens, as people are swept off the 
floodplain or out of buildings and they pull themselves into trees as they are swept 
underneath. 
The value of trees as chance havens depends on their density in an area, their 
ability to withstand the flood, and the velocity of the current. As the depth and velocity of 
a flood increases, trees are more likely to topple, provide a dangerous object against 
which people are killed, or become impossible to grasp and hold onto without being 
submerged or tom away. Generally speaking, if houses are destroyed, trees provide no 
refuge except where they overhang near shore. Where housing damage is minor, trees are 
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not needed for shelter. Where houses have major damage and upper-stories are not 
plentiful, trees can play an important role along with rooftops and other floating debris. 
Lethality rate outside safe havens 
CPtpar; Ls Pt Ft- L;,_E;, 
Ioill:r -Ln Lnf LiuJdn£1 
Life loss is a function of distance from a dam only as it is affected by warning 
times, depths, velocities, widths, loss of shelter, or other variables that are themselves 
indirect functions of distance from the dam. As the original wave increases in depth and 
magnitude when Wtavg = 0, life loss can be extended indefinitely until the wave itself 
looses lethal potential. 
As testimony to the high lethal potential outside of safe havens, whole families 
often perish together when houses are destroyed or they are overcome while crossing the 
floodplain (17.1). Atypical events that cost lives and atypical events that save lives are 
both common (6, 17). This is due in part to the dual nature of chance havens: they can 
either kill or save. The following sections examine the lethality rate outside of safe 
havens on a location-specific basis. 
In wading depths 
Waders in catastrophic floods are much more likely to be swept away than waders 
in a laboratory channel exposed to the same average depth/velocity combination. The 
following historic examples indicate why: 
1. Real floods often generate surges or waves that greatly exceed the average 
flow conditions, sweeping people into deeper water. 
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2. Real floods hide holes, logs, curbs, ditches, side stream channels, bushes, and 
other obstacles that cause waders to fall into deeper water or trip unexpectedly. 
3. Real floods contain up to 50% sediment, increasing the flood's momentum 
and increasing a wader's buoyancy, both of which promote toppling. In extreme cases, 
the sediment can also trap a wader' s feet or legs, hindering or preventing movement and 
possibly burying him or her. 
4. Catastrophic floods often arrive as a wall or a sudden surge against which it 
is difficult to brace, especially while running. 
5. Real floods are highly turbulent, making bracing and balancing much more 
difficult. 
6. Real floods typically carry a lot of large debris, which can easily knock down 
a wading adult. 
7. Real floods often increase in depth over time, so any delays such as 
stumbling can eliminate the opportunity to complete a crossing. 
8. In real floods, a wader may not be wearing shoes and natural surfaces or mud 
may hinder traction. 
9. An adult may be able to wade, but it is common for babies and young 
children to be swept out of their arms by the rising current, by a sudden wave or surge, 
when struck by debris, or when the adult falls. 
I 0. Among waders, strength and stamina are key factors, so size, age, gender, 
and general health are all important variables. 
II. If the individual is wearing boots or waders, these tend to fill with water and 
catch the current, pulling the person downstream and toward the stream bottom. Modern, 
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tight-fitting neoprene waders, however, are less susceptible to this and increase a person's 
buoyancy. 
Imagine an experiment in which I 00 identical individuals are placed on a 
floodplain, the depth or velocity is held constant at each location, and the other variable 
(depth or velocity) is varied over many repetitions of the experiment. The flood is 
allowed to behave like a typical, historic, catastrophic flood . Now plot the parameter that 
is allowed to vary (depth or velocity) against the average lethality rate. 
The resulting plot, a cumulative distribution function, is likely to follow a steep S-
curve resembling a graduated step-function. When flooding is minor, Ptpar approaches 
zero : virtually everyone manages to wade to dry land or a safe haven. When flooding 
becomes challenging to the point that movement is slow and the chance of falling and 
regaining one's footing is high, shorter or weaker individuals risk being swept away. If 
the waders are carrying babies, young children, or helping those with limited mobility, 
many of those being carried or assisted will be swept away. If there is an abundance of 
large debris, it will knock the weak and the strong alike into the flood. As conditions 
worsen, approaching the limits of wading, the number swept away will rise exponentially 
as they teeter, slip, get hit by waves, step into depressions, get hit by debris, get 
temporarily released by someone carrying them, or otherwise stumble. The fatality rate 
for those swept away will be high, because momentum will make it difficult or 
impossible to regain their footing and they will be swept into deeper and swifter water 
with greater turbulence. Survival will depend to a large extent on chance. The currents 
must keep them at the surface, preferably sweep them near a large floating object, steer 
them clear of fatal collisions, and ultimately deliver them to a place where they can exit 
257 
the flood-overhanging tree branches, the roof of a stationary building, a backwater near 
shore, etc. 
The likelihood of a flood providing the conditions needed for survival decreases 
exponentially as the flood increases in velocity and depth since both of these conditions 
are accompanied by an increase in turbulence. This turbulence pulls people and debri s 
underwater, renders swimming ineffective, forces air out of peoples ' lungs, and causes 
direct physical harm. 
Historically, the vast majority of people who have been swept away have died. 
Among the cases studies, the lowest characteristic depth fo r a high-velocity flood passed 
through the campground on the Anis Alluvial Fan in Spain. The maximum depth was 
about 3.3 ft, with a characteristic depth around 3 ft. Of the ISO campers present, 58% 
perished. Most of the survivors climbed trees or found shelter in buildings, so 80-100% 
of those swept into the current drowned. In events with greater depths, nearly everyone 
has drowned who has been swept away. 
These dynamics suggest the pattern of life loss found in Figure 13 for those in the 
flood zone without shelter. The flat portion to the left represents flooding through which 
it is easy to wade. The initial gradual rise accounts for mishaps, followed by less capable 
waders and babies or young children swept out of adult' s arms. Life loss then increases 
rapidly as healthy adults of various strengths and sizes begin to be swept away. Survivors 
are primarily limited to those who do not lose their footing or who manage to cling to a 
pole, wall , roof, tree, or other anchor. As the force of the flood makes it impossible to 
hold onto stationary objects, people in open water are at the mercy of the flood and life 
loss rapidly approaches 100%. The ones who survive are those that are immediately 
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Figure 13. An illustrative distribution of average fatality rate based on the peak 
depth*velocity a heterogeneous group of people encountered above an open 
floodplain . This graph applies to wade fishermen, those camping in tents, 
those overtaken while evacuating on foot, and those swept out of a building 
or other refuge into the flood. 
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carried by a wave toward shore, manage to use debris for flotation, or are washed to a 
tree or rooftop. At some point, a flood becomes sufficiently violent to pull even large 
debris beneath the surface, making survival extremely improbable (29, 31, 32.1 , 35). In 
such cases, the only survivors are those who are tossed onto land or into buildings at the 
edge of the flood where depth*velocity values are smaller (35 .1), and those dug out of 
mud when a flood passes in less than 5 minutes (32.1 ). 
In drifting depths 
Catastrophic flood waves are violently turbulent (see the previous section on 
flood dynamics) . As such, even strong swimmers are tossed about like debris. Where 
velocities are high and depths prohibit wading, most of those swept away drown or 
experience lethal injuries, with some experiencing dismemberment or extreme 
disfigurement. When velocities are high and depths exceed an event-specific cutoff of 
about 6 to 20 ft, the fatality rate generally approaches l 00%. 
In light of how difficult it is to reach or stay at the surface in a turbulent flood , it 
is generally safer to be swept off a roof or out an upper-story window than to be 
overtopped by a wave while on the floodplain or in a lower story. Those who reach the 
surface can survive if they can reach a permanent chance haven, such as a rooftop or a 
tree top; or if they reach a drifting chance haven that they can ride until they are rescued, 
they wash to shore, or they climb to safety across a debris dam. 
In buildings 
Death in a building typically involves one or more of the following: l) being 
trapped underwater when the flood rises to the ceiling, 2) being struck by debris driven 
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through the wall, 3) being struck as the structure collapses, or 4) being washed out of the 
building to perish downstream. 
Because structural members are more buoyant in water than in air, the risk of 
being killed by falling members appears to be greatest on floors where the flood is least 
deep. When a structure is rapidly tom apart by a flood wave, the occupants are often 
driven into the open current while still alive (17.3, 26). 
In buildings with major damage CLs = Ml. When damages are major, the internal 
environment in the building is usually a mix of areas that are highly lethal and relatively 
safe. As in buildings that are destroyed, lives are lost when occupants are injured by the 
building itself or by passing debris; when they are washed through a window, door, or 
wall; and when they are trapped underwater. As in buildings with minor damage, 
flooding on an upper story or on the roof can be sufficiently shallow or quiescent to make 
survival virtually certain (18.10). Hence, the elevation of the top story in relation to the 
peak elevation reached by the flood is the single most important determinant of the rate 
of life loss in buildings with major damage. 
The rate of life loss will follow a sharp S-curve resembling a step function when 
graphed against depth*velocity (see Figure 13). The dynamics are similar to those for 
waders, except that people are wading on an elevated floor instead of the floodplain and 
there are more items on which to float , stand, or cling. This will shift the graph toward 
the right and flatten the curve. 
When water rises behind a door, the pressure can make it difficult or impossible 
for an average person to overcome the pressure and open it ( 17, 18). Survival for an 
occupant of a building who is not swept into the current occurs in only three places: Safe 
havens, pseudo-safe havens, and aerated havens. Every other location is completely 
submerged or destroyed. 
261 
Conditions in safe havens and pseudo-safe havens are comparable to when Ls = 
L. The historic rates of life loss have approached zero when the safe haven or pseudo-safe 
was not eliminated. 
In aerated havens, occupants require more strength, stamina, and good fortune to 
survive than in a safe haven since the occupants have a higher degree of exposure to the 
flood. Nevertheless, there is a higher survival rate than in the open current. Chance plays 
a large role in whether or not an aerated haven remains or is destroyed. 
In buildings that are destroyed CLs = H). Life loss approaches 100% for Tpar 
occupying buildings that are destroyed. Survival largely depends on chance havens 
(I 8:7). 
In automobiles 
l fa flood sweeps a passenger vehicle into water more than 4 ft deep, those inside 
the vehicle are virtually guaranteed to drown unless they are rescued while the vehicle is 
still floating (9.3, 17.4). There were no exceptions in the historical events that were 
examined. Consider the following obstacles: External water pressure makes it difficult or 
impossible to open a car door or a car window while underwater. If a window is opened 
or broken, the flow of water and confining nature of the vehicle make it very difficult to 
ex it the vehicle until it is completely filled with water. By then, the occupants will be 
disoriented and nearly drowned. If someone escapes the vehicle, the turbulence of the 
water will make it extremely difficult to reach the surface. Throughout, the flood wi ll be 
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dark with sediment, making it nearly impossible to see once submerged. Combined, these 
factors make it extremely difficult for passengers of a vehicle to survive after being 
submerged. 
The following are all contexts in which occupants of vehicles can die during a 
flood: 
l . When a flood undermines a section of road or weakens a bridge, causing it to 
collapse as an unsuspecting motorist passes overhead. Similarly, the road can collapse at 
a distance too short for stopping (14) . 
2. When a motorist drives onto a flooded bridge or stretch of road before they 
see the danger. Drivers are most vulnerable to this at night during driving rain or fog 
(34.2) . 
3. When a section of roadway (perhaps across the dam crest) erodes away at a 
blind spot (due to darkness, mist, rain, a sharp comer, etc.) and motorists subsequently 
drive off the cliff and crash into the ground or stream (27.1). 
4. When people attempt to drive out of a long canyon instead of climbing the 
hillside and the flood overtakes them (15). 
5. When a road follows a stream and a walt of water catches motorists by 
surprise or travels faster than the vehicles (31.6). 
6. When a road follows a stream and motorists become stalled in incipient 
flooding, remain with their vehicles too long, and are swept away as the flood rises or 
suddenly surges (I). 
7. When a sudden surge of water sideswipes a vehicle on a dry or mildly 
flooded road or bridge (23. l, Nix Lake Dam failure). 
8. When a motorist decides to cross a submerged river crossing or a flooded 
intersection near a canal , gully, or flooded drainage ditch, and the flood sweeps the 
vehicle into swifter and deeper water (8). 
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9. When an evacuee attempts to move a parked vehicle out of harms way and 
the flood rises too quickly (there have been many close calls of this nature in driveways). 
I 0. When an expanse of city streets is inundated slowly or quickly ( 16.1, 25.2). 
II. When a driver has a fatal accident while evacuating (I found no historical 
examples). 
12. When an employee is driving on a darn while it fails , either to examine it or 
attempt repair work while driving heavy equipment (I found no deaths but, but several 
close calls). 
See automobiles under the section on subPar type and evacuation modes for 
additional insights that pertain to motorists and their passengers. 
In trains 
Depending on the depth of flooding and whether or not a train is moving, a train 
is most similar to either a mobile home (as was the case outside Johnstown when South 
Fork Dam failed in 1889) or an automobile, though in both cases a train is less buoyant. 
The impact of a crash can cause deaths even when people stay dry (19). 
In campgrounds 
Campsites are often located near a river where valleys are steep and narrow so 
recreationists can readily be exposed to any combination of high velocities, great depths, 
and a wall of water (3). Survival largely depends on evacuating, climbing a tree, or 
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reaching a sturdy outbuilding (3). Safe havens persist only if the flood does not topple the 
trees and buildings. If there is not time to climb a tree before the flood arrives, the flood 
must have sufficiently low velocities that someone can grab a tree while in motion 
without being tom away. 
Unfortunately, campgrounds can be one of the most difficult areas to reach with 
an official warning (16.2). Many campsites are informal and isolated, away from 
established campgrounds; established campgrounds often have no telephone or ranger on-
site; it may take a long time to drive to a campground; and campers are less likely to 
li sten to mass media reports than those in residential areas or automobiles (16.2, 16.3). 
While sensory clues often give a warning in the quiet of a campground (Little 
Deer Creek Dam, Utah, 1963), the warning may be very short if there is no wall of water 
to cause trees to crash (3). Even with a wall of water, if the flood travels quickly, is of 
great depth, or people are asleep, Wtavg may be less than the time needed to evacuate 
( 16.2, 16.3 , 31.4, 31.5). This said, there are two factors that make evacuation easier: 
I. The representative evacuation time (Ret) is often quite short if the valley has 
steep hillsides-on the order of 0.25-2 minutes during the day and slightly longer at 
night. 
2. Due to proximity, shouting can be readily heard, and so a warning can 
propagate very rapidly through a campground, even at night. 
In rivers (waders and swimmers) 
Waders and swimmers are more vulnerable than recreationists on the bank are 
because their evacuation is slowed and they are more likely to be caught in deeper water 
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without a refuge. Due to the popularity of tail water fisheries below dams, it is dangerous 
when a gate fails, a gate is opened very quickly (2), or when water levels rise during 
hydropower peaking or startup. Few people wade or swim more than an hour after dark, 
so thi s type of subPar can be ignored at such times. 
Along shore (hikers and the curious) 
Although there were no subPar in the data set consisting of hikers, reasoning 
suggests that this subPar would be nearly identical to campgrounds except for the 
following: 
l . There is little chance of delivering an official warning, unless Wt is more 
than 2-3 hr. 
2. Hikers may climb canyon walls or reach other places from which a rapid 
evacuation is impossible. 
3. This subPar can be largely ignored more than an hour after dark. 
There have been several examples of onlookers watching a flood who were 
subsequently trapped or killed (25.2, 29. \8 ). This can be a form of convergence. 
In boats 
Due to its density, a flood wave entering a lake will generally plunge toward the 
bottom, creating a powerful, choppy undertow near shore. By contrast, it may cause only 
a small swell at the surface more than a few hundred feet from shore. The exact dynamics 
depend on the depth, size, density, and orientation of the reservoir in relation to the 
incoming flood . Where the described pattern holds, boaters are likely to be capsized and 
pulled underwater near the mouth of the river, but not greatly endangered elsewhere. 
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Boaters in a reservoir above a dam that fails are also in danger, especially if they 
are near the dam. 
Regardless of their location, boaters increase their chances for survival 
dramatically when they wear life jackets (22.5) . 
In high velocities, boaters on a river risk capsizing or colliding with an object in a 
violent manner. A craft's high profile and streamlined shape can cause it to become 
airborne in ways that are less likely among those riding rooftops or logs. Consider the 
following eyewitness account (16.1 ): 
There was [this] boat [that) came down the creek with three or four people 
in it, moving at a tremendous speed, totally out of control and about the time it got 
to where the water fountain was, the boat shot 30 or 40 feet straight in the air. 
This was the last time we saw the boat or the people. (Natural Disaster Institute, 
1976, p. 371) 
As with hikers, this subPar would be very difficult to warn. The evacuation rate 
would almost always be longer than for any other recreational category. Fortunately, this 
subPar is not likely to exist when a single dam fails by overtopping as the result of a 
flood , since boating is uncommon during extreme weather. Sunny-day dam failures 
would, however, pose a particular risk to boaters. The popularity of guided fi shing trips. 
river rafting, kayaking, and personal drift boats has increased dramatically over time. 
Many rivers experience boats year round. As such, this type of subPar may become more 
relevant to future failures than to historic ones. 
In the cold 
During failures in the western world, where flooding usually passes w ithin 5 
minutes to 3 hr and people reach shelter within 0.25-8 hr, deaths attributed solely to 
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exposure are rare, but they have happened (6. 1, 18). However, it would be difficult fo r 
researchers to distinguish deaths due to drowning and deaths due to hypothermia when 
both sets of bodies are found in the flood and detailed causes of death are not listed. In 
theory, if a flood were at extreme winter temperatures, one might expect those unable to 
escape the water and find warmth to become unconscious or perish within 5-20 minutes. 
For some, the immediate shock would make breathing difficult and drowning much more 
likely. 
Lethality rate inside safe 
havens (Ls Pt. Ptpar1} 
Since most safe havens are found in buildings, this discussion is limited to that 
context. 
In buildings with minor 
damage (Ls = L) 
Life-loss rates are essentially zero when Ls = L. Death can result when the first 
floor is flooded to the ceiling, but regardless of the structural damages, such cases should 
be considered major damage in light of the loss of shelter. 
When buildings experience minor damage, debris and high velocities do not 
endanger the occupants. Generally, a safe haven remains on the ground floor. [f depths 
are shallow, the flood has little lethal potential. If depths exceed 4 or 5 ft, the water must 
have low velocities to avoid causing major damage. In such situations, deaths are quite 
rare. They result when someone is trapped on the ground floor and the water ri ses to the 
ce iling or when a child who cannot swim falls off a bed or other perch while no adult is 
in the room. Those who have limited mobility usually survive if someone is present to 
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balance them on a floating mattress or other elevated surface. Even when a safe haven is 
lost and water comes within a foot of the ceiling, the water is sufficiently quiescent to 
allow most people to survive by treading water or by standing on furniture. As such, 
deaths are usually caused by limited mobility, an inability to swim, or other anomalies 
like electrocution. 
Death by exposure, disease, or starvation is possible if the flood traps people for 
prolonged periods or the flood contaminates food and water supplies in less developed 
regions. Such was the case when the Banqiao and Shimantan Dam failures stranded 
people for many days amid very expansive flooding, although these deaths were excluded 
to make the subPar more pertinent to the west (I 0). 
In buildings with major 
damage (Ls = M) 
The most consistent factor governing the death rate among occupants of buildings 
is whether or not there is a safe haven on the highest floor. This follows from the historic 
pattern that very few people die in safe havens and most people die when exposed to the 
fu ll force of the flood (see the section on lethality rates outside of safe havens) . 
When a building has one or more upper stories and major damages are limited to 
the lower stories, those in the upper stories remain dry or experience the flood as if it 
causes only minor damage. When velocities are not high enough to sweep people out of a 
room, 3-4 ft of flooding above the highest floor produces a death rate comparable to that 
in buildings with only minor damage. This rate is usually zero, except in anomolous 
cases, such as when young children are trapped alone in a room and one or more falls into 
the water off a floating bed. 
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If velocities are low, people can survive even when flooding is nearly two-stories 
deep by staying near a second-story ceiling for air, either by treading water or by standing 
on furniture (18.9, 18.1 0). Such flooding exceeds the cut off for a safe haven, but it is still 
more shclt<:rcd and much safer than the open current. 
A wooden house will most likely float away before the water reaches the second-
story ceiling, maintaining a pseudo-safe haven until the building sinks or is tom apart. 
When houses have more than one story, the bedrooms are usually on the upper floors. 
This can significantly reduce life loss at night when a flood may fill the lower floor 
before the occupants are aware of the danger ( 18). 
Lethality rate outside of the 
flood zone (Ft Schvq) 
Deaths outside of the flood zone fall into five categories: 
I. Those who are injured in the flood , but who wash to shore while still alive 
and die within hours or days from inhaling water and mud, exposure, internal bleeding, or 
other traumatic injuries (6.1 , 17.6), or appear to have injuries from which they can 
recover, but die days later from a brain hemorrhage or other complication of an injury 
(17.3) . 
2. Those who die of a heart attack, stroke, or other complication brought on by 
fear for one's personal safety. 
3. Those who die of a heart attack, stroke, or other complication shortly after 
learning that their loved ones have perished (17). 
4. Those who commit suicide during or after the flood (Teton Dam, 1976). 
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5. Those who lose the will to live and rapidly deteriorate or die in their sleep 
within a few days, weeks, months, or years (17). 
The percentages of deaths in categories 2 and 3 are small to the point of being 
negligible, especially since deaths of this nature are most likely when a large number of 
people die in a flood from other causes. Heart attacks while drowning or being swept 
downstream would be difficult to identify and should be considered general drowning 
deaths. 
Note that many of these deaths are omitted from the official lists of flood-related 
fata lities. In some cases the individuals may not have been a part of Par or the 
surrounding community. 
Life-saving interventions 
CRr Sh Ch Psh Ptpari) 
For many, rescuers must reach them by helicopter, crane, or other extraordinary 
means within minutes if they are to be saved. Consider the helplessness of an eyewitness 
firefighter ( 16.1) : 
The water was chest high and the front of the truck was floating from time 
to time. From the rear of the fire truck we could see with the aid of large 
spotlights . .. ; people were clinging to anything that would float. Roofs and walls 
from damaged homes all had people clinging to them, floating refrigerators, cars 
and propane tanks. People were hanging in trees, the roar of the water was terrible 
and the sounds of screams [for] help were even loader than that. People floated by 
just out of reach and we couldn't get to them . ... The screams died down as 
people fell from the trees and rooftops and were swept away. (Natural Disaster 
Institute, 1976, p. 30) 
The floods with the greatest life loss have generally claimed their victims before 
professional rescuers were able to arrive. The task of the professionals was to search for 
the dead and injured after the flood had receded. 
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When people can reach treetops, housetops that are not moving, or islands, 
hundreds or thousands of people can be rescued by helicopter or boat over several hours, 
but in such cases most of the individuals are not at high risk of drowning and could 
survive while waiting for the flood to pass (9). 
People have rescued flood victims by forming human chains to reach stranded 
motorists, waders, or those already adrift; by pulling a drifting swimmer through a 
second-story window; or by holding them on a floating mattress while waiting for the 
water to subside inside a building. Overall, however, the most common rescues have 
involved those who risk their lives to provide early warnings or to assist weaker 
individuals to shore while it is still possible to wade. 
When a flood passes quickly, lives can sometimes be saved by digging victims 
out of the mud and by rushing those with serious injuries to nearby hospitals (17, 32). 
Since such quick floods are uncommon, however, those in the most danger are least 
likely to be rescued because they are swept out of reach or they are submerged. Thus, 
often those who are rescued could have survived had they not been rescued and the rate 
oflife Joss is reduced Jess than (number rescued)ffpar;. 
As a sidebar related to the relative ineffectiveness of modem rescue resources at 
reducing life loss, one should not assume that modernity in general necessarily decreases 
fatalities during flooding. Consider that automobiles do not necessarily enhance survival , 
for the following reasons: 
I . Horses and buggies could transport people quite quickly. 
2. A horse can be a superior means of evacuation to a car since it is not 
dependent on roads and can run up steep hillsides. 
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3. Historic evacuees were less likely to get stuck in traffic gridlock. 
4. It is the modem addiction to automobiles that often leads to fatalities . A high 
percentage of deaths during flash floods accrue to motorists who voluntarily try to cross 
flooded roadways or bridges. During the Big Thompson flash flood, those at greatest risk 
were those who attempted to drive out of the canyon, and those least at risk were those 
who chose to climb the canyon walls on foot (Gruntfest, 1977). 
Other considerations include the following : In narrow floods , the fastest way to 
evacuate is on foot. It can even be quickest for those with limited mobility, since family 
or neighbors are usually willing to assist them. Even in wide floods, evacuation on foot 
can be fairly rapid. The average adult walks 3 miles per hour and can jog much faster. A 
healthy adult empowered with adrenaline should be able to clear even a very wide 
floodplain in 30 or 40 minutes. Finally, evacuation warnings do not necessarily propagate 
more rapidly today. People were more familiar with their neighbors in the past and 
shouting readily penetrated into poorly insulated buildings. 
There are, however, modem advantages: Warnings can be delivered via 
loudspeakers on police cars or helicopters. Modem rescue equipment, especially 
helicopters and trucks with cranes, provide distinct advantages. Modem building codes 
preserve havens more readily. Wireless communication has the potential to facilitate 
warnings even when wired systems are destroyed, although cellular phone systems can 
quickly become overwhelmed during emergencies. Detailed census and GIS databases 
and trends toward registration at campgrounds and wilderness areas may improve our 
ability to warn and to identify missing persons. 
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Overall, increased casualty rates prior to the modem era can probably be 
attributed to these main causes: 
I. The l 00-year floodplains were often developed. 
2. High hazard d3.11ls were more likely to fail. 
3. Warning time was often less due to limitations in monitoring and detection 
systems, and limitations in communication pathways over long distances. 
4. Dam owners were reluctant to issue timely warnings. 
5. Mass communication was not possible. 
It follows that older cases of dam failure can be studied alongside modem cases, 
so long as these difference are kept in mind. 
Complications or aberrations 
CMI Ac Td Ts) 
What follows is a list of historic or readily conceivable complications that could 
be repeated in future events to increase the likelihood of life loss: 
I. As suggested in Chapter II, if an earthquake impacts a community as well as 
a dam, it can conceivably block evacuation routes, start fires, trap people in buildings, 
and disrupt communications before a flood arrives, all of which could increase life loss. 
2. The nature and concentration of a debris load influences the likelihood that 
someone can drift to safety while avoiding being crushed or pierced. Examples of 
particularly lethal debris loads include 700,000 cords of logs from a paper mill (6) and 
miles of barbed wire. 
3. An irony of floods is that they sometimes start fires when lanterns are tipped, 
gas mains rupture, power lines break, transformers or electric substations explode, or 
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furnaces are damaged. If floating debris such as a house catches fire, the fire can spread 
to other houses or to a debris dam. This greatly increases the danger to the occupants of 
the houses and to victims who are still alive but who have been swept to the debris dam 
(15, 16.1, 18.25; and South Fork Dam, in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, in 1889). 
4. Although power companies typically shut off the power to flooded 
neighborhoods to protect victims and rescue workers, while broken wires are live they 
pose a threat of electrocution to waders or those who come in contact. Deaths of this 
nature are rare. 
5. Lives can be lost in hospitals when flooding does not impact the patients or 
personnel directly if the flood prevents essential medical professionals from reaching the 
building or eliminates critical power sources. Natural gas lines and electric power lines 
are generally shut off to flooded regions to prevent leaks, fires , and electrocutions. 
Propane and gas tanks can readily float away. Combined, this can render both the main 
power and all backup generators inoperable. Such was the case in subPar 16: I, but there 
is no historical record of actual deaths due to this type of event in the sources examined. 
6. Invalids are dependent on others for evacuation. When Wt; is short, increased 
life loss can result as more mobile individuals linger to try to help the less mobile 
evacuate (16.1). 
7. Both summer and winter floods sweep snakes out of riverside haunts, adding 
them to the hazards in the water and leaving them behind in inhabited areas. This 
increases the likelihood of poisonous snakebites during and after the flood, although the 
frequency and fatality rate of such bites is still low ( 17, 22). 
8. Apart from drowning, prolonged floods or floods in winter can cause fatal 
hypothermia (18.28), but deaths specifically identified as such have been rare. 
9. Convergence deaths result when onlookers come to watch the flood and 
inadvertently become trapped and swept away (25.2). 
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I 0. Certain characteristics of floods can make an accurate accounting of the death 
toll difficult or impossible: 
a) Often, whole families perish together, sometimes with their neighbors, 
so no one remains who can identify them or tell how many people were in the 
home at the time of the flood. 
b) Floods can so mangle bodies as to make identification impossible. 
c) Floods can wash victims dozens of miles downstream or bury them in 
mud, making recovery difficult. 
d) It is difficult to dig for the dead using power equipment, since there is a 
reluctance to tear bodies apart. 
e) It is difficult to know how many tourists, transients, motorists, or visitors 
were in an area. 
f) When homes are destroyed, people can scatter all over the country to 
stay with relatives. This makes it difficult to equate a list of missing with people 
who died. 
g) Usually no records are kept of those who die weeks or months after the 
flood due to indirect causes. 
h) Death records can be county-specific with no master list. 
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i) In many cases, companies and foreign governments have not been eager 
to fully account for the dead and missing due to issues of culpability and liability. 
j) When a flood enters the center of a reservoir at an orthogonal angle, the 
dense, sediment-laden flow will sink, generating strong, spiraling currents near 
shore. This can create or enhance dangerous undertows many miles away that 
persist for some time. In this manner a flood can kill an unsuspecting swimmer 
the following day without being attributed to the flood (22. 7). 
Post-flood psychological 
trauma (Schvgl 
When homes are obliterated, people die, and people are relocated, it destroys 
social networks and a highly valued sense of community and belonging. This can 
generate and prolong extreme and debilitating psychological scarring ( 17). 
The trauma of a flood with large life loss includes seeing a large number of naked, 
muddied, and mutilated corpses, including friends and relatives. They are first seen 
floating by, sticking out of the mud, tangled in debris piles, or washed into homes. They 
are then viewed again as people search rows of bodies in temporary morgues, searching 
for familiar faces, hoping for the best and fearing the worst. 
Traumatic symptoms include an irrational fear of storms, even when relocated far 
above a river; recurring nightmares; a desire to withdraw from social contact; an inability 
to return to work; lethargy; drug or alcohol abuse; suicidal tendencies; chronic depression 
and apathy; marital conflict or divorce, including blame for warning one set of relatives 
over another or failure to save a child; guilt for surviving when others died; guilt for 
failing to save others or viewing oneself as a coward; and early death after giving up the 
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wi ll to live (16.1, 17). Disillusionment and a sense of personal violation can also follow, 
as there is almost always widespread looting following a destructive flood (17). 
The tendency of floods to kill people in clusters increases the emotional trauma 
and life-sty le disruptions. As an extreme example, only one woman survived from a 
family group of 55 (35). A strong faith in God, His sovereignty, and in heaven, can help 
people cope with the death of loved ones and move forward with healthy living patterns 
(26). 
Applicability of historic events to 
future events: logic behind 
a proposed model 
Logic behind a proposed model 
A flood is like a chemical element. While highly unique, each element is 
composed of a small set of subatomic particles that are indistinguishable from the basic 
building blocks of every other element. In isolation, the behavior of a single particle is 
impossible to predict: The behavior of electrons is governed by their own motion-
constrained by preferences for certain energy levels and orbital configurations-and the 
random motion of other particles. However, while one cannot predict the behavior of any 
individual particle, elements behave predictably on a macroscale. 
In the same way, every flood is startlingly unique, but by progressively breaking 
each Par down into more and more fundamental units, homogenous base units can be 
defined that share remarkably similar traits. Similar to the random motion of electrons, 
the outcome for each base unit (a homogenous group of one or more persons) depends on 
human motion and the random motion of the flood. While one cannot know the outcome 
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of any one base unit, it is possible to describe its probability distribution. One can then 
sum across the base units using a Monte Carlo simulation or the statistical means, in 
conjunction with their deviations, to estimate the likelihood of various rates of life loss 
for a specific event. 
Fundamental base units are homogenous with respect to the larger environment, 
temporal considerations, and the hydraulic characteristics to which they are exposed. 
Delineating subPar according to Par type (Pt) neutralizes differences in the environment. 
Reducing like subPar to like Tpar; neutralizes temporal variations. Dividing each Tpar; 
into homogenous bins based on degrees of exposure neutralizes hydraulic differences. 
Among buildings, this can be done by classifying Tpar; according to the loss of shelter 
(Ls). When Ls = M, Tpar; should be further distributed among flood zones (Szd, Cozd, 
Pcad, and Czd). Since some of these zones share the same homogenous characteristics as 
when Ls = L or Ls = H, they are truly base units. 
Role of historic events 
Historic events are used to determine the probability distributions for each type of 
fundamental base unit. Naturally, these distributions can be refined as more and more 
homogenous subPar are analyzed. 
Since fundamental base units are homogenous with respect to the surrounding 
environment, temporal considerations, and the nature of the hydraulic exposure; it is not 
surprising that their distributions during 19th and 20th century floods appear comparable 
(26). This suggests two important insights. First, if modem rescue equipment is not 
immediately available, loss of shelter is based on historic reality rather than a uniform 
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construction standard; modern dam safety standards are mute by assuming a failure; and 
the benefits of modern warning technologies and transportation systems are neutralized 
by focus ing on Tpar; and actual E; life-loss patterns should be consistent across the 
centuries. Second, one can similarly mix ancient and modern failures when comparing Ef; 
= Tpar;/Par; toE in one of three ways: l) exclude expansive floods for which automobiles 
or horses provide a distinct advantage, 2) include only floods for which Wtavg is 
sufficiently short that only evacuation on foot is possible, or 3) adjust Ret; to account for 
the forms of transportation that are/were available. One or more of these conditions is 
met for every event characterized in the unpublished working documents and 
summarized in Appendix C, so the current study can be used to predict future outcomes. 
Since life-loss distributions can be expected to be consistent across time, they can 
be used to predict statistical life loss in dam safety risk assessment. 
Limitations to historic events 
While the death rate in a given level of hydraulic exposure is not likely to change 
across the centuries, several things are likely to change and must be explored separately 
from the current mix of events: l) Since warning effectiveness is improved with 
advancements in communication equipment, monitoring equipment, monitoring 
procedures, early warning systems, and emergency action plans, Wt will not produce a 
uniform value for Wtavg across the centuries. 2) Since building codes change with time 
and country, Ls is specific to the structures at a site. The likelihood of a flood to cause Ls 
= L, M, or H can only be explored coarsely using the present database. 3) If one explores 
the delectability of a failure or the likelihood of a particular failure mode, the present 
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A PROPOSED MODEL UNDER DEVELOPMENT 
A Brief Review 
It is useful to review the topics that have been covered in previous chapters. 
Chapters I and II present the nature of dam safety ri sk assessment, the important role life-
loss estimates play within that field, theoretical considerations relevant to model 
development, and the difficulty of selecting an unbiased data set for regression analyses. 
Chapter III presents every important, flood-related life-loss model that had been 
developed or proposed up to 1998. The chapter describes the contributions and 
shortcomings of each model in detail and concludes with a summary of essential model 
components and considerations for representing those components. 
Until recently, the DeKay-McClelland regression equation DM-2d was the 
dominant life-loss equation in use. However, it has often been used in a manner 
inconsistent with its development and in violation of the assumptions that must be 
satisfied fo r its estimates to be considered reliable. Hence, Chapter IV explores this 
equation at length, raising important questions about its credibi lity and its usefulness. 
Chapter V provides an extensive list of variables that pertain in some way to life 
loss associated with dam failures or catastrophic flood waves. Although many of these 
variables were identified in some form by previous researchers (see Table 8 in Chapter 
III), this is the first time that most of them have been given specific names, symbols, 
definitions, and categories by which they can be coded. Other variables, especially those 
that show the greatest promise for estimating life loss, have been defined for the first time 
and play a critical role in the proposed model presented below. All the variables are 
summarized in easy-to-use reference guides in Appendix D. 
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Chapter VI provides the historical and theoretical foundations on which one or 
more new models can be developed. Table 16 details the ways in which people perish 
during floods and Table 17 details ways in which people survive floods . Table 18 then 
offers a way to break issues that affect the rate of life loss into 18 logical categories. The 
remainder of the chapter catalogues numerous historical insights that are useful for 
gaining a good understanding of the real-world dynamics within each category. These 
insights are supported by event characterizations fully recorded in unpublished working 
documents that underlie the examples and summaries in Appendix B and the master chart 
of characterized values in Appendix C; as well as by other failure events that have been 
studied but not yet characterized. 
The final category in Chapter VI describes the relevance of historical research to 
predicting life loss in future or hypothetical events. This should be reviewed carefully, 
since it presents the logic behind the model outlined below. 
An Overview of the Problem 
By way of review, on the scale of large populations spread across the length and 
breadth of a flood, every catastrophic flood event is startlingly unique. When one 
considers that Chapter V and Appendix D present over 90 characterizing variables that 
affect life loss in interdependent ways, and that most of these variables can be described 
using four to six different ranks, up to 14 different categories, or any number of different 
quantitative values, it is difficult to conclude that any three or four variables can 
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reasonably account for the variance in life loss across events. This is highlighted by the 
fact that Brown and Graham (1988) and DeKay and McClelland (1993b) both chose to 
omit certain cases as "outliers" even though those cases represent historical reality and 
not experimental error. 
Moreover, given the relatively small number of available data points--one for 
each hi storical flood event-the statistical significance of a regression involving 
numerous variables is necessarily unsatisfactory. Even with only three independent 
variables, the very broad confidence limits displayed in Table 9 and Figures 8-10 
illustrate this problem. 
Generally , analysts have felt uneasy assuming that point estimates like Wt and Fd 
could full y capture the uniqueness of a large, heterogeneous population. It is hard not to 
fee l uneasy if Par includes a small canyon community just below a dam, campgrow1ds 
along the river, popular fishing holes or reaches for rafting, bridges or stretches of 
highway that follow the river, a metropolitan community on the open plain. and perhaps a 
marina in the reservoir below. To reduce the level of cognitive dissonance, analysts have 
often attempted to select Wt; and Fd; that are specific to more homogeneous subPar and 
then to apply equations on that basis. Unfortunately, as described in detail in Chapter IV, 
the more homogeneous Par or subPar become, the less they resemble the original data set, 
the more the nonlinear relationships distort the results, and the less credible the results 
become in many cases. 
More fundamental than questions about statistical validity are questions about 
human confidence. Unless human decision-makers can have confidence in the 
reasonableness of an approach to life-loss estimation, the results of any dam safety ri sk 
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assessment will be viewed as suspect. Indeed, in the absence of confidence, statistical risk 
assessments will be forgone altogether. Chapters III and IV have raised some serious 
questions that should give any risk assessor pause before continuing with the current 
models, at least without making some attempt to factor in the wide uncertainty in 
predictions. 
Goals for a Solution 
Shortcomings in current models suggest traits that would be desirable for the next 
generation of models and the accompanying benefits of these traits: 
I. A model should be intuitively transparent and logically satisfying to engender 
confidence in its use and acceptance of its results. 
2. A model should be empirically tested or empirically grounded to validate its 
predictions. 
3. A model should focus on homogeneous subPar or smaller units that maintain 
similar characteristics across events. There are at least four reasons for this. First, the use 
of subPar increases the number of data points in a data set. This in tum allows more 
variables to be considered in a model , primarily through the separation of data points into 
distinct bins. Second, life loss within homogeneous units is less dependent on the 
uniqueness of a given event than are global Par; homogeneous units should provide a 
more consistent basis for prediction and comparison across events. Third, by focusing on 
homogeneous subPar, events are broken down into their most basic, shared components. 
These components could then, theoretically, be recombined to represent events that are 
quite different on a macroscale. As such, a limited data set can be used to make 
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predictions regarding hypothetical events that are unlike those in the data set. Fourth. as 
noted in Chapters II and IV, it is difficult to select a data set free from bias, especially 
when L is nonlinear with respect to Par; however, by basing regression on homogeneous 
units, each equation or probability distribution becomes relatively free from bias. 
Moreover, events with greater life loss can still reveal the conditions (homogeneous 
units) under which life loss is expected to be small or 0. 
4. A model should first reduce Par; to Tpar; before applying life-loss 
relationships so that these relationships are independent of warning times. This allows 
one to eliminate Wt from a regression equation and apply life-loss functions derived from 
events with Wtavg"' 0 or known values for Tpar; to events with different warning times. 
5. Ideally, Tpar; should first be distributed among approximately homogeneous 
flood zones before applying life-loss functions to reduce variance based on levels of 
exposure. These flood zones are aptly called homogeneous units. 
6. A model should rely on a variable like E that describes the interaction 
between warning time and evacuation time, rather than one in isolation from the other. 
In its simplest form, E = Wtavg-Ret (average warning time minus representative 
evacuation time). Wtavg is estimated subjectively based on historic descriptions. It 
accounts for the source of warnings (human and environmental), the time remaining 
before flood arrival, and the fraction of a population that gets warned. It produces an 
average value, considering both representative values (Sc, Td, Tw, Ts) and point 
estimates (Det, Wt, Wte, Wt;). 
Although Wtavg has been assigned a single value for each historic subPar in 
Appendix C. the value of Wtavg will likely be known with less precision when attempting 
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to predict its value for a hypothetical, future event. To capture this uncertainty, it is 
desirable to express Wtavg as an estimated probability distribution, specific to the event 
under consideration. 
Ret is a subjective estimate based on historic accounts of individual evacuation 
times under various conditions and logical assumptions about the rate at which people 
can move in an emergency. As such, Ret considers important psychological variables (the 
urgency of individual warnings, prior flood experience, the tendency of a message to 
cause or prevent panic), important physical limitations (the mobility of a population, 
physical barriers like streams and fences, the distance to safety, the available modes of 
transportation), whether families are together and their general preparedness to evacuate 
(Pr, Td, Tw), climatic hindrances (Ts, Ac, Ml), and the nature of the population under 
consideration (Pt). Like Wtavg, Ret can be expressed as an event-specific probability 
distribution. 
Whether warning time is described as a point estimate like Wt or an average value 
like Wtavg, it transcends a single event only when related to the width of the floodplain , 
the mobility of the occupants, the urgency of the warning, the time of day or night, and 
other factors that affect the amount of time required to successfully complete an 
evacuation. E captures this interplay. Also, by quantifying E based on subjective, logical , 
and empirical factors, E is able to represent a complex function of dozens of other 
variables that could not readily be analyzed using traditional statistical methods without 
an extensive data set. To explicitly capture the uncertainty there is in knowing the true 
value of E before an event occurs, it can be expressed as an event-specific probability 
distribution to reflect the distributions of Wtavg and Ret. 
287 
7. A model should be linear with respect to Par so that differences in the 
proportion of lives lost do not vary with size but with the value of the variables that 
characterize each homogeneous unit. In that way, the model can be applied to any size 
Par or to any size subPar without skewing the estimated life loss. Analysts who assess :he 
same hypothetical event should obtain similar estimates, regardless of how they divide 
Par into subPar. The model would also make comparisons between dams in a portfolio 
more reliable. To assist in this process, explicit guidelines should be prepared for model 
users. 
8. A model should use average values for homogeneous subPar-preferably 
probability distributions of average values for homogeneous subPar-rather than point 
estimates for heterogeneous Par. Average values, while harder to quantify, more closely 
represent the experience of each individual. This is more closely assured when subPar are 
relatively homogeneous with respect to the characterizing variable under consideration. 
Conversely, point estimates, like Wt, D, and V, do not necessarily represent more than a 
tiny fraction of a subPar, making comparisons across events problematic. 
9. One should be able to upgrade a model by refining past event 
characterizations, by completing new event characterizations, or by performing 
experiments to improve estimated distributions. 
10. A model should either be simple to use or have the potential to be automated 
so that results can be produced in an efficient and cost-effective manner. 
11 . A model should be versatile, able to produce a quick estimate for preliminary 
analyses or a refined estimate more detailed analyses. It should also be able to yield the 
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expected life loss (an estimate of the mean) or a range of possible lives lost in the form of 
a probability distribution. 
12. A proposed model may be under development and thus depend on 
distributions or data that are not adequately known at this time, but only if there is some 
reasonable hope of estimating the needed information in the near future. 
A Proposed Model Its Variations 
and Supporting Topics 
Introduction 
The next section presents a comprehensive overview of a proposed conceptual 
model for estimating life loss associated with catastrophic floods . The model incorporates 
each of the six components essential to a useful dam-failure life-loss model presented at 
the end of Chapter III, but goes beyond them in an attempt to be responsive to the many 
insights presented in subsequent chapters. Although still under development, this initial 
conceptual overview and the automated and simplified versions that follow it, once fully 
developed, tested, and refined, will attempt to meet each of the twelve goals proposed in 
the previous section. 
The first section below-a comprehensive overview of the proposed conceptual 
model-provides a step-by-step method for characterizing those aspects of a hypothetical 
flood event that are pertinent to life loss as accurately as time and resources allow. A less 
detailed approach can be distilled from this detailed algorithm, and would be necessary if 
the goal were to quickly characterize the expected life loss without providing a refined 
estimate. One such distillation follows the detailed presentation as the third section 
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below. During further model development, it is planned to continue to explore both of 
these levels of detail in tandem to produce the most flex ible and practical life-loss models 
that are consistent with analysts' objectives. A subsequent section addresses the critical 
need to automate the model, if it is to reach its potential as a practical tool. Interspersed 
among these three model versions-the detailed conceptual model, the simplified model , 
and the automated model-are sections that clarify or elaborate on important aspects of 
these models: flood zones and homogeneous base units, sensitivity to key model 
components, estimating loss of shelter, important empirical relationships, and 
customizing Joss distributions. The chapter continues by exploring the potential 
usefulness of key variables defined in Chapter V through an examination of empirical 
trends in Table C. I of Appendix C. Chapter VII ends with a short discussion of how to 
estimate incremental life Joss. 
A comprehensive overview of 
the proposed conceptual model 
This section presents a 12-step algorithm for characterizing those aspects of a 
hypothetical flood event that are pertinent to life Joss as accurately as time and resources 
allow. The end goal of the procedure is a credible and defensible estimate oflife Joss. 
Simplifications to this procedure are possible, and one such simplification is presented 
later in the chapter. 
By way of a preview, the model seeks to reduce the population at risk (Par) to 
logical, homogeneous base units that have consistent life-Joss distributions across events, 
much like subatomic particles are consistent across elements and compounds. By first 
characterizing historic flood events in this way, it is possible to derive empirically based 
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life-loss functions or distributions that can then be applied to homogeneous base units in 
any future or hypothetical flood event. 
Conceptually, the model reduces each Par to subPar that are homogeneous with 
respect to Par type (Pt), excess evacuation time (E), and loss of shelter (Ls). Each subPar 
is then reduced to a threatened subpopulation (Tpar;) through the use of an empirical 
evacuation function. This function is unique in that it is based on E. As such, the model 
takes into account several dozen variables that affect the average warning time (Wtavg) or 
the representative evacuation time (Ret). 
Members ofTpar; are distributed into four flood zones-three with distinct 
physical attributes and one that represents a zone of uncertainty between the two most 
lethal flood zones. These zones rely heavily on the loss of shelter (Ls). The appropriate 
life-loss distribution is then applied to each zone. 
The detailed steps to estimating life loss are as follows: 
I. Develop failure scenarios and construct event trees. A group of experts 
should determine the ways a given darn might fail and the type ofloadings that would be 
associated with each failure mode (hydrologic, seismic, landslide, debris, mechanical, 
human error, internal, other). Analysts then determine the range of loading magnitudes 
that should be evaluated (for example, up to the PMF 1 and MCE2), the possible timing of 
such loadings, the likelihood that each loading magnitude will lead to failure, the rates at 
which a breach might develop, and the ultimate dimensions of a breach. 
1 probable maximum flood 
2 maximum credible earthquake 
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This progression suggests a complex pattern of possible failure scenarios that can 
be explored best using event trees. Each branch of the event tree is assigned a probability 
of occurrence that when multiplied along a given pathway provides the probability that 
the pathway will materialize. To keep the number of pathways manageable, analysts may 
discard those for which the likelihood of failure clearly falls below some minimum 
threshold. They will also approximate continuous functions by breaking them down into 
ranges likely to produce similar flood results and then using the values at the midpoints 
of the ranges . In conjunction with preliminary flood routing, sensitivity analyses can be 
useful in setting the limits of each range. 
To capture the inherent uncertainty behind each of the estimates above, event-tree 
analysis can use probability distributions in place of single-valued best estimates. In this 
case, a Monte Carlo simulation or related technique is required to multiply the 
distributions along the branches of the event tree . In a detailed analysis, this approach is 
preferable as it makes the uncertainty involved in dam safety risk assessment and life-loss 
estimation explicit and quantifiable . 
The timing of the failure is important because Par;, E, and weather patterns all 
show strong diurnal and seasonal trends . 
2. Route failure scenarios. It is impractical to route every conceivable failure 
scenario, but scenarios should be routed whenever the depths downstream are expected to 
differ enough to significantly impact the quantification of Par, the values for Ls, or the 
anticipated wading depths. Typically, failure scenarios should be routed when depths are 
expected to differ by I ft or more . This may require uncertainty analyses, or at least 
sensitivity analyses and iteration. 
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When exploring a particular failure scenario, experts should use detailed 
topographic maps and a dynamic flood wave model such as DAMBRK or FLOW A V to 
route the flood with sufficient detail to yield credible estimates of travel times, depths, 
and velocities on a scale that can be related to individual buildings. The timing of a 
failure is not usually important for routing. 
3. Begin to establish subPar by characterizing regions by Par type (Pt). Maps, 
field recognizance, and records of various kinds are needed to characterize Par within the 
flood zone. This process can be expensive and time consuming if high levels of accuracy 
and detail are desired. The first step will typically be the easiest, however, requiring only 
that analysts divide the flood zone into tentative Par; based on homogeneous Par type 
(Pt). 
The following are examples of terrain unique to Pt: (C) campsites near the river, 
either isolated or part of a formal campground; (W) reaches popular for fishing; (B) 
reaches popular for drift boats, skiing, or rafting; (L) near the mouth of the river in a 
reservoir or near the dam in the reservoir upstream; (At) bridges that cross the river, 
roads that parallel the river, and roads that will be flooded, other than those in residential 
or commercial districts; (T) train tracks or train stations that are flooded, undermined, or 
washed away; and (D) residential or commercial districts, including their network of 
roads. 
A final regional category pertains to areas that are vacant. These do not 
technically belong to Par and can be excluded from subsequent analysis unless they are 
likely to provide a reliable haven during the flood. 
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4. Continue to refine subPar such that they are reasonably homogeneous with 
respect to the excess evacuation time, E. This entails subdividing each regional Par type 
into geographic units in which Wtavg and Ret show minimal variability when applied to 
representative clusters of persons within the geographic boundaries. Drawing a loose grid 
system may prove useful, but in many cases a more flexib le approach to subdivision that 
follows natural physical boundaries, neighborhoods, roads, or other logical divi sions may 
be desirable. It is important to remember, however, that in regions where there is 
meaningful variability in the evacuation dynamics, such as across a wide floodplain , the 
geographic units must be divided laterally as well as longitudinally down the stream 
channel. If using a grid, strips on the order of 300-1,000 ft wide might be typical. 
Ultimate ly, however, because the size and shape of the geographic units depend onE, 
wl1ich in turn depends on Wtavg and Ret, step 4 is an iterative process. The paragraphs 
that follow highlight those aspects of Wtavg. Ret, and E that should be born in mind. 
As each Par type is iteratively subdivided, estimate Wtavg for distinct regions or 
population centers (such as nursing homes or schools) within each geographic unit. 
Continue iterating until every geographic unit is acceptably homogenous with respect to 
Wtavg· 
Recall that Wtavg is the average individual warning time (Wt;) from any source, 
human or natural. It is never less than Sc (the average warning time provided by sensory 
clues), but it can be either shorter or longer than Wt. The following subtleties should be 
kept in mind: 
a) Wt must account for the detailed chain of events that must occur before 
a message can first be disseminated on a mass scale. 
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b) Wt begins when the first formal warning is delivered that urges 
evacuation and is intended for propagation through a community. Generally, a 
representative of the darn owner, a public official, or a messenger from upstream 
would initiate Wt. When a person sees a wall of water and shouts to his family or 
knocks on his neighbor's door while running to the hillside, this does not satisfy 
the definition of Wt. In the same way, a motorist who races by while honking his 
horn is not initiating Wt. 
c) Such informal warnings, often initiated by those who first detect sensory 
clues, do, however, shape Wt.,g. Wtavg considers every form of warning and the 
rate at which a warning propagates through a subPar. 
d) Wt ends the moment potentially lethal flooding reaches the leading edge 
of Par;. Wtavg is shaped by Wt;, however, which vary spatially and temporally 
throughout the region of Par;. 
e) Wtavg > Wt when Wt < Sc or when Par; is large and the warning fully 
penetrates a population as it propagates downstream faster than the rate of travel 
of the flood wave. 
f) Wtavg < Wt when the flood travels more swiftly than the warning 
saturates a population. This is usually the case. 
As with Wtavg, as each Par type is iteratively subdivided, estimate Ret for distinct 
regions or population centers (such as nursing homes or schools) within each geographic 
unit. Continue iterating until every geographic unit is acceptably homogenous with 
respect to Ret. Recall that Ret is the representative evacuation time or the average time 
required for each individual within a population to clear the floodplain. Ret considers 
many important variables listed under goal number 6 presented earlier in Chapter VII. 
Guidance on estimating the representative evacuation time (Ret) is provided under its 
definition in Chapter V and Appendix D. 
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Delineate subPar that are homogeneous with respect to region, Pt, and E. Recall 
that E is the excess evacuation time, defined by Wt,v8-Ret when Ret; are consistent across 
a subPar. 
It is important to understand the concepts behind Wtavg and Ret, presented above, 
but it should not be forgotten that the goal of step 4 is homogeneity with respect to their 
interaction: E. Despite the fact that E is influenced by dozens of variables that shape the 
values for Wtavg and Ret (see goal 6 earlier in Chapter VII), some generalizations can 
greatly speed the iterative process of delineating homogeneous geographic units. 
Generally speaking, the length of a reach and the longitudinal dispersion of the members 
o f Par; dominate the variance between Wtavg and its corresponding Wt; or Wt,. In 
contrast, excluding those Par; with large populations of people with limited mobility. the 
width of the flood zone and the lateral dispersion of Par; (goodness of fit, Gf) dominate 
the variance among Ret;i. Thus, a subPar can usually be considered homogeneous with 
respect to E when the following conditions are met: 
a) The flood peak should cross the contiguous region of Par; within a few 
minutes, Wtavg should depend largely on Sc throughout the reach, or Wtovg should 
be known to be homogeneous. 
b) If the reach is divided into lateral and longitudinal bands of several 
hundred yards each, one enters a new Par; whenever an adjacent Ret; changes by 
an amount likely to have a measurable effect on successful evacuation. This 
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depends, in part, on the length of Wtavg· Table 19 presents a possible standard, 
although other standards are also possible. 
5. In regions with Pt = D, further delineate subPar by Ls. Buildings provide a 
unique refuge, so in order for Par; to be homogeneous with respect to levels of exposure, 
the buildings within Par; should have a reasonably uniform loss of shelter (Ls). At this 
point in the model, the estimated depths and velocities become important and not just the 
flood 's boundaries. 
Using field reconnaissance, surveys, GIS databases, housing records, and/or 
detailed topographic maps, buildings within Pt = D must be identified according to 
structural endurance, height, and approximate location (depth and velocity). In some 
cases, whole neighborhoods may be able to be classified as a unit; in other cases, a quick 
drive through a neighborhood or a perusal of records by building inspectors may provide 
sufficient information to classify buildings individually. 
Table 19. Possible criteria by which changes in Ret; indicate a region should be 
subdivided into two or more subPar 
When Wtavg :-:; X and Ret; :-:; 150% of Wtavg, then when moving across 
Ret;, if the smallest Ret; differs from the largest Ret; by 20% of X or 
more, a new Par; begins. Use the smallest value of X, below, for 









Any number > 200 
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Using structural damage functions , the analyst should estimate which buildings 
will have complete loss of shelter (Ls =H); which will have major damage without being 
completely submerged, though perhaps being displaced as much as 300 ft (Ls = M); and 
which buildings will sustain only minor damage (Ls = L) . 
6. Distribute members within each subPar while quantifying the subPar. Once 
Par; are fully delineated based on region, Pt, E, and Ls, the analyst should quantify each 
subPar using the best available census data, GIS files, field surveys, interviews, historical 
records, civic records, and reasoning. 
Distribution of members of Par; follows experience and common sense. For 
example, if Par; is a campground, the campsites nearest the river often tend to till up first 
and those closest to the road last. If Par; is a residential community, an average 
occupancy should be assigned to each house based on the demographics in the 
neighborhood. 
Values for Par; will vary according to the temporal considerations already 
incorporated in step l (Td, Ts, Ty) and temporal considerations that do not affect the 
probability of a failure scenario (Tw, holidays). 
7. Reduce each Par; to Tpar; based onE; and Ef. Evacuation rates are expressed 
as Ef; = Tpar;/Par; =the evacuation nonsuccess factor . Values of E were determined 
iteratively for each Pari in steps 5-7. Because E normalizes the differences in Wt,g and 
Ret across events, one can expect the historical evacuation rates with various values for E 
to hold approximately true in the future . 
Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between Efand E derived for those 
characterizations in Appendix 8 for which both Tpar; and Par; were known. The 
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Figure 14. The evacuation nonsuccess factor vs. the excess evacuation time (E) when E 
is close to zero. 
uncertainty resulting from historic variability can be maintained by expressing Ef as a 
probability distribution. Alternatively, one can draw a smoothS-curve through the figure 
and treat Ef as a point estimate. The choice depends on whether life-loss functions are 
expressed as mean values are as distributions. 
8. IdentifY flood zones within reach ofTpar;. Although we cannot know what 
people will do or where they will go for certain, history suggests that most people find 
the safest haven within the time allowed. Variations to this pattern can be accounted for 
by using a probability distribution. For many, the safest haven that time permits is 
complete evacuation from the flood zone. For Tpar, it is usually the highest floor in a 
building, a neighbor's house on higher ground or with an upper story, a nearby island of 
higher ground, a stout tree in a campground, or some other refuge. When no havens are 
within reach, people are trapped underwater or swept downstream without assistance. 
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Together, havens and the open flood form flood zones in which every member ofTpari 
can be located, although there is not a one-to-one relationship between havens and zones. 
The reminders and guidelines that follow should prove helpful in distributing Tpari. 
Four categories of havens and four categories of flood zones are carefully defined 
in Chapter V. If one includes the uncertainty of reaching a chance haven, these havens 
become progressively more dangerous in the following order: safe havens (Ch), pseudo-
safe havens (Psh), aerated havens (Ah), and chance havens (Ch). Flood zones become 
progressively more dangerous in the following order: safe zone (Sz), compromised zone 
(Coz), pseudo-chance zone (Pcz), and chance zone (Cz). The reader should review the 
definition of each haven and each zone if the subtleties of each are not clearly 
understood. 
The open flood indicates locations where people are trapped underwater or swept 
downstream without the aid of chance havens (including the shore). As such, the open 
flood implies a death rate of I 00%. Those who die while their haven remains intact 
usually die in the open flood , but since historic distributions account for this fact, such 
people should still be assigned to the haven and not the open flood. 
Members of Tpari must face the flood inside of a building, inside of a train, 
outs ide of a building on or above the floodplain, or in a boat. Flood zones for each of 
these locations are described below. 
Buildings are most relevant when Pt = D, but they are also found in campgrounds, 
parks, and other locations. Inside of buildings, havens and flood zones are tied to 
structural damages, flood depths, and flood velocities. Here are some helpful rules: 
a) When Ls = L, safe havens always remain, even on the ground floor, 
forming part of the safe zone. 
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b) When Ls = M, safe havens, pseudo-safe havens, and/or aerated havens 
always remain. Which are most likely will depend on the structural integrity of a 
building, its height, the depth of the flood, the velocity of the flood, and the nature 
of the debris in the flow. Flood zones are more important than havens, so analysts 
should group buildings according to the safest zone expected to last throughout 
the flood. 
Safe zones are a safe haven or a mildly compromised haven such as might be 
found when debris damages part of a safe haven's wall or a pseudo-safe haven 
that drifts less than 300 ft without crumbling. The latter category would be 
especially common with mobile homes and frame houses that are not bolted to 
their foundation. 
Compromised zones are pseudo-safe havens that drift less than 300ft, but 
that are likely to experience significant structural damage along the way; and 
buildings that are likely to lose walls or experience significant depths and 
ve locities above the top floor, reducing safe havens to aerated havens. 
c) When Ls = H, only chance havens remain. It is not important to predict 
whether people reach a chance haven or face the open flood since these are 
combined to form the chance zone. 
d) Ls = Mh is used in predictive contexts when analysts have no reasonable 
basis for assigning a building to Ls = M or Ls = H. Such cases belong to the 
pseudo-chance zone. 
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Although there was only one Par that included train passengers for the events 
characterized in Appendix B (19), trains have been important in other floods (i.e., 
Johnstown, 1889) and should be included when relevant. Trains most closely resemble 
mobile homes, but they also share characteristics with automobiles. If a train derails 
while moving, either because it is hit by a wave or because the track has been 
compromised, fatalities from the crash itself must be considered. When a train is standing 
still , it should be treated as a category of building. 
Those with outdoor Pt like C, W, and Afmust generally face the flood without the 
benefits of protective walls. Outside of buildings, non-chance havens exist where shallow 
water or structures such as trees or submerged hills provide the opportunity to stand in 
the flow, climb above the flow, or hold one's head above water while in the flow. The 
same zones apply outside of buildings as inside of buildings, differentiated by consistent 
life-loss distributions. Examples follow: 
a) Safe zone: Safe wading depths, depths that cannot submerge a vehicle or 
sweep it into deeper water for motorists, and trees that can easily withstand the 
flood, are easy to climb, are easy to reach, and are easy to sit in for extended 
periods of time. 
b) Compromised zone: Wading depths in which some people might be 
swept away (especially children), but over half could stand for prolonged periods, 
perhaps with the help of readily accessible trees, lampposts, fences, or telephone 
poles. An abundance of less-dependable trees than those described above might 
also form part of a compromised zone. 
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c) Pseudo-chance zones: Combinations of depth*velocity for which 
analysts have no reasonable basis for concluding whether more or less than 50% 
of waders will be swept away before they can be rescued. The basis for setting the 
uncertainty threshold at 50% follows from the historical life-loss distributions for 
compromised zones and chance zones. Except for the rarest of exceptions, 50% 
was the largest rate of life loss found in a compromised zone, and 50% was the 
smallest rate of life loss found in a chance zone (see Figures 40 and 41 , presented 
where they are discussed later in the chapter) . 
d) Chance zones: Any place where virtually all waders or motorists are 
expected to be swept away or trapped underwater. 
Boaters have the potential advantage of wearing life jackets, of riding a boat to 
safety, or of being in a reservoir with slower velocities than in a river. They also have the 
potential to launch into the air or to collide with objects at high speeds. Unfortunately, 
little historic evidence exists to characterize subPar with Pt = B or Pt = L, although a few 
subPar (23.5 , 23.6, and 23.7) and a few narrative descriptions (16) do shed some light 
(see Chapter VI). Zones can be defined based on the level of exposure boaters are likely 
to face, but these zones may not reflect the same loss functions as for previous zones with 
the same name: 
a) Safe zone: Areas on a lake or reservoir above or below a dam at which 
waves or a swell from the flood will not capsize a boat and where sufficient time 
exists to reach shore before the craft is in danger of capsizing or going over the 
dam. This time frame should be calculated generously to account fo r stalled 
motors and the need to paddle or swim. Given a flood with high lethal potential , 
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such as a dam failure , there are no safe zones on a flooded river unless the boaters 
are far downstream where flooding is minor and inclusion in Par is questionable. 
While boaters may be swept into quiescent waters that constitute a safe haven, 
they must begin their journey in the main stream channel, where the flood's 
greatest depths and velocities will typically manifest. 
b) Compromised zone: Any stretch of a river that catches boaters with a 
fast-rising flood and that produces a rise slow enough to allow over half of the 
boaters to reach shore without being capsized. 
c) Pseudo-chance zone: Any flood in a river or a reservoir for which it is 
uncertain whether more or less than 75% of the boats will be capsized. In the 
events characterized in the unpublished working documents underlying 
Appendices B and C, the fatality rate among boaters who capsized was about 
50%3 As indicated previously, a 50% fatality rate also appears to be the cutoff 
between compromised zones and chance zones. However, capsized boaters are 
certainly in a chance zone if they are not wearing a life preserver (by definition), 
and they are more likely in a compromised zone if they are wearing a life 
preserver. To account for the added uncertainty of estimating not only how many 
3 Among the historic subPar characterized, there were six reported boats that capsized by flooding: 
fou r on Lake Mohave due to the Eldorado Canyon flash flood of 1974 (subPar 22.5 and 22.7 in Appendices 
Band C); one on the river below Timber Lake Dam in 1995 (subPar 34.1a in Appendices Band C); and 
one on Rapid Creek afterthe failure of Canyon Lake Dam (subPar 16. I in Appendices Band C). Nine 
people occupied the five boats in the first two events and three drowned, with (I ife- Ioss)/occupancy rates as 
follows : 1/ 1, 1/3, III , 0/2, and 0/2. Generally, those who survived were wearing life jackets, and those who 
drowned were not. On Rapid Creek, the boat had three or four passengers and shot 30 or 40 ft into the air 
while travelling about 40 miles per hour. Witnesses did not see the boat or the passengers again after they 
plunged under water, there was no indication the passengers were wearing life jackets, and the overall 
death toll in this area was 171, so given the descr iption of witnesses, it is most likely the boaters drowned. 
Taking the boat occupancy at three, that ' s an overall life-loss rate for all six occurrences of6/ 12 or 50%. 
boats will capsize, but how many boaters will be wearing a life preserve r. the 
pseudo-chance zone extends the capsize rate down from 100% to 75%. 
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d) Chance zone: Any area in a lake or in a reservoir for which it is highly 
likely that 75%-100% of the boats will be capsized and/or pulled underwater. 
9. Quantify flood zone densities. Zone densities are simply the number of 
people within each flood zone. This can be quantified globally or for each Tpar; 
separately. 
Historical patterns help in distributing Tpar; among flood zones. First, fami ly 
members that are together when a flood arrives tend to get trapped in the flood together 
or evacuate together (see, for example, the names of the fatalities associated with events 
17, 18, 29, 31, 32, and 35). There are at least two reasons for this: I) Wt; will have very 
little variance within a single group, and 2) family members tend to help one another, 
often risking their own lives to do so. 
Second, people will seek shelter in a neighbor's house if their own house is single 
story and the neighbor's house has a second story or is located on much higher ground. 
However, this is much less likely if their own house has an upper story to which they 
might flee (see, for example, events 17, 18, and 29). 
These historic patterns suggest the following procedure for distributing T par; 
among flood zones: 
a) Divide Tpar; into logical units based on demographics, families. 
employees, hiking companions, fishing groups, etc. 
b) Scatter these units proportionately among the objects on which they are 
based: mobile homes, single-story residences, two-story residences, businesses, 
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campsites, RVs, trails, fishing reaches, automobiles, boats, trains, etc. Paq will be 
sufficiently homogeneous that an equitable distribution is fining even among 
Tpar;. 
c) Assume that Wt; 2:0.5 minutes in buildings and Wt; = Sc outdoors, 
raising both estimates if there is reason to believe they are longer among Tpar;. 
Wt; is unlikely to be shorter inside buildings unless Ls = H, in which case it 
doesn ' t matter. Outdoors, Sc should closely approximate Sc;. Wt;, as it pertains to 
Tpar; , should be limited to warnings that are unmistakable and urgent. 
d) Sketch a circle around each location to which one or more members of 
Tpar; have been assigned. This circle should represent the distance members can 
travel given Wt; and a strong sense of urgency. The circles can extend across the 
original boundaries of each Par; . These circles are called circles of accessibility. 
e) Identify the safest zone within each circle and assume the people to 
whom the circle pertains reach that zone and either survive there or perish there 
during the flood. If, however, the safest zone is in another building and the 
original building has two or more stories, the group should not be placed in the 
second building unless the building is more than 3 minutes away (i.e., the 
floodplain is wide and the building is some distance inland). 
f) If there is a sufficient empirical or logical basis, take a justifiable 
percentage ofTpar; from the second-most-dangerous zone and distribute them in 
the most dangerous zone within reach of Tpar;. This accounts for the exceptions 
to the rule, as explained next. 
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Although most people reach the safest zone that distance and time permit, there 
are important exceptions. The first is when people leave a safe haven in a building that 
will subsequently receive major damage in order to run into the floodplain. This occurs 
when the people are convinced that the building will be destroyed and that their only 
hope is to reach shore; and when people try to free livestock. The second is when people 
leave the safety of the hillside in order to return for some possession or to help warn or 
rescue others. The third is when people enter the flood zone to reach their family . While 
such cases are a small percentage of Par as a whole, they can make up a larger percentage 
ofL. 
The percentage of people who chose to enter more dangerous areas is highly 
variable and, to date, no empirical distributions have been developed. Here are some 
guide lines, however, based on insights from Appendix Band other events. Regarding 
such behavior: 
a) Remember that it will typically contribute a small percentage of L unless 
L itself is small. Such behavior is the exception to the rule. 
b) It is largely irrelevant when Ls = L. In such cases, a large wave is 
unlikely to catch people in the floodplain and history suggests that people either 
find safe havens or do not perish under such conditions. 
c) It is irrelevant when Ls = H, because virtually everyone is already in the 
most dangerous zone. 
d) It is largely irrelevant when people have no warning and a flood comes 
upon them at night because there is not time to race ahead of an approaching 
wave. 
e) It is largely irrelevant when people have more than a few minutes to 
decide what to do and where to go. 
f) For the most part, such fatal choices are relevant only when Ls = M. 
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Wtavg is on the order of 0-5 minutes, and E is < 3 minutes. In such cases, it would 
be appropriate to move no more than 20-30% of the members in the second-most 
dangerous zone to the most dangerous zone: Historically, under these unique 
conditions, no more than this percentage of people made such fatal choices. 
I 0. Apply a unique loss function, in the form of a probability distribution, to each 
flood zone density. These loss functions should be based on historic levels of flood 
exposure comparable to that expected in each flood zone. 
A number of points should be kept in mind. Loss functions must have a linear 
relationship to the size of Par. If the mean life loss is desired, these functions might be 
simple proportions based on the average historical life loss under similar conditions 
(Ptpar; = L;/Tpar;). If it is desirable to capture the known uncertainties. Ptpar; can be 
expressed as a probability distribution. One can then use a Monte Carlo simulation to 
generate a single distribution of Ptpar for the entire event. 
Isolated segments of each flood zone can be treated separately or they can first be 
combined and then the four flood zones can be treated separately. If the segments are 
treated separately, it may be possible to identify other factors that indicate which portions 
of the historic probability distributions are most likely to apply to each segment. Such an 
effort seeks to identify a base unit more homogeneous than flood zones. 
II. Sum all estimates of life loss across the event. 
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12. Quantify risk. Risk is generally defined as the probability of an event and its 
expected consequences. It is often expressed in an annualized form as an expected value, 
but more generally as a probability distribution that takes into account uncertainty. Since 
event trees can be used with either best estimates or probability distributions, the risk of 
life loss posed by a dam is calculated by adding life-loss estimates to the event tree begun 
in step I. 
Flood zones and homogeneous base units 
Homogeneous base units are the fundamental building blocks from which any 
flood event can be constructed from the perspective of life loss, much like protons, 
neutrons, and electrons are the fundamental building blocks from which any substance is 
constructed. For floods, it is impractical to define a base unit that is truly homogeneous in 
every respect, but the definition of flood zones central to the conceptual model are closer 
to homogeneous base units than any unit proposed so far. 
It is important to recognize that flood zones rely on categories of Ls and havens, 
but zones are not synonymous with either. The essential criterion underlying a flood zone 
is the level of flood exposure its occupants are likely to experience. This exposure should 
be relatively consistent throughout a flood zone, so that variations in life loss are largely a 
matter of chance. That is, the life-loss distributions are based on homogeneous statistical 
populations. The unique capabilities and decisions of each occupant, the unique patterns 
of damage rendered by debris, and random encounters with chance havens once 
occupants are washed into the open flood will govern the variation. While it might be 
possible to predict trends in any of these factors, they are not currently amenable to 
refined estimation. 
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Thus, flood zones, as approximately homogeneous base units, attempt to define 
conditions that have universal application in historic, hypothetical, and future flood 
events. Through event-specific combinations and proportions, one should be able to 
characterize the life loss in any event using life-loss distributions from comparable 
historic flood zones . 
Zones are not synonymous with havens for two reasons. Zones include every area 
in the flood, whether the areas contain havens or not; and zones are defined to match 
certain life-loss distributions, which vary more within havens than within zones, and 
which overlap the transitions between havens. 
Zones also accommodate our inability to accurately model some havens and 
transition points. The transitions points berween Ls = M and Ls = H for various kinds of 
buildings and between wading depths and toppling depths are likely to remain uncertain. 
Moreover, there will be uncertainty regarding the flood depths and velocities themselves 
on the scale of buildings and evacuation pathways. To accommodate these uncertainties, 
the pseudo-chance zone was defined and assigned a combined distribution from both 
sides of the transition. 
Ways to simplify the procedure 
As indicated previously, the conceptual model has been presented in its most 
detailed form. If less precision is required or justified fo r a particular application, the 
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effort required to use the model can be reduced without sacrificing its underlying log ic. 
Here are several ways to reduce the workload at the expense of precision: 
Step I : Reduce the number of failure modes to those most dominant and increase 
their estimated likelihood of failure to account for similar failure modes that are 
discounted. However, avoid combining failure modes when they can be expected to 
result in significantly different consequences or their prevention requires different 
remedial measures. 
Step 2: With reduced failure modes, run fewer flood scenarios. For example. 
rather than routing the flood every time the river rises by I ft , route it at 2-ft, 3-ft, or even 
5-ft intervals instead. One could interpolate between final life-loss estimates to explore 
the ranges in between. 
Step 3: Combine similar Par type to reduce the number of categories. For 
example, the following pairs might be combined: campers (C) and waders (W); boaters 
(B) and recreationists on lakes (L); motorists (At) and mobile train passengers (T): and 
stationary train passengers (T) and residents (D). 
Step 4 : Use larger geographic units. The impact of this diminishes when Wtavg > 
I 0 minutes or when the geographic units transect the river. Reduce the effort expended to 
quantify Wtavg and Ret;. Divide Par; based on larger changes in Ethan are recommended 
in Table 19. Realize, however, that when E is close to 0, a very small change in E results 
in a very large change in Ef. Hence, Steps 4-7 should only be simplified when E is 
greater than ±7 minutes (see Figure 14). 
Step 5: Rather than identifyi ng the height, location, elevation, and structural 
nature of specific buildings within Par;, determine the rough percentage of buildings that 
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fall within each category in the community as a whole . Then distribute these 
proportionately or randomly according to the approximate number of buildings within 
each Par;. An averaging process should reduce the error introduced by this procedure. 
The uncertainty involved in distributing Tpar; also justifies this approach when less 
precision is required. As for depths and velocities, make estimates at large intervals and 
interpolate between. 
Step 6: In distributing Par;, rather than choosing the six most common temporal 
divisions [work hours (Td = S), home hours (Td = H), and sleep hours (Td = N) during 
the tourist season (summer) and slumber season (winter)], select a single value for each 
Par; based on an average across the year. 
Step 7: One can maintain the uncertainty indicated in Figure 14 by using a 
di stribution for Ef, or one can draw a smoothS-curve through the center of the data 
points and use a point value for Ef. The latter is much simpler when working by hand but 
does not account for uncertainty in Ef. 
Step 8: It is difficult to simplify this step without violating the heart of the model, 
but one's effort will be limited by the availability of dependable damage functions and 
knowledge of the details in the flood zone. The simplest approach would be to limit 
havens to their dominant members- floors in buildings that rise above the flood and 
steep hills within the flood zone that are clearly visible on topographic maps. 
Step 9: Assume that members of Tpar; do not leave their buildings unless they are 
washed away or seek refuge on a steep island within the flood. 
Step I 0: Apply historic life-loss distributions without considering additional 
fac tors that might suggest one portion of the distribution would fit more closely than 
another. If the method is not automated, use only mean values or mean values and 
standard deviations rather than the entire distribution. 
Step I I: This is a simple summation. 
312 
Step 12: This is also a simple calculation if one chooses point values throughout, 
neglecting the uncertainty expressed in distributions. 
Sensitivity 
Assuming that steps I and 2 are performed well, the model is most sensitive to the 
quantification ofE (steps 5 and 6), the fluctuation in E allowed within a homogeneous 
subPar (step 7), and the quantification of zone densities (step 12). One should proceed 
with caution when simplifying these steps in the model and perform sensitivity analyses 
when in doubt. 
Important empirical relationships 
The conceptual model is informed by empirical relationships on many levels. 
First, Table 15 in Chapter V that provides guidelines on estimating Ret (step 6) is based 
on impressions following the characterization of 179 historical subPar. Second, Table 19 
under step 7 provides an algorithm for differentiating subPar ba5ed on E that recognizes 
that the sensitivity ofEfto E decreases as E increases and as Wlavg increases. This 
relationship is reflected, in part, in Figure 14, but it is also reflected in dozens of other 
subPar for which the range of Tpar; was apparent but the precise value for Tpar; could not 
be quantified. Third, step 8 requires structural damage functions necessary to determine 
the level of loss of shelter (Ls) at each structure. Functions currently exist, but they are 
generally used to estimate economic damages and existing functions will probably need 
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refinement before Ls can be estimated with precision or confidence. In the mean time, the 
designation Ls = Mh and pseudo-chance zones should help analysts apply the model in 
the face of uncertainty. Fourth, havens and flood zones can be identified more readily if 
damages can be understood on a detailed level when Ls = M. The same comments as for 
the third point apply here, as well. Fifth, the method in step 12 for quantifying zone 
densities follows certain assumptions about trends in people's behavior during the urgent 
moments just before a flood arrives in force. These trends have not been quantified, but 
they are expressed in Chapter VI and they show a consistent pattern throughout most of 
the subPar that were examined. Sixth, all of the distributions ofPtpar; in step 13 are 
empirical in nature. Each of these six empirical categories could be customized for any 
Par type or subset of a Par type (for example motorists at bridges, on a road that parallels 
a river with a slow rise, or fl eeing from a wall of water down a canyon). 
Estimating loss of shelter (Ls) 
The conceptual model is heavily dependent on the ability to estimate the degree of 
structural damages. When buildings are overtopped by floodwaters , Ls = H and people 
are assigned to the chance zone. Below these depths, however, it is important to judge 
what kind of haven remains on the top floor or accessible roof. This, in turn, is affected 
by whether or not a building floats and drifts into the main current; whether lower floors 
are destroyed, submerging the top floor; and whether water that reaches the top floor 
carries sufficient debris to tear away walls. 
Answering these questions is beyond the scope of the current study, but it is 
helpful to suggest ways in which researchers might estimate such dynamics. First, 
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researchers should conduct a thorough literature review to discover what kinds of loss 
di stributions currently exist for use by insurance companies or interested agencies. It is 
important to remember, however, that Ls, havens, and flood zones are based on exposure 
to strong currents and not on economic damages. 
Second, structural engineers include lateral wind loads in their calculations when 
they design buildings. In some cases, wind is modeled as a dynamic load or as an impact 
load, since it can come in sudden gusts. This is analogous to the lateral movement of 
water and to the sudden impact of a wall of water. Recognizing this similarity, current 
software like ST AAD could be used to develop structural damage tables, curves, or 
functions for standard building configurations that estimate damages at 1-ft increments of 
depth and a range of corresponding velocities. It would be important to remember that 
catastrophic floods are more dense that sediment-free water in calculating the loads. 
These relationships could then be refined further to account for the impacts 
caused by large debris like trees, rooftops, vehicles, and houses. Since these impacts 
would be more random than the force of the flood alone-not only in terms of whether 
they occur but also where they might occur on a structure-their affects could be 
expressed in the form of a probability distribution. 
Third, the functions developed above could be empirically tested or calibrated by 
several means. 
I. Studying historic failures, it might be possible to reconstruct the velocity and 
depth of a flood at individual structures and then to correlate these to specific damages. 
The most important point to identify is the boundary between Ls = M and Ls =H. It is 
not important whether a failure involves loss of life or whether it is a dam fai lure or a 
flash flood. If no historic events are available, enough flash floods occur every year to 
begin to collect data in the near future . 
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2. One could construct small-scale models and test them in the laboratory using 
steady flows and sudden, debris-filled walls of water. 
3. It might be possible to identify a dam for which no significant losses to the 
environmental, property or human life would be expected from a very large release of 
water. If so, one could construct small, inexpensive structures in or beside the stream or 
relocate structures from land that will be redeveloped, and then release increasing 
quantities of water, tracking the damages with time. As an alternative to the second 
option of using scaled models in the laboratory, one could use larger scaled models below 
adam. 
It is also important to realize that software is currently under development or 
currently exists that includes the goal of quantifying physical damage to structures by 
floods. Appendix E addresses this important opportunity for collaboration. 
Automating the conceptual model 
If the proposed model were to be applied to a large number of dams, it would be 
useful to automate the procedure as much as possible. Ideally, it would be desirable to 
write software that could read GIS data files and manipulate the data according to the 
needs of steps 3-15 . Steps I and 2 are well established in the field of dam safety risk 
assessment and currently rely on a combination of expert interaction and modeling 
programs, so one would want to prepare the new program to accept output from the 
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software used in these steps. At minimum, software is required to run the Monte Carlo 
simulations if probability distributions are used to express Ef and Ptpar. 
It might be necessary to approach steps 5 and 6 manually, since the large numbers 
of variables that influence Wtavg and Ret; are difficult to express in a function and must be 
estimated themselves. However, one might have a program suggest standard values such 
as those in Table 15 of Chapter V and allow the user to alter them on a case by case basis. 
Alternatively, one could input a base estimate for Wtavg and Ret, input values for each of 
the variables affecting Wtavg and Ret (see goal 6 under "Goals for a Solution," above), 
and assign these variables influence functions that shift the values of Wtavg or Ret up or 
down. The analyst could then check each result and alter those that appear unreasonable. 
This would certainly be an area for additional research. 
As mentioned above, software currently under development might prove useful in 
determining values for Ls (see Appendix E). 
Customizing loss distributions 
Recognizing that flood zones are not pure homogeneous base units, one way to 
customize the distributions of Ptpar for each zone segment is to fully characterize each 
subPar after the manner in Appendix B. The subPar in Appendix B, already 
characterized, form a database that can inform an expert system. Given an expert system, 
the analyst can then select whatever criteria or set of criteria he or she feels is most 
important for a particular subPar. For example, in the Vaiont failure, the depth of the 325-
ft flood was critical; in the Anis Alluvial Fan flash flood, the velocity of the 3-ft flood 
was critical , in combination with high levels of exposure; and in the failure of the 
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Banqiao and Shimantan Dams, the shear expanse of the flood and the poor quality of the 
peasant' s shacks was critical. Responding with the number of subPar the analyst requests, 
the expert system would select the subPar that most closely matched the analyst's criteria, 
produce their names for reference, and produce a customized life-loss distribution based 
on their historic values for Ptpar. 
When Ls = D, as an alternative to flood zones, the less-refined criteria for Ls 
alone can be used to segregate Par; according to levels of exposure. These can then be 
refined through customized loss functions, as described above, if criteria are selected that 
are likely to distinguish between Ls = Mminor and Ls = Mncarly destroyed· 
Critique of the proposed models 
Before exploring the empirical data that underlies the conceptual model, it is 
useful to critique the extent to which the model meets the goals set forth previously. 
Table 20 provides a report card. 
Introductory comments 
Important Empirical Distributions 
Exploratory Data Analysis 
and Potential Trends 
Appendix C presents a table containing dozens of characterized variables for 179 
subPar and 163 non-overlapping subPar. To date, only the first stages of analysis have 
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Table 20. A critique of the proposed models against the proposed goals 
Level of Achievement 
(Poor, Good, Excellent) 
Detailed 
Conceptual Automated 
Goal: A Model Should. Model Model 
1. be intuitively transparent and logically satisfying to Excellent Excellent 
engender confidence. 
2. be empirically grounded to validate its predictions. Excellent with Room for 
Continual Improvement 
3. focus on homogeneous base units that can be Excellent Excellent 
compared across events. 
4. reduce Par; to Tpar; before applying life-loss Excellent Excellent 
relationships. 
5. distributed Tpar; among homogeneous flood zones Excellent Excellent 
before applying life-loss functions to eliminate 
variance based on levels of exposure. 
6. rely on a variable like E that describes the interaction Excellent Excellent 
between warning time and evacuation time. 
7. be linear with respect to Par so life loss is based on Excellent Excellent 
the characterization of each Par; and not the manner 
of its division. 
8. use average values for homogeneous subPar rather Excellent Excellent 
than point estimates for heterogeneous Par. 
9. be capable of upgrade by refining past event Excellent Excellent 
characterizations, by completing new event 
characterizations, or by performing experiments to 
improve estimated distributions. 
l 0. be simple to use or be automated so that results can Poor Excellent 
be produced in an efficient and cost-effective 
manner. 
11. be versatile, able to produce a quick estimate for Poor Excellent 
preliminary analyses, a refined estimate for more 
detailed analyses; a single, expected value, and a 
range of probable outcomes in the form of a 
probability distribution. 
12. be allowed to be under development, but only if there Good-to- Good-to-
is some reasonable hope of estimating the needed Excellent Excellent 
information in the future . 
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been possible. As new data points are added to tbe data set, ever-richer avenues can be 
explored. 
A caution should be noted, however. From the perspective of life-loss dynamics 
in flood zones, every subPar is independent of every other subPar once they are reduced 
to Tpar; and fully characterized. That is, life loss is person-specific and location-specific 
and not event-specific. Other variables, however, are event-specific (i.e ., Td, Fm, Hp, Dt, 
M, etc.) and can appear to have statistical significance if some events are broken down 
into more subPar than otber events. The current data set includes 38 events, but some 
events like Dale Dyke (56 subPar), Mill River (19 subPar), and Buffalo Creek (16 
subPar) dominate. The reason for this dominance is because these floods passed through 
many communities and sources recounted the events on a personalized scale that made it 
possible to identify both subPar and Tpar;. Fortunately, all of these events included 
subPar with Ls = L, Ls = M, and Ls = H, so tbis greatly reduced event-specific biases. 
For now, four tracks have been explored: I) temporal relationships that provide a 
reasonable estimate of Ef; = Tpar;/Par;; 2) probability distributions of Ptpar; based on 
subPar that are homogeneous with respect to loss of shelter (Ls); 3) exploration of 
variables that, in isolation, might skew Ptpar; toward the upper tail, lower tail , or central 
portions of each Ls-distribution; and 4) probability distributions for flood zones. In a 
sense, step 3 was an early attempt to reduce Ls to flood zones without defining flood 
zones directly or determining their densities. 
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Overview of the data set 
Although there were 163 non-overlapping subPar in the data set from 38 separate 
flood events, Tpar; could be accurately quantified for only a fraction of them. The reason 
is simple: Tpar is seldom known or reported for historic floods. The exceptions are when 
Wtavg = 0 and Tpar =Par, or when an author recounts a flood on a house-by-house basis. 
Such floods are invaluable, not only because they portray the evacuation 
dynamics, the flood dynamics, and the life-loss dynamics in great detail , but also because 
they often can be broken down into subPar with known values for Ls and Zd. In all, there 
were 92 subPar for which both Par; and Tpar; could be quantified. There were 122 subPar 
for which Ls was known, but not all of these were homogeneous with respect to Ls. 
Among subPar with Tpar; > 0, there were 38 subPar with Ls = HIOO%, 22 with Ls = 
M I 00%, and 19 with Ls = LIOO%. When these subPar were further divided into zones, it 
was possible to identify 45 isolated chance zones, three pseudo-chance zones, II 
compromised zones, and 4 7 safe zones. 
Reducing Par; to Tpar; (E vs. Et) 
It is fitting to present the results of the analysis in the same sequence as the 
information is needed in the model. Step I 0 reduces each Par; to Tpar; with the help of 
Wtavg. Ret, and E, calculated for each Par; in steps 5-8. Once E is known, an empirical 
relationship between E and Efprovides the means of moving from Par; to Tpar; . This 
relationship is presented in Figure 14 and Figure 15. 
. ' . 
• Bpar = Pre • Bpar ,. Post 
Figure 15. The evacuation nonsuccess factor vs. the excess evacuation time (E) given 
Bpar = Pre and Bpar =Post. 
The first figure indicates that thtee out of the five largest values of E occurred 
because an official warning was delivered before the dams failed. In two of these three 
cases, Ef was substantially higher than one would expect from the general trend in the 
graph (more visible in Figure 14). To these could be added subPar 35.5, the shore side 
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communities around Vaiont Lake. Those people had more than a day's warning and were 
forcibly evacuated by the police-in some cases twice-yet 158 people (Ef"' 0.1 5) 
evaded evacuation and died. That data point reflects a value forE of -5 minutes and an Ef 
value of 1.0 because Par was quantified based on those who evaded evacuation. The 
significance of these thtee events is that warnings prior to failure often carry less urgency 
or credibili ty than warnings during or after fa ilure, and should not be treated in the same 
way. Additional evidence comes from events that could not be included in the figure. For 
example, warnings were disseminated from many sources, official and unofficial. up and 
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down the Buffalo Creek Valley hours before the dams failed. Despite these efforts, the 
warnings were generally disregarded due to the history of false alarms in the region. 
Deaths occurred for about 12 miles. 
Figure 14 narrows the scale to show the large number of E-values close to zero. 
The fact that most E-values were close to zero is a byproduct of several factors: I) The 
most common type of flood event that leads to many fatalities is one with short warnings 
in a steep, narrow valley and total destruction of buildings, 2) events through long, 
narrow valleys are most readily broken up into many subPar, and 3) writers are more 
likely to chronicle an event on a house-by-house basis-helpful in quantifying Tpar;-
when communities are small and sequential than when they are large and dispersed. 
Although it is not immediately apparent, a close comparison between Figure 14, 
Figure 15, and Appendix C will reveal that negative E-values continue out to -30 minutes 
and beyond with no departure from Ef= 1.0. There were no historical examples ofTpar; 
<Par; when E < -5 minutes. Values ofE < -10 minutes reflect expansive, urban 
neighborhoods or island communities with little or no warning time. As such, this graph 
represents all types of communities, large and small, canyon and plain, when Wtavg is 
short; and should accurately reflect the pattern of activity withiri the final, urgent minutes 
before the arrival of any catastrophic flood. It fits especially well for those who live 
within I ,000 ft of the hillside. 
The strong and extended trend line at Ef= 1.0 shows that it would be unrealistic 
to expect any evacuation of a homogeneous subPar when E < -6 minutes. However, most 
people can run far and fast when their life depends on it, so between E = -4 minutes and E 
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= +4 minutes, Ef drops from about 0.98 to 0.02 in an S-pattem with an inflection point at 
Ef = 0.5 andy-intercept at 0.25 . There is, of course, wide scatter around this trend line. 
The right tail of the graph can be extended indirectly through events like Buffalo 
Creek that provide especially good studies in life loss with incremental increases in E. 
The subPar can not be used directly because the values for Tpar; are not known. 
However, every fatality was a member ofT par; and the approximate value ofT par; can be 
guessed via the life-loss distributions presented in Table 2 I (illustrated graphically later 
in Figures 22 and 23). The results are displayed using new scales in Figure I 6. The new 
data points were calculated by distributing L; proportionately to each level of Ls, then 
dividing each Lij value by the appropriate average proportion of lives lost recorded in the 
bottom row of Table 2 I. Potential Tpar; among houses with Ls = L were neglected since 
they would have grossly distorted the results. 
While it might be preferable to display confidence limits, it is gratifying to see 
that the general pattern produced is exactly what one would have expected. That is, the 
new data points fit well with the original pattern close to zero and they continue to 
approach zero asymptotically with time. Note that while most people evacuate within the 
first 5-l 0 excess minutes, even when the warning time exceeds the evacuation time by 40 
and 55 minutes, there can still be stragglers that do not evacuate for one reason or 
another. 
There are two ways to use these figures. One way is to draw a smooth S-curve 
through the center of the data points and then to read point estimates off this curve. 
Another approach is to sketch upper and lower bounds around the data points and then to 
determine the distribution of Ef within small increments of E. The distributions can be 
Table 21. Proportion of lives lost within threatened subpopulations (Ptpar;) with 
homogeneous Ls when values were available 
Homogeneous Loss of Shelter 
Ls- HIOO% Ls- M100% Ls- LIDO% 
1.00 1.00 0.93 0.57 0.88 0.020 0.013 0 
1.00 1.00 0.93 0.50 0.80 0.013 0.0025 0 
1.00 1.00 0.89 0.40 0.56 0 0.0016 0 
1.00 1.00 0.86 0.38 0.50 0 0 0 
1.00 0.99 0.84 0 0.43 0 0 0 
1.00 0.99 0.83 0.43 0 0 0 
1.00 0.98 0.80 0.33 0 0 0 
1.00 0.98 0.78 0.28 0 0 0 
1.00 0.98 0.71 0.13 0 0 0 
1.00 0.97 0.66 0.037 0 0 
1.00 0.94 0.64 0.036 0 
Average = 0.857 Average= 0.202 
Average-
0.000914 
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Figure 16. The evacuation nonsuccess factor vs. the excess evacuation time (E), 
including points back-calculated from L; and the average life loss for each 
category of Ls. 
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produced directly using the data points in Appendix C. As a general trend, the skewness 
in this distribution shifts from positive to negative as E changes from negative to positive 
values. Any prediction of life loss that intends to capture real-world dynamics needs to 
incorporate this intrinsic variability. 
Reducing Par; to Tpar1 (shortcomings 
ofWt, Wtavg, and Sc) 
Wt, Wtavg, and Sc are much less useful than E in predicting Ef. Figure 17 shows a 
slight reduction in Ef as Wt increases beyond 45 minutes, but Figure 18 is essentially 
trendless when Wt is less than 15 minutes. Figure 17, does, however, reinforce the notion 
that pre-failure warnings are ineffective. The data point at the extreme upper right comer 
represents the communities around Vaiont Lake, discussed above. Overall, when Wt 
began prior to failure, less than 80% of the population evacuated in six out of seven 
cases. The triangles represent these same seven data points, only Wt is limited to the time 
subsequent to failure. Notice that under these constraints, the evacuation rates were in 
keeping with other events, suggesting Wt was not taken seriously until the dams actually 
failed. 
Wtavg shows a stronger trend in Figure 19 and its corresponding close-up in Figure 
20 than did Wt, while Sc in Figure 21 shows simultaneous trends in opposite directions. 
Such illogical results are possible because, fundamentally , any measure of warning that is 
independent of the required evacuation time is only half of the puzzle. In and of 
themselves, warning times mumble when they try to declare who can and who cannot 
escape the flood zone. 
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Figure 2 1. The evacuation nonsuccess factor vs. the average warning time provided by 
sensory clues (Sc) for the full data set. 
Applying loss functions to 
homogeneous units based on Ls 
Once Tpar; is determined by multiplyi ng Par; by Ef, Par; must be distributed 
among homogeneous units for which there are known, empirically based life-loss 
distributions. Flood zones were a late addition to the model, so early analysis 
concentrated on damage functions for Ls = H 100%, Ls = M 100%, and Ls = L I 00% with 
the hope that these environments could also be related to conditions in the open. 
Figures 22-24 tabulates the proportion of lives lost for each subPar; that was 
completely homogeneous with respect to a category of Ls. These points could be chosen 
at random as a means of using a probability distribution in a model. Other alternatives 
invo lve selecting the average value from a range of values according the proportion of 
subPar in that range. A third method would be to make a completely continuous function 
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by drawing a smooth line through a histograph. The histograms for Ls = H100%, Ls = 
MIOO%, and Ls = LIOO% are presented in Figures 22-24, respectively. In each case, the 
height of a bar represents the number of data points within that range, and the data points 
are all less than or equal to the number at the bottom of the column. The underlying 
values can be found in Table 21 and in Appendix C. 
Notice the strong trends when Ls =Hand Ls = L. When Ls = H, the most likely 
value for the proportion of lives lost among Tpar; (Ptpar;) is 1.0, and the average death 
rate is 85. 7%. When Ls = L, however, deaths are a rare exception, so one would generally 
expect zero deaths and, on average, only 1 out of I ,000 people left stranded in the flood 
zone would die (see the averages at the bottom of Table 21). 
When Ls = M, the flood conditions could approximate Ls = L or Ls = H, 
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Figure 22. Histogram of the proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes 
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Figure 24. Histogram of the proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes 
(Ptpar;) for Ls = LIOO%. 
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Ptpar; ranges across the spectrum between Ls ~ L and Ls ~ H. Losses appear to be 
clumped into three separate distributions. Most likely, the distribution near zero reflects 
cases for which upper stories or other safe havens provide flood conditions most similar 
to Ls ~ L. The distribution on the far right reflects tenuous conditions in which people are 
more likely to be submerged or swept away than to find adequate shelter. The distribution 
in the middle likely represents subPar with a range of major damages, some very severe 
and other rather middle, producing a mixed distribution. 
Figure 25 ignores the frequency of Ptpar; ranges, but it demonstrates the diversity 
of values and the overall spread. The plot is based on Lsw, which is a weighted, linear 
combination of Ls-values for which the average Ptpar; when Ls ~His the reference. The 
equation is shown at the bottom of the graph and it is explained in Chapter V. The 
importance of the graph is that life loss falls within the expected ranges for subPar with a 
mixture of Ls values: it increases as Lsw approaches Ls ~H. 
Refining loss functions 
with predictive variables 
While these Ptpar; distributions are satisfying, the wide range of possible values in 
Figures 22, 23, and 25 suggest that loss of shelter, alone, does not adequately define 
homogeneous base units. Does it make sense that life loss can range between 0% and 
I 00% when Ls ~ H? Does Figure 23 represent three distributions or only one? 
To try to narrow the range of each distribution that should be used in a given 
context, Ptpar; was graphed against a number of possible predictive variables with the 
data points broken out separately for each category ofLs ~ X!OO%. The most likely 
candidates for predictors were various approaches to depth and velocity. 
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Figure 25 . Scatter plot of Ptpar; vs. weighted loss of shelter (Lsw). 
Figure 26 shows Ptpar; vs. D, with Ptpar; broken out by Ls categories. Figure 27 
duplicates this graph when D < 30 ft. It is important to remember that Dis a maximum 
value and not necessarily representative of a subPar as a whole. However, together, these 
figures suggest several valuable insights. 
When D > 100ft, one can reasonably expect Ls = HlOO% and Ptpar; will fall 
within that range of the Ls = 100% distribution for which Ptpar; > 0.94. This roughly 
corresponds with the upper 40'h percentile of the Ptpar; distribution. 
Although the graph implies that when D $ 3 ft one would expect only minor 
damages, this is not necessarily the case. For example, with D"' 3 ft, velocities were 
sufficiently high across the Anis Alluvial Fan that had it been a neighborhood instead of a 
campground, damage would most likely have been major. The roads were washed away 
in places and erosion was pronounced. At 4 ft , the flood through Eldorado Canyon caused 
residential trailers to float and move into deeper water where they were destroyed. Ptpar; 
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Figure 26. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar;) vs. the 
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Figure 27. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar;) vs. the 
peak depth (D) when D <30ft. 
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= 0.57 instead of 1.0 for this data point because three people were able to reach shore 
before the trailers were swept away. At 6 ft of depth, frame houses below Lee Lake Dam 
were destroyed, killing those who could not evacuate. 
Taking each Ls category in isolation, there are no clear trends when D <30ft that 
would allow one to focus on one part of a Ptpar; distribution over another. More severe 
damage can be expected as D increases, but the graph does not provide a reliable 
distribution for prediction since damages are highly dependent on velocities. However, 
when D <:20ft, Ls = HIOO% unless buildings are very tall and sturdy (such as some 
commercial structures) or some buildings are in water less than 20ft deep. 
Figure 28 is almost identical to Figure 27, except that Wwr is used in place of 
depth. Wwr represents the height of a wall of water or the comparable height of a fast-
rising flood, taken as 0.8*0 when R = V, 0.3*0 when R = H, and I ft when R = L. These 
weightings are subjective, but they seek to capture the depths that are most likely to 
impact people if they are caught while evacuating. Since most events in the data set had 
walls of water, and since these walls were usually equivalent in height to D, little new 
information is provided. However, note that key data points for Ls = HI 00% and Ls = 
M I 00% are shifted toward smaller values, reinforcing the point made earlier that floods 
less than 4 ft in depth can still cause considerable damage and life loss if velocities are 
high. 
Figure 29 indicates the relationship between Ptpar; and peak velocity. As forD, V 
is not necessarily representative of Par; as a whole. When Ls = HI 00% or L I 00%, no 
apparent trends exist that would allow one to refine the Ptpar; distributions in Figures 22 
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Figure 28. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar;) vs. the 
height of a wall of water or the equivalent height of a rising flood (Wwr). 
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Figure 29. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar;) vs. the 
peak velocity (V). 
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exceed 0.15, but this should be verified through additional research and one would not 
expect this to hold true if buildings were submerged. 
Theoretically, D and V should have greater predictive potential when their 
separate influences are combined. Figures 30 and 31 explore this for the product ofV*D, 
which, again, is not necessarily representative of Par; as a whole. One can be reasonably 
confident that when D*V > 600 ft2/s, a relatively homogeneous, residential subPar will 
have Ls = H 100% and Ptpar; > 0.8. Above D*V = 2,500 ft2/s, one would generally expect 
Ptpar; ?. 0.94. At the other extreme, when D*V < 40 ft2/s, one would most often expect 
Ptpar; < 0.15, but this can be violated as suggested by a Ptpar; value of 1.0 when D*V = 
50 ft2/s. In between these extremes, D*V offers little help in distinguishing levels of 
damage or life loss. That is not to say that it is impossible to predict levels of damage in 
this range, but only that the point values of D and V offer little help without knowing 
what D and V are at each structure and the relative durability of the structures involved 
(whether structures are mobile homes, unbolted frame houses, bolted frame houses, brick 
houses, commercial structures, etc.). 
The destructive velocity, Dv, seeks to represent an entire reach more uniformly 
than D*V since it relies on W and Qp. However, there is still the dilemma that Dv does 
not represent the fringes of a flood zone well or those segments of a reach wider or more 
narrow than W. For the most part, only the maximum width was available, so Figures 32 
and 33 display only Dvmin (Dv is minimized when W is maximized). There are no 
apparent trends when Dv is small, but Ls = H appears to stop about Dv = 600 ft2/s and Ls 
= M appears to stop about Dv = 1,000 ft2/s in homogeneous, residential communities. 
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Figure 30. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar1) vs. the 
product of peak depth and peak velocity (D*V). 
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Figure 31. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar;) vs. the 
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Figure 32. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar;) vs. the 
destructive velocity (Dv), based on the maximum width (Wmax) to produce 
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Figure 33. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar;) vs. the 
destructive velocity (Dv), based on the maximum width (Wmax) to produce 
Dvm;n when Dvm;n < I ,400 ft2/s. 
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Researchers would want to confirm this with additional data points, however. Beyond Dv 
= I ,000 ft2/s, one would also expect Ptpar; to fall above 0.95. 
Figure 34 explores the impact that day and night have on Ptpar;. The data are 
inconclusive. Because Td usually remains the same for every subPar associated with a 
given event, there is great potential to detect false trends. In particular, the Dale Dyke 
Dam failure occurred at night, as do many lethal flood events, so there are more subPar 
with Td = N than with Td = H or S. It should be noted, however, that Td is already 
incorporated into the model in that it profoundly affects E by shortening Wtavg and 
lengthening Ret. Once people are trapped in a flood, the effects ofTd should be less 
pronounced. 
In the same way, the general preparedness of people to evacuate prior to failure 
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Figure 34. Range ofPtpar; for a dichotomous treatment of day and night (Td). 
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bearing on life loss after the flood arrives. Figure 35 demonstrates no clear trend except 
that Pr tends to be low among events with life loss. 
As for both Td and Pr, the level of development in a region suggests something 
about the rate at which a warning can propagate and tht: lt:ngth of time it might take to 
evacuate (affecting E). Development should only affect Ptpar;, however, as it reflects the 
shape of the floodplain, the likely damages present, and the nature of chance havens (or 
lethal walls of housing debris). Thus, Figure 36 does not reveal reliable trends, but it does 
show that the data set is dominated by events in relatively narrow valleys as opposed to 
urban reaches. Only heavily urbanized areas, including tall buildings, qualify for Dev = 4, 
and none of these were in the data set. 
There is no obvious reason to expect E to influence Ptpar; after the flood arrives, 
and Figure 3 7 shows no clear trends. 
Figure 38 shows a trend opposite to what might be expected: Ptpar; is higher 
when adverse attendant circumstances contributed essentially nothing to L; and lower 
when Ac had a profound effect on L;. There may have been isolated cases in which Ac 
was coded inconsistently, but overall the graph simply reflects two facts: events with high 
rates of life loss are not dependent on Ac to kill people, and the data set was dominated 
by events for which life loss was largely independent of Ac. 
The same can be said for rescue resources. Among the floods studied, most had 
low levels of rescue resources available in the first critical minutes when rescues are most 
likely to reduce life loss. Generally, advanced rescue resources can help only those who 
survive a flood's first onslaught, after which their survival is much more likely. An 
example of the latter would be a large, urban area that floods and traps people on 
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Figure 35. Range of Ptpar; for a categorical treatment of people's preparedness to 
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Figure 36. Range of Ptpar; for a categorical treatment of the level of development 
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Figure 38. Range ofPtpar; for a categorical treatment any attendant circumstances that 
might accompany a flood wave (Ac). 
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rooftops, treetops, and in upper stories. In such cases, people are available for rescue 
simply because they have already reached a flood zone with a relatively low rate oflife 
loss. Of course lives can be saved when people who are injured are rushed to area 
hospitals. In any case, Figure 39 suggests no reliable trend in Rr vs. Ptpar; for any 
category ofLs. Each category reflects a V-pattern centered at Rr = 2, which simply 
indicates that the data set was dominated by events with Rr = 2, increasing the likelihood 
of greater spread in Ptpar; at this value. 
Summary of predictive variables 
The following variables were not found useful in identifying subsets of the 
distributions in Figures 22-24: Td, Pr, Dev, E, Ac, and Rr. The first three, however, have 
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Figure 39. Range ofPtpar; for a categorical treatment of the extent to which rescue 
resources are modern and available (Rr). 
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The most promising variables appear to be depth and velocity or functions that 
describe the nature of the flooding people experience. This is not surprising, since it is the 
flood dynamics that cause fatalities. D, Wwr, V, D*V, and Dvmin all have the 
shortcoming that they are either extreme point values or extreme averages that do not 
necessarily describe the flooding unique to Tpar;. Moreover, if people are in havens, they 
will not experience the full force of the flood. Nevertheless, the following trends can be 
considered reliable under normal circumstances, with the idea that efforts should be made 
to confirm them through additional historical characterizations. 
I. D in isolation: 
a) If D > I 00 ft, Ls = HI 00% and Ptpar; is represented by that portion of 
Figure 22 for which Ptpar; ~ 0.94 or possibly Ptpar; ~ 0.9. 
b) When every building has Dij ~20ft, Ls = HIOO%. 
c) When D < 30 ft, Ls will determine which Ptpar; distribution applies, but 
in each case, the entire distribution applies. 
d) Wwr offers no clear predictive advantage over D. 
2. V in isolation: 
a) The entire Ptpar; distributions apply when Ls = HIOO% or Ls = LIOO%. 
b) It is possible that when V < I 0 fps in residential areas, Ptpar; ::; 0.15. 
3. V*D in isolation: 
a) When D*V > 600 ft2/s accurately represents a residential area, Ls = 
H \ 00% and Ptpar; ~ 0.8. 
b) When D*V > 2,500 ft2/s accurately represents a residential area, Ls = 
HI 00% and Ptpar; ~ 0.94. 
Ptpar; . 
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c) When D*V < 40 ft2/s, Ls =LorMand Ptpar; is almost always :S 0.15, 
which eliminates most of the variance within the Ptpar; distribution for Ls = 
MlOO%. 
d) Ls-values are heavily dependent on the durability and buoyancy of the 
buildings. 
4. Dvmin in isolation: 
a) Above Dvmin = 600 ft2/s, it would be rare for Ls = L. 
b) Above Dvmin = 1,000 ft2/s, it would be rare for Ls = M. Also, Ptpar; ~ 
0.95 on the Ptpar; distribution for Ls = HlOO%. 
5. Notice that depth/velocity relationships provide guidance on Ls as well as 
Applying loss functions to 
homogeneous units based on Zd 
The fundamental problem with most potential predictive variables is that they are 
point estimates and may or may not describe the conditions in the immediate vicinity of 
each member of Par;. It is incongruous to reduce a subPar to a fairly homogeneous unit 
and then to attempt to refine the predictions further by including less homogeneous 
variables. Instead, it is desirable to refine the units further and then to develop new 
distributions for the next greater degree of homogeneity. This is the goal of flood zones. 
Each subPar for which sufficient information was available was divided further 
among one or more flood zones, regardless of whether or not Ls was homogeneous for a 
particular subPar. As with Ls, each historic example of a zone was gathered together with 
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other examples of the same zone to determine the distribution of the proportion of lives 
lost under that level of flood exposure. 
Table 22 lists the data points that were obtained. Flood zone densities replace the 
designation Tpar; and Pr is used as the prefix for "proportion" to avoid confusion 
between pseudo-chance zones (Pcz) and the proportion of lives lost in the chance zone 
(Prcz). 
The average value for each zone's proportion is listed in the second-to-last row. 
Confirmation that these zones are more homogeneous units than categories of Ls is 
evidenced by the fact that the average Prcz value (0.918) is higher than the average Ptpar; 
value for Ls = H 100% (0.857); and the average Prsz value (0.000345) is an order of 
magnitude less than the average Ptpar; value for Ls = Ll 00% (0.00 107). The high end of 
the Ptpar; distribution for Ls = M was eliminated for Prcoz because those lives were lost 
in chance zones. Similarly, the single data point at Ptpar; = 0 for Ls = HI 00% represented 
a threatened population that found haven in the safe zone. 
The pseudo-chance zone closely resembles the chance zone rather than a 
combination of the chance zone and compromised zone, although there were only three 
data points to evaluate. Until this zone can be refined, it is probably appropriate to apply 
the Prcz distribution to Pczd, although one could add the nonzero values from the Prcoz 
distribution or, alternatively, the values that overlap with the Prcz distribution, with little 
effect. 
Figure 40 presents the distribution of Prcz in the form of a histogram and is 
directly analogous to Figure 22. Figures 41 and 42 present the distributions of Prcoz and 
Prsz, respectively, and should be compared to Figures 23 and 24. Figure 43 illustrates the 
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Table 22. Proportion of lives lost in each flood zone for which values were available 
Proportion of Lives Lost in the .. 
Pseudo-Chance Compromised 
Chance Zone Zone Zone Safe Zone 
Prcz Prpcz Prcoz Prsz 
1.000 0.988 1.000 0.500 0.013 0 
1.000 0.981 0.900 0.500 0.002 0 
1.000 0.981 0.900 0.241 0 0 
1.000 0.978 0.222 0 0 
1.000 0.971 0.036 0 0 
1.000 0.938 0 0 0 
1.000 0.933 0 0 0 
1.000 0.933 0 0 0 
1.000 0.929 0 0 0 
1.000 0.915 0 0 0 
1.000 0.889 0 0 0 
1.000 0.857 0 0 
1.000 0.857 0 0 
1.000 0.842 0 0 
1.000 0.833 0 0 
1.000 0.806 0 0 
1.000 0.800 0 0 
1.000 0.706 0 0 
1.000 0.655 0 0 
1.000 0.643 0 0 
1.000 0.500 0 0 
1.000 0.383 0 0 
0.991 0 0 
0 
average- 0.918 average- 0.933 average- 0.136 average- 0.000 
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Figure 43. Graphical display of the percentage of lives lost in chance zones and safe 
zones. The size of the shaded regions compared to the entire graph represents 
the average values ofPrcZavg = 0.918 and Prszavg = 0.0003. 
350 
dramatic difference in fatality rates between chance zones and safe zones. Each of the 45 
points across the bottom represents a unique homogeneous unit with its own value for 
Prcz and Prsz. As such, the rectangular graph represents the entire population in every 
chance zone or every safe zone, and the shaded regions represent the respective 
percentage of lives lost in each zone. Numerically, if the chance zone had 3,000 
members, 2,754 would die, but if the safe zone had 3,000 members, one or fewer people 
would be expected to die. 
Limitations to refining loss 
functions with D, V, or Dv 
Conceptually, point estimates ofD, V, or Dv are especially ill suited to 
characterize the specialized environment within each flood zone. For example, by 
definition, V only represents the velocity in a safe zone when an entire subPar is 
characterized by shallow wading depths in the open. Compromised zones are 
characterized by great variability, as reflected in its Prcoz distribution, so there can be no 
one-to-on relationship between compromised zones and D, V, or Dv. Only the chance 
zone is likely to be well-characterized by these predictors. In this case, the chance zone is 
nearly identical with Ls = HlOO%, minus Ptpar; = 0. As such, the previous summary 
comments regarding predictive variables hold true when they refer to Ls = HIOO%. 
1. D in isolation: 
a) IfD >100ft, the entire subPar is a chance zone and Prcz is represented 
by that portion of Figure 40 for which Prcz ~ 0.94 or possibly Prcz ~ 0.9. 
b) When every building has Du ~ 20 ft, the entire subPar is a chance zone, 
unless some buildings are 3 stories tall and resistant to the prevailing velocities . 
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c) Wwr offers no clear predictive advantage over D. 
2. V*D in isolation: 
a) When D*V > 600 ft2/s accurately represents a residential area, the area is 
a chance zone and Prcz <: 0.8 . 
b) When D*V > 2,500 ft2/s accurately represents a residential area, the area 
is a chance zone and Prcz <: 0.94. 
3. Dvmin in isolation: 
a) Above Dvmin = 1,000 ft2/s, most or all of the area is a chance zone. Also, 
Prcz <: 0.95. 
Estimating incremental life loss 
Chapter V presented several different definitions for incremental life loss, their 
advantages and disadvantages, and the contexts in which they were most appropriate. 
Incremental life loss can be estimated in the same manner in every case. By focusing on 
flood zones, life loss can be predicted regardless of the source of the flood. The only 
thing that changes with different flood types is Wtavg, Ret, and E affecting the size of 
Tpar;, and the flood dynamics themselves affecting the availability of havens and the 
density of each flood zone. Incremental life loss is simply the difference between the 






"Estimating Life Loss for Dam Safety Risk Assessment" chronicles a journey that 
begins with the importance of credible and defensible life-loss estimates in dam safety 
risk assessment, moves to the need for an improved life-loss model, spends extensive 
time behind the scenes gleaning insights through the characterization of flood events 
using new variables and new approaches, and rests for a moment by presenting these 
insights in the form of a conceptual model. The model is still under development and has 
yet to be tested, so the journey is far from over. 
With respect to the text itself, Chapter I introduced the topic of dam safety risk 
assessment and the central role that life-loss estimation plays in that field. Chapter II 
discussed important preliminary considerations in model development. Chapter III 
provided a detailed review of previous life-loss models that pertained to floods, including 
a critique of each. Chapter IV explored the DeKay-McClelland model in detail and raised 
serious concerns regarding its future use. Chapter V defined nearly 100 variables and 
their respective categories for use in characterizing flood events. Chapter VI provided a 
detailed outline of historical insights that relate to flood events in one of 18 logical 
categories. Chapter VII proposed the framework for a new conceptual life-loss model-a 
model which is still under development and has yet to be refined or offered for testing-
with sufficient details to indicate how it was developed and how it might be used. 
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Conclusions 
While "Estimating Life Loss for Dam Safety Risk Assessment" draws from the 
strengths and weaknesses of previous models, it also breaks new ground in important 
ways. The following are the most important conclusions and contributions from each 
chapter. 
Conclusions from Chapter I 
It is critically important for the future of dam safety risk assessment that credible 
estimates of life loss be developed. 
Conclusions from Chapter II 
There are enough interdependent variables to make every catastrophic flood event 
extremely unique and large-scale statistical analysis problematic. Any successful model 
must confront this complexity and represent the most important life-loss variables to 
avoid having predictions dominated by unrecognized life-loss influences. 
Selecting an unbiased data set on which to base regression or development of a 
parametric modela is difficult, especially as it pertains to events with no life loss. 
Conclusions from Chapter Ill 
Historic attempts to model life loss have evolved over time, moving from purely 
conceptual models to pure regression equations and finally toward an incomplete attempt 
to mix the two. 
No historic models have been based on a look at life-loss dynamics and human 
behavior on the level of the individual in actual floods. 
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There are at least six components that every life-loss model should contain, each 
with guidelines on how these components can best be approached. 
Unique contributions from Chapter III 
This chapter provided the first detailed critique of the B.C. Hydro Model under 
development by Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach (!998) and a thorough presentation and 
evaluation of every model that had been developed at the time of the writing. 
Conclusions from Chapter IV 
Chapter IV lists 32 shortcomings related to the DeKay-McClelland equation, the 
way in which it is used, the logit procedure on which it is based, the treatment of the 
underlying data set, the choice and definition of the variables on which it relies, and the 
inherent biases it contains. Without elaboration, the main shortcomings can be 
summarized as follows: 
l . Life loss is nonlinear with respect to Par, causing inflated and highly variable 
estimates of L when the model is applied to subPar. 
2. The model relies on heterogeneous Par, making application to homogeneous 
Par or unique Par umeliable. 
3. The model does not distinguish between life-loss dynamics experienced by 
those who fail to evacuate and those who successfully evacuate. 
4. The model uses the point estimate, Wt, rather thanE, ignoring important 
issues regarding Ret, Wtavg, Sc, the urgency and credibility of the warning, the time of 
day or night, the benefits of improved warning dissemination, and those most at risk. 
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5. Fd is too coarse for refined estimates, it implicitly assumes a Par has 
heterogeneous levels of damage rather than extreme and consistent damage, and it fails to 
recognize that the difference in life loss between buildings with major damage and total 
destruction is one of the most important predictors of life loss. 
6. The data set itself is treated in ways that distort life-loss dynamics, such as 
combining multiple watersheds into a single event, quantifying Par without regard to the 
location or nature of the life loss (ignoring Pt), and characterizing variables in a manner 
that can now be viewed as historically inaccurate. 
7. The DeKay-McClelland logit procedure, in combination with the data set 
under consideration, produces an equation that is biased toward ever greater 
underestimation of life loss as L grows and as P approaches 0.5. 
8. The underlying data set makes application of the equation to extreme flood 
events inappropriate. 
9. The confidence limits surrounding the life-loss estimates are very large, 
seriously undermining the equation's credibility, unless they are taken into account when 
using the method. 
Unique contributions from Chapter IV 
This chapter provided the first detailed examination and critique of the equation 
developed by DeKay and McClelland (1993b) and the methods with which it is 
commonly used in dam safety risk assessment. This was the also the first in-depth 
examination of the implications of using a logit procedure in life-loss estimation and the 
inherent danger of using any equation that is nonlinear with respect to Par. The chapter 
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provided the first quantitative demonstrations of the effects of nonlinearity and regression 
using the logit transformation; and the first historically grounded critique of Fd and Wt 
on which the model relies. 
Conclusions from Chapter V 
Appendix A and Appendix D 
Life loss in flood events is influenced by an extremely large and complex set of 
interdependent variables that must be carefully defined and categorized if events are to be 
characterized in a comprehensive, meaningful, and consistent manner. 
Unique contributions from Chapter 
V Appendix A and Appendix D 
While a wide range of variables has been discussed in the abstract by previous 
authors, this is the first time that most of them have been carefully defined, given a 
unique symbol, and given categories and descriptions by which they can be characterized. 
This is also the first time that simple and consistent rules of nomenclature have been 
proposed for symbol development. Dozens of new variables and concepts have been 
identified and carefully defined, including those most central to the conceptual model. 
Conclusions from Chapter 
VI and Appendix B 
Flood events are not easy to understand in the abstract. Event characterization is 
as much an art as a science. If an analyst wishes to avoid making historically unjustifiable 
errors, there is no substitute for immersing oneself in the literature that describes historic 
flood events and the stories of those who perished and of those who survived. 
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A complex tapestry of historic insights can be woven around 18 logical topics that 
describe the factors influencing life loss or life-loss models: I) The type of failure, 2) 
detectability of the failure, 3) warning times and warning effectiveness, 4) evacuation 
rates, 5) excess evacuation time, 6) subPar types and evacuation modes, 7) homogeneity 
of subPar, 8) flood dynamics, 9) loss of shelter, I 0) havens, II) flood zones and the 
distribution of people among those zones, 12) the lethality rate outside safe havens or 
zones, 13) the lethality rate inside safe havens or zones, 14) the lethality rate on dry land, 
IS) life-saving interventions, 16) complications and aberrations, 17) post-flood trauma 
psychological trauma, and 18) the applicability of historic events to future events via an 
empirical life-loss model. 
Unique contributions from Chapter 
VI and Appendix B 
This is the first time that any historic flood events have been examined on a 
subPar basis, by loss of shelter, or by flood zones . This is the first time that any historic 
events have been characterized with the level of detail present in the unpublished 
working documents . Dozens of variables have never before been characterized, including 
such fundamental variables as Wtavg. Ret, and E. This is the first time that such 
characterizations have been carefully recorded and documented so that future researchers 
can refine past characterizations, attempt to be consistent when making future 
characterizations, and have access to previous research. 
Conclusions from Chapter 
Vll and Appendix C 
The proposed model offers the ability for analysts to construct any hypothetical 
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flood event with any characteristics through different combinations of homogeneous base 
units defined as flood zones. 
Distributions describing the proportion of lives lost are empirically grounded and 
intuitively defensible. The nature of dam safety risk assessment is to deal in hypotheticals 
and sometimes-crude estimates, but within these constraints, the uncertainties should be 
made explicit so that the results can be appropriately interpreted. 
Unique contributions from 
Chapter VII and Appendix C 
This is the first time that Par type has been recognized as an important 
consideration. This is the first time that homogeneous base units, approximated by flood 
zones, have been proposed and defined such that they consider the unique characteristics 
of havens inside and outside of buildings. 
Although Lee et al. (1986) and Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach (1998) both relied 
on conceptual evacuation models, this is the first time that an empirical evacuation 
funct ion has been proposed, the first time that the excess evacuation time (E) has been 
formalized, and the first time that historically grounded guidelines have been offered for 
estimating the representative evacuation time. 
This model is the first to offer empirical probability distributions for the life loss 
within homogeneous units and the first to explore ways of further refining these 
distributions based on other predictive variables likeD and V. 
This is the first model that can fit approximately as well with the most extreme 
events like the failure at Vaiont, Italy, and minor flooding from normal seasonal rainfall. 
It applies across the spectrum of potential fai lure modes and can consider any 
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characteristics unique to a given event. It circumvents the dilemma of which zero-fatality 
events to include in a data set, because more hazardous events contain subPar with zero 
life loss. Because the resulting distributions closely approximate true homogeneous base 
units, data-set bias should be minimized and the distributions should have much broader 
application than the global events from which they were derived. 
Because the model relies on Sc and Wtavg. rather than Wt, it fits equally well with 
dam failures , flash floods , and major floods that do not lead to dam failure . As such, the 
quantification of incremental damages can be done directly by applying the model to the 
two distinct flood scenarios and comparing L in each case. 
Now that the groundwork is firmly laid, other researchers can expand the data set 
further, refine the probability distributions over time, and seek out subPar with 
characteristics that were absent given the subPar in Appendix B. 
Recommendations 
Every effort has been made to present the model in as final a form as possible 
within the time allowed. Chapters V and VII present numerous suggestions on how to 
quantify variables consistently and accurately, how to accomplish the steps in the model, 
and how best to use and refine the pertinent historical distributions. Additional insight 
can be gleaned by studying the ways in which variables were characterized in Appendix 
B and the rationale recorded for each decision. 
Nevertheless, there are several steps that might greatly improve the model for the 
future. First, an expansion of the data set through additional characterization of historic 
subPar will enable the various distributions to be further refined. Appendix A offers a 
360 
lengthy list of events, many of which have not yet been characterized. Appendix A also 
offers suggestions on which events currently hold the most promise and which events 
might not. Hundreds of flash floods occur every year, offering a rich source of material 
for researchers. Also, as future events unfold, researchers familiar with this model may 
have the opportunity to conduct extensive post-failure interviews and field research to 
attempt to characterize subPar on the level of Pt, E, Ls, and flood zones. 
Second, the existing characterizations in Appendix C are provided so researchers 
can explore more relationships than have been explored to date. There may be variables 
or combinations of variables other than V and D that offer the potential to become 
predictive variables to target specific ranges within the existing distributions of the 
proportion of lives lost. 
Third, resources could be devoted to developing reliable and practical functions 
from which loss of shelter (Ls) can be estimated given depths and velocities from flood 
routing and characteristics of the debris load. See Estimating Loss of Shelter (Ls) in 
Chapter VII for suggested approaches. 
Fourth, the model should be automated and integrated with GIS software and 
flood-rout ing software like DAMBRK or FLOW A V so that it can be used in an efficient 
and cost-effective manner across a portfolio of dams. 
Fifth, if additional historic events can be fully characterized on the level required 
for the model, the model should be applied to these events to test its validity. It should be 
remembered, however, that the model does not claim that life loss will correspond with 
the sum of the mean life-loss values provided by application of each distribution. Instead, 
the model makes the natural variance provided by chance and unpredictable human 
behavior explicit, and it assumes that most life loss will fall within the range of values 
that the distributions indicate. 
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Sixth, continuing research should explore in tandem both a detailed model, 
intended to fully characterize those aspects of a flood event that are pertinent to life loss 
as completely as resources allow, and a simplification of that model, intended to provide 
a convenient, relatively quick algorithm for estimating life loss when a more thorough 
approach is not possible or justified. 
Any specific event provides a single outcome from a range of possible outcomes 
that would have been possible. That outcome will very rarely match the mean value of all 
possible outcomes, but it is possible, given the underlying distributions, to express the 
expected value of an outcome for a hypothetical event and the likelihood of any other 
outcome based on the distribution. 
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Table of Flood Wave Events 
Table A.l is a comprehensive list of every life-loss event reviewed for 
characterization in Appendix B. It may be the most comprehensive list of fatal dam-
failure events in existence today, although it could be greatly expanded by hundreds of 
additional flash flood events. Some of the events have been listed twice when more than 
one designation is found in the literature. 
Columns 5-8 are explained in the footnotes to the table. In brief, column 5 gives a 
representative estimate of the life loss reported in tbe source documents. These values do 
not necessarily correspond to the values chosen in Appendix B and they may need to be 
revised if the events are characterized more fully. 
Column 6 classifies each event according to its dominant characteristics, with the 
first symbol carrying the greater weight. Column 7 indicates the 28 events in the database 
explored by DeKay and McClelland (1993b), with the division of the Teton failure into 
two separate cases from a single event producing a total of 29 case studies. Of those 28 
events, they rejected 3 events as statistical outliers and treated over half of the remaining 
events in a manner that this author considers potentially misleading because they either 
combined multiple watersheds into a single event (events 3, 23, 69, Ill , 143), they 
selected historic values significantly different from those chosen for Appendix B [events 
3 (Par), 13 (Wt), 15 (Wt), 19 (Par or Tpar), 21 (Wt), 23 (Par, Wt), 28 (L, Par), 69 (Wt), 
72 (Par), 86 (Par), 128 (Par), !59 (Par); and probably 96 (Wt) and 103 (Wt); see Figure 
Table A. I. Comprehensive list of every flood-wave event collected in files and 
examined for characterization in Appendix B 
EVENT DATE COUNTRY 'L bFlt 'D-M 
1 Alia Sella Zerbino Dam (near Genoa) 8/13/35 Italy > 140 D 
2 Allegheny and Ohio River floods (Penn. & Ohio) 1937 USA <900 F 
3 Allegheny County (Little Pine Creek, Penn.) 5/30/86 USA 9 Ff U,M 
4 Angels Dam (California) 4/10/1885 USA I D 
5 Anzalduas Dam (Mission, Texas) 2/6172 USA 4 D 
6 Aris alluvial fan flood (Central Pyrenees) 8/7/96 Spain 87 Ft; D 
7 Amo River flood 11 /Jf/66 Italy 127 F 
8 Arno River llood (Florence) 1333 Italy 300 F 
9 Ashburnham Reservoir Dam (Massachusettes) 5/6/1850 USA 2 D 
10 Asherville Dam (North Carolina) 2/22/76 USA 4 D 
II Austin [Bayless Pulp & Paper Company] Dam (Penn.) 9/30/11 USA >88 D 
12 Austin Dam (Colorado River, Texas) 417100 USA 8 D 
13 Austin flash floods (Texas) 5/24081 USA 13 Ff U,M 
14 Babii Yar Dam (Ukraine) J/25/61 USSR 145 D 
IS Baldwin Hills Darn (California) 12/14/63 USA 5 D U, M 
\ 6 Bangladesh stonn surge (coast) 11/12/70 Bangladesh 500000 s 
I 7 Banqiao & Shimaman Dams (China) 8/8/75 China 85000 D, F 
18 Bass Haven Lake Dam (Texas) 8117/84 USA I D 
19 Bear Wallow Dam (North Carolina) 2/22/76 USA 4 D U,M 
20 Bergeron Pond [Meadow Pond or Alton] Dam (N. 1-1.) J/IJ/96 USA I D 
21 Big Thompson flood (Colorado) 7/31/76 USA 139 Ff U, M 
22 Bila Desna Dam (near Jablonec nad Nisou) 9/16 Czech 65 D 
23 Black Hills & Canyon Lake Dam (S . D.) 6/9f/72 USA 245 Ff, D U,M 
24 Bolan Dam (26 villages, northeastern Pakistan) 9/76 Pakistan low D 
25 Boston molasses flood (Massachusettes) 1/15/19 USA 21 D,O 
26 Bouzey Dam (Moselle River near Epinal) 4/27/1895 France > 100 D 
27 Brazil floods (widespread) Jf/74 Brazil >1500 F 
28 Buffalo Creek coal waste dam (West Virginia) 9/26172 USA 125 D U, M 
29 Burgess Falls Power Dam (Tennessee) 6/29/28 USA 0 D 
30 Bushy Hill Pond Dam [+7 dams downstream] (Conn.) 6/6/82 USA 0 D u 
31 Cabin Creek flood (West Virginia) 8/9/16 USA 44-50 Ff 
32 Castlewood Dam (Colorado) 1933 USA 2 D 
33 Chimney Rock & Bat Cave flood (N.C.) 7/16/16 USA 34 Ff 
34 Connecticut flash floods (Conn.) 6/4fl!82 USA 12 Ff 
35 D.M.A.D. (Utah) 6123/83 USA I D R 
36 Dale Dykes [Bradfield] Dam (Sheffield, England) J / 11 /64 England 263 D 
37 Dam #2 (Pennsylvania) 6/17/92 USA I D 
38 Del Rio flash floods (Texas) 8/24/98 USA 1242 Ff, F 
39 Denver flood (Sou the Plane River, Colorado) 6/14fl!65 USA I F u 
40 Dozier Lake Dam (Georgia) 1994 USA J? D 
41 Dry Creek flash flood, train wreck (Colorado) 817104 USA 96+ F 
42 East Lee (Mud Pond) Dam (Massachusettes) J/68 USA 2 D 
43 Eastover Mining Co. sludge pond (Kentucky) 12/18/81 USA I D 
44 Eastwick RR Fill (Washington) 2/j2 USA 7 D 
45 El Cajoncito dike (La Paz, Baja Cal. Sur) 10/4/76 Mexico 600+ Dy 
46 El Habra Dam (3 failures; 3/10/1872. 11/26/27) 12/1881 Algeria 209 D 
4 7 Eldorado Canyon flood (Nevada) 9/14/74 USA >9 Ff 




















































Table A. I . Continued 
EVENT DATE COUNTRY ' L 11Fit ' O-M <~value 
49 Evans & Lockwood Dams (North Carolina) 1989 USA 2 D B 
50 Fort Pitt Dam (Pennsylvan ia) 7/5/03 USA 2 D L 
5 l Frias Dam (probably the same as Pardo Dam) 1970 Argentina 42-102 D L 
52 Fushan Dam A.D. 516 China 10000 D L 
53 Gaokou Village Dam (Hubei province, China) 3/8/98 China 7 D L 
54 Gleno Dam (Alps of north-central Ital y) 1211123 Italy 600 D L 
55 Grenoble Dam 1219 France high D L 
56 Harris County flash llood (Texas) 6/15176 US A 8 Ff L 
57 Hill (Woodward) Dam (New Hampshire) 5129/18 USA I D B 
58 Holland Dykes (Nethe rlands) I/3Jij53 Holland 1835+ Dy. S L 
59 Holland Dykes (Netherlands) 11/142 1 Hol land 10000 Dy, S L 
60 Holland Dykes (Netherlands) 1211287 Holland 50000 Dy, S L 
6 1 Hwang-Ho River Dyke (act of war) 4/38 China 500000 Dy L 
62 Hwang-Ho River flood 1933 China !8000 Dy, F L 
63 Hwang-Ho River flood 1011887 China 900000 Dy, F L 
64 Hyokiri Dam 7/ 1216 1 S. Korea 127 D L 
65 lsahaya floods (west Japan) 1957 Japan >600 F/Ff L 
66 Japan's lzu Peninsula 1/ 14178 Japan 21+ 0, F L 
67 Jarrolds Valley tlood (West Virginia) 8/9[/ 16 USA 75 D L 
68 Johns10wn tlood (Pennsy lvania) 3117/36 USA 30 D L 
69 Kansas City floods (Kansas, Missouri) 9/!2V77 USA 25 F U, M B 
70 Kansas River (Kansas City) 7/ IOfT/5 1 USA II F R p 
71 Kantalai "tank" Dam (Sri Lanka) 4121 /86 India >135 D L 
72 Kelly Barnes Dam (Toccoa Fal ls, Georgia) 11/6177 USA 39 D U,M B 
73 Kendall Lake Dam (South Caro lina) 10/10/90 USA 4 D p 
74 Kenduskeag Village Dam (Maine) 11 11311853 USA I D L 
75 Kerville-Medina area flash tloods (Texas) 1978 USA 26 Ff L 
76 Knife Lake Dam (Minnesota) 7172 USA 4 D L 
77 Kuala Lumpur Dam 196 1 Malaya 600 D L 
78 Kuban-Kel Lake Dam (Uzbekistan & Kyrgyzstan) 7/8198 Asia 43+ D L 
79 Lake Keowee Cofferdam (South Carolina) 10178 USA 7 D L, p 
80 Lake Lud low Club Dam (New York) 1935 USA 3 D L 
81 Lake 0' the Hills Dam (Arkansas) 4172 USA I D L 
82 Lakes Eigiau & Coedty Dams (Dolgarrog) 11 /2125 Wales 16 D L 
83 Lakeside Dam (South Carolina) 9/18175 USA I D B 
84 Laurel Run Dam (Johnstown area, Penn.) 7/ 19V77 USA 40 D u L, p 
85 Lawn Lake and Cascade Lake Dams (Colorado) 7115/82 USA 3 D u p 
86 Lee Lake Dam (Massachusetts) 3/24/68 USA 2 D U.M B 
87 Little Deer Creek Dam (Utah) 6/16163 USA I D u p 
88 Little Indian Creek (Tennessee) 6129128 USA 3 D L 
89 Little Pine Creek flash flood (see Allegheny County) 5/30/86 USA 9 Ff B 
90 Lower Otay Dam (San Diego, Cali fornia) 1127/ 16 USA 14 or30 D L 
91 Lyman Dam (Arizona) 4115/15 USA 8 D L 
92 Lynchburg & Scousville (Virginia) 8119/69 USA 107 F/Ff L 
93 Lynchburg Dam (Virginia) 6195 USA 2 D L 
94 Lynmouth fast-rising fl ood 8115/52 England 24 F L 
95 Machchu II Dam (Morvi , West India) 8/ 11179 India >1300 D L 
96 Malpasset Dam (France) 1212159 France 421 D U,M L 
97 Mammoth Dam (Utah) 61240 17 USA I D L. p 
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98 McMinnvill flash flood (Tennessee) 1902 USA 5 Ff L 
99 Melzingah Dams I & 2 (New York) 7114/1897 USA 7 D L 
100 Merriespruit Tailings Dam (Republic of South Africa) ? S. Africa 17 D L 
10\ Mill River Dam (Massachusetts) 1874 USA 14l D B 
I 02 Mississippi flood (Lower Mississippi) spring, '27 USA lll F L 
103 Mohegan Park (Spaulding Pond) Dam (Connecticut) l/6/6l USA 6 D U,M L, p 
I 04 Mohne Dam 5/17/4l Gennany 1200 D L 
105 Moldavia Region, Belciu Dam (Onesti) 8/15/91 Romania 107 D L 
106 Mountjoy Hill Reservoir(Maine) 8/6/189l USA 4 D L 
I 07 Nanak Sagar Dam (32 villages, Northern India) 918/67 India 100 D L 
I 08 Nevada Del Ruiz volcano glacier burst (Columbia) 11/85 Columbia 20000 GB L 
I 09 Nix Lake Dam (Texas) l/89 USA I D L, p 
110 Northeastern U.S. floods 1/96 USA ll F L 
J II Northern New Jersey flood 415184 USA 2 Ff U,M p 
112 Oakford Park Dam (Jeannette, Penn.) 7/5/0l USA 2l D L 
11 3 Ohio floods (Ohio) l/13 USA <700 F/Ff L 
l 14 Or6s Dam l/25/60 Brazil l0-50 D L 
liS Palagnedra 1978 Switzerland 24 ? L 
116 Panshet & Khadakwasla Dams (Poona, Maharastra) 7112161 India heavy D L 
117 Pardo or Frias Dam (Mendoza, 1970) 1970 Argentina 42-102 D L 
II 8 Prospect Dam & Lord Reservoir (Colorado) 2110/80 USA 0 D R p 
l 19 Puentes Dam 4/l0/1802 Spain 608 D L 
120 Quebrada Ia Chapa 196l Colombia 250 ? L 
121 Randall's Pond Dam [Lower] (Road Island) l/11/01 USA I D L 
122 River Ouse sea inundation lll!U5l England l07 Dy, S L 
123 San lldefonso Dam l/1626 Bolivia <4000 D L 
124 Sandy Run Dam (Johnstown. Penn .) 7119U77 USA 5 D L, p 
125 SchoelldopfStation rock slide (New York) 617156 USA J? 0 L, p 
126 Seminary Hill Reservoir (Centralia, Washington) 10/5/91 USA 0 D u p 
127 Sempor Dam (central Java) 1211 /67 Java 200 D L 
128 Shadyside [Wegee and Pipe Creeks] (Ohio) 6114/90 USA 24 Ff u B 
129 Skagway Dam (Pueblo. Colorado) 1965 USA 2 D L 
IJO South Fork Dam (Johnstown, Penn.) 51ll11889 USA 2209 D p 
Ill Spain flash flood 197l Spain !50 Ff L 
IJ2 Spaulding Pond Dam (Mohegan Park, Connecticut) l/6/6l USA 6 D U,M L, p 
Ill Spring Creek flash flood (Colorado) 7/28197 USA 5 Ff L, p 
ll4 Spring Lake Dam (Fiskeville, Rhode Island) 8/2511889 USA l D L 
ll5 St. Francis Dam (California) ll12/28 USA 450 D B 
ll6 Stava Dam (Italy) 7/9/85 Italy 2l2 D u B 
IJ7 Swift & Lower Two Medicine Dams (Montana) 6/8/64 USA l5 D u p 
ll8 Swimming Pool Dam (New York) 1979 USA 4 D L 
IJ9 Tarbela Dam 7177 Pakistan 2 D L, p 
140 Tennessee flash floods ll28102 USA 2l+ Ff Ff p 
141 Teton Dam (Lower Reach, Idaho) 6/5176 USA 4 D u p 
142 Teton Dam (upper reach, Idaho) 615176 USA 7 D u p 
14l Texas Hill Country 8/lff/78 USA 25 Ff U,M p 
144 Thompson Mill Dam (Tennessee) 812116 USA 24 D B 
145 Tigra Dam (Madhya Pradesh) 8/14/17 India ??? D L 
146 Timber Lake Dam (Virginia) 6122195 USA I D B 
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147 Tsao-Lin Natural Reservoir Earth Dam 5/18/51 Taiwan 134 D L. p 
148 unnamed dam#! (Colorado) 1923-29 USA I D L 
149 unnamed dam #2 (Colorado) 1923-29 USA I D L 
ISO unnamed dam (Minas Gerais) 5186 Brazil 7 D L 
IS\ unnamed dam (Newfound, Noth Carol ina) 1976 USA 4 D L 
152 unnamed dam (Portland, Maine) 1893 USA 4 D L 
I 53 unnamed dam (South Carol ina) 10110/90 USA 4 D L 
154 unnamed dam (West Gennany) 9177 Gennany 0 D L 
l 55 unnamed dam (Wisconsin) 6179 USA 2 D L 
\56 unnamed dam failure & flash flood (Puerto Rico) 8179 USA 37 D L 
157 Vaiont Dam 10/9/63 Italy 2000 D B 
158 Valparaiso Dam 8/ 11 / 1888 Chile >100 D L 
I 59 Vega de Tera Dam 1/9/59 Spain 150 D U.M B 
160 Virden Creek Dam (Iowa) 7/17/68 USA I D L 
161 Wagner [Loop LoopJ Dam (Washington} 4/ 19/38 USA I D L 
162 Walnut Grove Dam (Arizona) 212211890 USA 150 D p 
163 Wegee Creek flash flood (near Shadyside, Ohio) 7/19/19 USA 9 Ff B 
164 West Virginia flash floods II /4U85 USA 56 Ff L 
165 White River Incident (Washington) 7176 USA 2 D L 
166 Willow Creek flash nood (Oregon) 1903 USA 200 Ff L 
167 Winston Reservo ir (Nonh Carolina) 11/2104 USA II D p 
168 Wise River Dam (Montana) 6/ 14127 USA 4 D L 
169 Womack Dam No. I (Colorado) 6/27 USA I D L 
l 70 Woodward (Hill) Dam (New Hampshi re) 5129/18 USA I D 8 
171 Yangtze Kiang River flood 1911 China 100000 Dy. F L 
172 Yangtze Kiang River flood 193 1 China 200000 Dy, F L 
173 Yangtze Kiang River tlood 1954 China 30000 Dy, F L 
174 Yangtze Kiang River flood 7/81 China >3000 Dy, F L 
li5 Yangtze Kiang River flood 8/98 China 3656 Dy. F L 
176 Zgorigrad Dam (nonhwestem Bulgaria) 511166 Bulgaria 121 D L. p 
a L = loss of life. Values are only preliminary estimates. 
b Fit ~ flood type: D ~ dam failure; Dy ~ dyke failure; Ff ~ flash flood; F ~ flood; Ts ~ tsunami; S ~sea 
surge; H ~ hurricane flooding ; GB ~glacier burst; 0 ~other flooding. 
' D-M ~ data set explored by DeKay and McClelland. U ~ used in their regression; R ~ rejected as an 
outlier; M ~their treatment is potentially misleading because they combined multiple watersheds, their 
value for Par, L, or Wt was significantly different from the best historical estimate, and/or L had very little 
relationship to Par ( i.e., Par ~ residential and L ~ motorists outside the neighborhoods). 
' Value: B ~ characterized in Appendix B; L ~lacking key information on Par;, L;, or Wt;; P ~ looks 
promising. 
26 in Chapter IV], or Par is quantified based on a different Par type (Pt) than the one 
experiencing fatalities (events 3, 13 , 69 and possibly others). 
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Column 8 indicates the relative usefulness of the information contained in this 
author's files for characterizing Par and subPar, the number of lives lost, and various 
warning times for each event. B indicates that the event has already been characterized in 
Appendix B, while "B, L" indicates the characterization was lacking essential 
information and had to be excluded from the master table in Appendix C. L indicates that 
there is limited information available and that, in most cases, the needed information will 
be difficult or impossible to obtain. P indicates that an event could potentially yield a 
useful characterization, in some cases without the need for additional source material. 
The combination "L, P" indicates that additional source material would be needed. As 
such, P and "L, P" can help researchers target their efforts if they wish to expand 
Appendix B. 
Appendix B 
Characterized Flood Events 
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The complete characterization of every flood event that was studied in detail as 
part of this investigation was recorded in over 900 pages of single-spaced working 
documents. These documents followed a specific format developed for this research, but 
to date they have not been formally published. To summarize and illustrate aspects of 
these documents, and to supply future researchers with the tools found helpful in 
producing these documents, four types of information have been published here in 
Appendix B: l) an alphabetical list of the events that have been characterized, numbered 
to provide a key for references in the text, 2) an example of a complete event 
characterization using the Kelly Barnes Dam failure in Toccoa Falls, Georgia, 3) striking 
characteristics and valuable quotations (Schvq) from various subPar, and 4) event-
specific bibliographies. Do to the nature of these working documents, excerpts found 
herein will generally not conform to the format found throughout the rest of the report. 
Alphabetical list and numeric key 
Table B. l lists every event and every subPar that has been characterized to date. 
The list is ordered alphabetically by event and in numerical sequence by subPar. Events 
that were lacking critical information have not been numbered (left column), but every 
event included in the master table of Appendix C has been numbered consistently here 
and there. Thus, this list serves as a master index for citations and for cross-referencing. 
As an example of how the index works, subPar 17.1 refers to the community of Saunders 
along Buffalo Creek in West Virginia. 
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Table B.l. Master list and key for every event characterized in the unpublished version 
of Appendix B 
SubPar 
Event SubPar Name # 
Alla Sella Zerbino Darn 
I Allegheny County Flash Flood: motorists, Saxonburg Blvd. I 
Allegheny and Ohio River Floods 
Angels Darn 
2 Anzalduas Darn I 
3 Anis alluvial fan flood (Spain) I 
4 Arno River flood (Italy) I 
Arno River flood (13 3 3) 
5 Asherville Darn I 
6 Austin, Penn. (Bayless Pulp & Paper Co.) Darn : Austin City I 
6 Austin, Penn. (Bayless Pulp & Paper Co.) Darn: to paper mill 2 
Austin, Penn. (Bayless Pulp & Paper Co.) Darn: Costello 
7 Austin (Colorado River) Darn (Texas) I 
8 Austin, Texas, flash floods: residential I 
8 Austin, Texas, flash floods: Shoal Creek crossings 2 
8 Austin , Texas, flash floods: Bee Creek crossing 3 
8 Austin, Texas, flash floods: Bull Creek crossing 4 
8 Austin, Texas, flash floods: Walnut Creek tributary crossing 5 
8 Austin, Texas, flash floods: Hwy 35 and U.S. 183 crossing 6 
8 Austin, Texas, flash floods: Dry Creek South crossing 7 
Babii Yar Darn 
9 Baldwin Hills Darn: to Village Green I 
9 Baldwin Hills Darn: other residential 2 
9 Baldwin Hills Dam: commercial districts 3 
10 Banqiao & Shimantan Dams (China): global event I 
10 Banqiao & Shimantan Darns (China): Shahedian Town 2---
10 Banqiao & Shimantan Dams (China): Wencheng commune 3 
10 Banqiao & Shimantan Darns (China): Weiwan Brigade 4 
11 Bass Haven Lake Darn 1 
12 Bat Cave and Chimney Rock Flash Flood I 
13 Bear Wallow I 
14 Bergeron Pond (also Meadow Pond or Alton) Dam I 
15 Big Thompson flood I 
16 Black Hills flash flood: Rapid City below Canyon Lake Darn I 
16 Black Hills flash flood: Rapid Creek & rural Pennington County 2 
16 Black Hills flash flood: Keystone on Battle Creek 3 
16 Black Hills flash flood: Box Elder on Box Elder Creek 4 
16 Black Hills flash flood: Highway 79 where crosses Spring Creek 5 
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Table B.l. Continued 
SubPar 
Event SubPar Name # 
16 Black Hills flash flood: Sturgis on Bear Butte Creek 6 
16 Black Hills flash flood: 16 widely scattered cities in 3 counties 7 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Saunders I 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: backwater up North Fork 2 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: 3 houses 0.4 mi below Saunders 3 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: farm between Saunders/Pardee 4 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: vehicles between Saunders/Pardee 5 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Lorado and Pardee 6 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Lundale and Craneco 7 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Stowe 8 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Crites 9 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Latrobe 10 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Robinette II 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Amherstdale and Becco 12 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Braeholm and Fanco 13 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Accoville 14 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Kistler and Crown 15 
17 Buffalo Creek Dams: Upper and Lower Man 16 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Bradfield I 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Bradfield, destroyed Ia 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Bradfield, major damage lb 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Roebuck House 2 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Damflask 3a 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Damflask, destroyed 3al 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Damflask, major damage 3a2 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Storrs Bridge 3b 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Loxley and Rowell Bridge 4 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Little Matlock 5 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: 1.5 miles of steep, narrow gorge 6 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Harrison's Tilt & Forge 6a 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Harrison's house 6b 
18- Dale Dyke Dam: Malin Bridge (high force) 7 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Malin Bridge (Ls- HIOO%) 7a 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Malin Bridge (Ls- MIOO%) 7b 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Malin Bridge (low force) 8 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Limerick Wheel and houses 9 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Limerick Wheel 9a 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: houses above Limerick Wheel 9b 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Hillsbro' 10 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Hillsbro', destroyed lOa 
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Table B. I. Continued 
SubPar 
Event SubPar Name # 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Hillsbro', major damage lOb 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Hillsbro', minor damage lOc 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Hill Bridge II 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Owlerton 12 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Owlerton, destroyed 12a 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Owlerton, major damage 12b 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Owlerton, minor damage l2c 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: across from Owlerton 13 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: across from Owlerton, destroyed 13a 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: across from Owlerton, minor damage 13b 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: works below Parl3 14 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Farfield Gardens 15 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Hillfoot 16 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Neepsend Lane 17 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Neepsend downstream ofNeepsend Lane 18 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Rutland Road 19 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Harvest and Orchard Lanes 20 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Bacon Island 21 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Bacon Island, destroyed 2la 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Bacon Island, major damage 2lb 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Philadelphia District 22 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Green Lane Dist. and area 23 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Long Croft (Ls -H) 24a 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Long Croft (Ls- L) 24b 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: Kelharn Island 25 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Kelharn Island houses 25a 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Kelharn Island mill 25b 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: adjacent and downstream ofKelharn Island 26 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Nursery Lane District 27 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Nursery Lane District, major damage 27a 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Nursery Lane District, minor damage 27b 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Lady's Bridge to Midland Railway Station 28 
18 Dale Dyke Darn: Brightside and environs 29 
18 Dale Dyke Dam: other/inland Sheffield neighborhoods 30 
19 Dry Creek Flash Flood (Train Wreck) I 
20 Eastover Mining Company Sludge Pond Darn I 
21 El Cajoncito Dike (La Paz, BCS, Mexico) I 
22 Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: restaurant I 
22 Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: trailers swept away 2 
22 Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: trailers with mild damage 3 
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SubPar 
Event SubPar Name # 
22 Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: icehouse 4 
22 Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: half of boat dock nearest shore 5 
22 Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: half of boat dock farthest from shore 6 
22 Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: on Lake Mohave 7 
23 Evans and Lockwood Pond Dam: van on highway I 
23 Evans and Lockwood Pond Dam: downtown 2 
24 Hyokiri Dam (S. Korea) 1 
25 Kansas City Floods: private/public bldgs. I 
25 Kansas City Floods: motorists +pedestrians 2 
26 Kelly Barnes Dam: Forrest Hall Dormitory I 
26 Kelly Barnes Dam: Residence Row 2 
26 Kelly Barnes Dam: Trailerville 3 
26 Kelly Barnes Dam: automotive 4 
26 Kelly Barnes Dam: below Hwy. 17 bridge 5 
27 Lakeside Dam: Lakeside Road across dam I 
27 Lakeside Dam: houses in Greenville County 2 
28 Lee Lake Dam: dwellings destroyed 1 
28 Lee Lake Dam: dwellings w/major damage 2 
28 Lee Lake Dam: dwellings w/minor damage 3 
28 Lee Lake Dam: Clark-Aiken plant (Ls- MIOO%) 4 
29 Mill River Dam: Williamsburg residences (Ls- H) I 
29 Mill River Dam: Williamsburg commercial (Ls - H) 2 
29 Mill River Dam: Williamsburg residences (Ls - M) 3 
29 Mill River Dam: Williamsburg commercial (Ls- M) 4 
29 Mill River Dam: Williamsburg residences (Ls- L) 5 
29 Mill River Dam: Skinnerville residences (Ls- H) 6 
29 Mill River Dam: Skinnerville commercial (Ls- H) 7 
29 Mill River Dam: Skinnerville residences (Ls- M) 8 
29 Mill River Dam: Haydenville residences & tobacco co. (Ls- H) 9 
29 Mill River Dam: Haydenville commercial (Ls- H) 10 
29 Mill River Dam: Haydenville residences (Ls- M) 11 
29 Mill River Dam: Haydenville residences & commercial (Ls- L) 12 
29 Mill River Dam: Leeds silk factory & boarding house (Ls- H) 13 
29 Mill River Dam: Tpar by river/bridge- campers (Ls- H) 13b 
29 Mill River Dam: Tpar by river/bridge- waders (Ls- H) 13c 
29 Mill River Dam: Leeds button factory (Ls- H) 14 
29 Mill River Dam: Leeds residences (Ls- H) 15 
29 Mill River Dam: Leeds, water closet & Quigley (Ls- M) 16 
29 Mill River Dam: Florence (Ls- L) 17 
29 Mill River Dam: Northampton (Ls- L) 18 
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SubPar 
Event SubPar Name # 
30 Shadyside Flash Floods: Wegee Creek I 
30 Shadyside Flash Floods: Pipe Creek 2 
31 St. Francis Dam: Powerhouse No. 2 ~---
31 St. Francis Dam: ranches 2 
31 St. Francis Dam: Castaic Junction 3 
31 St. Francis Dam: S. Pac. Section camp near Castaic (tents) 4a 
31 St. Francis Dam: S. Pac. Section camp near Castaic (b1dgs) 4b 
31 St. Francis Dam: Edison tent camp at Kemp 5 
31 St. Francis Dam: motorists on Hwy. 126 6 
32 Stava Dams (Italy): all destroyed structues in Stava 1 
32 Stava Dams (Italy): undamaged Dolomiti Hotel 2 
33 Thompson Mill Dam: houses detroyed I 
33 Thompson Mill Dam: houses with major damage 2 
33 Thompson Mill Dam: houses with minor damage 3 
34 Timber Lake Dam: U.S . 460 Bridge I 
34 Timber Lake Dam: U.S. 460 Bridge (boaters) Ia 
34 Timber Lake Dam: Turkey Foot Road Bridge 2 
35 Vaiont Dam (Italy): town of Longarone 1 
35 Vaiont Dam (Italy): high comer of Longarone 2 
35 Vaiont Dam (Italy): Longarone Commune (6 villages) 3 
35 Vaiont Dam (Italy): abutments of dam 4 
35 Vaiont Dam (Italy): lakeside communities 5 
35 Vaiont Dam (Italy): Belluno, 10 mi downstream 6 
36 Vega de Tera Dam (Spain) 1 
37 Wegee Creek Flash Flood of 1919 1 
37 Wegee Creek Flash Flood of 1919: destroyed Ia 
38 Woodward (Hill) Dam I 
TOTALS: 38 events included in Appendix A, 179 subPar, and 163 non-duplicate 
subPar. 
Selected example: Kelly 
Barnes Dam failure 
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What follows is the complete characterization of the Kelly Barnes dam failure that 
occurred on November 6, 1977 at Toccoa Falls, Georgia. Since it is included here only to 
illustration the template style and nature of the characterizations used throughout the 
unpublished working documents, this case study is presented exactly as it appears in the 
otherwise unpublished working documents rather than in the traditional thesis format. 
The illustration ends on page 413, so intermediate headings are part of the example and 
do not follow the pattern found throughout this thesis. In this example, there are five 
subPar. 
KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE fTOCCOA FALLS) 
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, AND VARIABLES MORE EASILY 
PRESENTED THROUGH A GLOBAL ANALYSIS 
Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 
Par= 140; L = 39; P = 0.28 
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There were several dam failures or flash floods in the early 20'h and late 19'h 
centuries that impacted relatively small populations located in the I 00-year floodplain 
along narrow river valleys with little or no warning. This event is similar in many ways, 
providing an excellent opportunity to compare these early failures with a modem failure. 
Since the fatality rates were comparable, it suggests these early failures should be 
included in historical studies meant to predict future life loss, so long as housing damages 
and warning times are adequately defined. 
To allow for global commentary and the efficient presentation of variables, many 
aspects of the flood have been described in this preliminary global overview to avoid 
cluttering the individual subPar. When one of those subPar uses an asterisk(*) it refers to 
the information contained in this report. 
Global Introductory Summary 
Kelly Barnes Lake was located about half a mile above the 186-ft high Toccoa 
Falls near Toccoa City, Georgia. A short distance downstream from the waterfall was the 
small community of Toccoa Falls. The area impacted by the flood consisted of one-third 
of Toccoa Falls Institute or Bible College and its faculty, staff, and students. At about 
1 :20 AM, the dam failed in such a way that it released 2 flood waves over a short 
interval, the first 5-ft high and the second 30-ft deep. These waves plummeted over the 
falls, then shot with tremendous speed across the 200-500 ft floodplain to destroy nearly 
every residence they touched. Individual spouts of water carried debris 65 ft above the 
normal creek surface as the waves slammed into objects, and as high as 100 ft when a 
second, 30-ft wave collided with the initial 5-ft wave as it backed upstream behind the 
bridge on Georgian Highway 17. Since it was night and most people were asleep, the 
upstream residents had little if any warning. There were, however, a few people who 
were quick to respond and who ran downstream with urgent cries that reduced the life 
loss with distance (6). 
Source 6 is one of the most detailed texts available on the human drama 
encountered during a catastrophic flood. Foster begins his narrative with a foreword that 
includes the following credentials: "I knew most of the people who died and all of those 
who survived" (6, p. 9). Combined, sources I and 6 give a house-by-house account of the 
flood and the resulting life loss, providing an excellent opportunity to quantifY subPar 
and L; with high accuracy. Foster also provides an inspiring account of the way faith 
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shaped the attitudes of students and faculty just before they died or after they lost family 
members. 
The subPar were: 
l. Those living on the ground level of Forrest Hall, the single men's dormitory. 
2. Those living in Residence Row, a series of houses near the creek. 
3. Those living in or adjacent to Trailerville, a cluster of mobile homes occupied by 
married students and their families. 
4. Those occupying vehicles when they were hit by the flood. 
5. Those living downstream from Georgia Highway 17 which was 1.5 miles below the 
falls. 
Global Event 
Par (Population at Risk) DeKay and McClelland followed the U.S.B.R. in 
quantifying Par at 250. This value probably came from source 4, which stated, 
"some 250 persons lived in dormitories, houses and mobile homes at the foot of 
the falls." Fortunately, this early ball-park estimate was followed extremely 
detailed accounts that allow us to quantify both Par and subPar with more 
accuracy. The subPar are defined above in the Introductory Summary. Par 1 and 
Par4 will be quantified first, followed by Par2, Par3, and Par5 with the help of a 
table. 
The flood hit 7 buildings on the main campus (8). In sequence, they were 
Gate Cottage, a restaurant; the Bandy residence owned by a former college 
president; Forrest Hall, a college dormitory; the music building; Morrison Hall, a 
college dormitory; Ralis Hall, a dormitory for the closed high school (it floated 
down the creek, p. 112); and a guard house. Fortunately, only Forrest Hall and the 
Bandy Residence were occupied (6). 
Although the flood surrounded the Bandy residence, the main current 
bypassed this structure (6). Where the Bandy residence would appear on a map, 
source 8 shows a structure on an oval of high ground that escaped flooding 
altogether. Apparently, the flooding was quite mild and it might have touched 
only one side of the building. Only 24-year-old Greg was home, in an upper room 
30 ft above the creek. Since this person never had to move and never got wet, and 
since the flooding did not threaten the integrity of the building, and since this 
situation was unlike the flooding in any other subPar (6), this single individual 
will be ignored as one who was never truly threatened. 
Par1, ground-level of Forrest Hall: Forrest Hall was a multi-story men ' s 
dormitory with capacity for 147 students (6; source 2 indicates 140). Based on the 
flood maps in sources 6 and 8, the building was L-shaped, with only the lower 
part of the Lin the path of the flood (9, also). The flooded portion had 4-stories 
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(6, text and photograph), but since the lowest level was called the "basement" in 
source 2 and the stem of the L was not flooded, it is likely the stem had only 3 
stories. This is significant in quantifying Par~, since it means that the ground floor 
was roughly 0.5-0.7 times as large as each of the three stories above it, 
depending on the dimensions of the L. 
The ground-floor windows were all broken, but the structural integrity of 
the building was not compromised and the upper floors were not damaged. Since 
flood depths reached only 8 ft (9), the first flood could not have had more than a 
few inches of water, if it got wet at all (9). A post-flood photograph (6, p. 83) 
confirms this general description. The building was surrounded without warning 
at night, so no one in the upper floors had time to enter the ground floor and 
endanger themselves. Moreover, the natural route of escape would have been to 
exit onto the hillside from the first floor (2 , 6, 9). Since there was no damage, 
essentially no flooding , and no danger above the ground floor, only those on the 
ground floor should be included in Par1• 
Although the dormitory ' s capacity was 147, there were 124 students in 
residence when all were present, with far fewer on the weekends. Foster makes 
the observation that 75 men could have died had the walls collapsed, so this 
appears to be his estimate of the weekend occupancy when the wave hit (6). 
Dividing these 75 occupants proportionally over the 3.5-3.7 floors places a 
preliminary estimate of II - 14 students on the smaller ground floor. 
There are at least three reasons to assume this range is still too high, 
however. First, only 124 of the 147 beds were filled, leaving 23 beds unfilled . A 
disproportionate number of empty beds were probably on the ground floor, since 
college students generally prefer upper stories with better views. 
Second, source 6 mentions the names of only 7 students who were on the 
first floor. These were Kenny Carroll , who had been asleep less than an hour after 
ending a date with Marcy Rees; Bobby Carter and Jon Kerr who caught Carroll 
running the wrong way and turned him toward the stairwell (all 3 squeezed 
through the door together); Chuck Dowell, who climbed the stairs to ground level 
on the uphill side of the building; and Gerry Brittin, Rick Swires, and Cary Hanna 
who drowned when they were unable to open their room doors against the water. 
While it is not certain that this accounting was comprehensive, the author did give 
a comprehensive accounting of every individual in every other structure in which 
people died. As such, it is highly likely that these were the only 7 students present 
on the ground floor. 
Third, a review of the narratives in sources 6 and 2 (source 2 mentions 4 
of these 7 students) reveals that all 7 were alone in their rooms. While the number 
of rooms is not reported, most dormitories include a mix of double and single-
occupancy rooms. Based on the fact that these 7 students were alone in their 
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rooms and the fact that the privilege of a single room was likely balanced by the 
less-desirable location of the ground floor, it is likely that many of the first-floor 
rooms had only one bed. 
Overall, then, the range of ll - 14 is a high estimate, reduced by a 
disproportionate number of single-occupancy rooms, empty rooms, and a highly 
credible accounting of those actually present: Par1 = 7, Tpar1 = 7, and L1 = 3. 
Par 4, those occupying vehicles: This level of detail is only found in source 
6. There were 4 people that encountered the flood while in vehicles. 
Before the first flood wave arrived, the creek was high and rising. After 
having cookies and coffee at Ron Ginther's, firemen David Fledderjohann, Bill 
Ehrensberger, and Eldon Elsberry decided to move the Sproulls and the 
Woerners, the two families at the lowest elevation in the residential areas . 
Elsberry turned to see the first 4- or 5-ft wall of water approaching and shouting a 
warning. Fledderjahann sent him and Elsberry to sound the alarm across the 
creek. The two men splashed through water to reach the truck, but the truck was 
pushed sideways before they could reach the bridge. They agreed to abandon the 
truck, but Ehrensberger hesitated. When he stepped out, his hip boots filled with 
water and pulled him under to his death. Elsberry grabbed a tree, but it gave way 
and he was pulled under, too. After getting his boots off, he was pinned to a rock 
underwater and fought other obstacles, but he eventually made it to shore. 
Dee Pinney was a volunteer fireman who worked for Fledderjohann. He 
stayed behind when the others left the Ginthers', then left at about I :20 AM. 
When the power went out, he drove along the creek road toward the approaching 
flood, looking for an electrician and a fire truck. The water began to trickle 6 
inches across the road, but it quickly rose to the floorboards. He tried to back up, 
but hit a tree and stepped into knee-deep, then waste-deep water. He managed to 
scramble up the hill on campus. 
His sister, Eloise, lived in Trailerville. It is not known with certainty what 
transpired, but she first called the operator at l :30, thinking the explosion she 
heard was the print shop on fire. When she became aware of the flood, she 
attempted to drive to Upper Trailerville, but the car stalled or was washed away 
and she drowned: Par4 = 4, Tpar4 = 4, and L4 = 2. 
Par2 and Par3 can be quantified with the help of a table which summarizes 
the detailed descriptions in sources l and 6. Although details concerning 
warnings, actions, and words are recorded for virtually every person in the flood , 
these are largely omitted here for the sake of space. All the deaths can be 
considered general drowning deaths. 
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Par2, Resident Row: There were five houses in residence row (6, p. 113). 
Beside these, away from the river, was a mobile home with a frame addition 
(owned by the Ginthers). Based on a photo of where Residence Row once stood 
(6, p. 84) and commentary in the text, every structure in Residence Row was 
obliterated, including the Ginthers' residence. As shown in Table B.2, lives were 
lost in every one of these residences: Par2 = 29, Tpar2 = 29, and L2 = 19. 
Par3, Trailerville and nearby trailers: There is some question as to the 
number of structures that were flooded. Source 6 shares the estimate from one 
report that indicated "twenty-seven trailers were swept away" (p. 123). According 
to source 8, "Approximately nine houses, 18 house trailers, two college buildings, 
and many motor vehicles were completely demolished. Four houses and five 
college buildings were damaged by water. Only two houses downstream from 
Georgia Highway 17 were damaged" (sheet 2). Source 2 indicates that there were 
" 11 houses, 25 trailer homes and various other buildings" at Toccoa Falls Bible 
College (p. 34), but this says little about the number damaged. 
The discrepancies appear to be primarily ones of classification. Sources 6 
and 8 each contain a flood map marked with buildings. With respect to the flood 
zone, they are essentially the same, except that source 8 appears to include some 
small outbuildings and source 8 adds 2 trailers to an inner row in Trailerville. 
Ignoring apparent outbuildings, the structures within the flood imprint were as 
follows: 
1. 7 buildings that were either clearly on the main campus or large enough to be 
college buildings rather than individual residences; 
2. 2 large buildings that were only partially flooded and another at the mouth of 
Trailerville (the latter was probably a wood frame garage and one of the 
former was probably a maintenance building, both of which were partially 
destroyed; source 9); 
3. 5 houses in a row along Residence Row and 1 residence next to these closer to 
the bank (sum of Parz); 
4. 4 buildings (source 6 calls them trailers in the text) iinmediately beyond 
Residence Row and across the river where the river made a sharp turn to the 
right; and 
5. 22 (6) or 24 (8) residences close by in Trailerville, of which 2 escaped 
flooding. Trailerville as a whole was "demolished" when the trailers were 
either smashed or floated away (9, p. 15). 
The 27 dwellings classified as trailers by source 6 can be accounted for by 
the 20 flooded in Trailerville, the 4 just across the river, the trailer/frame-addition 
associated with Residence Row, and 2 more below Highway 17, not shown on the 
map. The 27 trailers and 5 frame houses in residence row make a total of 32 
single-family dwellings. 
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Table B.2. Record ofPar;j, Lij, damages, and warning by family/home 





Pepsney and 3 7 
Sproull girls 
Williams 2 



















10-30 seconds from Elsberry's warning to 
deadly water. 
Center of flood, I" residence in Residence Row, 
no evident Wt. 
None 
Moved 3 girls to Pepsneys' and returned. Then 
heard Elsberry's warning (above). 
Denise heard thunder of fuses going out, waking 
up at I :26. She sensed the dam had broken and 
ran outside a minute later, then ran through 
Trailerville shouting and pounding on trailers. 
Brother, David, initially followed, then ran back 
for family. They all ran along path of flood, not 
thinking to run up the mountain. 
Saw approaching Ww, but rose to chest by time 
got family up ladder to attic. 
Ginther a fireman. Ran home, thinking dam had 
broken. Water to knees after rousing children. 
PAR3: TRAILERVILLE 
Kemp ( I 5 I Mother shouted warning when water already 2 ft 
deep. trailer to go) 
Metzger 4 2 Awakened by people screaming warnings, but 
after putting on pants, trailer began to move 
before could look outside. 
Hamer 
Ehrensberger 






Eloise Pinney, I 
Dee Pinney's 




I Maybe 20 seconds, based on Sc. 
3 destroyed Heard warning from Denise Woerner. Trailer 
moved after dressed and children roused. 
0 Destroyed Didn't look outside until the flood hit the trailer. 
0 They were running across the floodplain toward 
Upper Trailerville when the flood hit them. 
Par4 She had enough warning to get in her car and 
attempt to flee before getting caught. 
15 
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Based on one interpretation of source 8 (see the quote above), there was an 
"approximate" total of 13 houses near the college, 2 houses downstream from 
Highway 17, 18 house trailers, and 7 college buildings, for a total of 33 single-
fami ly dwellings. If the 2 houses that were damaged below Highway 17 were 
included in the 4 (total) houses that were damaged, there were a total of 31 single-
family dwellings that were damaged or destroyed. 
Source I distinguished between "trailers" and "permanent trailers." With 
respect to "permanent trailers," it appears that source 6 calls them trailers and 
source 8 calls them houses, accounting for the different subtotals in each source. 
Source 8 attempts a more detailed accounting of damages, so these will be given 
precedence, but since the totals from source 8 were admittedly "approximate," 
and could fall on either side of 32, the total of 32 structures from source 6 will be 
accepted. 
Since the 2 houses below Georgia Highway 17 were spatially removed 
from Par3 and they experienced the flood after it was weakened, they are treated 
as Pars. Since Eloise Pinney has been included in Par4, her vacant trailer should be 
excluded from Par3. Hence, Par3 will be based on 32 dwellings, minus the 6 in 
Parz, minus the 2 in Pars, minus Mrs. Pinney's trailer since she was in Par4 and 
the trailer was vacant, yielding 23 trailers in Par3. Of these, 19 trailers were 
completely destroyed and 4 were damaged. 
The trailers held a distinct demographic population, consisting primarily 
of married students and their children, but also faculty and other college 
employees (6, 9). While Eloise Pinney has been excluded from Par3, she 
nevertheless informs the average occupancy rate in Trailerville. Based on known 
occupancies, there was an average of3 .88 persons per trailer, including guests 
and excluding those who were away from home. Applying the average occupancy 
to the remaining trailers that were flooded yields a total of34 + (23- 8)*3.88 = 
92 and L3 = 15 (excluding Par4). 
Par5, 2 houses below Georgia Highway 17: The 2 damaged houses below 
Highway 17 form the basis for quantifying Pars. A debris dam formed behind the 
bridge, causing the flood to pond until it eroded around each abutment and 
continued with reduced velocities. In this area, "there was flooding of farm land, 
local erosion, and bridge damage, but apparently no major damage" (9, p. 13). 
Flood depths reached 5-7 ft on the floodplain. Using the same average as for 
Par3, Pars= 8 and Ls = 0. As indicated under Tpars, it is highly likely that Tpars = 
8. 
ln summary, Par1 = Tpar1 = 7, L1 = 3; Parz = Tparz = 29, Lz = 19; Par3 = 
92, Tpar3 = 64 (see Tpar), LJ = 15; Par4 = Tpar4 = 4, L4 = 2; Pars= Tpars = 8, Ls = 
0; and Par= 7 + 29 + 92 + 4 + 8 = 140, Tpar = 7 + 29 + 64 + 4 + 8 = 112, and L = 
39. 
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L (Life Loss) Some sources report L = 37 (3) or L = 38 (2, 9), but this is because 
the reports were immediately after the event (3) or based on the number of 
recovered bodies. One person, Paul Williams, was swept away with his wife, but 
his body was never found (I). See Par: L = 39 (1, 6, 7, 8). 
Tpar (Threatened Population) In addition to 39 fatalities, 60 people were injured 
(7), meaning over 71% of Par came in contact with dangerous flooding . This 
helps provide an estimate ofTpar3. Four students escaped from Par1 without 
injury. Of the 10 survivors from Par2, all were washed out of their homes and all 
were likely injured. Of the 2 that escaped from Par4, I almost died and was 
probably injured and the other waded to safety without injury before the flooding 
peaked (6). Based on the calmer currents, lack of damage, and moderate depths in 
Pars, there would have been few injuries there and probably none. 
This leaves 77 survivors in Par3, of which approximately 49 were injured. 
We know that the warning issued by Denise Woerner allowed a number of people 
to escape before the flood reached them (see Wt). If7 out of the 23 families 
evacuated, it would account for the 77 - 41 = 28 = 7*4 people that escaped injury. 
This is a reasonable estimate on its face, but we also know that the flood was 
filled with debris and universally destructive, so those who did not evacuate were 
highly likely to be swept downstream and killed or injured. Combined, then, 92 -
28 who evacuated= 49 injured + 15 who died= 64 people who were in Tpar3. 
While an approximation, it is an informed approximation that fits well with the 
known facts and which should closely approximate the true value for Tpar3: Tpar3 
= 64. 
Combining this value with those for Tpar1.2,4.s (see Par): Tpar = 7 + 29 + 
64 + 4 + 8 = I 12. 
Par1 (Current SubPar) 
Pars= 8. 
L1 (L Among SubPar) 
Tpar1 (Tpar Among subPar) 
Tpar4 = 4, Tpars = 8. 
See Par: Par,= 7, Par2 = 29, Par1 = 104, Par4 = 4, 
See Par: L, = 3, L2 = 19, L1 = 15, L4 = 2, Ls = 0. 
See Par and Tpar: Tpar 1 = 7, Tpar2 = 29, Tpar1 = ---, 
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities 
Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) There was 
high water from the storm, but the flood had begun to go down again prior to 
failure, so every fatality was a direct result of the dam break: Ln = Lnf = 0 and 
Ldr = unknown. 
Ft (Fatality Type) Ft 1•3 = D= 100%; F4 = Af= 100%; Fts = N 
Identification/Location of Fatalities: See Par. 
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Flood Characteristics 
Fit (Flood Type) D 
V (Peak Velocity) There is no direct estimate ofV, but "Hydrologists 
on the scene would say only that the water could have been going between 50 and 
!50 miles per hour [73 - 220 fps]" (6, p. 26). Although these velocities are 
extremely high, they were a product of the water cascading 186 ft over the falls. 
The floodplain at the base of the falls was 113 to 1/6 as wide as the floodplain 
downstream, so the water was forced out of the narrow canyon by the water 
thundering down from above. Even so, by the time the water reached each subPar, 
it would have slowed to the point that even the lowest end of this range seems 
improbably. The Metzgers in Trailerville gave a subjective estimate of at least 35 
mph (51 fps) as they watched a car wash by (6, p. 76). As a reasonable 
approximation, V 14 =50 fps and V5 = unknown but much less. 
D (Maximum Depth) The in-channel depth of the wave was as great as 30 
ft (3). The flood rose 8ft at Forrest Hall, essentially filling the ground floor to the 
ceiling (9) : D 1 =8ft. D3 = 10 ft (9). Downstream of Georgia Highway 17, depths 
above the floodplain were 5 - 7 ft (9), but they were probably less at the 
residences. Without more information, the lower estimate will be chosen: D5 = 5 
ft. D2 and D4 shared the same area and would have had depths comparable to 
those in DJ, since they were close together and both were near the channel: D2 = 
D4 = 10ft. 
Qp (Peak Flow Rate) Based on statistics and station marks in source 8 
and a curve fitting the 4 computed velocities below the falls 
(y = -10,031*ln(distance in feet) + 107,710), values for Qp; are shown in Table B.3 
below: 
Table B.3. Values ofQp by Par; 
Distance Approx. Dist. 
Drainage Below of Par; Below 
Area the Darn Peak Discharge Par; the Darn Qp; 
(mi) (ft) (mi) (cfs) (#) (ft) (cfs) 
4.6 1,100 0.21 23 ,000 I 3,900 24,750 
above falls 
6.2 4,270 0.81 24,000 2 5,300 21,700 
8.6 10,860 2.06 14,300 3 6,100 20,300 
12.8 23,870 4.52 6,3 80 4 5,300 21,700 
25.5 32,870 6.23 3,660 5 > 10,000 ---
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Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate) The peak outflow from Kelly Barnes Dam prior to 
failure was 400 cfs (8) . This threatened the lowest houses in Par2 with flooding 
and produced minor flooding in Trailerville: Qb = 300 cfs. 
W (Maximum Width) Based on the flood map in source 8, Wmax/Wmin 
were as follows: WI= 325/325, w2 = 400/250, WJ = 6001300, w4 = 600/250 
(because part near Par2 and part near Par3), and W5 = ---. 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) Dvmin/Dvmax is as follows: Dv 1 = 75175 , Dv2 
=53/85 , Dv3 = 33/66, Dv4 = 36/85, and Dv5 = ---. 
R (Maximum Rise Rate) There were two waves, the first about 5 ft high, 
followed soon after by another 30 ft above the creek bottom. When the first wave 
hit the bridge at Georgia Highway 17, it sent a backwash upstream that collided 
·with the second wave. Observers at Par24 say this collision sent debris I 00 ft 
above the normal level of the creek (6). 
The initial surge shot over the falls , fell 186 ft, stalled a second or two 
until the box canyon at the base filled, and then shot out of the canyon mouth with 
great velocity and force like a "fire hose" (6, p. 27). The flow had sufficient 
momentum that outside the main current, the water was actually calm in places. 
The Brandy residence was spared at the head of the reach and the Metzgers found 
themselves in stagnant water as they stepped outside in Trailerville. A car raced 
by them in the flood, traveling at least 35 mph (6, p. 76). 
At Residence Row, Eldon Elsberry was standing outside. He "wheeled to 
see a wave of water four or five feet high rolling along soundlessly like rapids." 
He shouted, "Look out! There's a wall of water" (6, p. 37). Looking at the sensory 
clues summarized in the table under Par and expanded upon in source 6, others 
also saw the wave approaching, but the initial wave did not crash over people's 
heads or trailers in an instant. Rather, it rose so quickly that they were unable to 
rouse their families and evacuate before they were trapped. Seconds later, and up 
to a minute or two, homes disintegrated and the occupants were washed 
downstream (6). "Most of the damage, at any given place, occurred in about 20 
seconds" (6, p. 22). 
Overall, then, both waves came initially as walls, but the first wall 
collapsed enough to resemble fast-rising rapids, rising to full force in less than a 
minute. Once trapped, there was no escape, and many experienced the full force 
of the second wall of water: R = Ww, except Rs = V (see Ww). 
Ww (Height of Wall of Water) The largest wall of water was described as 30 ft tall 
(2, 4), but this was deep in the channel and would have included the depths from 
previous flooding and the first wave. Since D was substantially less than 30 ft at 
each subPar, it is more appropriate to equate Ww wi th D. Since flooding below 
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Georgia Highway 17 was mitigated by the debris dam at the bridge, the wall of 
water was likely transformed to a very rapidly rising flood in Par5 (Ww5 = 0 ft) . 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) See Par. 
Dd1: The water rushed rapidly and violently through the windows, pinning 
doors closed before some students could escape. Since the building was brick and 
near the edge of the flood, the structural integrity of the building was in no way 
compromised, but in terms of flood dynamics and the impact on the interior, this 
flood was characteristic of floods causing major damage. 
Dd2: All 6 dwellings were destroyed. 
Dd3: 19 dwellings were destroyed and 4 had major damage. 
Dd,: There were no dwellings, since this subPar was associated with 
vehicles, but the vehicles were among Par2 and Par3, where virtually every 
structure was swept away and destroyed. Forcefulness should be assigned 
assuming complete destruction. 
Dd5: Since there was "no major damage" around this subPar (9, p. 13), 
these 2 dwellings had minor damage. 
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) Fp 1 = 1.0, Fp2 = 1.0, Fp3 = 1.0, Fp4 = 1.0, Fps = 0.0. 
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) Fd1 = I, Fd2 =I, Fd3 =I , Fd, = I, Fds = 0. 
F5 (Incremental Forcefulness) F5 1 = E, F52 = E, F5J = E, F54 = E, F5s = L. 
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar) 
0.0, Fpars = 0.0. 
Fpar1 = 0.14, Fpar2 = 0.21, Fpar3 = 0.2 1, Fpar4 = 
H (Height of the Dam) Source 3 placed the height at 26ft. The basis for 
this is unclear. The Federal Inventory listed the dam height as 20ft, but 
measurements after failure indicated that the dam was about 40 ft (9). Source 5 
reports that the dam was 42ft after scouring, 38ft of which was fill material: H = 
38 ft. 
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool) Source 9 indicates that there was 1.5 - 2 ft of 
freeboard below the dam crest, with 3.8 ft of water in the spillway, when the dam 
failed (9). Source 8 offers a more recent and more detailed estimate, with the 
maximum water surface before failure at elevation 1,141.6 ft , compared to a low-
point crest elevation of about l, 147 ft. The water was dropping at failure, so Hp = 
H- 6 = 32ft. 
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B (Breadth of Dam) Source 3 placed the width at !00 - 200 ft . Source 5 
puts B at 400 ft, but the section taller than 20 ft was only 200 ft long: B = 200 ft. 
Vol (Volume of Release) Based on the highest pool elevation prior to failure 
(some of which was released before the catastrophic failure) : Vol= 630 acre-ft (5, 
8). 
Rf (Rate of Failure) There were no witnesses, but, "Apparently failure 
was sudden. According to residents below the darn, a roar was heard accompanied 
by popping sounds probably !Tom breaking of trees and the impact of the old crib 
logs [buried in the center of the dam] on the walls of the gorge" (9, p. !5). Since 
Fm assumes some erosion and not an instantaneous blowout, Rf > 0.5 min: Rf= 2 
min. 
A (Area of Final Breach) 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par! and the Flood 
T (Time Summary) The darn failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday, 
Nov. 6, 1977 (5 , 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river 
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the 
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial , 
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5). 
Td (Time of Day) 
Tw (Time of Week) 
Ty (Time of Year) 





Wt (Waming Time) Denise Woerner somehow sensed the danger when 
she awoke at I :26 AM. A minute later she was outside and "As she ran through 
Trailerville she kept screaming and, according to one report, thumping trailers 
hard with her open palm. A number of people who were thus awakened were 
saved" (6, p. 6!). Based on the subtleties listed under Sc (in minutes): Wt1 = 0, 
Wt2 = 0.33, Wt3 = 1.5, W4 = 0.33, Wt5 = 0. 
Wta,g(Avg. Individual Wt) Based on the subtleties under Sc (in minutes): 
Wtavg1 = 0, Wtavg2 = 0.4, Wtavg3 = !, Wtavg4 = 0.33, Wtavgs = 0.25 . 
Bt (Building Types, %) See Par3 under Par. The houses were frame and 
brick construction (6, p. 50). Treating the trailer with a frame addition as a house 
and treating "permanent trailers" as trailers, Bt 1 = H = l 00%, Bt2 = R = I 00%, Bt3 
=M= 100%, Btt=N, Bts= RorM. 
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Dev (Development/Urbanization) The flood maps reveal that the majority of 
dwellings in Toccoa Falls were not flooding (8), making the community a small 
town, but below Highway 17 there were almost no dwellings: Dev14 =L and 
Devs=N. 
Gf (Goodness of Fit) Gf1-s=H 
0 (Outdoors) It was night and only Par4 were outdoors. 
Sc (Sensory Clues) Some residents heard the roar of the flood and the 
popping sound of trees and logs hitting the canyon wall. This enabled some to 
scramble to safety (6, 9). Nearer the campus, power lines and a transformer fell 
exploding with sparks (2, 6). Immediately after this, the dark waters turned red 
from freshly suspended Georgia clay (6). 
On the ground floor of Forrest Hall, the first clues were the sights and 
sounds of the flood itself as it leaked into the dorm rooms or burst the windows 
(6). For example, Bobby Carter had just finished his nightly Bible reading and 
was falling asleep when his windowsill fan washed across the room (2): Sc1 = 0. 
At Residence Row, firemen Eldon Elsberry, Bill Ehrensberger, and David 
Fledderjohann were attempting to move the reluctant Sproulls to higher ground 
since their yard was flooded. The Sproulls moved their daughters to another house 
and the couple was back home with the firemen on their doorstep when Elsberry 
saw the first wave coming and shouted a warning. Two of the rescuers attempted 
to drive across the river to the head ofPar3 to warn others, but as soon as they 
reached their truck, the wave hit. 
This account and the others in the table under Par2 suggest Sc was about 
20 seconds for those who noticed sensory clues, reducing to zero for the children 
that had to be awakened. The exception was the Woerners, who were alerted by 
Denise. It is unclear what alerted her, but somehow she knew the dam had failed 
about 4 minutes before the others. It appears she lived in the second-to-last house 
in the row and that, apart from her family, she did not warn Par2 but did warn 
people in Par3. Tracing the warnings listed in the table under Par for Par2 and 
assigning 0 Wt; to children that were awakened as the flood hit the houses: 
Fledderjohann, Mr. and Mrs. Sproull, and Mr. Veer had Sc = 0.33 min; Mr. 
Ginther had Sc = 1 min; Denise Woerner had Sc = 4 min; David Woerner had Wt; 
= 3 min and Sc = 0.33 min.; 3 other Woerners had Wt; = I min and Sc = 0.33 min; 
and 19 people had Sc = Wt; = 0 min. Hence, taking a weighted average, Sc2 
rounds to 0.25 min and Wtavg2 = rounds to 0.4 min. 
By the time Denise Woerner reached Trailerville, she had only I or 2 
minutes to pound on trailers and shout warnings . Since people were asleep, it took 
them a moment to respond. It is unclear how many trailers she reached. She may 
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have reached the Metzgers, Andersons, Smiths, and Pinney (see table under Par), 
but she did not apparently reach the other families which experienced fatalities. 
Combined with Denise ' s warnings and the warnings that propagated through 
Trailerville, perhaps 2/3 of these residents had some level of verbal warning, and 
roughly half appear to have escaped without being washed downstream, although 
this is largely an argument from silence. In terms of Sc alone, it would have been 
comparable to that for Par2, but in terms of Wtavg, it would have been on the order 
of I min : Sc3 = Sc2 = 0.25 min and Wtavg3 = I min. 
Sc4 = Sc2 = 0.25 min and Scs =unknown, but phone lines were down so it 
is reasonable to assign it the same value. 
Pr (Preparedness) Since the flood rose and then fell around 9:00 PM, 
"Some cars were moved and there was idle talk, but no apprehension" (6, p. 75). 
The firemen were concerned about flooding because the water covered the only 
bridge to Trailerville with a foot of water before it began to subside and the creek 
had flooded before. About I 0:30 PM, Ron Ginther mentioned the dam with mild 
concern, so Ginther and Fledderjohann road up to take a look. The water appeared 
far down and the dam appeared safe, so the radioed back that the dam posed no 
threat. Upon his return, Fledderjohann commented, "It' s as normal as ever. I've 
seen it much higher many times." The water continued to drop until the bridge to 
Trailerville was no longer submerged (6, p. 36). Despite suggestions to the 
contrary in some sources, Fledderjohann was warning people of ordinary flooding 
when the failure occurred, not a potential dam failure: Pr = N. 
We (Waming Effectiveness) Recognizing that although there was often some 
kind of warning, it was generally not timely in light ofSc and Tpar, We in 
minutes was: We1 = N, We2 = N, We3 = L, We• = N, Wes = N. 
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time): 
(Epar1) Par; (Ret I) The floodplain was not more than about 500 
ft and the distance to high ground was less than half of this for nearly every 
location, often much less. Hence, Ret 1 generally entailed waking up, ascertaining 
the danger, getting minimally dressed, rousing children, and running a short 
distance across easily-traversed terrain to safety: Ret b. J, 5 = 2 min. 
Par4, being already outside and aware of the approaching flood, had only 
to make a quick lateral dash: Ret1 4 = 0.33 min. 
Evacuation of Forrest Hall did not begin until water crashed through the 
windows. Evacuation entailed running down the hall and up the stairs to the dry 
first floor. Those who escaped estimated this flight, through water, as 7 - I 0 
seconds (6, p. 31 ). However, the three students who drowned could not open their 
doors against the water pressure, so their rate of evacuation may have been 
slower: Ret! 1 = 15 seconds= 0.25 min. 
E (Ease of Evacuation) 
Es = -1.75. 
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In minutes: E1 = -0.25, Ez = -1.66, E3 = -1, E4 = 0. 
Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Fm (Failure Mode) A 12 ft by 30 ft sharp irregularity with sloping trees 
suggested that the darn face had slumped years or decades prior to 1977 (8, 9). 
Almost continual seepage had also been evident for some time (8). The dam was 
also permeated by an extensive root system since it was heavily vegetated and 
some trees were more than 1 ft in diameter (5). While piping may have 
contributed, the 1977 failure was most likely dominated by a second flood-
induced slump, followed by rapid erosion (5 , 9): Fm =Fe. 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) N 
M (Magnitude of Loading) Moderate rains had persisted for 5 days prior to the 
failure, dropping 5.6 inches on nearby Toccoa. This amount was not unusual (9). 
The precipitation above the headwaters of Toccoa Creek was greater and was 
estimated at 7.2 inches. The heaviest rainfall fell between 6:30 and 7:30PM and 
return periods for various lengths of time all fell within a range of2- 5 years (5 , 
8): M = L. 
Ml (Mag. of Loading, Locally) The rainfall was intense at the college in the hours 
before the failure and there was some flooding (9), the college was built on the 
floodplain (8): Ml = L. 
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Dt (Dam Type) The darn was built in 2 to 4 stages over decades, 
with incomplete historical records. The best summary is found in source 5. The 
initial stage was a rock-filled log crib (9), but the bulk of the finished darn was 
earthen (2): Dt = E. 
Rr (Rescue Resources) The local fire department and civil defense from 
nearby Toccoa began rescue efforts before the flood subsided. This was 
significant in getting the wounded to the County Hospital a quarter mile north (9). 
National Guard units and helicopters were available later on Sunday. Overall, 
however, the rescue resources available during the most critical stages of the 
flood were limited: Rr = L. 
Del (Delectability) Local firemen inspected the darn an hour before the 
failure, but they saw nothing to cause alarm. They were not, however, trained in 
dam safety (9). Based on the historical slide and the continual seepage (see Fm), 
there was cause for concern: Det = L. 
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Sclrvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): H in every case. 
See the opening paragraph at the head of this global overview. The rates of life 
loss in this event help validate the use of comparable events that occurred prior to the 
advent of modern transportation, communication, etc., so long as housing damages and 
warning times are careful defined. 
Despite newspaper articles to the contrary, the dam had not been officially 
inspected for safety (3, 9). 
There was strong attenuation of Qp with distance, as was assumed for the Dale 
Dyke Dame failure, and as is typical of catastrophic floods . Computed values are listed 
under Qp. 
See Tpar. Among the 4 hardest-hit subPar, 60 out of93 survivors were injured. 
This is one of the highest injury rates for any flood, indicating that the warning was 
generally shorter than the necessary evacuation time and that Tpar"' Par. 
The fact that the entire community impacted by this event was characterized by an 
exceptionally strong Christian faith and a resulting strong sense of solidarity seems to 
have dramatically reduced or eliminated the kinds of psychological debilitation seen in 
other events with a high rate of community mortal ity (i.e., see Buffalo Creek). The 
underlying burden of source 6 was to illustrate this perception by presenting every family 
that experienced life loss and to present the impressions of those who came in contact 
with them. First Lady Rosalynn Carter wrote the following introduction: 
This is a story about faith .... a personal testimony that there is inherent courage 
within us to face the challenges of life and death. 
l visited Toccoa Falls College on the day after the disaster that you will 
read about in this book. l went because l hoped that l could comfort those who 
had survived. Instead I was enveloped by hope and courage and love. 
The miracle of Toccoa Falls confirms what l believe. God loves us and 
will help us always. He gives us unlimited strength when we trust in Him. (6, p. 
13) 
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS) 
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140 
Par1: ground floor of Forrest Hall Dormitory 
Ll = 3, PI = 0.43 
Global Event Subpopulations 
L p Par Tpar l 1 PI Par1 Tpar1 
life Loss Proportion of Population at Threatened Life Loss at Proportion at Current SubPar Tpar at Current 
Lives Lost Risk Population Current SubPar Current SubPar SubPar 
_(p) (u) (p) (p) (D) (u) (p) (p) 
39 0.28 140 112 3 0.43 7 7 
Incremental Life Loss Flood Characteristics 
Ln Lnf lin lint Ft Fit v D 
Natural Dam Removal lncremental l lnctemental l Fatality Types Flood Type Peak Velocity Maximum 
Channel life l Life Loss Using Ln Using lnf (N.C,W,E,Af, (D,Dy,Ff,F,Ts, Depth 
(D) (p) (p) (p) Aa,D,Sf,O,U) S,H,Gb,O) (ft/s) (ft) 
0 0 3 3 0 100 D 50 8 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Qp Qb w Dv R Ww Fp Fd 
Peak Flow Rate Bankful Flow Maximum Width Destructive Max. Rise Rate Wall of Water Proportional Dichotomous 
Rate Velocity ~~~~~~) (Height) Forcefulness Forcefulness (cfs) (cfs) (ft) (ft' ts) (ft ; 0-> R) (0.0 -1.0) (0 or 1) 
24750 300 325/325 75/75 Ww 8 1.0 1 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Fs Fpar H Hp B Vol Rf A 
Incremental Forcefulness Height of Dam Height of Breadth of Dam Volume of Rate of 60% Area of Final 
Forcefulness per SubPar Reservoir (Crest length) Release Failure Breach 
(L,M,H,V.E) (bldg/p) (ft) (ft) (ft) (acre-ft) (min) (It') 
E 0.14 38 32 200 630 2 ---
Spatial and Temporal Relationships 
Td Tw Ty Ts Wt Wtavg Bt Dev 
nmeofDay n meofWeek Time of Year nme of Season Wamingnme Avg. Individual Bldg Types (%) Development 
lliight, !:!ome, (We nd or (§ummer or Warning Time (N.T,Sh,M,R. (Urbanization) 
Separation) Wday) (1- 12) Win ter) (min) (min) C,H,Lm) (N,L,M,H) 
N Wend 11 w 0 0 H10o L 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued) 
Gf 0 Sc Pr We E 
Goodness of Fit Outdoors Sensory Clues Preparedness Warning Ease of 
{!ndoo rs o r Effectiveness Evacuation 
(L,M,H,V) Outd oors) (min) (N,L,M,H) (N,L.M,H) (min) 
H I 0 N N -0.25 
Attendant Circumstances 
Fm Ac M Ml Dt Rr Det Schvq 
Failure Mode Attendant Magnitude of Magnitude of Dam Type Rescue Delectability Striking . 
(lp,le.F.Ff,Ff/O,Fo. Circumstances Loading Local l oading Resources (Predictor Fit) 
Fe.Sp, Se,G,L) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,E,R.M,CA) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V) (L,H) 
Fe N L L E L L H 
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Introductory Summary 
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar). 
Global Event 
Par (Population at Risk) • 140 
L (Life Loss) • 39 
Tpar (Threatened Population) 112 
Par1 (Current SubPar) • 7 
L1 (L Among SubPar) • 3 
Tpar1 (Tpar Among subPar) • 7 
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities 
Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) • Ln = Lnf= 
0 and Ldr = unknown. 
Ft (Fatality Type) • D = I 00% 
Identification/Location of Fatalities: See Par • . 
Flood Characteristics 
Fit (Flood Type) • D 
V (Peak Velocity) • 50 ft!s 
D (Maximum Depth) • 8 ft 
Qp (Peak Flow Rate) • 24,750 cfs 
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate) • 300 cfs 
W (Maximum Width) • Wmax/Wmin = 325/325 ft . 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) • Dvmin/Dvmax = 75175 ft2/s. 
R (Maximum Rise Rate) • Ww 
Ww (Height of Wall of Water) • 30 ft, but based on D in this case: Ww = 8 ft. 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) • Despite the lack of external structural damage, the 
internal damages were probably sufficient to classify this as major damage. Every 
window was broken violently and students were washed downstream. 
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) • 1.0 
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) • I 
F5 (Incremental Forcefulness) • E 
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar) • 0.14 
H (Height of the Dam) • 38ft 
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool) • 32 ft 
B (Breadth of Dam) • 200 ft 
Vol (Volume of Release) • 630 ft 
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Rf (Rate of Failure) * 2 min 
A (Area of Final Breach) 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Pari and the Flood 
T (Time Summary) The dam failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday, 
Nov. 6, 1977 (5, 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river 
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the 
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial, 
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5). 
Td (Time of Day) N 
Tw (Time of Week) Wend 
Ty (Time of Year) II 
Ts (Time of Season) W 
Wt (Warning Time) * 0 min 
Wta,g(Avg. Individual Wt) * 0 min 
Bt (Building Types,%) * H = 100% 
Dev (Development/Urbanization) * L 
Gf (Goodness of Fit) * H 
0 (Outdoors) * I 
Sc (Sensory Clues) * 0 min 
Pr (Preparedness) * N 
We (Warning Effectiveness) * N 
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time): 
(EparJ) Par; (Ret1) * 0.25 min 
E (Ease of Evacuation) * -0.25 min 
Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Fm (Failure Mode) * Fe 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) * N 
M (Magnitude of Loading) • L 
Ml (Mag. of Loading, Locally) * L 
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Dt (Dam Type) • E 
Rr (Rescue Resources) * L 
Det (Detectability) * L 
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): * H 
Case Bibliography 
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE {TOCCOA FALLS) 
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140 
Par2: those in or adjacent to Residence Row, apart from Par4 
L2 = 19, P2 = 0.66 
Global Event Subpopulations 
L p Par Tpar L1 PI Par1 Tpar1 
life Loss Proportion of Population at Threatened life Loss at Proportion at Current SubPar Tpar at Current 
Lives Lost Risk Population Current SubPar Current SubPar SubPar 
(p) (u) (p) (PI (p) (u) (p) (p) 
39 0.28 140 112 19 0.66 29 29 
Incremental Life Loss Flood Characteristics 
Ln Lnf Lin Lint Ft Fit v D 
Natural Dam Removal Incremental L lncremental l Fatality Types Flood Type Peak Velocity Maximum 
Channel Life L life Loss Using l n Using lnf 
~~~o~~~t.~~ 
(O,Dy,Ff,F,Ts, Depth 
(p) (p ) (p) (p) S,H,Gb,O) (ftls) (ft) 
0 0 19 19 D10o D 50 10 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Qp Qb w Dv R Ww Fp Fd 
Peak Flow Rate Bankful Flow Maximum Width Destructive Max. Rise Rate Wall of Water Proportional Dichotomous 
Rate Velocity (~~~;;;,:') (Height) Forcefulness Forcefulness (cis) (Cfs) (ft) (It' is) (ft; 0 -> R) (0.0 -1.0) (0 or 1) 
21700 300 400/260 58/85 Ww 10 1.0 1 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Fs Fpar H Hp B Vol Rf A 
Incremental Forcefulness Height of Dam Height of Breadth of Dam Volume of Rate of ao% Area of Final 
Forcefulness per SubPar Reservoir (Crest Length) Release Failure Breach 
(l ,M,H,V.E) (bldg/ I (ft) (ft) (ft) (acre-ft) (min) (ft2) 
E 0.21 38 32 200 630 2 ---
Spatial and Temporal Relationships 
Td Tw Ty Ts Wt Wlavg Bt Dev 
Time of Day nmeofWeek Time of Year Time of Season WamingTime Avg. Individual Bldg Types (fl/o) Development 
lliight, !jome, (Wend o r @ ummer or WamingTime (N,T,Sh,M,R. (Urbanization) 
Separation) Wday) (1. 12) Winter) (min) (min) C,H,lm) (N,l ,M,H) 
N Wend 11 w 0.33 0.4 Rtoo L 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued) 
Gf 0 Sc Pr We E 
Goodness of Fit Outdoors Sensory Clues Preparedness Warning Ease of 
{!ndoors o r Effectiveness Evacuation 
(l ,M.H,V) Outdoors} (min) (N,l ,M,H) (N,l ,M,H) (min) 
H I 0.25 N N -1.66 
Attendant Circumstances 
Fm Ac M Ml Dt Rr Det Schvq 
Failure Mode Attendant Magnitude of Magnitude of Dam Type Rescue Delectability Striking . . 
( lp,le.F.Ff.Ff/O,Fo Circumstances loading l ocal loading Resources (Predictor Fit) 
Fe.Sp.Se,G,L) (N,l ,M,H) (N,l ,M,H,V,E) (N,l ,M,H,V,E) (N,E,R,M,C,A) (N,l ,M,H) (N,l ,M,H,V) (l,H) 
Fe N L L E L L H 
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Introductory Summary 
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar). 
Global Event 
Par (Population at Risk) • 140 
L (Life Loss) • 39 
Tpar (Threatened Population) • 112 
Par2 (Current SubPar) * 29 
L2 (L Among SubPar) • 19 
Tpar2 (Tpar Among subPar) • 29 
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities 
Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) • Ln = Lnf = 
0 and Ldr = unknown. 
Ft (Fatality Type) * D = l 00% 
ldentification/Location of Fatalities: See Par * 
Flood Characteristics 
Fit (Flood Type) 
V (Peak Velocity) 
D (Maximum Depth) 
Qp (Peak Flow Rate) 
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate) 
W (Maximum Width) 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) 
R (Maximum Rise Rate) 
Ww (Height of Wall of Water) 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) 
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) 
•o 
• 50 ftls 
• 10ft 
• 21 ,700 cfs 
• 300 cfs 
• Wmax/Wmin = 400/260 ft . 
• Dvmin/Dvmax = 58/85 ft2/s. 
•ww 
• 30 ft, but adjusted to match D: Ww = I 0 ft. 
• All 6 residences were destroyed. 
• 1.0 
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) • I 
F5 (lncremental Forcefulness) *E 
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar) 
H (Height of the Dam) 
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool) 
B (Breadth of Dam) 
Vol (Volume of Release) 
Rf (Rate of Failure) 
A (Area of Final Breach) 
• 0.21 




• 2 min 
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Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Pari and the Flood 
T (Time Summary) The dam failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday, 
Nov. 6, 1977 (5, 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river 
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the 
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial, 
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5). 
Td (Time of Day) N 
Tw (Time of Week) Wend 
Ty (Time of Year) 11 
Ts (Time of Season) W 
Wt (Waming Time) * 0.33 min 
Wt.,g(Avg. Individual Wt) * 0.4 min 
Bt (Building Types, %) * R = 100% 
Dev (Development/Urbanization) * L 
Gf (Goodness of Fit) * H 
0 (Outdoors) * l 
Sc (Sensory Clues) * 0.25 min 
Pr (Preparedness) * N 
We (Warning Effectiveness) * N 
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time): 
(Epar I) Par; (Ret 1) * 2 min 
E (Ease of Evacuation) • -1.66 min 
Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Fm (Failure Mode) • Fe 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) • N 
M (Magnitude of Loading) * L 
Ml (Mag. of Loading, Locally) • L 
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Dt (Dam Type) • E 
Rr (Rescue Resources) • L 
Det (Delectability) • L 
Scllvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): • H 
Daniel Woerner, a young soccer player, reached shore as the flood rose around 
him by jumping from one car roo f to the next before the vehicles became mobile (6). 
People do not always take the safest or shortest route to safety in a flood. As an 
example, the Woerners ran downstream along the road that paralleled the river, never 
once thinking to run laterally up the mountain to high ground (6, p. 61). This was, 
however, unusual. 
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Ten-year-old Kirk Veer survived by opening the door to a truck that passed by 
him underwater and climbing in to breath the bubble of air inside. Later, he reemerged to 
ri se to the surface (6, p. 67). 
Case Bibliography 
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS) 
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140 
Par3: Trailerville and closely-associated trailers across the river 
L3 = 15, P3 = 0.16 
Global Event Subpopulation~ ______ 
L p Par Tpar L; P; Par1 Tpar1 
Life Loss Proportion of Population at Threatened Life loss at Proportion at Current SubPar Tpar at Current 
Lives Lost Risk Population Current SubPar Current SubPar SubPar 
(p) (u) (p) (p) (p) (u) (p) (p) 
39 0.28 140 112 15 0.1 6 92 64 
Incremental Life Loss Flood Characteristics 
Ln Lnf Lin Lint Ft Fit v D 
Natural Dam Removal Incremental L Incremental L Fatality Types Flood Type Peak Velocity Maximum 
Channel Life l Life Loss Using ln Using lnf 
~~~6~1~6~0) (D,Dy,Ff,F,Ts. Depth (p) (p) (p) (p) S,H,Gb,D) (f!/s) (ft) 
0 0 15 15 01 00 D 50 10 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Qp Qb w Dv R Ww Fp Fd 
Peak Flow Rate Bankful Flow Maximum Width Destructive Max. Rise Rate Wall of Water Proportional Dichotomous 
Rate Velocity (M,H,V,Ww) (Height) Forcefulness Forcefulness 
(cfs) (cis) (ft) (ft21s) (cfslmin) (ft ; 0 -> R) (0.0- 1.0) (0 or 1) 
20300 300 600/300 33/66 Ww 10 1.0 1 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Fs Fpar H Hp 8 Vol Rf A 
Incremental Forcefulness Height of Dam Height of Breadth of Dam Volume of Rate of 80% Area of Final 
Forcefulness per SubPar Reservoir (Crest length) Release Failure Breach 
(L,M,H,V.E) (bldg/p) (ft) (ft) (ft) (acre-ft) {m in) (ft') 
E 0.21 38 32 200 630 2 ---
Spatial and Temporal Relationships 
Td Tw Ty Ts Wt Wlavg Bt Dev 
Time of Day Time of Week Time of Year Time of Season Warning Time Avg. Individual Bldg Types(%) Development 
l!:!ight, !jome, (Wend or (§.ummeror Warning Time (N,6·.~\~)R, (Urbanization) 
Separation) Wday) (1 -12) Winter) (min) (min) (N,L,M,H) 
N Wend 11 w 1.5 1 M1oo L 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued) 
Gf 0 Sc Pr We E 
Goodness of Fit Outdoors Sensory Clues Preparedness Warning Ease of 
{!ndoors or Effectiveness Evacuation 
(L,M.H,V) Outdoors) (min) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H) (min) 
H I 0.25 N L -1 
Attendant Circumstances 
Fm Ac M Ml Dt Rr Det Schvq 
Failure Mode Anendant Magnitude of Magnitude of Dam Type Rescue Delectability Strik1ng . 
( lp,le.F,Ff.Ff!O,Fo, Circumstances loading local loading Resources (Predictor F1t) 
FeSp.Se.G.L) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,L.M,H,V,E) (N.E,R,M,C.A) (N,L,M,H) {N,L,M,H,V) (L.H) 
Fe N L L E L L H 
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Introductory Summary 
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar) . 
Global Event 
Par (Population at Risk) • 140 
L (Life Loss) * 39 
Tpar (Threatened Population) • 11 2 
Par_, (Currmt SubPar) * 92 
L3 (L Among SubPar) • 15 
Tpar3 (Tpar Among subPar) • 64 
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities 
Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) • Ln = Lnf = 
0 and Ldr = unknown. 
Ft (Fatality Type) * D = !00% 
Identification/Location of Fatalities: See Par •. 
Flood Characteristics 
Fit (Flood Type) •o 
v (Peak Velocity) • 50 ft/s 
D (Maximum Depth) *!Oft 
Qp (Peak Flow Rate) • 20,300 cfs 
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate) • 300 cfs 
w (Maximum Width) * Wmax/Wmin = 6001300 ft. 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) * Dvmin!Dvmax = 33/66 ft2/s. 
R (Maximum Rise Rate) *Ww 
Ww (Height of Wall of Water) • I 0 ft 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) • 19 mobile homes were destroyed and 4 had maj or 
damage. 
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) • 1.0 
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) • I 
Fs (Incremental Forcefulness) *E 
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar) • 0.21 
H (Height of the Dam) • 38 ft 
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool) • 32ft 
B (Breadth of Dam) • 200 ft 
Vol (Volume of Release) • 630 ft 
Rf (Rate of Failure) • 2 min 
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A (Area of Final Breach) 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par1 and the Flood 
T (Time Summary) The dam failed about 1:20 or l :30 AM, Sunday, 
Nov. 6, 1977 (5 , 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river 
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the 
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial , 
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5). 
Td (Time of Day) N 
Tw (Time of Week) Wend 
Ty (Time of Year) ll 
Ts (Time of Season) W 
Wt (Warning Time) • 1.5 min 
Wta,g(Avg. Individual Wt) • l min 
Bt (Building Types,%) • M = 100% 
Dev (Development/Urbanization) • L 
Gf (Goodness of Fit) • H 
0 (Outdoors) • I 
Sc (Sensory Clues) • 0.25 min 
Pr (Preparedness) • N 
We (Warning Effectiveness) • L 
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time): 
(Epar,; Par; (Ret,; • 2 min 
E (Ease of Evacuation) • -1 min 
Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Fm (Failure Mode) • Fe 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) • N 
M (Magnitude of Loading) • L 
Ml (Mag. of Loading, Locally) • L 
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Dt (Dam Type) • E 
Rr (Rescue Resources) * L 
Del (Delectability) • L 
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): • H 
Where the main channel curved, water-surface elevations on the left bank 
exceeded those on the right bank by as much as I 0 ft due to superelevation. Even in these 
high velocity areas, however, there were calm waters in the backwaters of creek mouths 
(8). 
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Mobile homes generally stayed intact as they floated away, unless they hit another 
mobile home or other obstacle in the water. In that case, they disintegrated (6). 
Case Bibliography 
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS) 
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140 
Par4: those known to be in automobiles when the flood hit 
L4 = 2, P4 = 0.5 
Global Event Subpopulations --L - - -p-- ' - Pir --Tpar- r-- L; P; Par; Tpar; 
Life Loss Proportion of Population at Threatened Life Loss at Proportion at Current SubPar Tpar at Current 
lives Lost Risk Population Current SubPar Current SubPar SubPar 
(p) (u) (p) (p) (p) (u) (p) (p) 
39 0.28 140 112 2 0.5 4 4 
Incremental Life Loss Flood Characteristics 
Ln Lnf Lin Lint Ft Fit v D 
Natural Dam Removal lncremental l lncrementall Fatality Types Flood Type Peak Velocity Maximum 
Channel Life L L1fe l oss Using Ln Using Lnf (N,C,W,E,Af, (D,Dy,Ff,F,Ts, Depth 
(p) (p) (p) (p) Aa,D.Sf,O,U) S,H,Gb,O) (ftls) (ft) 
0 0 2 2 Af1oo D 50 10 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Qp Qb w Dv R Ww Fp Fd 
Peak Flow Rate Bankful Flow Maximum Width Destructive Max. Rise Rate Wall of Water Proportional Dichotomous 
Rate Velocity ( ~:,;~~) (Height) Forcefulness Forcefulness (cfs) (cfs) (ft) (it' is) (ft;O-> R) (0.0- 1.0) (0 or 1) 
21700 300 600/250 36/85 Ww 10 1.0 1 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Fs Fpar H Hp B Vol Rf A 
Incremental Forcefulness Height of Dam Height of Breadth of Dam Volume of Rate of 80% Area of Final 
Forcefulness per SubPar Reservoir (Crest Length) Release Failure Breach 
(L.M.H,V,E) (bldg/p) (ft) (ft) (ft) (acre-ft) (min) (ft') 
E 0.0 38 32 200 630 2 ---
Spatial and Temporal Relationships 
Td Tw Ty Ts Wt Wlavg Bt Dev 
Time of Day Time of Week Time of Year Time of Season Warning Time Avg. Individual Bldg Types (%) Development 
lliighl, tjome, (Wend or (§ummer or Waming Time (N,T.Sh,M,R, (Urbanization) 
Separation) Wday) (1 - 12) Winter) (min) (min) C,H,Lm) (N,L.M,H) 
N Wend 11 w 0.33 0.33 N L 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued) 
Gf 0 Sc Pr We E 
Goodness of Fit Outdoors Sensory Clues Preparedness Warning Ease of 
{!ndoors or Effectiveness Evacuation 
(L,M,H,V) Outdoors) (min) (N.L,M,H) (N,L,M,H) (min) 
H 0 0.25 N N 0 
Attendant Circumstances 
Fm Ac M Ml Dt Rr Det Schvq 
Fa ilure Mode Attendant Magnitude of Magnitude of Dam Type Rescue Delectability Striking . 
( lp,le,F,Ff,Ff!O,Fo. Circumstances Loading Local Loading Resources (Predictor Fit) 
Fe,Sp,Stt,G.L) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,L,M,H,V.E) (N.E,R.M,C,A) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V) (L,H) 
Fe N L L E L L H 
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Introductory Summary 
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar). 
Global Event 
Par (Population at Risk) • 140 
L (Life Loss) • 39 
Tpar (Threatened Population) • 112 
Par 4 (Current SubPar) • 4 
L4 (L Among SubPar) • 2 
Tpar 4 (Tpar Among subPar) • 4 
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities 
Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) * Ln = Lnf = 
0 and Ldr = unknown. 
Ft (Fatality Type) * Af = I 00% 
Identification/Location of Fatalities: See Par • . 
Flood Characteristics 
Fit (Flood Type) * D 
V (Peak Velocity) • 50 ftls 
D (Maximum Depth) • I 0 ft 
Qp (Peak Flow Rate) • 21,700 cfs 
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate) • 300 cfs 
W (Maximum Width) • Wmax/Wmin = 600/250 ft . 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) • Dvmin!Dvmax = 36/85 ft2/s. 
R (Maximum Rise Rate) • Ww 
Ww (Height of Wall of Water) • 30 ft, but adjusted for D: Ww = I 0 ft . 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) • This subPar was automotive, but the cars were 
very near to buildings in Par2 and Par3 where virtually every structure was 
destroyed. 
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) • 1.0 
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) • I 
F5 (Incremental Forcefulness) *E 
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar) • No buildings: Fpar = 0.0. 
H (Height of the Dam) • 38 ft 
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool) • 32ft 
B (Breadth of Dam) • 200 ft 
Vol (Volume of Release) • 630 ft 
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Rf (Rate of Failure) • 2 min 
A (Area of Final Breach) 
Snatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par! and the Flood 
T (Time Summary) The dam failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday, 
Nov. 6, 1977 (5, 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river 
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00PM, at the same time the 
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial , 
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5). 
Td (Time of Day) N 
Tw (Time of Week) Wend 
Ty (Time of Year) II 
Ts (Time of Season) W 
Wt (Warning Time) • 0.33 min 
Wta,g(Avg. Individual Wt) • 0.33 min 
Bt (Building Types, %) • N 
Dev (Development/Urbanization) • L 
Gf (Goodness of Fit) • H 
0 (Outdoors) • 0 
Sc (Sensory Clues) • 0.25 min 
Pr (Preparedness) • N 
We (Warning Effectiveness) • N 
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time): 
(Epar1) Par; (Ret1) • 0.25 min 
E (Ease of Evacuation) • 0 min 
Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Fm (Failure Mode) • Fe 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) • N 
M (Magnitude of Loading) • L 
Ml (Mag. of Loading, Locally) • L 
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Dt (Dam Type) • E 
Rr (Rescue Resources) • L 
Del (Detectability) • L 
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): • H 
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In the case of the firemen, their hip boots helped to pull them under (6). A similar 
danger could apply to fishermen wearing waders. 
Case Bibliography 
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS) 
Par : Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140 
Pars: 2 houses below Georgia Highway 17 
Ls = 0, Ps = 0.0 
Global Event Subpopulations 
--
L p Par Tpar Li pi Par1 Tpari 
Life Loss Proportion of Population at Threatened life l oss at Proportion at Current SubPar Tpar at Current 
Lives Lost Risk Population Current SubPar Current SubPar SubPar 
(p) (u) (p) (p) (p) (u) (p) (p) 
39 0.28 140 112 0 0.0 8 8 
Incremental Life Loss Flood Characteristics 
Ln Lnf Lin Lint Ft Fit v D 
Natural Dam Removal lncrementall Incremental L Fatality Types Flood Type Peak Velocity Maximum 
Channel Life L life Loss Using Ln Using lnf (N,C,W,E,Af, (D,Dy,Ff.F,Ts, Depth 
(p) (p) (p) (p) Aa,D,Sf,O.U) S,H,Gb,O) (ftls) (ft) 
0 0 0 0 N 0 --- 5 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Qp Qb w Dv R Ww Fp Fd 
Peak Flow Rate Bankful Flow Maximum Width Destructive Max. Rise Rate Wall of Water Proportional Dichotomous 
Rate Velocity ~~~~~:') (Height) Forcefulness Forcefulness (CIS) (cis) (ft) (ft2/s) (ft; 0-> R) (0.0- 1.0) (0 or 1) 
--- 300 --- --- v 0 1.0 1 
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Fs Fpar H Hp 8 Vol Rf A 
Incremental Forcefulness Height of Dam Height of Breadth of Dam Volume of Rate of 80% Area of Final 
Forcefulness per SubPar Reservoir (Crest Length) Release Failure Breach 
(L,M,H,V.E) (bldo/o) (ft) (ft) (ft) (acre-ft) (min) (ft') 
E 0.14 38 32 200 630 2 ---
Spatial and Temporal Relationships 
Td Tw Ty Ts Wt Wtavg Bt Dev 
Time of Day nmeofWeek Time of Year Time of Season Waming Time Avg. ll'ldividual Bldg Types(%) Development 
lliight, .!jome, (Wend or (§.ummer or WamingTime <NL~~i.~·r (Urbanization) Separation) Wday) (1 - 12) Winter) (min) (min) (N,L,M,H) 
N Wend 11 w 0 0.25 R or M L 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued) 
Gf 0 Sc Pr We E 
Goodness of Fit Outdoors Sensory Clues Preparedness Warning Ease of 
{!ndoors or Effectiveness Evacuation 
(l ,M,H,V) Outdoors) (min) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H) (min) 
H I 0.25 N N -1 .75 
Attendant Circumstances 
Fm Ac M Ml Dt Rr Det Schvq 
Failure Mode Attendant Magnitude of Magnitude of Dam Type Rescue Delectability Striking . 
(lp,le.F.Ff,FIID,Fo, Circumstances Loading Local loading Resources (Predictor Fit) 
Fe:Sp,Se,G.L) (N,L,M,H) (N ,L,M,H,V,E) (N ,L,M,H,V,E) (N .E,R.M,C.A) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V) (L,H) 
Fe N L L E L L H 
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Introductory Summary 
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar). 
Global Event 
Par (Population at Risk) • 140 
L (Life Loss) • 39 
Tpar (Threatened Population) • 112 
Par5 (Current SubPar) • 8 
L5 (L Among SubPar) • 0 
Tpar5 (Tpar Among subPar) See Par5 under Par •. There is no direct historical 
account of these two families. Nevertheless, since Sc was on the order of0.25 
minutes or less, riverside phones were knocked out by the flood, nobody lived 
nearby to issue a verbal warning, and the families would have been asleep, it is 
highly unlikely that these families evacuated before being flooded : Tpar5 = 8. 
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities 
Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) • Ln = Lnf = 
0 and Ldr = unknown. 
Ft (Fatality Type) N 
Identification/Location of Fatalities: None 
Flood Characteristics 
Fit (Flood Type) •o 
v (Peak Velocity) 
D (Maximum Depth) • 5 ft 
Qp (Peak Flow Rate) 
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate) • 300 cfs 
w (Maximum Width) 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) 
R (Maximum Rise Rate) •v 
Ww (Height of Wall of Water) • 0 ft 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) • 2 dwellings had minor damage. 
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) • 0.0 
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) • 0 
Fs (Incremental Forcefulness) • L 
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar) • 0.0 
H (Height of the Dam) • 38 ft 
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool) • 32 ft 
B (Breadth of Dam) 
Vol (Volume of Release) 
Rf (Rate of Failure) 
A (Area of Final Breach) 
• 200ft 
• 630ft 
• 2 min 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par! and the Flood 
T (Time Summary) The darn failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday, 
413 
Nov. 6, 1977 (5 , 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river 
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the 
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial , 
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5). 
Td (Time of Day) N 
Tw (Time of Week) Wend 
Ty (Time of Year) II 
Ts (Time of Season) W 
Wt (Warning Time) • 0 min 
Wt0 ,g(Avg. Individual Wt) • 0.25 min 
Bt (Building Types, %) • R or M 
Dev (Development/Urbanization) • N 
Gf (Goodness of Fit) • H 
0 (Outdoors) • I 
Sc (Sensory Clues) • 0.25 min 
Pr (Preparedness) • N 
We (Warning Effectiveness) • N 
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time): 
(Epar 1) Pari (Ret t) • 2 min 
E (Ease of Evacuation) • -1.75 min 
Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Fm (Failure Mode) • Fe 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) • N 
M (Magnitude of Loading) • L 
Ml (Mag. of Loading, Locally) • L 
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Dt (Dam Type) * E 
Rr (Rescue Resources) • L 
Det (Detectability) • L 
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): • H 
Case Bibliography 
Striking characteristics and 
valuable quotations 
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The following section is excerpted and in some cases modified or expanded from 
the larger, unpublished version of Appendix B. The formatting and style are generally 
preserved from the original appendix. Reference numbers refer to the event-specific 
bibliographies in the next section. 
ALLEGHENY COUNTY (FLASH) FLOOD. PENNSYLVANIA 
Par: several watersheds in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 1986 = 1,700 
Par1: motorists on Saxonburg Boulevard below its intersection with Harts Run 
Road on Little Pine Creek north of Pittsburg; L1 = 9, P1 = 0.33 
To understand this event, it is important to distinguish between the flood 's peak, 
characterized by a wall of water up to 4 or 5 ft high, and the slow rise that preceded it. 
During the fastest rise leading up to the peak, the flood rose 3.5 ft over 45 minutes at the 
intersection of Harts Run Road and Saxonburg Boulevard, upstream from most of the 
damage and all of the life loss. Since the homes were primarily located between the river 
and the road, an even slower rise rate first flooded the homes. Under these conditions, the 
sensory clues of flooding would have given homeowners time to climb the hillside a few 
seconds away long before the flooding reached lethal proportions. In the same way, 
rather than being overwhelmed, most or all motorists were swept away only because they 
did not abandon their vehicles during the long period when the rise rate primarily posed a 
threat to property and not to life. 
The consistent message from this event and from other life-loss events involving 
flash floods is that modem tools used to predict flash flooding are prone to error and 
failure. See Wt for reasons warnings are often delayed in flash floods. Also, in 
transitioning to a computer-aided model, the NWS predicted that 5.5 inches of rainfall 
would be required to cause flash flooding when 3.8 inches would have been more 
realistic. 
Wt (Warning Time) A NWS flash flood warning was issued at 5:53 PM, 
about I hr after extreme flooding began. It was not issued earlier because the true 
intensity of the storms was not expected. Although radar estimates did indicate 
high rainfall estimates, forecasters attributed these to anomalous propagation 
patterns that had frequently occurred in the past. Electrical outages in the flooded 
area hampered verbal confirmations, and reports of flooding on Saxonburg 
Boulevard were confused with the town of Saxonburg, where rainfall was light. 
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Once the flash flood warning was finally disseminated over the 
Emergency Broadcast System, no one from the local TV or radio stations could 
remember broadcasting it, nor could they remember receiving the warning over 
the UPI or AP wire services: Wt = 0 min. 
Sometimes, victims of flooding will climb onto the roofs of their vehicles rather 
than wading to high ground, not realizing that a vehicle can be floated and washed away 
by moderate flooding. In this way, they bypass their window of opportunity for escape 
and drown when the flood rises high enough to mobilize the vehicle or when an 
unexpected surge or wall of water suddenly sweeps them away. At least 3 victims died in 
this way in this event. 
ANGELS DAM 
Par: down San Domingo Creek, Calaveras County, California, 1895 =unknown 
Par1: same as Par 
L1 =I, P1 =unknown 
Workmen apparently left portions of cottonwood roots under the masonry section, 
leaving the foundation vulnerable to piping. 
ARAS ALLUVIAL FAN FLASH FLOOD AND DAM FAILURES 
Par: Central Pyrenees, Spain, 1996 =unknown 
Par1: Las Nieves Campground 
Ll = 87, PI = 0.58 
"In terms of human lives lost, this flood has been the largest natural disaster in 
Spain in the last 23 years" (I, p.268). In 1973, 150 people died in a flash flood . 
The Anis barranco was the main feeder channel to the Anis alluvial fan. It 
contained more than 30 check dams which had long since filled with sediment (some had 
pine trees around 40 years old), giving it a terraced appearance. During the flash flood, 
most of these darns were destroyed and much of the sediment was deposited via sheet 
flow across the alluvial fan. 
"The people that survived the disaster are mainly those who were able to take 
shelter in one of the buildings or those who climbed the poplars planted on the camping 
area. Most of those who died were drowned, trapped or buried in the sediment and hit by 
moving debris." (1, p.277-8) 
"The roadways of the camp site were scoured and acted as preferential flow paths 
. .. The highly turbulent flow generated scours up to 1.5 m deep on bare surfaces and 
next to obstructions like the road whose asphalt cover was tom off." (I, p. 279) 
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Of those killed, about 50% were women and 25% children, so strength may have 
been a factor. (1 , p. 278) 
AUSTIN DAM (BAYLESS PULP & PAPER COMPANY DAM) 
Par: Freeman Run River Valley, Pennsylvania, 1911 =unknown 
Par1: Austin City below the Bayless paper mill 
Lt = 88, Pt = 0.045 
The concrete structure was built about 800ft (less reliably reported as 500 yards) 
below an original earthen dam that was in good shape and that held nicely when the 
reservoir behind the concrete structure was drained in 1910. This earthen structure was 29 
ft high, 380 ft wide, and had I ft of freeboard. It was designed to impound 25,000,000 
gallons of water ( 76.7 acre-ft; 12, p. 8). When the concrete structure failed, it created a 
vacuum that sucked the earthen darn with it, leaving virtually no trace of its existence. 
Mary Blailse was interviewed in the hospital by a reporter shortly after the 
disaster. She was doing accounting work at the Bayless mill when suddenly one of the 
big pulp grinding stones crashed through her wall. The ceiling caved in and the flood 
washed over her, but she must have been very near the edge of the flood because rescuers 
later found her alive (and several others), with her leg pinned beneath the stone. The 
stone was too big to move, so she pleaded with them to get an ax and chop off her leg. 
"No man would volunteer. 'Cut if off,' I pleaded. 'You can stand it if! can."' After her 
friends said they couldn't do it, she asked a large stranger. "By the lantern light I saw the 
descending blade glisten. I think he chopped it four or five times before they could pry 
me loose." Blailse apparently survived. Others were also rescued alive from wrecked 
buildings, even three days after the event, sometimes located near dead bodies. (1). 
When Grace Baldwin Collins heard of the danger, she called her mother (blind) and 
father (old and lame) who were living with her and began slowly toward the nearest 
mountain, supporting each one on an arm. She saw the flood approaching closer and 
closer, and all who watched from safety urged her to leave her parents and save herself. 
Instead, she held her head higher and was engulfed with her parents. 
Three people were saved by riding above the logs on their beds when their homes 
were destroyed. 
Saturday was bath day, so many people were taking baths when the darn broke. 
Turner street boardered the mountains, so people naturally ran that direction. Most 
escaped, but "they di scovered that high fences of all types bordered the lots back of the 
houses . . . and many people lost their lives trying to get over the fences . There were 
several instances where older people frightened to exhaustion looked at the barriers and 
the approaching flood so threw children over the fence just minutes before they were 
swept away." ( 11 , p. 11 ) 
AUSTIN DAM (COLORADO RIVER DAM) 
Par: Colorado River, Austin, Texas, 1900 =unknown 
Par1: Power plant beside and just downstream of the dam 
L1 = 8, P1 = 0.8 
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Twenty-eight feet of silt behind the dam was comparable to a liquid with unit 
weight of 85 lb/ft3. This was probably a significant contribution to the failure forces that 
shoved the dam downstream. 
AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS 
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austin/Town Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981 = 1,196 
Par 1: residential areas, primarily on Shoal, Walnut, and Little Walnut Creeks 
L1 = 2, P1 = 0.0017 
Based on R = 260 cfs/min = M, the global flood was truly threatening only for 
those who waited too long to evacuate and for those who underestimated the ability of 
shallow but very swift water to sweep away an automobile (subPar 2- 7). "In general , 
the common factor in nearly all the drownings was that they probably could have been 
avoided if the victims had better understood the potential risks from extreme flood 
conditions" (2 , p. 12). 
The moderately fast-rising flood itself would have provided sufficient notice for 
many residents to contemplate evacuation before the flood became lethal. The flood rose 
slowly enough to drive or walk away from it without great hurry. The only residential 
fatalities involved a couple who refused to evacuate after being warned. 
AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS 
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austin/Town Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981 = 1,196 
Par2: 3 vehicles at 3 crossings along Shoal Creek 
Lz = 4, Pz = 0.8 
Despite the high rate of fatalities at low-water crossings or hydraulically deficient 
bridges, and despite the large quantities of debris in the flows, "it is indeed surprising that 
no bridges were destroyed" (2, p. II). 
The rise rate was only moderately fast , so none of the cars were broadsided by an 
unexpected wave of water. Rather, each driver chose to enter a flooded crossing, 
believing it to be passable. Although the darkness and rain probably contributed to the 
deception, such choices are commonly observed in other events during the day, as well. 
Even baricades and warnings do not necessarily prevent motorists from attempting 
crossings when the waters appear shallow and slow enough to cross. Drivers can not be 
trusted to accurately judge the ability of flowing water to float or move a vehicle into 
deeper and more lethal water. 
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Variables like Dv and Qp have limited application to vehicle fatalities at crossings 
since the vehicles initially encounter only the water flowing over the road surface and not 
the water flowing under the bridge or through a culvert. 
Variables like E really misrepresent this type of Par, because this is really a form 
of convergence after the warning has been issued and the area is cleared. 
AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS 
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austinffown Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981 = 1,196 
Par3: West Lake Drive where it crossed Bee Creek 
L3 = 2, P3 = 0.67 
The fact that two cars could be swept away when crossing the same intersection 
more than an hour apart demonstrates how deceptively safe an intersection may appear 
when covered by relatively shallow but swift water. 
Wt is not an important predictor for convergence fatalities at river crossings. 
AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS 
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austinffown Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981 = 1,196 
Par4: Bull Creek crossing 
L4 = 2, P 4 = 1.0 
As in other subPar during this event, the fact that the motorists were from out of 
town may have decreased their awareness of the danger posed by any particular flooded 
crossing. 
AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS 
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austinffown Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981 = 1,196 
Par5: crossing at a tributary to Walnut Creek 
Ls = 1, Ps = 0.5 
Significantly, this fatality occurred during the very earliest stages of flooding on a 
tributary to the main channel. Flooding need not be extreme to pose a significant hazard 
to motorists at river crossings. 
BALDWIN HILLS DAM 
Par: Baldwin Hills, western Los Angeles, California, 1963 = 16,500 
Par1: Residential regions from the dam to Village Green 
L1 = 4, P1 = 0.0028 
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"Automobiles were transported by comparatively moderate velocities across 
pavements lubricated by a layer of sediment when the water was deep enough to give the 
car some bouyancy . ... In several cases, people were rescued from cars being transported 
by floodwaters by men wading alongside" (17, p. 121t). At Coliseum and Rodeo, human 
chains braved the swirling waters to try to rescue motorists being transported by the flood 
waters (9). 
The age of the 5 victims may not have been a factor in their drowning (the flood 
was strong enough to sweep people from their apartments), but it may have been a factor 
affecting why they did not evacuate. Hundreds of others did not evacuate either, however. 
"Several telephone poles, their wires still flowing with electricity, flamed at the 
tops like giant candles." (9, p. BIO) 
While the Hermans worked frantically to get their little guests back to their own 
homes [at the interruption to the birthday party] ("Did you ever ask a six-year-old 
her phone number? some of them don't even know how to spell their last 
names!"), doorbells rang insistently all over Baldwin Hills .... There wasn't time 
to think or ask questions or pack anything or even think much about the danger. 
Parents just seized their children, piled into their cars in silence, and stepped on 
the accelerators. Nobody looked back .... "One minute we were driving, the next 
we were floating," Mrs. Herman remembered. "We got out. The water was up to 
my waist. It was freezing cold, filthy, and full of debris. We got out of the way of 
a tree just in time. My husband had our youngest child and the dog. I had the two 
gi rl s who weren't mine under my armpits. My other two girls were holding onto 
them." (14, p. 91) 
BALDWIN HILLS DAM 
Par: Baldwin Hills, western Los Angeles, California, 1963 = 16,500 
Par3: Commercial districts and their surrounding roads; primarily shopping centers 
LJ =I, P3 = 0.000069 
The 12-ft deep, 30 x 20ft. excavation for an 81-inch sewer pipe into which Mrs. 
Schwartz car sank was totally obscured by the flood waters, rendering it invisible (2). 
BANGLADESH STORM SURGE AND CYCLONE 
Par: Bangladesh, 1970 =unknown 
Par1: same as Par 
L1 = 225,000, P1 =unknown 
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Being a storm surge, this flood was quite dissimilar to a flash flood or dam failure 
in that it did not diminish with width. Nevertheless, it did reveal the tremendous loss of 
life that is possible when immense quantities of water are released on an unprepared 
population. In this case, 225,000 people died. Despite an officially warning time of about 
3 days, the dissemination of the warning was limited. 
Wt (Warning Time) The cyclone was tracked for three days, through the Bay of 
Bangal, until it struck on Nov. 12, 1970, at night. Warnings reached Dacca early , 
but not the low lying islands to the south at greatest risk. 
BANOIAU AND SHIMANTAN DAM FAILURES 
Par: Huai River Basin, Henan, China, (tributaries to the Yangtze), 1975 = 3 million 
Par1: The global event, minus the 3 remaining, identifiable subPar 
L. = 65773, P. = 0.022 
The flood was simply too large and in too foreign a setting to understand it fully. 
The fact that E was an extremely large, negative number (E = -1380 min), 
suggests that this failure may point toward an upper envelope on the potential lethality of 
a flood with relatively minor F -values and a Dv value less than 3. 
As Par; grows, parameters like V and Ww become less representative, being 
localized maximums and not representative values. On the flip side, parameters like E 
also become less representative, being averages rather than localized extremes that could 
be more damaging. Parameters like Dv may still apply, on average, since localized, peak 
flows tend to increase the value while localized peak widths tend to decrease the value. 
On the whole, a representative value may still result. 
BASS HAVEN LAKE DAM 
Par: Tributary of Coon Creek, near Athens, Texas, 1984 = 8 
Par1: same as Par 
L. = 1, P. = 0.15 
This failure is unique in that no members of Par were downstream when the dam 
failed, none were threatened by flooding, and all danger was from the material of the 
embankment itself. The failure was initiated intentionally but progressed at an 
unexpected rate, leading to a rapid draw-down slope failure. 
BEAR WALLOW DAM 
Par: two homes along river, near Asheville, N.C.= 7 
Par1: same as Par 
L 1 = 4, P1 = 0.57 
Apart from the small Par and the small Volume, this flood approaches a worst-
case scenario: a flood that destroys all homes, without warning, at night, in the winter. 
For this reason, it is critical to determine whether the second home had occupants that 
should be included in the Par. 
BERGERON POND DAM 
(also known as ALTON DAM or MEADOW POND DAM (11)) 
Par: Alton, New Hampshire, 1996 = 25; Par1: same as Par 
L1 = 1, P1 = 0.040 
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The dam was constructed in 1992 and last inspected in July of 1994. The 
emergency action plan was approved two months later. It was followed, resulting in the 
notification and evacuation of some 50 people (II). 
The Thoroughgoods tried to escape in their car when the saw the flood coming, 
but the flood caught them in the garage, filling up to their windows. They retreated with 
their dog upstairs as the water rose 5 ft in their first floor, collapsed several first floor 
rooms, and filled their basement. This again shows the relative safety of roofs and levels 
above the flood stage (8). 
BIG THOMPSON FLASH FLOOD (AND DIVERSION DAMl 
Par: Big Thompson River/Canyon, 1976 = 2500 
Par 1: same as Par 
L1 = 145, P1 = 0.058 
There was a general impression from people analyzing the event that the 
evacuation warnings were disbelieved because at the lowest end of the canyon the local 
weather was often fair or produced only light rain during the day, and because previous 
floods had not exceeded I 0 ft compared to the 20 that occurred this time ( 4, 8). In other 
words, mild conditions and prior experience with milder floods can create a kind of 
detrimental, upbeat attendant circumstance (Ac) that deters evacuation. 
Rather than panic, people typically disregarded warnings that were not repeated or 
otherwise made more believable . For example, one waitress reported that no one in her 
restaurant moved after being warned of landslides and flooding, but they left after 
receiving a second, false report that a darn upstream in Estes Park had broken (4, 5). 
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There was not a wall of water but a steady, rapid rise. In Drake, Sensory clues 
were the only warning most people received (4). These included heavy rainfall, a visually 
rising river, and the change in the sound of the river as the flows increased. Those who 
attempted to evacuate by automobile or who did nothing seriously imperiled themselves, 
while those who immediately sought high ground were the safest. 
"Trees with trunks over 2 feet thick were gouged from the canyon's walls, and 
boulders l 0 feet in diameter were rolled down the riverbed .... Dotted about the canyon 
were many concrete slabs, all that remained of the buildings the flood had swept away" 
(6 , p. 125). 
There was tremendous scour and deposition. "In a few hours [the flood] turned 
Tom Hart's tomato patch into a ten-feet-deep ravine strewn with three-ton boulders" 
(Cynthia Russ Ramsay, in 6, p. 125). Elsewhere, cars were buried 6 feet beneath the bed 
of the Big Thompson River. 
Although some trees withstood the waters, "The ground became so sodden that 
the roots could barely support the trunk and branches: 30-foot-tall pine trees could be 
felled by a vigorous push" (6, p. 125). 
The last cry heard over the CB of one victim buried in her car was "My God! It's 
the end of the world!" (6, pl25) 
A family which survived the Rapid City flood (1972), one which was familiar 
with sever flooding in Texas, and one familiar with tornadoes all responded to warnings 
immediately by heading toward higher ground. While not a scientific sample, these 
examples represented what investigators considered a benefit from experience with sever 
disasters. By contrast, those familiar with local flooding that routinely failed to threaten 
lives were often reluctant to respond to warning, explaining later that they had survived it 
before; why should this time be any more dangerous ( 4)? 
The likelihood of people to respond to evacuation warnings increased with the 
number of warnings they received (4). 
BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE 
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota= 12,375 
Par,: Rapid City, S.D., below Canyon Lake Dam along Rapid Creek 
L1 = 171, P1 = 0.040 
Pactola Reservoir was 25 stream miles above Canyon Lake Dam (3). It 
contributed virtually nothing to the flood ( 4), so runnoff was limited to the 66 mi2 
drainage between the reservoirs ( 4 ). 
There was no real-time reporting system for river flow and rainfall (5). 
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"We learned that people had been hesitant to leave their homes as they couldn't 
relate to the danger because of previous smaller floods in other years." (7, p II) 
Between 8:00 and 9:25, Mayor Barnett asked Lt. Hennies to again call the radio 
stations, this time to ask people to stay away from the west end of town, nearest the dam. 
Expecting curiosity seekers and resulting traffic problems, the Lieutenant asked him to 
cancel the request and the call was never made. 
"The water was chest high and the front of the truck was floating from time to 
time. From the rear of the fire truck we could see with the aid oflarge spotlights. 
people were clinging to anything that would float. Roofs and walls from damaged homes 
all had people clinging to them, floating refrigerators, cars and propane tanks. People 
were hanging in trees, the roar of the water was terrible and the sounds of screams [for] 
help were even loader than that. People floated by just out of reach and we couldn't get to 
them .. . . The screams died down as people fell from the trees and rooftops and were 
swept away." (7.2, p. 30) 
"There was [this] boat [that] came down the creek with three or four people in it, 
moving at a tremendous speed, totally out of control and about the time it got to where 
the water fountain was, the boat shot 30 or 40 feet straight in the air. This was the last 
time we saw the boat or the people" (7.15 , p. 371 ). 
""Across the street a house caught fire and burned. An electric substation 
exploded and lighted the sky .... Near W. Blvd and Main the stench of gas was heavy 
and it was apparent that gas was rising out of the filling station gas tanks and the danger 
of fire was great." (7.2, p. 30) 
St. John 's Hospital lost power along with 93% of the city. The emergency 
generator was also unavailable because the natural gas line which fueled it had been shut 
down to reduce the danger from dozens of broken gas lines. Service was not restored 
until 2:42 AM, 2 hr and 45 min after power was lost (7.5, p. 64f). The hospital was also 
surrounded by flood waters, so not a single doctor could reach the building. The sole 
medical authority was the night nursing supervisor (7.14, p. 347). 
Chuck Hewitt, a worker at the hospital, recounts fighting a waterfall of water to 
climb the hospital stairs to reach entrance, of being knocked down 2 or 3 times while 
trying to clear dangerous debris from around the building, and of wading through 
shoulder-high water to get food from the Safeway store for patients (7.15, p. 366ft). 
Some invalids died, while others required special effort to save. One 71-year-old 
lady saved her daughter by holding her on a mattress, standing herself in water up to her 
chest because she couldn't get her on the roof. The water was slimy, it was hard to stand, 
and if it had risen higher, they both would have perished (8, p. 43). 
Most of the bodies were mangled and beyond recognition (7.7, p. 130). 
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Though Pennington County had an emergency plan, few were familiar with it and 
"no one could relate it to their current situation" (7 .8, p. 204). 
"The NWS had an unlisted number but it was not available to State Radio. State 
Radio also tried to call on a hotline, part of the National Air Raid warning service .. 
Unfortunately, the loud speaker at NWS was probably turned off' as it frequently was 
and the call was not answered (7.12, p. 304). 
Two reasons dominated people's reluctance to evacuate when receiving warnings: 
I) there was no experiential precedent for a flood of this magnitude; the most recent large 
flood I 0 years earlier had only flooded lawns and basements, and 2) the stream rose at 
night, when people couldn't see what was happening (7 .20, p. 617). Due to this darkness, 
there are no pictures of the flood. 
"All bridge approaches were overtopped except in the outer fringes of the flood 
zone. Water surface profiles were highly irregular; natural formations , debris piles, and 
urban improvements partially diverted flows, causing the water to flow at different 
elevations in a cross section across many of the streams. The differences in cross-
sectional water surface elevations were most obvious in the mountain areas upstream 
from Rapid city, in Keystone, and in Sturgis, where flood depths were relatively shallow. 
Superelevation of flows on the outside of curves caused stages to rise and flood land that 
was elevated well above the average flood stages." (9, p. 38) 
The post-flood emotional disturbances were many (see source 7.18 for excellent 
and sobering examples). 
We (Warning Effectiveness) "Although these [early media) warnings were 
timely and useful .. . they did not carry with them a sense of urgency" because 
the magnitude of precipitation was unknown. "One person remarked that, ' It (the 
first warning for Rapid Creek) was the kind of warning that suggested that I 
should bring in the lawn furniture' " (5 , p. 15). 
Later, REACT, 4-wheelers, the Rapid City Police, the Fire Departments, 
and the National Guard all made door-to-door warnings in the Canyon Lake Area 
(7, p. 137). In some cases, they also used sirens and bullhorns (7.20, p. 614). Still, 
over l 0% of Par was trapped by flood waters and later rescued (over 1,000 
persons) orperished(7.8, p. 203; 7.13,p. 316; 7.20, p. 618), mostofthese in 
Rapid Ci ty (about 25% ofPar1) . Many refused to believe the reports, even when 
contacted by friends, relatives, or emergency personnel, and some were so 
angered by the media reports that they called the radio station to chastise them for 
scaring people (7.8, p. 203). 
The door-to-door efforts were sincere and urgent, but a lot of people did 
not attempt to leave "until they heard it [the flood) next door" (7.20, p. 615) or the 
extent of the flood was obvious (9) . 
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While the city had civil defense sirens, it did not occur to anyone to sound 
them (7.20, p. 617). 
A large number of people who heard the media reports drove to watch the 
flood, many losing their lives (7.20, p. 618; other sources). 
Since somewhere between 50% and 90% evacuated, We= M. 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) At least 9,500 telephones lost service and long-
distance service to towns such as Keystone was lost (7.3, p. 52). "By II :30 p.m., 
the flood had disrupted communications to nine Northwestern Bell exchanges, 
two Independent company exchanges, [and] five Minuteman Missile sites. '' 
(7.4, p. 58). 
About I 1:47, 93% of the electrical load was out of service in Rapid City 
due to houses floating down the creek and destroying the main transmission 
feeder lines. Lines were shut down to avoid electrocuting people in the flood (7 .5, 
p. 64!). Prior to this, lights went out in the flooding area, making rescue 
operations difficult, especially with downed wires everywhere and large debris 
moving up to 40 mph (7.13, p. 316). 
In particular, the darkness hindered both warnings and rescues: Ac = H. 
BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE 
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota= 12,375 
Par2: The flooded, rural/unincorporated portions of Pennington County, including 
Rapid Creek above Canyon Lake Dam; L2 = 36, P2 = 0.0068 
Sclrvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): Would be H if only 
Rapid Creek, but due to the large number of locations and creeks, Schvq = L. 
"Many of the victims, campers in the Black Hills area near the streams," were 
overcome while they slept or before they could reach high ground. In one cabin, 3 out of 
7 campers perished 
A little before II p.m. , Tom heard water coming in the cabin. He woke us all up . 
We couldn't open the cabin door to get out because of water outside. I kicked out 
a window and right then a car smashed into it. We all grabbed a mattress in the 
one room in the cabin and floated in the water-it was four or five feet deep-and 
the cabin started floating downstream. It went at least a mile and then one wall of 
the cabin broke away from the rest of it. (8, p. 43). 
Although Wt was 120 min, and Wtavg around 55 min, personal Wt; was 0 for 
many people in the most danger (camping) and the effectiveness of the warnjngs was 
likely very low. 
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BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE 
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota= 12,375 
Par3: Battle Creek in and near Keystone 
L3 = 12, P3 = 0.075 
"The Black Hills attracts many campers and visitors, and it was difficult to warn 
those people in the more remote canyons and valleys. This is a [growing] national 
problem ... " (5, p. v) 
BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE 
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota= 12,375 
Par4 : Box Elder Creek near the town of Box Elder and Black Hawk 
L4 = 15, P4 = 0.038 
What is striking is that Box Elder experienced an attenuated flood (only 17,000 
cfs compared to 51,000 cfs near Doty School on Nemo Road or 30,100 near Nemo) 
because it was located on the plains (8, 9) . This means the flood should also have been 
shallower, albeit more widespread. Yet, compared to no deaths along its length in the 
canyons, where the waters were deeper and swifter, there were IS deaths in Box Elder. 
This suggests several observations: 1) death rates are highly variable and not easy to 
predict based on flood characteristics alone; 2) the fact that the flood peaked at 5:00AM 
in Box Elder, when everyone was asleep, compared to 9:00 PM the rught before near 
Nemo, when people were still awake (Nemo was evacuated by 7:45 ; see Wt7), appears to 
have been a key factor; 3) Even though Box Elder could have had 5 to 8 hr of warning 
time from officials experiencing great loss of life in streams with comparable canyon 
flow (notably in Rapid City), either the warning was not passed on or the evacuation was 
not effective; 4) the absence of record-breaking thunderstorms locally probably made few 
residents of Box Elder expect great flooding; and 5) once a flood reaches lethal 
proportions, the flood magnitude is probably far less important than temporal/spatial 
considerations. 
BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE 
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota = 12,375 
Par6: City of Sturgis on Bear Butte Creek 
L6 = 0, P6 = 0.0 
This case demonstrates how variables like Dv can misrepresent a case. Dv is 
measures for the main flow, but in this case, the main flow impacted very few structures. 
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Instead, a large number of structures were inundated by quiescent backwaters. A variable 
like Schvq can help flag this. 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, 
AND VARIABLES DEPENDENT ON SHARED ANALYSES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 
Par= 3,170; L = 139; P = 0.044 
Pearl Woodrum wrote the Governor of West Virginia 4 years before the failure on 
Feb. 5, 1968: "Every time it rains it scares everyone to death. We are all afraid we will be 
washed away and drowned . .. please for God's sake have the dump and water destroyed. 
Our lives are in danger." She urged others to write, but they were afraid of losing their 
jobs with the mines (24). 
Considering the death of Michael, who died 3-4 months after conception when his 
mother died, " I still wonder everyday about what my other baby would have been. 
Michael would have been 24 now" (7, Larry Owens, p. 168). 
A poisonous snake bit a little girl, even though it was winter. "The flood water 
brought them out. One of the most dangerous things to contend with after a flood is 
snakes" (7, James Singleton, p. 179). Hundreds of snakes were swimming in the lake 
following the Eldorada Canyon flood, as well. 
Some reported as many as I ,000 people injured (25), but Jason Riggins, the hospital 
administrator, indicated they treated 511 in the emergency room, with 20 being admitted 
to the hospital. Another 645 were directed to Red Cross shelters (7, p. 172). 
In this event, as with most similar events, there was widespread looting of stores 
that survived the flood, evacuated homes, and debris piles (3, etc.). It did not stop until 
the National Guard arrived (7, Harold Hale, p. 97). 
As in other violent floods (i.e., see Eldorado Canyon), most recovered bodies had 
no clothes, the clothes having been tom off the bodies by the currents. Many who 
survived also lost their clothes to the flood (7, 14). 
Like the flood in Eldorado Canyon and other floods preceded by debris darns and 
a wall of water, the wave road the valley a bit like a bobsled. "Clusters of homes on one 
side of the tracks were swept away altogether while clusters on the other side, lying at 
precisely the same elevation, were barely splashed." According to an anonymous 
eyewitness, "This water, when it carne down through here, it acted real funny. It would 
go this way on this side of the hill and take a house out, take one house out of all the 
rows, and then go back the other way.lt would just go from one hillside to the other" (10, 
p. 30). 
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The emotional problems following this flood were extreme and ubiquitous. 
Wilbur and Deborah are good examples. Their account of the flood is presented under 
Schvq for Par6 in Lorado. Afterward, they moved to a new house far up the hillside above 
any conceivable flood, above Man where flooding was the mildest (I 0) . Two years after 
the flood , Wilbur described his state: 
Every time it rains I get that old dirty feeling that it is just a natural thing for it to 
become another flood . .. . If there's a storm warning out, why I don't go to bed 
that night. I set up. I tell my wife, "Don't undress our little girls . . .. " 
My nerves is my problem. Every time it rains, every time it storms, I just 
can ' t take it. I walk the floor. I get so nervous I break out in a rash. I' m taking 
shots for it now .. .. 
Every time it rains or goes to come up a storm, I get my flashlight-if it' s 
2:00 in the morning or if it's three. Now it ' s approximately 500 feet from my 
house to the creek, but I make me a round about every thirty minutes, looking at 
that creek . ... to see if the creek has raised any. 
What I went through on Buffalo Creek is the cause . ... The whole thing 
just happens over and over again in my dreams. 
I don' t want to get out, see no people. I despise even going to town, going 
to the supermarket. I just want to be by myself ... don't want to see nobody. 
Why? I don't know. I'm just a different person .. . . I didn't event go to the 
cemetery when my father died [about a year after the flood]. 
Deborah also described her state: 
I' m neglecting my children. I've just completely quit cooking. I don' t do no 
housework. I just won ' t do nothing. Can' t sleep. Can ' t eat. I just want to take me 
a lot of pills and just go to bed and go to sleep and not wake up .. .. I loved to 
cook. I loved to sew. I loved to keep house ... . But now I've just got to the point 
where it don' t mean a thing in the world to me. I haven't cooked a hot meal and 
put it on the table for my children in almost three weeks .... 
l just didn't want to live .... I just cried all the time. 
At one point, she planned a suicide, but her family stopped her, drug her back into the 
house, and gave her some nerve medicine (10, p. 143-145). 
Many had worked very hard all their lives and were just starting to fee l like they 
were getting ahead, having purchased and remodeled their homes, when their life's work 
was stripped away in a few minutes. Some time after the flood, testimonies like these 
were common: "I've just about given up all hope . . . . It seems like it's useless to even 
want to go on and try again," and 'There were months and months and months where l 
felt l was just sitting around waiting to die. And I believe a lot of these people was the 
same way" (I 0, p. 158). 
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Others were devastated by the manner in which they lost loved ones. "One of our 
very close friends stayed drunk for almost five months because he could still hear his 
brother and sister screaming ... when the water hit them" (I 0, p. 171 ). Carol Hoosier, 
who ran from her parents porch while her mom ran inside and died with Hoosier' s father, 
"was under constant care of doctors" for two years following the flood for "physical as 
well as emotional problems" (7, Carol Hoosier, p. 106). 
Most of those who survived the flood were subjected to the horror of seeing 
bodies wash by, seeing bodies wash into their homes or into nearby debris piles, seeing 
bodies dug out of the mud by bulldozers or rescue workers, or scanning rows of black, 
mutilated, corpses in the temporary morgues in an effort to identify family or friends. It 
often took multiple passes before people could identify close relatives, the flood so 
distorted their appearances (7) . "The bodies were mangled. I saw arms twisted just like 
you'd wring out a dish rag .... Some had the back of their heads missing. It was horrible 
(7, Ruth Morris, p. 1421). 
Numerous witnesses along the length of the valley recall being traumatized by a 
false report that another dam had broken or was ready to break, sending people in a panic 
back up the mountainsides (7). 
Structural anchors can actually make a house more dangerous, causing it to be 
destroyed rather than floating on the flood as a temporary raft: "We noticed the houses 
that had chimneys busted up and washed off, but the ones without chimneys just floated 
over and piles up" (7, Leroy Mays, p. 127). 
Whether winter or summer, one of the lasting dangers of a large flood is that it 
can sweep poisonous snakes out into the open or near residential areas: "We had a little 
girl to be bitten by a snake, and though that seems unusual for that time of the year, what 
people don ' t realize is that the flood water brought them out. One of the most dangerous 
things to content with after a flood is snakes" (7, James Singleton, p. 179). In a similar 
way, hundreds of rattlesnakes were washed out of Eldorado Canyon and into the lake 
downstream during that flash flood. 
The discrepancies between Wt and Wtavg point to several shortcomings of Wt. 
First, warnings prior to failure do not carry the urgency or credibility of warnings after 
failure. Second, an official warning can be issues such that the early warning 
effectiveness is extremely low. This can result in high life loss with a long warning time, 
or it can be masked by a highly effective evacuation in the final few minutes based on 
post-failure warnings or sensory clues. Third, the official Wt may be 0 while the sensory 
clues provide adequate warning for most people to escape. In all three cases, Wt has very 
little predictive power, distorting reality as it pertains to most members of the subPar. 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171 
Par1: Saunders 
Ll = 8, PI = 0.40 
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In rev iewing the list of fatalities in source 7 and those in other events such as the 
Dale Dyke Dam failure, it is clear that entire families often perish in floods . The lethality 
of a flooding situation can broadly be broken down into three types of functions : I) 
Above a certain threshold and at a certain distance from safety, the function is horizontal-
-the flood is lethal to virtually everyone it touches. Those who escape do so by 
outrunning the flood altogether or by experiencing a fluke of the current that washes them 
to safety. 2) At the other end, the function is also flat-the flood may be extremely 
inconvenient and cause non-structural damages, but fatalities are the exception. Such 
floods may rise deeply or run swiftly, but not at the same time. There is adequate safety 
on a nearby hillside or on a higher story within a building, and fatalities occur due to 
flukes not experienced by the majority of the population. 3) In between, the fata lity rate 
fo llows a ri sing or fa lling curve that depends on many factors, where "flukes" that cost 
lives are common and "flukes" that save lives are also plentiful. 
Roger Lambert indicated that "houses would float a small distance in the water, 
but then bigger waves would crush them to pieces while they were in the air" ( 16). 
Lambert had one leg and an artificial one. Since the limb was in the trunk of the 
car, he had to use crutches to begin climbing the hillside. He lost one crutch rushing to 
get out of the car, lost the other a few more feet up the hill, and had to crawl the rest of 
the way to reach safety (16). This gives a good idea of the urgency the evacuees fe lt as 
they struggled to beat the flood in the few seconds that were available. 
169). 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171 
Par3: 3 houses clustered 0.4 mi downstream from Saunders 
L3 = 4, P3 = 0.12 
Danny Peters noticed 3 waves of water at their hillside house (7, Danny Peters, p. 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171 
Par6: Lorado and Pardee 
L6 = 32, P6 = 0.11 
"The wall of water roaring down Buffalo Creek swept a good deal of seepage 
before it like an enormous broom. That is why a yard could be overrun with water and 
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small debris before the wave itself arrived" (10, p. 138). One man named Wilbur reported 
his family's experience in Lorado, confirmed by his wife: "For some reason, I opened the 
inside door and looked up the road-and there it came. Just a big black cloud .... like .. 
seeing barges coming down four or five abreast. . . . It was coming slow, but my wife was 
still asleep (downstairs] ... and the other kids were still upstairs asleep." He screamed to 
his wife, she leaped up and looked outside, and there was already shallow water and 
smail debris washing into their yard, well ahead of the wall of water. She roused the kids 
and they piled into the car. The only escape route was upstream, so they drove toward the 
approaching mass of houses, decided to abandon the car, and scrambled under a gondola 
(railroad car) on the way toward the hillside. While under the gondola, it was struck by 
their neighbors house, wrecking it, but also turning the bulk of the flood toward the 
center of the valley and giving them time to scramble out and up the hill. Wilbur saw 
about 14 people in the 5 houses above his washed away in their homes. Many others were 
scrambling up the bank near them. Shortly after this, Wilbur passed out (10, p. 138ft). 
The erratic selectivity of the flood could be seen at one site where a house was 
completely washed away, but the fence and gate were still standing and the Logan 
Banner paper box was still attached (7, anonymous female, p. 29). 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171 
Par7: Lundale and Craneco 
L1 = 66, P7 = 0.15 
Bill Owens survived, without any physical harm, after being washed up into a 
tree. His sister and sister-in-law died (7, anonymous female, p. 28). 
The train on the track at Craneco diverted a lot of water, sparing the houses 
behind it on higher ground (7, Barbara Brunty, p. 50, and others). 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171 
Par10: Latrobe 
LIO = 6, PIO = 0.10 
Josephene Adkins was caught by the edge of the flood because she turned back 
during the evacuation to get her pocket book. She almost pulled her husband under with 
her, but he managed to hold onto the railroad tracks and he pulled her out after his mother 
came over to help (7, Adkins, p. 12!). 
"When it hit, the debris just piled up against the coal cars on the tracks, and it 
formed a sort of barricade that protected us from the water. I will always believe that was 
the hand of God protecting us. The water was diverted away from us" (7 , Barbara Burton, 
p. 57). Other houses in Lundale were similarly protected by the coal cars (7, Evelyn 
Mays, p. 125). 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171 
Paru: Robinette 
Lu = 3, Pu = 0.011 
432 
Jeana, my youngest, looked up at me and asked, "Mommy, is this the end of 
time?'' I said, "No, honey, the end of time will come with fire, not water." Just as 
I said that, a transformer hit the train trestle, and fire was shooting out 
everywhere, and then the railroad trestle came down in the water. That just about 
scared Jeana to death. (7, Barbara Spears, p. 184). 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171 
Par12: Amherstdale and Becco 
Lu = 2, P12 = 0.0039 
I seen the first house hit the bridge, then the second, then the third and fourth. 
And then a mobile home hit those houses where they had done jammed up against 
the bridge, and I guess the pressure and the impact was rolling under and that 
mobile home just vanished underneath. I never did see no more of it. There were 
three women in it. They were standing in a big picture window and their mouths 
were moving. I gathered they were hollering. (I 0, p. 33 under "the view from 
Braeholm" but with respect to Amherst Camp upstream) 
When the sensory clue is rising water and debris, it does not necessarily prompt 
an urgent response, even when it is known a dam is in danger of failing, unless the true 
magnitude of the event is understood. For example, Barbara Brunty in Amherstdale had 
discussed the possibility of the dam failing many times, but she felt such an event would 
only put 2 or 3 ft of water in the yard. Her sister Opal called that morning to warn her that 
miners feared the dam would soon fail. She looked out the window every few minutes to 
keep tabs, but she let her husband sleep until she saw the creek rising fast. Soon after that, 
the creek began to bulge in the middle (see Sc). Her husband told her to evacuate. She 
started to leave, but then went rummaging for a change of clothes for her daughter, 
looking for something old that could get dirty. Once outside, she returned for her pocket 
book. Once outside a second time, she returned to call her neighbor, but the phone was 
out. Before she ran next door, she went to get an umbrella and grab a blanket. There was 
not enough time to warn her neighbor as the water rose, flooding the roads, then the car, 
then her house (7, Barbara Brunty, p. 48ff). 
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In Amherstdale, as at other towns, when the drifting houses jammed together 
behind bridges, forming temporary or permanent debris dams, it provided an opportunity 
for many to escape their houses and walk across the mass of debris to safety on the 
hillside (7, several witnesses, including Barbara Brunty, p. 48ft) . 
BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES 
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171 
Par14: Accoville 
Lt4 = 2, Pt4 = 0.048 
The tendency of people to seek to evacuate by automobile is not only based on a 
false sense of efficiency but on the fact that it is a very valuable commodity that people 
want to save from a flood. There was evidence of this in many eyewitness reports (7). As 
an example, instead of running up the nearby hillside, Mikey Wilson insisted on running 
over to his neighbors volkswagen so he could drive it up the hillside. Those on foot 
reached the hill long before he did, and the water washed over the back of the vehicle, 
coming within seconds of causing Wilson's death (7, Barbara Spears, p. 183). 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
DELINEATION OF PAR, SUBPAR, LIFE LOSS, 
AND PARAMETERS COMMON TO ALL 30 SUBPAR 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, Yorkshire, England, 1864 
Par= 20,800, L = 263, P = 0.013 
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): It would be extremely 
rare to have subPar defined in a more homogeneous manner, or to have them described 
more thoroughly. Without exception (except perhaps ParJo), Schvq =H. 
Many bodies were never identified because in many cases every member of the 
family died and nobody was left to recognize key features. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par3.: Damflask, 2.5 miles below Dale Dyke Dam 
LJa = 5, PJa = 0.20 
A strange phenomona was seen in Mr. Hobson's garden after the flood. There was 
a hole 12 ft deep and many yards in diameter, apparently caused by a flood vortex. Such 
holes occurred many places along the length of the flood. 
All five deaths occurred to people who did not heed the timely warnings. One 
refused to believe the report and delayed in bed. The other four were at work at the mill, 
one of the few places were it was normal to work all night. Since the earliest warnings 
occurred before the dam actually fai led, they likely felt pressured to keep their normal 
work shi fts, despite the danger. 
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Although a small minority of the total number of casualties in the entire event, 
there were many deaths like those of the 4 mill workers. Since these water-powered 
fac ilities were very near or even on the river, they were exposed to the full force of the 
flood. A very high percentage of those who were working late in such facilities died. If 
the flood had occ urred in the early evening, after dark, instead of at midnight when very 
few workers were present, there might have been many times as many deaths 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par3b: Storrs Bridge, between Damflask and Loxley 
LJb = 0, PJb = 0.0 
Scltvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): The fit is good, except that 
the houses were near the edge of the flood so Ov is not representative. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par5: Little Matlock, below Rowell Bridge and about 3.6 miles below the dam 
Ls = 9, Ps = 0.56 
Here, like most places, the deaths were concentrated in the home, where the 
flooding was the most severe. In this case, the front houses provided a buffer, protecting 
those behind. In a row of 5 apartment-style houses, the first (empty) unit was removed in 
its entirety, the second was severely damaged and 7 of7 people died. In the next house 
back, sheltered still further, only l of 7 died- not because the wall was removed but 
because he washed out a second-story window. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par6: 1.5 miles of steep, narrow gorge from Little Matlock to Malin Bridge 
L6 = 2, P6 = 0.33 
Based on the I 00% mortality rate at the streamside commercial structures-here, 
at Par3. , and elsewhere- the late hour was a key factor in reducing this type of fata lity by 
perhaps 30 or 40 fold . When people were at work, the shift was a small fraction of the 
day crew, but the majority of riverside mills, wheels, forges, and the like were completely 
unoccupied. The local work-patterns are a key ingredient in quantifying subPar in 
commercial districts . 
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAMl 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par7: tbe contiguous balf of Malin Bridge witb exceptionally violent flooding 
L, = 102, P, = 0.93 
"A large number of the bodies were never identified, the reason being that in 
many cases entire families were drowned, no one surviving who could recognise the 
features of corpses which were recovered" ( l , p. 3 7). Moreover, none of the closest 
neighbors survived. 
Corpses from this area often had very few clothes on-maybe a single stocking or 
a coat-suggesting to researchers at the time that the sleeping occupants had no time to 
dress before their houses collapsed and were washed away. In light of other events, 
floods often strip the clothing off people who are fully dressed, but the weight of other 
evidence supports the notion that there was little time for people to get dressed during the 
Dale Dyke Dam failure . 
Stone or brick houses do not readily float, so that if they fai l, they are more likely 
to collapse on the occupants than to provide a raft. 
lost: 
Life loss here was so complete, it is educational to examine the lives that were not 
l . The two who survived from the Spooner household floated out the second-
story windows on their beds and were washed to adjacent fields, where they 
were rescued. In both this event and many other events, lives have often been 
saved by mattresses, either by floating on them inside a room, or by riding 
them downstream until they bump into a place of refuge. Also, in other 
instances, people have been drowned when swept out their window on a 
mattress. 
2. The watchman was standing outside Ann Mount' s house, speaking with her at 
her door. On seeing the flood coming (Sc ), he ran for high ground and 
escaped; she ran inside and drowned. 
3. William Watson's house was destroyed and he was swept downstream with 4 
other fami ly members. He was holding onto a "balk of timber" (I, p. 40) for 
support. The family stayed together at first, but then the current carried him 
apart and deposited him on top of a pile of debris that had washed against the 
Widdowson' s house. This is the only house in this subPar that was not 
destroyed. He called out for help and they pulled him through a window. 
4. The 4 Widdowsons just mentioned were the only other survivors. 
This indicates the life loss expected when an entire neighborhood is swept away 
in an instant by a flood less than 2-stories deep: l survived by evacuating ahead of the 
flood, 3 by riding rafts to a refuge and then being rescued, and 4 by experiencing less-
severe flooding ; l 02 died. Although the houses were 2-stories, they provided no refuge 
when they were erased. 
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par8: the contiguous half of Malin Bridge called Holme Row 
Ls = 0, Ps = 0.0 
Harrison attributes the lower lethality of the flood in this area to the sheltering 
effect of adjacent buildings and to more substantial construction in Holme Row. These 
adjacent buildings were not described. Perhaps they were well-situated end houses that 
received the greatest damage, perhaps Par7 was close enough to temporarily deflect or 
absorb the strongest currents before being removed by the flood, or perhaps there were 
non-residential structures such as barns or shops on the periphery. In any case, reports 
indicate that the flood rose and fell in about 15 minutes, so even structures that were 
completely washed away could conceivably have deflected the peak flows-first as a 
wall and then as a temporary pile of stone rubble. 
It is most likely that Holme Row benefited from being the second line of defense, 
as it were. The depth here was half as deep (or less) as in Par7, and since Par7 occupied a 
strip of land adjacent to the river, Holme Row was probably some distance inland. Par7 
would have helped direct the major currents downstream, buffering the land behind it: 
Par8 = 24*4 = 96 and L8 = 0. 
Although the first floors were flooded to 5 or 6ft, every home had a second story, 
where most people slept. Without this refuge, under Wtavg = 0, there would likely have 
been life loss. With this refuge, they were able to get up, get dressed, and watch the flood. 
There were at least 3 close calls for people who encountered the flood while downstairs. 
Two managed to climb the stairs to the second story, while the third broke a hole into a 
neighbors house and was rescued. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par9: Limerick Wheel and houses across from Malin Bridge 
L9 = 3, P9 = 0.33 
Even when flooding is nearly 2-stories deep, people may survive by holding near 
the ceiling for air. This assumes that currents are sufficiently mild to avoid destroying the 
structure or washing the occupants out through windows or damaged walls, that people 
have time to reach the second story, and that the victims can stand on furniture or tread 
water throughout the duration of the flood. 
Corresponding to the observation above, notice that because the structure was 
sturdy stone, the flooding was able to rise to a great depth while causing no more than 
minor structural damage. If the structure had been a frame house, it would have floated 
away and perhaps been destroyed when colliding with other houses or obstacles. 
437 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par10: Hillsbro', 6 miles from the dam and below Malin Bridge 
L10 = 39, P10 = 0.45 
Par1, Par10, and Par11 , all experienced severe flooding, but in ways that distinguish 
the I i fe loss in each. Par1 had flooding that, in combination with the buildings present, 
was powerful enough to strip away even the foundations. Almost everyone died. Par10 
had flooding which washed away some homes, flooded others above the rooftops, and 
damaged others, but left just enough space in about half of the homes to breath. 
Consequently, life loss was close to 50%. If Brick Row had not been 3 stories tall, life 
loss would probably have been comparable to that for Par7. Par 11 had flooding very 
similar to Par7, but a debris dam deflected enough of the current that the buildings 
remained standing, despite their major damage. Life loss here was reduced to I 0%. This 
study suggests some hypotheses worth exploring: 
When Par are present, life loss is very near to I 00% when homes are 
completely destroyed or entirely submerged. 
When a community is marked by severe damages, including complete 
destruction of many homes, life loss may approach 50%, with life loss 
concentrated primarily where damages are greatest or houses are submerged. 
Even when suffering extreme damage, if a home is not destroyed and 
maintains a refuge, life loss can be dropped to between I 0 and 50%. Here, life 
loss occurs where major damage exposes occupants to currents that can sweep 
them out a door or window or through a broken wall ; where occupants are 
overcome quickly before they can get to the refuge; or where occupants can't 
swim, they fall into swirling waters, and others are not able to rescue them. 
There may be value in exploring life loss separately for houses which are 
completely submerged or completely destroyed, and for those which are 
damaged severely but without eliminating places of refuge. If separate 
functions could be developed, these could then be applied to the expected 
damage statistics in predicting life loss. Of course, these examples are limited 
to cases where Wtavg = 0, so there was no prior evacuation. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
SubPar# 10: Hillsbro', 6 miles from the dam and below Malin Bridge 
Par1ob: houses that were partially destroyed (major damage) 
LJOb = 32, PIOb = 0.44 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) 15 houses and 2 inns had major damage. In some 
cases, the flood completely submerged the structures, but many structures were on 
higher ground or had 3 stories. The inns were only flooded to the first floor, the 9 
three-story houses in Brick Row were partially flooded in the highest floor, and a 
few people like George Cooper and his wife escaped by climbing to the top of 
their two-story house (1). 
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As suggested under Dd, above, it appears that everyone or virtually everyone who 
survi ved was able to reach a high point in a structure where they could keep their head 
above water. Everyone appears to have died in structures that were completely 
submerged (largely single story). Had Brick Row not been three stories high, life loss 
would probably have been much greater. This suggests that for Tpar, the main difference 
in life loss between cases where structures are destroyed and those where buildings 
remain standing with major damage is the availability of a comparatively safe refuge on 
an upper floor or the roof. If this refuge is removed through complete submergence, life 
loss is comparable in buildings with complete destruction and with only major damage. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par11 : Hill Bridge, overS miles from the dam 
L11 = 10, P11 = 0.096 
D (Maximum Depth) "The waterline was nearly on a level with the top of 
the second storys" (l , p. 44). This is consistent with Mallin Bridge upstream: D = 
14ft. 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) 99,500/W = 378 ft 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) See the description under Par; above. Crooke's 
home had minor damage, but the rest appear to have suffered some level of 
structural destruction. 
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) 0.96 
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) l 
F5 (Incremental Forcefulness) E 
This subPar, Par8, and Par7 make an interesting set that demonstrates the 
relationship between flood lethality and life loss. Par7 was utterly washed away and only 
the exceptions survived. Although Par 11 had almost identical values forD, Dv, Fp, Fd, 
and F s, the true structural damage was much less-{)nly 4 structures were destroyed and 
there was no indication that any structures were washed away. The remaining damage 
was quite serious, including in many cases the loss of entire walls and most of the 
second-story floors , but the remnants of most houses allowed over 90% of the subPar to 
survive. Pars had flooding that filled most of the first story, but structural damage was 
almost nonexistent and the vast majority of this subPar never got wet. Life loss there was 
0. 
As a side note to the discussion above, Hill Bridge could have resembled Par7 
with respect to both structural removal and life loss, but "a barricade formed of the 
accumulation of trees, chairs, sofas, and other articles brought down by the flood," 
providing protection to this housing development. This is one small example of how 
uncertain flood routing can be under the dynamic action of a catastrophic flood. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
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Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par 12 : Owlerton, the first large community on the plains, over 6 miles from the dam 
L12 = 5, P12 = 0.0063 
Over and again, the sensory clues indicating the flood was coming were missed 
until the houses were surrounded or filled with water. There were 3 possible reasons for 
this: I) the flood rose exceptionally quickly, but it did not usually come as a wall, 
instantaneously breaking trees and houses, 2) there was an exceptionally strong wind, so 
people sometimes confused the flood with the gale, and 3) most people were asleep. 
However, even when people were awake, unless they actually saw the flood coming, 
sounds alone were insufficient to trigger a timely response. Here are two examples of 
reactions from those who were awake: 
Mrs. Proctor herself did not go to bed, but sat up reading. Soon after half-past 
twelve she heard a tremendous roar like the sound of many waters, and she 
immediately went to the door, to see what was the cause of the commotion. Just 
as she was about to open the door the water began to come in. She ran into the 
room where her daughter and the others were sleeping, and had only just time to 
get them upstairs when the door and windows gave way, and the water filled the 
lower rooms up to the ceiling. Had the inmates been three minutes later they 
would assuredly have been drowned. (I , p. 51) 
Sergeant Foulds and his wife went to bed about eleven o'clock. Mrs. Foulds was 
awoke in about an hour by a great noise in the room. She exclaimed to her 
husband, "The wind is breaking the windows of the room." He jumped out of bed, 
and was astonished to find himself up to his hips in water. (I, p. 52) 
There are two important footnotes to the Foulds' story (above). First, the pressure 
from the water made it difficult or impossible to open doors. This dilemma was observed 
by Harrison with respect to many houses and some failed rescue attempts. In this case, 
Sergeant Foulds was unable to open the door to the bedroom of his two young children 
and both of them drowned. Second, the Foulds were sleeping on the ground floor. In 
areas with flooding less than I 0 ft deep, most of the deaths occurred to people so located. 
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
SubPar# 12: Owlerton-first large community on the plains,> 6 mi from the dam 
Parl2b: houses/barracks with major damage 
L12b = 2, P12b = 0.013 
Defining F (Fp, Fd, F5) in such a way that major damages and totally-destroyed 
structures are lumped together as a single category produces identical F values for Par12a 
and Parm, even though P12a = 1.0 and Pm = 0.013. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM> 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Paru: an enclave across the river from Owlerton 
Ln = 0, Pn = 0.0 
Deep floods are not necessarily lethal, even with short warning time. Here, safety 
was very near because the hills were very steep and the houses were close enough to 
cross directly from the second story of the homes. This was a common means of escape 
in similar reaches upstream when the houses were surrounded by the flood. If the flood 
had come with higher velocity, however, the houses may have been washed away before 
escape was possible. In terms of priority, floods with high velocity appear to be more 
lethal than floods which are relatively deep. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
SubPar# 13: an enclave across the river from Owlerton 
Par13b: 5 houses with minor damage 
Lnb = 0, Pnb = 0.0 
V13 (Peak Velocity) • Since the flooding was deep, but the structural 
damage was light (see D and Dd), this subPar did not experience the flood's peak 
velocity of26.5 fps. Most likely the mill dam and steep hills worked together to 
shield this enclave, producing a deep backwater. For consistency, the 13.5 fps 
assumed in the next reach below will be used here also (see V 1s): V = 13.5 fps. 
V13b (Peak Velocity) As indicated under V13, the water was deep, but the 
structural damage was minimal, indicating a deep backwater. V is difficult to 
estimate, but it was slow, probably on the order of I - 3 fps: V = 2 fps. 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) 99,500/W = 185 
This is a good example of how Dv can completely misrepresent an isolated 
location, in this case a deep backwater with very mild currents. 
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Although TparJJb = 6, all 6 escaped to the hillside from the second story without 
getting wet after the flood arrived. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAMl 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par1s: Farfield Gardens, above Neepsend, about 7.5 miles below the dam 
L1s = 24, P1s = 0.44 
When houses are single story, life loss can be very great even when the number of 
houses destroyed is small. Although almost two thirds of these structures had only minor 
structural damage, the flood reached the ceiling or higher in many cases and the resultant 
life loss was nearly 50%. 
Among those who survived, most or all appear to have climbed on their roofs. 
This was not always safe, however, since at least one person was swept off the roof and 
drowned. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par1s: all ofNeepsend downstream ofNeepsend Lane 
L1s = 15, P1s = 0.021 
Three deaths were caused because John Mayor's wife was an invalid and so the 
fami ly chose to sleep downstairs. It is likely that many persons today with limited 
mobility choose to live or sleep on the ground floor, where escape from flood waters that 
come without warning is much more difficult. 
The following story illustrates why simple velocity*depth curves derived through 
laboratory studies fall short of the practical realities some people face in a flood. 
Mrs. Needham managed to get into Austin's house, but the water was so deep that 
she was lifted off her feet. All this time she had a young child in her arms, which 
added to the difficulties of her desperate struggle for preservation. She tried to get 
up stairs into the bedroom, but the door was shut, and the pressure of the water 
was so great that the A us tins could not push the door open. Mrs. Needham exerted 
herself to the utmost to hold the child out of the water, notwithstanding which it 
was drowned i her arms, and she was obliged to let it go, inorder to saver herself 
from being swept away by clinging to the nearest object she could lay hold of. 
This happened to be a table, and it floated up nearly to the ceiling with Mrs. 
Needham clinging to it. Her other child was also swept away and drowned. (I, p. 
60) 
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par20 : Harvest and Orchard Lanes, the first flooded district in Sheffield 
L2o = 8, P2o = 0.0034 
All 8 deaths occurred to people who slept downstairs on the first floor. Such 
sleeping quarters were unusual in this area, since most houses were 2-stories with upstairs 
bedrooms. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par21 : Bacon Island, in the center of the channel in upper Sheffield 
L21 = 3, P21 = 0.032 
There is inherent difficulty in defining such things as "evacuation time" since the 
time it takes to evacuate the flood zone is often much greater than the time it takes to 
reach a place of moderate safety. In the case of two-story buildings, safety might be a few 
seconds away on the second floor. Even when one's house provides no refuge, and the 
peripheries of the flood are out of reach, safety may not be far away. 
Consider the story of the Sharmans. Bacon Island was entirely flooded, and with 
such depths and velocities that 100% of the homes were partially or completely 
destroyed. The Sharman's house quickly filled part way up the second story. Fortunately, 
there was an adjacent hill that rose so steeply that police-constable John Thorpe was able 
to stand waste-deep on it, in the flood, and catch all 9 occupants as they jumped without a 
ladder. This was within inches of the torrent which moments after the rescue swept the 
house away so that only its foundation remained. Behind him, there was ground of 
sufficient height that Thorpe was able to first catch their baby and deposit it in safety 
before helping the rest of the family. 
Although John Thorpe was not able to warn anyone before the water entered their 
houses, his warning was early enough to allow many to evacuate, often with his help, 
before they were killed. Here, again, Wt, Wtavg, and E do not fully capture the time 
dynamics. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par23 : the Green Lane District and contiguous neighborhoods, upper Sheffield 
L23 = 1, P23 = 0.00065 
D (Maximum Depth) One of the works was flooded 4ft deep. On Dun 
Street, in Green Lane, Dennis M'Laughlin drowned when his ground-floor room 
443 
was flooded to the ceiling. All of Ball Street was flooded part way up the second-
floor bedrooms, and street lamps were extinguished by the flood: D = I 0 ft . 
Despite considerable depth in places, since the structures were 2-stories tall and 
only one had any structural damage, only one person died. Again, this person lived 
downstairs. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par24: Long Croft, between Green Lane and the river 
L2• = 6, P24 = 0.026 
V (Peak Velocity) • I 0 fps 
D (Maximum Depth) • Some houses were flooded above the first-floor 
ceiling. This being between Parn and the river, depths here were comparable to or 
greater than Dn: D = I 0 ft. 
The flood conditions here were almost identical to those for Par23 , although 
currents may have been swifter since this subPar was closer to the identical reach. 
Together, they give an idea of the life-loss potential when 2-story buildings are flood up 
to l 0 ft deep, currents are swift enough to carry people far down stream, but the 
combined forces of the water are insufficient to tear away walls or dislodge houses. 
When trying to wade through a flood, the size, age, and stamina of the wader are 
critical, as are the vagaries of the flood itself. Consider the following story: 
When the watchman alarmed Mrs. Ryder, she ran down stairs, followed by her 
two children. She managed to open the door; but had no sooner done so than a 
torrent of water rushed into the house. Mrs. Ryder seized hold of her daughter, 
and, breasting the waves, though quite undressed, carried the girl to the top of the 
street. The boy followed, clinging to his mother's night-dress. Mrs. Ryder was 
almost exhausted, and, in order to rest for a moment, clung to a lamp-post which 
had not yet been washed down. Just at this moment, a sudden rush of water 
carried the boy off his feet. "Oh, mother!" he screamed out. "Oh, Bob! Shrieked 
his little sister in reply. The next moment the torrent bore him away on its surface, 
and his cries soon died away amid the roar of the flood. Mrs. Ryder, though up to 
her neck in the water, still struggled for her own life and for that of her daughter. 
The water swept them in the direction of the King William Inn, the inmates of 
which house pulled Mrs. Ryder in, and she and her daughter were saved . .. "(I, 
p. 75) 
444 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par25: Kelham Island, in the center of the river about the middle of Sheffield 
L2s = 2, P2s = 0.083 
Identification/Location of Fatalities: Mr. Eaton died when he left his second-story 
bedroom to try to save his pig, and Mrs. Eaton died trying to help her husband. 
Evacuations are rarely as quick as they could be and people can not be counted on 
to choose the safest behavior when faced with a visible flood. There were several 
examples during this event of people rushing back to their houses or yards to get 
something they forget, to rescue a pet, or to free valuable livestock. These often resulted 
in very close calls, or, in this case, the only two fatalities. 
Fires are remarkably common during floods , having occurred in several different 
historical events (i.e. Johnstown and others). In this one, the men at the Kelham Rolling 
Mills managed somehow to set the building on fire while climbing into the rafters for 
safety. Fortunately, the flood rose quickly enough that the flames were soon 
extinguished. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par26: the communities adjacent to and downstream of Kelham Island 
L26 = 2, P26 = 0.0028 
In this case, a woman evacuated her first-floor apartment when the flood waters 
burst in. A second family lived upstairs, and seeing her, they quickly extended a sheet to 
pull her up. While clinging to the sheet, a second wave knocked the woman loose and she 
drowned. This was just one of several stories in which an individual was lost while being 
rescued or had a child swept away or knocked out of their arms by a sudden wave. This 
second wave may have been the result of the dam failing in what some recalled as two 
distinct stages. In any case, there is no doubt that sudden wave surges or localized 
pockets of unexpectedly high velocity can prove to be especially lethal. 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par28: Lady's Bridge to the Midland Railway Station, the final reach in Sheffield 
L2s = 2, P2s = 0.0027 
It was winter and the wind was very strong, so there was a real risk of freezing to 
death. Undoubtedly, some who were swept away were soon overcome by cold. Here, 
some watched a man clinging to a lamp post who "perished, as much from the 
benumbing influence of the cold as from the effects of the water" (I, p. 83). 
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM> 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par29 : Brightside & environs, downstream suburb of Sheffield below Wicker Station 
L29 = 2, P29 = 0.0016 
Sc (Sensory Clues) *The occupants of the Shuttle House in Brightside 
at the head of Sanderson' s Dam slept through the flood as it surrounded their 
house. They were not aware it had come until the next morning, long after it had 
departed again: Sc = 0 
See Sc. This is strong evidence supporting significant attenuation of the flood by 
thi s point, as assumed in quantifying Qp, V, and R throughout Sheffield and its suburbs 
(see *). 
DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM) 
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800 
Par30 : Sheffield neighborhoods primarily inland of Par15 through Par29 
L1o = 0, PJO = 0.0 
There is always the potential for life loss around water. People might be 
electrocuted, stumble and knock themselves unconscious and drown, have limited 
mobility and fall into the water while alone, or panic and suffer lethal medical side-
effects. However, when flooding is shallow and slow, such deaths have been quite rare, 
historically. 
Par30 is limited to areas with almost uniformly minor flooding-more so than any 
of the previous subPar. As such, it is not an inherently biased conglomerate of areas 
which by chance had zero life loss. Instead it pools many areas, some contiguous and 
some not, that shared a uniform set of descriptive variables. Some of the previous subPar 
also had zero fa tali ties, but they were distinguished by the nature of flooding at those · 
locations. It follows that this subPar was expansive enough, the flood damages consistent 
enough, and the life loss predictable enough that Par3o suggests flooding conditions at or 
below which life loss is not expected except under unusual circumstances. 
DRY CREEK FLASH FLOOD 
Par: Dry Creek train crossing near Eden, Colorado, 1904 = 138 
Par1: train called the Missouri Pacific Exposition Flyer 
Lt = 96, Pt = 0.70 
Floods which compromise the integrity of train crossings, or flooded regions 
occupied by a train , can cause high numbers of fatalities either by drowning trapped 
occupants or through fatal injuries resulting from a crash. 
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Significantly, the track itself was not flooded, but the bridge failed under extreme 
flooding conditions when crossed by the train. 
This type of fatality, along with fatalities caused by roads being overtopped or 
undermined by floods , should probably be treated separately from general drowning 
deaths in residential areas. 
EASTOVER MINING COMPANY SLUDGE POND DAM 
Par: Ages, Harlan County, Kentucky, 1981 = 100 
Par1: same as Par 
L1 = l, P1 = 0.01 
"Residents heard two explosions before the break, raising the possibility of 
sabotage. The dam was inspected by the Mine Safety and Health Administration Dec. 14 
[ 4 days before the failure]" (I , p. 5). 
EL CAJONCITO DYKE FAILURE 
Par: El Cajoncity River through La Paz, Baja California Sur, 1976 = 2,000 
Par1: same as Par 
L. = 800, PI = 0.40 
Identification/Location of Fatalities: These were poor shack-dwellers living in and 
along a dry riverbed, made dry by diverting the flow with a dike. 
Bt (Building Types, %) Sh= 100%. 
It is unclear what kind of forcefulness would have been experienced had the 
building been more substantial. On the one hand, a 6 ft wave, after attenuating, may have 
done little damage farther downstream or toward the edges of the flood. On the other 
hand, the peak discharge was maintained for 7.5 hours, so damages may have been higher 
than one might expect. In any case, the presence of flimsy shacks removed places of 
refuge that would have likely reduced life loss had the flood occurred in a region with 
better building standards. 
ELDORADO CANYON FLASH FLOOD 
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, 
AND PARAMETERS COMMON TO SEVERAL SUBPAR 
Par: Eldorado Canyon Resort and Lake Mohave, Nevada, 1974 
Par= 50, L = 10, P = 0.2 
A flash flood sent a huge wall of water through the normally dry mouth of 
Eldorado Canyon, Nevada. 
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This event was fairly unique in that all of the victims were immediately swept into 
Lake Mohave on the Colorado River, rather than down a stream corridor, a dynamic 
which dramatically changed the hydraulic characteristics of the flood (see Schvq7). 
Damages were almost exclusively limited to the Eldorado Canyon Resort. Just 2 
miles upstream in a tributary called Eagles Wash, there was no wall of water but a series 
of rapid pulses that increased until the flood reached 4 to 6 ft deep through a section 400 
to 600ft wide. Dr. J. H. Sessums was forced to abandon his car at this location and watch 
it bob downstream like a cork. It traveled only a mile before the flood subsided enough to 
set it down again ( l ; 2!, statement). Ninety to 95% of the 2,000 acre-ft of sediment-laden 
water that flowed into Lake Mohave passed the resort within 30 minutes(!, hydrograph). 
Flows from Eagles Wash, Techatticup Wash, and Eldorado Canyon converged slightly 
more than a mile above the lake, half a mile above the upstream portions of Nelson 's 
Landing. Intense rainfall moving down-basin, fairly uniform slopes close to 400 ft/mi 
along each channel, and a noted lack of vegetation caused very rapid and closely 
coordinated runoff. A constriction just above the restaurant then helped push the 
instantaneous flow into an even greater wall of mud, debris, and water. This canyon had a 
history of flooding , but this particular flood was by far the worst on record ( l ). 
"Peak flow apparently followed, rather than coincided with, the initial surge of the 
flood. Therefore, peak flow estimates probably do not bear directly on damage and 
casualties" (l, p. 8). 
The flood destroyed all power and telephone lines into the area, so survivors had 
to travel by boat before anyone outside the event knew about the disaster. 
As the commentary under Ac indicates, the intense hail and rain on site probably 
reduced life loss in many cases by causing people to leave the flood zone, or it may have 
endangered some by masking auditory sensory clues. 
The local downpour caused many to seek shelter, especially at the icehouse. John 
Gallifent barely escaped from his trailer after observing abnormally large runoff in many 
small gullies and rills through his window. Mrs. Kirby Koop described the runoff along 
the normally dry canyon floor as knee- to thigh-deep before the first major wave arrived 
(I). In an area prone to flash floods , such visual clues were significant. 
"Rattlesnakes-hundreds of them-were swimming in the water" (2!, statement 
by Patsy Johnson). 
ELDORADO CANYON FLASH FLOOD 
Par: Eldorado Canyon Resort and Lake Mohave, Nevada, 1974 =50 
Par2: those among trailers that were swept away and destroyed at the trailer park 
L2 = 4, P2 = 0.57 
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When there is no warning time and a building is completely destroyed, the fatality 
rate may depend on whether or not that building is near the edge of the flood. When far 
from safety, fatality rates approach I 00% for these conditions (as in the restaurant, Par1). 
When near the edge, a flood may come in surges or rise slowly enough that occupants 
can flee out a back door or window, or quickly wade to safety and flee up the adjacent 
hillside before the structure is swept away (as in the present case). Whether a building is 
destroyed or not is less critical when it is destroyed slowly, in stages, or following 
sensory clues and it is near safety. 
When the flood moved down the canyon, it sloshed from side to side, ricocheting 
off the walls, and yielding dramatically uneven high water marks on either side. For 
example, the greatest depth on the wall immediately behind the trailer court along the left 
bank was 4 ft. Across the nearly-level canyon on the right bank, one piece of debris was 
left 16 ft above the canyon floor (l ). Ricocheting across the canyon, the main flow 
reversed within a few hundred feet. Seven-hundred feet beyond the trailer area, the left 
bank around the restaurant was submerged 20 to 25 ft . Directly across on the right bank, 
the concessioner's home came within 3 ft of being flooded, but the water only rose 5 ft 
high (I , p. 19, fig. 14). Such uneven water-surface profiles, though dramatic, are not 
uncommon with catastrophic floods involving huge walls of water. Not only do curves in 
the channel, protruding ridges, high volumes, and high velocities increase the effects of 
superelevation and turbulent sloshing, but debris dams routinely form from boulders, 
trees, mudslides and man-made obstacles like bridges, trailers, houses, and automobiles . 
These can accumulate on one side of the channel , forcing the water to pile up; they can 
constrict a channel, backing up water generally; or they can redirect the flow in an 
unexpected direction not suggested by the original channel geometry. Such dynamics 
reveal the limitations of using modem modeling programs that assume a level water 
service or that neglect the effects of debris dams during dam-failures or flash-flood 
events. 
ELDORADO CANYON FLASH FLOOD 
Par: Eldorado Canyon Resort and Lake Mohave, Nevada, 1974 = 50 
Par5: the half of the boat dock closest to shore, ground up and sucked underwater 
Ls = 2, Ps = 0.5 
At the canyon mouth was a marina with a ramp to the shore off to one side. This 
created a gap across the water of about 200 ft when measured from shore in line with the 
canyon. The canyon entered the long and narrow reservoir at a right angle. The dock was 
about 450ft long and extended away from the canyon and at a slight angle. Since the 
reservoir was formed in the Colorado River, the bed slope beneath the dock was roughly 
the same as that throughout Nelson's Landing-about 280 ft/mi or a little over 5 ft/100 ft 
(1, see Schvq1). 
There were three occupied boats at the dock when the flood hit, two in the first 
half of the dock and one in the second half. When the flood hit, the dock broke in half-
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possibly as a result of being hit by a vehicle. The flood affected these two halves quite 
differently based on their respective distances from shore, so they have been divided into 
separate subPar. 
Schvq7 describes the flood ' s general hydraulic behavior once it reached the lake. 
A summary follows, with additional details derived from statements from Manuel Cortez 
and Craig Grugel who watched the event from an elevated parking area beside the boats, 
and statements from Maryanna and Helen Grugel who were in one of the boats when the 
flood arrived (21, statements). 
Those in the boats expected a flood, but not a wall of water. Without warning, a 
wall of water and debris 25-30 ft high skated across the lake and broke, crashing down 
about 200 ft from shore, taking out the first part of the dock and gas pumps, and causing 
the lake surface immediately beyond to temporarily mound up (Craig told his mother it 
looked like 50 ft). Subsequent waves closely followed, causing the many moored boats to 
smash together. The extremely dense flow did not continue across the surface, but rushed 
to the bottom, carrying objects like trucks, trailers, telephone poles, and boats with it. 
These objects did not resurface. This strong undertow, continually fed by the flood and 
new surges, created a turbulent boundary like a paddle-wheel or someone mixing eggs 
that pulled nearby surface objects toward shore and the violence. Eventually, this action 
would grind up the entire first half of the dock. 
The nearest occupied boat contained Frank Olsen, whose boat quickly went down. 
He drowned. The other boat held Herbert Grugel, his wife Helen, and Craig Grugel's 
wife Maryanna. After the first wave struck, Mr. Grugel told the two women to put on 
life-preservers and Mrs. Grugel told Maryanna to sit down and pray. Mr. Grugel went to 
the bow to try to find another life-preserver. As he was putting it on, the boat was hit 
broadside by the fourth or fifth wave and sank. Apart from God's hand, it is likely that 
the two life jackets saved the only two who survived-Helen and Maryanna. Even so, 
their clothes were partially ripped off. Each were under so long they expected to die, but 
they surfaced far from the flood in calm water and managed to swim to shore: Pars = 4 
and L5 =2. 
This flood pulverized debris and ripped the clothes off its victims-both those 
who died and those who survived (I, 2). Stripping of clothes is a common feature found 
in many other violent floods as well, and does not indicate that the victims were 
undressed when the flood arrived. 
See Schvq7. 
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ELDORADO CANYON FLASH FLOOD 
Par: Eldorado Canyon Resort and Lake Mohave, Nevada, 1974 =50 
Par7: those on or in Lake Mohave close to the canyon mouth or adjacent shoreline 
L1 = 2, P1 = 0.5 
John K. Daily was in one boat and Rod and Barbara Hallin were in another-a 
green and white tri-hull. Both boats capsized and Daily drowned. It is not reported 
exactly where these boats were located, but since the flood affected the surface flow only 
close to shore, they must have been near the shoreline and not far from the canyon mouth. 
However, since they were not seen at the dock, they were floating freely at some lateral 
di stance. 
The morning after the flood, at ll :00 AM on Sept 15, a 19-year-old boy named 
Tsutomu Robert Kinugasa drowned when he waded 15ft from shore while his 
companions chatted on the bank. He was caught by an unexpected undertow, surfaced 
once, and went down. He could not swim. 
This death has been included in this subPar, despite its late timing, because the 
undertow was generated or greatly exacerbated by the flood. The flood sent about 2,000 
acre-ft of dense, sediment-laden water, at 40 fps and in about 30 minutes, in such a way 
that it developed a localized, violent, spiral flow very close to shore (1, 2). The canyon 
was about 35 miles upstream from Davis Dam on the 50-mile long reservoir in the 
Colorado River (I , p. I 0 and map on p. 3 ). Since the lake would have had a residence 
time greatly in excess of one day and since the flood event was characterized by a large 
volume, great violence, and a dramatically different density than the rest of the river, 
spiral currents would have continued to hug the shoreline for some time after the event. 
Whatever the natural currents would have been at the site where Kinugasa drowned, their 
potential lethality was greatly increased at the time of his death: Par7 = 4 and L7 = 2. 
Eyewitness accounts from Kirby Koop, Lemuel Washington, and Manuel Cortez 
(I ; 21 , statements) indicate that the 20-ft wall of water did not propagate across the lake. 
Rather, it skated a short distance across the surface due to momentum, then sought the 
lowest reaches in the lake as the large amounts of sediment and debris had made the flood 
much denser than the cleaner lake water. There was very little pushing action at the 
surface and very little disturbance of the lake beyond the point of entry. Watermarks gave 
no evidence of a wave through the lake higher than 1.75 ft (1). Beyond the first few 
hundred feet, the dock and boats were displaced safely away from shore. Nearer to shore, 
the flood generated a swift and violent undertow, described as being free from pushing or 
whirlpool action and instead resembling someone beating eggs or a paddlewheel back-
paddling. This action drew the near-shore surface waters toward the flood-even against 
active boat motors-and sucked large objects like trucks, boats, a dock, and trailers 
beneath the surface, grinding the dock and trailers to pieces and ripping off the clothes of 
those who were sucked under. As the death of Kinugasa (Par7) indicates, abnormally 
strong undertows continued to circulate around the shoreline of the lake the next day, 
miles away. 
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This particular flood was noteworthy for the density of its leading edge. Located 
in a dry desert, there was virtually no vegetation to resist erosion. Both Lemuel 
Washington and Kirby Koop described the initial flood surge-which would have 
determined the flow path to follow- as having a viscosity equal to or slightly less than 
that of freshly mixed concrete. The mixture sprayed out gravel and was stacked with 
trucks, rrailers, and 01her debris (1; 2!, statements by Kirby Koop and the Washington 
brothers with Lucas; 2K, Supplemental Report). 
Even so, such descriptions are not unique to this event. Not only is this a common 
characteristic of flash floods in Nevada-like deserts (I), but it appears to be a common 
characteristics of nearly all floods with a leading wall : the wall is partially sustained by 
muck-initially mud, rocks, sticks, and trees, followed by houses, bridges, fences , 
automobiles, and other obstacles (see, for example, the Buffalo Creek dam failure). Since 
nearly all catastrophic floods are densely sediment-laden, the action of this flood would 
likely be imitated by most walls of water that plunged suddenly into a large, deep 
reservoir. 
Lake Mohave was narrow and the flood entered it at close to a 90 degree angle, so 
the " length" of the lake was about 1 mile and the "width" was about 50 miles. Due to 
sediments deposited in the lake, the shoreline was extended about 350 feet and gained 1.1 
acres of land surface. The average estimated thickness of deposits between the pre-flood 
and post-flood shorelines was 9ft (1 , p. 14, Table 4), suggesting the lake (Colorado 
River) reached a depth of around 18 ft within 300 to 400 ft of the shore. This fits the 
general slope at Nelson's Landing of280 ft/mi (1 , p. 10 and fig. 12), which would drop 
18 ft over a distance of 339ft. 
Conditions under which a flood might be expected to significantly impact a lake ' s 
surface for more than a few hundred feet would include a shallow lake or if a flood wave 
was superimposed on a substantial existing flow that had previously conditioned the lake 
to have a dense current in the direction the wave was traveling. 
EVANS AND LOCKWOOD POND (also called SUMMERTIME LAKEl DAMS 
Par: Hybarts Branch, Fayetteville, Cumberland County, N. Carolina, 1989 = 471 
Par1: vehicle occupants on the flooded portion of the S-lane Morganton Road 
Lt = 2, Pt = 0.33 
Wt (Warning Time) The occupants of the van were warned not to cross 
the flooded Morganton Road (I ). Reasonable estimates of Wt are possible based 
on circumstantial evidence. Evans dam was known to have overtopped for I hour, 
followed by Lockwood Pond Dam being overtopped for 30 minutes. Clearly, both 
dams were being watched. All four lakes in this series were visible from houses 
dotting their shores; and being well within the city, they were surrounded by 
heavily populated areas and busy, multilane highways. By 1989, there would have 
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been regular traffic reports for the area, and news crews in helicopters could have 
quickly captured a dam failure in this area on film. The failure of Evans Dam 
could not have gone unnoticed, resulting in intense monitoring of the subsequent 
dams in the series and rapid news flashes. 
Since Lockwood Pond Dam overtopped by about I ft for 30 minutes prior 
to failure, it is safe to assume that people were actively warned to avoid the 
flooded Morganton Road crossing for a minimum of 0.5 hr (the period of steady-
state flow) and perhaps as long as 1.5 hr. Being conservative, Wt1 = 30 min. 
Wt.,g(Avg. Individual Wt) Apparently all cars were being warned to avoid this 
stretch of Morganton Road. Although traffic reports probably issued warnings, 
warnings appear to have been given to drivers as they arrived at the flood edge, 
also , so Wtavg = 0.5*Wt = 15 min. 
Par 1 indicates a common problem: How does one predict the number of people 
who will ignore a clear warning when there is ample time to evacuate or avoid entering a 
potential flood zone? In this case, the threatened population entered the hazardous region 
moments before the wave arrived, despite warnings not to cross. 
KANSAS CITY FLOODS 
Par: greater metropolitan area, Kansas and Missouri, 1977 = 3000 
Par1: residents and shoppers not associated with their vehicles 
Ll = 4, PI = 0.0015 
The greater Kansas City metropolitan area experienced 2 record-breaking storms 
within a 24-hr period. The first storm began about I :00 AM on September 12, 1977, 
causing the small creeks and rivers that lace the area to crest around 6:00 AM with minor 
flooding. The second storm began about 8:00PM that evening. 
Since the ground was saturated, 90% of this storm immediately ran off. Nuisance 
flooding began by 8:22, when basements and some streets got wet (5), and severe 
flooding began by 9:00 PM. There was widespread flooding across I 0 counties, causing 
damages in nearly every basin within a 1000 mi2 area, 60% of which was metropolitan. 
The area was relatively level with gently rolling hills. Even in the hardest-hit 
areas, the flood does not appear to have exceeded much above 7 ft. There are no reports 
of a wall of water or a sudden surge, so the event was atypical of a sudden dam failure. 
However, over the span of an hour or two, flood waters gained sufficient breadth, depth, 
and strength to cause about $80 million in damages in the two hardest-hit basins and 25 
people lost their lives (2). 
Although atypical of catastrophic dam failures or floods through narrow canyons, 
this event might be similar to the progressive, slow release of a large reservoir behind a 
short dam above a large, metropolitan community that extends a long distance 
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downstream with a very modest slope. It does not necessarily correspond to a wide flood 
across a plain, however, since the size of this Par was a function of the number of streams 
involved, not the distance from the channels. 
The striking thing about this event was that none of the deaths were due to 
drowning associated with a residential or commercial structure: 17 fatalities were drivers 
or passengers of vehicles, 4 were pedestrians, and 4 were heart attacks, electrocutions, or 
unknown causes (3). Two of the fatalities had been watching the flood waters (5). 
Tpar (Threatened Population) If flooding begins 40 minutes before it becomes 
threatening, what fraction of Par evacuates during that time? How many people 
remain out of curiosity or to try to salvage a vehicle or belongings? How many 
refuse to abandon a vehicle while it still safe to wade, not knowing how high the 
water will rise or the threat posed once the vehicle is mobilized? How bad does 
flooding have to get before people are willing to go out in a downpour? A 
reasonable guess at Tpar might be 5% or 10% of Par, after flooding became 
dangerous but before it reached its peak, but there is no basis for estimating the 
true value. 
R (Maximum Rise Rate) Based on the hydrograph for Brush Creek at Main 
(see Qp), the creek rose in linear fashion from a flow close to zero (the morning 
peak had already dissipated) to a flow of 17,600 cfs in about 2.5 hours. 
T (Time Summary) The second storm began about 8:00 at night, 
flooding low streets and basements by 8:22PM and reaching levels of incipient 
lethality by 9:00 PM. 
We (Warning Effectiveness) The flood does not appear to have been viewed as 
life-threatening, and for most it was probably not. Source 5 recounts a story 
revealing people's attitudes and the fact that the flood rose slowly enough to 
retreat before it: 
Most people took action only when water reached them. At a restaurant 
near Brush Creek, the managers and customers watched the water rise, and 
some "toasted the flood ." When water reached the door of the restaurant, 
the door was closed. When water broke windows, the building occupants 
evacuated via the back door to a higher level. ... 
There is evidence that a portion of the public heard the flash flood 
watches and warnings, but paid no attention to them because they had 
heard so many watches and warnings of all types before without 
personally experiencing any disasterous consequences. (5, p. III-731) 
The two critical factors that limited life loss in this event were: I) the flood rose 
slowly, giving adequate sensory warnings for evacuation, and 2) the topography was not 
steep and the flooding spread away from the stream channels, so although it was deep 
enough in places to require swimming, the currents were not uniformly lethal. 
KELLY BARNES DAM F AlLURE (TOCCOA FALLS) 
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, AND VARIABLES MORE EASILY 
PRESENTED THROUGH A GLOBAL ANALYSIS 
Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 
Par= 140; L = 39; P = 0.28 
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There were several dam failures or flash floods in the early 20th and late l91h 
centuries that impacted relatively small populations located in the I 00-year floodplain 
along narrow river valleys with little or no warning. This event is similar in many ways, 
providing an excellent opportunity to compare those early failures with this modem 
failure. Since the fatality rates across the centuries were comparable, the rates of life loss 
in this event help validate the use of events that occurred prior to the advent of modem 
transportation, communication, etc., so long as housing damages and warning times are 
careful defined. 
Despite newspaper articles to the contrary, the dam had not been officially 
inspected for safety (3, 9). 
There was strong attenuation of Qp with distance, as was assumed for the Dale 
Dyke Dame failure, and as is typical of catastrophic floods. Computed values are listed 
under Qp. 
See Tpar. Among the 4 hardest-hit subPar, 60 out of 93 survivors were injured. 
This is one of the highest injury rates for any flood, indicating that the warning was 
generally shorter than the necessary evacuation time and that Tpar"' Par. 
The fact that the entire community impacted by this event was characterized by an 
exceptionally strong Christian faith and a resulting strong sense of solidarity seems to 
have dramatically reduced or eliminated the kinds of psychological debilitation seen in 
other events with a high rate of community mortality (i.e., see Buffalo Creek). The 
underlying burden of source 6 was to illustrate this perception by presenting every family 
that experienced life loss and to present the impressions of those who came in contact 
with them. First Lady Rosalynn Carter wrote the fo llowing introduction: 
This is a story about faith. . . a personal testimony that there is inherent courage 
within us to face the challenges of life and death. 
l visited Toccoa Falls College on the day after the disaster that you will 
read about in this book. l went because I hoped that l could comfort those who 
had survived. Instead I was enveloped by hope and courage and love. 
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The miracle of Toccoa Falls confirms what I believe. God loves us and 
will help us always. He gives us unlimited strength when we trust in him. (6, p. 
13) 
KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE (TOCCOA FALLS) 
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140 
Par2: those in or adjacent to Residence Row, apart from Par4 
L2 = 19, P2 = 0.66 
Daniel Woerner, a young soccer player, reached shore as the flood rose around 
him by jumping from one car roofto the next before the vehicles became mobile (6). 
People do not always take the safest or shortest route to safety in a flood. As an 
example, the Woemers ran downstream along the road that paralleled the river, never 
once thinking to run laterally up the mountain to high ground (6, p. 61). This was, 
however, unusual. 
Ten-year-old Kirk Veer survived by opening the door to a truck that passed by 
him underwater and climbing in to breath the bubble of air inside. Later, he reemerged to 
rise to the surface ( 6, p. 67). 
KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS) 
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140 
Par3: Trailerville and closely-associated trailers across the river 
LJ =IS, P3 = 0.16 
Where the main channel curved, water-surface elevations on the left bank 
exceeded those on the right bank by as much as 10 ft due to superelevation. Even in these 
high velocity areas, however, there were calm waters in the backwaters of creek mouths 
(8). 
Mobile homes generally stayed intact as they floated away, unless they hit another 
mobile home or other obstacle in the water. In that case, they disintegrated (6). 
KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE (TOCCOA FALLS> 
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140 
Par4 : those known to be in automobiles when the flood hit 
L4=2,P4=0.S 
In the case of the firemen, their hip boots helped to pull them under (6). A similar 
danger could apply to fishermen wearing waders. 
LAKESIDE DAM 
Par: Greenville County, South Carolina, 1975 = 60 
Par1: Lakeside Road near Piedmont where it crossed Lakeside Dam 
La = 1, Pa = 0.33 
Par (Population at Risk) At 6:30AM, Avanell Myers, age 25, drove her 
456 
1964 Dodge through a misty rain to drop off her 3-year-old daughter, Melody 
Ann, at her sisters on the way to work. At 6:40, she hit her brakes, but the car 
plunged off Lakeside Road into a 50-ft deep and I 00-ft wide hole where Lakeside 
Dam used to be. She received internal injuries and injuries to her back, but she 
managed to climb out of her car. She was, however, unable to free her daughter 
sitting beside her, who drowned as floodwaters carried the car a short distance 
downstream. It is unclear whether Melody Ann was washed free of the car or 
whether the car eventually disappeared into the flood, but she did fight to get free 
and it took rescuers 4 hours to find her body (I, 2). 
Myers ' next-door neighbor, Ernest Bryant, age 42, left for work moments 
after the accident. He said, " When I came around the curve, it looked misty, 
dusky, not right. I hit my brakes and slid" (2). The front wheels of his truck 
stopped part way over the edge of the broken pavement. When he got out, he saw 
headlights glowing in the water below. He ran back home, told his wife to get 
help, and drove his other car around the lake to barricade the street on the other 
side. Leroy Bryant, age 16, went with his mother to help Avanell Myers who was 
standing ankle-deep in water (I , 2). 
The primary danger to Par 1 was the 50-ft plunge. After such a fall, even water 
with little force had a high potential to cause drowning, especially to a young child. 
LAKESIDE DAM 
Par: Greenville County, South Carolina, 1975 = 60 
Par2: damaged houses in Greenville County 
L2 = 0, P2 = 0.0 
This case demonstrates the importance of defining Forcefulness more precisely. 
Even though Fp = 0.47, Fd =I, and Wtavg = 0, no houses were destroyed, no lives were 
lost, major damages were primarily non-structural damages from mud, and the maximum 
depth was about 4 ft , sufficiently shallow in which to stand. 
LEE LAKE DAM FAILURE 
Par: houses along East Lee Brook, Massachusettes, 1968 = 123 
Par1: dwellings that were destroyed 
L, = 2, P, = 0.4 
A 20-ft wide dam in the same location failed in 1886, killing 7 people (7). 
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If it had been any other time than Sunday, day or night, there would likely have 
been significant life loss at the Clark-Eiken plant (7). 
MILL RIVER DAM FAILURE 
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, AND VARIABLES MORE EASILY 
PRESENTED THROUGH A GLOBAL ANALYSIS 
Par: 6 towns along 10 miles of the Mill River above its mouth, Massachusettes, 1874 
Par= 1,700; L = 151; P = 0.089 
The flood dynamics were comparable in the first 4 villages, killing virtually 
everyone who was unable to reach high ground before their corresponding structures 
were destroyed. However, since only a few minutes of warning were available to each 
community as local Paul Reveres road ahead of the flood , this event provides an excellent 
opportunity to estimate the evacuation rate over a small range of Wt and Wtavg· Due to 
the detailed, house-by-house narrative that was common after 191h century floods, this 
event also provides an excellent opportunity to compare life loss under varying degrees 
of structural damage (Ls = H, M, or L). 
Poor choices due to panic are uncommon during floods, but when panic occurs, 
life loss can be increased dramatically . As an example, 12 people died while evacuating 
the Nonotuck silk mill in Leeds, despite the fact that the flood barely grazed the building. 
Thirteen people became confused about where to go, panicked, ran to cross the bridge on 
the ri ver in hopes of reaching high ground on the other side, and were swept away. 
People were similarly stupefied while evacuating the button factory in Leeds. 
Here, the buildings were utterly destroyed, but during the evacuation, rather than running 
for high ground, many ran into the city streets, either trying to reach their homes and their 
families or simply trying to outrun the flood. According to the papers at the time, there 
was general panick among this set of workers . As examples of behavior, Carrie Bonney, 
Sarah Ryan, and her 4-year-old son Charles "had ample time to save themselves but were 
completely stupefied with terror, and, with a fixed stare, stood motionless" until swept to 
their deaths. About half of those who died in Leeds were employees of the button factory 
(3) . 
It is significant that, due to panic among two sets of factory workers, roughly 75% 
of the deaths in Leeds occurred among those least threatened by the flood. The workers in 
the button factory were the first to be warned in this village and those in the silk mill 
would scarcely have gotten wet had they not run downhill. 
As an example of panic during the Dale Dyke Dam failure, a man ignored the 
protests of his family and jumped from an upper story window, causing himself fatal 
injuries, even though flooding was extremely minor at his residence, posing no direct 
threat to life. 
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Although Wt1 was twice as long as Wli;.s in Skinnerville, Wtavg1 was 
approximately half as long as Wtavg6.8 · The difference iay in the rate of warning 
propagation and dissemination, which Wtavg considered but Wt neglects. Here, the 
relative magnitudes of Wtavg are in line with Tpar/Par;, but the trend is counterintuitive 
with respect to Wt. 
Note that the evacuation time was increased substantially due to families being 
separated during work hours. This was very, very significant in this event, contributing 
up to 50% of the fatalities in Leeds. 
A young boy described the flood as follows: A great mass of brush, trees, and 
trash was rolling rapidly toward me. I have tried many times to describe how this 
appeared; perhaps the best simile is that of hay rolling over and over as a hayrake moves 
along the field, only this roll seemed twenty feet high, and the spears of grass in the 
hayrake enlarged to limbs and trunks of trees mixed with boards and timbers; at this time 
I saw no water. (3 , p. 97). 
For two weeks, huge crowds came everyday to the area by road and train to see 
the damage (3). 
SHADYSIDE (WEGEE AND PIPE CREEKS) FLASH FLOODS 
Par: Wegee and Pipe Creeks near Shadyside, Ohio, 1990 = 547 
Par1: Wegee Creek (see also Wegee Creek Flash Flood of 1919 for a similar event) 
Ll = ll, PI = 0.40 
In a long, narrow river valley, when a wall of water progresses slower than people 
can evacuate by car, there will typically be motorists or residents who detect the flood 
through sensory clues and who flee downstream in an automobile. If they can gain 
distance, these motorists may stop along the way to warn residents or to pick up family or 
neighbors. At the least, they will typically turn on their lights, honk their horns, and 
possibly shout quick warnings out their windows. Such warnings do not always 
communicate the approaching danger effectively, but they generally prompt a curiosity 
that alerts other residents to sensory clues or alternate forms of warning. This allows 
many to run up a nearby hillside or to evacuate by automobile. Such actions generate a 
chain reaction, as more vehicles evacuate, people warn their neighbors, or people notice 
the swarm of unusual activity outside their windows. This contagious process can 
mobilize the better part of a community, saving countless lives, even in the absence of 
warnings by public officials. However, it is by nature much more random than a formal 
evacuation plan implemented by trained public officials. As such, when many houses are 
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rapidly destroyed, the chances that at least some people will remain ignorant of the 
approaching danger and fall victim to the flood remains high. The Buffalo Creek Dam 
Failure provides an excellent example of this process as it worked itself out over 15 miles 
(see Wt, Wtavg, and Sc under the Buffalo Creek Dam Failure). Since there were flood 
alerts but no formal flood warnings, this type of informal warning propagation 
undoubtedly unfo lded in both Wegee and Pipe Creeks, as well. 
Post-flood profile surveys did not indicate that debris dams necessarily formed, 
but a photograph of a huge pile of boards behind a bridge indicates that such dams 
formed at least partially (2). Such dams tend to counteract the natural attenuation of a 
wall of water, renewing its height. 
SAINT FRANCIS DAM FAILURE 
Par: along San Francisquito Creek and Santa Clara River, California, 1928 = 2,250 
Par1: work camp at Powerhouse No.2 
Ll = 81, PI= 0.99 
Less than 2 years after completion, Saint Francis Dam in San Francisquito 
Canyon, failed catastrophically and without warning just before midnight. The failure 
released a wall of water ranging from 50- 120 ft high on numerous sleeping families in 
small encampments along 9 miles of San Francisquito Creek. The flood then followed the 
Santa Clara River 43.5 miles to the ocean, killing people in several small communities 
along the way. 
The flood is unique in U.S. history in terms of the depth of the flood and in terms 
of the distance over which the flood remained highly lethal. Summaries from Source I 
indicate that 2 days after the event, 53 were listed as Dead in Santa Paula, 19 in 
Moorpark, 48 in Fillmore, 13 in Castaic, 53 in Newhall, 14 in Ventura, 89 in Edison 
Camp, and 20 in the South Pacific section camp near Castaic. While these values would 
have been revised over time, this demonstrates that the flood caused significant life loss 
all the way to the ocean (Santa Paula, then Ventura), nearly 53 miles below the dam. 
Also, in light of Par6, a significant percentage of these were motorists. 
Life loss is a function of distance from the dam only as it is effected by warning 
times, depths, velocities, widths, loss of shelter, or other variables that are themselves 
indirect functions of distance from the dam. As the original wave increases in depth and 
magnitude when Wtavg = 0, life loss can be extended indefinitely until the wave itself 
looses lethal potential. 
STAY A DAM FAILURES 
Par: Stava, Italy, 1985 = 300 
Part: all structures destroyed in Stava 
Lt = 270, Pt = 0.94 
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This was one of the deepest, most violent, and most lethal floods on record. There 
were two mine-waste tailing dams high on the mountain. Photographs (2) reveal that they 
were built one immediately behind the other, terrace-style on a 30-45 degree slope. 
Such compact construction meant that the volume of the embankments was probably 
equal to or greater than the volume of the water they impounded, resulting in a flood 
dense with mud. 
On July 19, 1985, the upper pond collapsed, immediately removing the lower 
pond and releasing a 100-ft wall of water and mud that erased the village of Stava half a 
mile below in 20 seconds, burying residents in mud and debris up to 18 ft deep. There 
was no official warning, the sites of the previous buildings could not be identified from 
the air or the ground, and life loss was virtually 100%. As Franco Ruggero described the 
expanse of mud, wreckage and uprooted greenery that was once Stava, "This is Stava, 
where you see nothing" (8). With the help of helicopters and dogs trained to sniff out 
buried victims, 18 survivors out of nearly 300 victims were dug from the mud (4, 6, 8, 9, 
10, etc.). 
The lethality of a sudden wave of water can be enhanced by a large sediment load 
that makes swimming difficult and which can literally bury victims alive, hiding them 
from rescuers and preventing escape under their own power. In some respects, such 
floods resemble mudslides. Nineteen victims were recovered alive from the mud at Stava, 
but far more were unearthed after they had died. 
Flash floods in dry regions (see Eldorado Canyon) and flood waves from earthen 
embankment failures--especially embankments made from mine tailings (see Buffalo 
Creek)-are often characterized by a dense concentration of suspended solids and even 
preceded by a wall of mud. In the case of the Stava failure, the sediment concentrations 
were extreme. Photographs of the reservoirs reveal that the volume of the two 
embankments was probably comparable to the volume of the deep, 150ft by 300ft ponds 
(2) , yet "the dam itself was flattened" (9) and "the dam was washed away completely" 
(6). Source 3 indicates that the wave carried equivalent amounts of water and mud. It is 
likely that much of this mud settled near its origin, but at Stava, a wave up to 130 ft ( 4, 5, 
6) deep deposited sediment up to 18ft deep (3) as it quickly passed, then continued to 
deposit mud for another 3 miles (5). 
Rescue workers reported that some of the bodies had been dismembered (9) . 
Among the first 150 bodies recovered, 15 were so disfigured that it was impossible to tell 
the victim' s sex (10). 
"Civil Protection Minister Guiseppe Zamberlette recounted, 'The sites of the 
hotels and houses had to be pointed out to me. It 's as if they never existed' (3, p. 11). 
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Huge walls of water tend to create sufficient spray and dust and to be sufficiently 
unexpected that they are not always easy to identify as they approach. In case after case, 
walls of water are described as resembling fog, smoke or fire. In this case, one survivor 
described the 100-ft wall of water as follows: "I saw the end of the world. I saw a white 
wall coming toward me. I couldn't tell if it was fire or what" (9). 
Here, like in many catastrophic floods, more than one distinct wave was observed. 
A man called Pietro told reporters his brother had climbed a tree to escape the first wave, 
but a second wave carried him away. 
THOMPSON MILL DAM FAILURE 
Par: Barren Creek below the Thompson Mill dam, Tennessee, 1916 = 78 
Par1: every house that was destroyed 
L, = 24, P, = 0.59 
On Aug. 3, 1916, Thompson's mill pond collapsed suddenly while most people 
slept. The wall of water traveled 5 miles to the next creek, causing major damage or 
destruction to most homes it touched. Life loss was limited to homes that were 
completely destroyed, being swept away before members could evacuate. 
Although this event occurred in 1916, there is no reason to think L would be less 
today if no warning were given, structures were within the floodplain, and the structures 
sustained the same degree of damages. In other words, based on housing damages alone 
and a very short Wtavg, modem failures would be no less lethal. However, current abilities 
to monitor dams, alert communities, restrict floodplain development, and enforce stricter 
building codes for multi-story residences might reduce L in a modem setting. 
TIMBER LAKE DAM 
Par: road crossings and a few trailers on Buffalo Creek, 1995 = 7 
Par1: bridge across Buffalo Creek on Highway U.S. 460 
L1 = 1, P1 = 0.17 
Par (Population at Risk) Par for this event is obscured by the fact that dozens 
or perhaps hundreds of watersheds were flooded throughout the state. Based on 
the statistics in the Introductory Summary, the most expansive view of Par would 
be roughly (I ,622 houses statewide that were destroyed or seriously damage + 
????houses with minor damage)*(3 persons per house) > 5,000 and perhaps as 
great as 30,000. This expansive view of Par would be consistent with the 
approach taken by Dekay and McClelland in Allegheny County, Kansas City, or 
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the Black Hills floods . Since we are looking only at flooding caused by the dam 
failure on Buffalo Creek, Par was considerably smaller. 
The main threat to life loss was posed to motorists, since there were 7 river 
crossings in the first 6 or 7 miles downstream. 
Pr (Preparedness) Although the Timberlake Homeowner's Association 
had an emergency action plan for their dam (9), the members of Par were 
completely unprepared for a dam failure: Pr = N. 
See Fm for the role of human failure in dam failures . 
Fm (Failure Mode) Although the spillway was repaired one year 
previously, the dam failed when the only person with a key to the spillway first 
waited too long to begin his trip to the dam and then got stranded on the way due 
to flooding (6). Water flowed over the top of the dam, and then it burst quite 
suddenly under the excessive pressure (12): Fm =Fe. 
See Pr and Fm: an emergency action plan did not help save lives or prevent the 
failure of the dam. 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) Flooding prior to failure blocked traffic from 
crossing the bridge on U.S. 460, the location likely to have more traffic than all 
the other bridges combined. In place of vehicle traffic, rescuers were present. 
Even so, the rescuers had a better chance of floating to safety than would have 
motorists trapped in their cars. In the case ofPar1, Ac1 = N. 
Although the dam was declared inadequate in 1981 due to an undersized spillway, 
it was "grandfathered in" after the spillway was improved (6). The dam was certified in 
1991 , and an engineer' s review in September of 1994 rated the dam as in "good 
condition/maintenance is better." The homeowners were praised for repairing the 
spillway after winter storms (5). 
Jonathon Wright was one of those stabilizing Martin's rope (the rescue worker 
looking for occupants in the cars stranded on the bridge). While ducking under the rope, 
prior to the dam failure, he fell and rescuers grabbed him before he was swept away. He 
reflected, "I have a new respect for water. It was an incredible force. Words can't 
describe it ... Your foot leaves the ground and you' re gone" (14). 
VAIONT DAM (ALSO SPELLED VAJONTl 
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, AND VARIABLES MORE EASILY 
PRESENTED THROUGH A GLOBAL ANALYSIS 
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Par: communities along 12 miles of the Piave River and the shoreline behind Vaiont 
Dam on the Vaiont River in Italy, 1963 
Par= 3,000; L = 2,056; P = 0.69 
Due to the unprecedented magnitude of the flood waves generated in this event, 
the Yaiont disaster provides a unique opportunity to explore the impact of huge waves on 
several different communities. While rather unique in terms of its cause, floods with 
similar characteristics might be generated if a high concrete arch dam or a high concrete 
gravity dam were to fail instantaneously, either through internal weaknesses or as a result 
of an earthquake or explosion. Earthen or rock fill dams perched high on steep slopes or 
which fail very rapidly have similar potential for destruction (i.e, see Stava Darn for a 
much smaller reservoir that caused nearly comparable fatality rates). 
Vaiont Dam is a double-curved, thin-arch, concrete dam that was the tallest dam 
of its kind and the second-tallest dam in the world, rising 871ft. Following years of slow 
movement, a massive portion ofMt. Toe plummeted into the reservoir, displacing a huge 
quantity of water that washed over lakeside communities and plunged over the dam, 
obliterating the towns below. As a testimony to the design of the dam, the dam itself did 
not fail, even though the forces it experience far exceeded those for which it was 
designed. The following summary is a composite drawn from sources 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
Mt. Toe had a reputation for unstable slopes, causing some to question whether 
the dam should be built. Nevertheless, construction on the dam began in 1956 and it was 
completed in 1960, when the reservoir began filling. On Nov. 4, 1960, a crack on Mt. Toe 
opened I ft wide and 8,000 ft long. Engineers placed markers on the slope to help 
monitor its movements. Based on scale models of the dam and the entire basin, engineers 
decided that the worst landslide they could envision would be safe to human life if the 
lake were kept 75ft below the dam 's crest. It was believed that a wave no more than.S ft 
deep could pass over the crest and the primary concerns applied to the communities 
around the reservoir. 
Due to demand for power, however, the reservoir was raised to within 41 ft of the 
crest, beginning in April of 1963. As a result, another long crack appeared on the 
mountain. From July to September there were small earth tremors and the lake water 
"boi led up." Over the three years leading up to the failure, the average rate was 3/8 of an 
inch per week. This rate increased dramatically during the three weeks leading up to the 
failure. From Sept. 18- 24, the rate was 3/8 of an inch per day, from Sept. 25- Oct. I it 
was 4-8 inches per day, from Oct. 2-7, it was 8-16 inches per day, Oct. 8 saw 16 
inches and the slope moved 2.64 ft on Oct. 9 prior to the complete failure. Animals which 
customarily grazed on the slope must have sensed the movement since they left the area 
around October I. 
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On September 26, Nino Biadene, the deputy director-general for technical 
matters, ordered the valves to be opened so the water level could be reduced. Based on 
previous calculations, this rate was limited so as not to unbalance the hydraulic pressures 
in the slope. As the water drained, the rate of slippage increased, causing the many 
scientists now monitoring the slope to install floodlights to help read the slope markers at 
night. 
By the end of September, engineers and geologists considered it highly probable 
that there would be a landslide by the end of November. By October 8, engineering-
geo logists realized that the markers were moving in unison and that they involved a slide 
area 5 times greater than previously thought. The morning of the 8th, the day before the 
failure, Biadene and the mayor of Erto sent warning messages throughout the lakeside 
communities. In the letters, the mayor urged residents to evacuate on government trucks 
at 4:00PM. The power company supplied trucks to help remove families and livestock, 
some people were removed by police helicopter, and the evacuation was enforced 
through stationed police guards. 
The evening of October 9, 1963, was rainy and dark. Just before 9:00PM, 
additional warnings were sent to select areas downstream and efforts were made to block 
the roads, but there was not a strong sense of danger since very little water was expected 
to fall over the dam. At I 0:40:41 PM, illuminated by the floodlights, 312 million ( 4) or 
314 million (6) yd3 of mostly rock fell offMt. Toe, completely filling the reservoir for 
l.l miles immediately behind the dam to heights of 490ft (6) or 574ft (4) above the 
reservoir service. Seismic records demonstrate that the entire slide quit moving in less 
than 30 seconds, with most of it over within 14 seconds, after travelling up to 100 fps (68 
mph). Seismographs detected this event across Europe at Rome, Trieste, Vienna, Basel, 
Stuttgard, and Brussels; the readings indicated that an earthquake did not precede the 
slide. 
According to observers at Erto, the entire reservoir for 1.2 miles formed one, vast, 
curving wave that hung in the air for l 0 seconds. Measurements would indicate that the 
highest wave rose 460 ft above the reservoir, but the strong updraft created by the nearly 
instantaneous displacement carried water and rocks still higher to at least 885 ft . This 
blast of air blew out windows around the lake and a similar blast ahead of the wall of 
water downstream would blow out windows in Longarone. The wind violently shook a 
house 850 ft above the reservoir at Casso before lifting up the roof and hurtling in rocks, 
spray, and rain for what seemed like 30 seconds to the owner. The man jumped from bed 
and left the room just before the roof crushed his bed. 
Part of the water backed up in the reservoir, engulfing the lowest portions of the 
various lakeside villages. Two huge waves came together and crested at least 325 ft 
above the top of the 871-ft dam, forcing the bulk of the displaced reservoir downstream. 
The wave crest fell nearly a quarter of a vertical mile into the Vaiont River below. The 
flood wave was 230ft high when it left the mouth of the Vaiont canyon 0.5 miles away 
and crossed the Piave River at an orthogonal angle. The wall of water rushed across the 
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mile-wide Piave River valley and up the opposite slope. Along this trajectory, on the far 
side of the valley, was the town of Longarone. The water smoothed the physical surface 
of the valley and completely removing every structure in this town except for a few 
fortunate buildings poised high on the mountain. Part of the flood backed far up the Piave 
River, but most of it washed downstream, carving a swath a mile wide and utterly 
destroying everything it touched for 4 or 5 miles. Due to the width of the valley, the flood 
had attenuated significantly after the first few miles until it rose only 15 ft at Bell uno I 0 
miles away. There, !50 houses were damaged that were not sufficiently protected by 
dikes. 
Based on the flood hydraulics, this wave probably carried more lethal force than 
any other flood wave associated with a reservoir in recorded history. As such, it tended to 
utterly destroy everything it touched in an ali-or-nothing rampage. The number of dead 
outnumbered those who were injured by 40 to I. "Almost all persons who survived, 
including those around the major impact areas, did not lose any of their material 
possessions" (5 , p. 211 ). 
Cultural. religious, organizational and political considerations hindered an 
accurate accounting of the dead in this disaster. The following points were observed 
during the investigation presented in source 5: 
As of October 15, 6 days after the event, the official count of recovered bodies 
was only l, I DO-roughly half of those who actually died and a little over 40% 
of the semi-official estimates. 
Fire officials did not begin to systematically move down the valley to look for 
bodies below the impact point until the 5th day. 
When the Italian Army concluded there were no more injured to rescue, they 
decided not to uncover the dead with heavy equipment. Instead, they used 
only shovels (5)-tools that could not possibly clear the debris over such a 
broad region (2 miles wide with bodies found 60 miles downstream). 
There was a great reluctance on the part of residents to help officials carry 
dead bodies in any form. The task was eventually assigned exclusively to the 
fire department. 
The press consistently reported life-loss figures about 50% higher than the 
official estimates. 
The nature of the human-impact was poorly understood. Compared to more 
than 2,000 fatalities, there were only 86 injured survivors. The reason was 
simply that the wave had such lethal potential that it killed nearly everyone 
that it touched. Those who were only injured were located farther from the 
dam or in the mountain communities around the reservoir. In contrast to the 
small number of injuries, several thousand hospital beds were prepared by 
relief organizations. In contrast to the areas where assistance was most 
needed, early efforts were concentrated at the heart of the disaster where few 
remained who needed assistance. It took 36 hr to get a communication line to 
the lakeside communities. 
466 
In many cases, whole families died, along with their neighbors, so none 
remained who could identify the bodies or name those who were still missing. 
The area attracted large numbers of tourists, making it more difficult to 
identify bodies or to compile a comprehensive list of the missing. 
Officials were not highly motivated to recover bodies: "Many of the 
authorities felt that the search for bodies should have been stopped much 
earlier since any new corpse found would very likely be in a highly 
deteriorated condition." Officials were complaining about corps that leaked or 
lost limbs when touched by the third day after the failure. One high ranking 
official complained: " It's absurd to dig down lOft of rocks and stones and 
find a body so we can re-bury it in only 5 ft of dirt" (p. 209). 
Beyond these observations should be added the fact that no source provided an 
official estimate of missing persons. Unofficially, officials estimated that there were 
another 200 to 300 persons missing, but such a vast range indicates any list was far from 
accurate or complete, if it existed at all. Official lists of fatalities were strictly limited to 
the number of recovered bodies (3). This practice suggests why the press routinely made 
estimates 50% higher than officials, especially in the first days after the disaster. 
The differences in the reported height of the dam (see H) reveal the difficulty in 
obtaining even the most verifiable statistics. This kind of divergence is common for many 
variables in a great many of failure events. What is especially frustrating is that sources 
almost never report the basis for these statistics nor the fact that other sources have 
reported different values. 
Here are a few close calls at the extreme edge of the flood (3): 
I. Twenty-two-year-old Maria Teresa Galli was closing her balcony shutters when the 
house dissolved and she was swept away in a combination of wind and water. She 
thought, "I'm flying ... walking ... swimming!" She survived after washing into the 
ground floor of a 2-story home that survived. 
2. A paralyzed man asked his wife what was going on. She stepped out on the balcony 
to look and was snatched away by a passing edge of the wave before he even knew it 
was a flood. 
3. l n one family, a cousin opened the door to see what the roar was about, then slammed 
it shut again crying, "We're all dead!" Water washed over them-presumably from 
run-up--then retreated a moment later, leaving some with broken bones but only one 
dead. 
Apparently referring to a larger area than Longarone village-perhaps with 
reference to Longarone commune-source 3 indicated: "Out of every six children in 
Longarone proper, five died .. . . One boy said wonderingly, "When I walk past 
grownups, they all look at me as if they want me" (3 , p. 66). 
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The impact on the living can be far greater when many people die. In this event, I 
woman survived from a family group of 55. In another family group of 36, only the 
Giacinta Vignago and her grandson survived. The psychological impact was severe: 
An unharmed woman with an unharmed baby in her arms, the only survivors of a 
large family , wandered from soldier to reporter to priest, to anybody, begging in a 
gentle voice, "Kill me. Please kiil me." (3 , p. 66) 
Sc (Sensory Clues) Animals behaved strangely as the time for the 
failure approached. The evening of the event, cattle and dogs demonstrated 
unease. A caged canary fluttered violently until it strangled itself to death in the 
bars of its cage. The owner turned to his wife and said, "Something's going to 
happen! The darn . .. ?" (3 , p. 60). 
V AIONT DAM (ALSO SPELLED V AJONTl 
Par: the Piave River and behind the dam on the Vaiont River, Italy, 1963 = 3,000 
Par5: the lowest reaches of Casso, Pineda and San Martino 
Ls = 158; Ps = l.O 
The high fatality rate around the lake demonstrates the danger of defining Wt so 
that it can begin before an actual failure . The sense of urgency before a failure is 
sometimes missing, causing people to ignore or circumvent even coordinated and 
officially enforced evacuation efforts. 
The communities around the lake were evacuated the day before the disaster. 
Casso was considered to be in danger of sliding into the reservoir. The mayor of Erto sent 
warning notices throughout the region, urging residents to leave on ENEL-SADE trucks 
that would come at 4:00PM on Oct. 8, the day before the failure. (ENEL-SADE was the 
government-controlled power company that governed the darn following its 
nationalization.) The carabinieri (national police) ordered evacuations of Casso, Erto, and 
San Martino. Inhabitants were removed not only by truck but by helicopter, over their 
protests . Some returned at night and had to be evacuated a second time on October 9th. 
Patrols of I 0 carabinieri stayed behind to guard each village. Those who died (at least 
!58) ignored the evacuation warnings and eluded the police (3, 5). 
VEGA DE TERA DAM 
Par: Vega on the Tera River in the Zamora District of northwest Spain, 1959 = 415 
Par1: same as Par 
L1 = 153, P1 = 0.37 
Two of the few differences between this event and the Vaiont Darn failures were 
the size of the wall of water and the brief warning time. 
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The flood wave dispersed in the lake below Rivadelago, so the heavily populated 
region down the next river valley along the Rio Duero was not damaged (I) . It is possible 
that over half of the population at Rivadelago survived because of the mitigating 
influence of this lake. Compared to the 20-ft wall of water that washed through town, the 
lake rose only 2 m (6 or 7 ft) where the flood entered. As at Eldorado Canyon, the lake 
was probably fairly calm once people were washed beyond the immediate shoreline. 
WOODWARD DAM (also called HILL DAM) FAILURE 
Par: Flaoder's Brook, from dam to Hill Village, New Hampshire, 1918 = 165 
Par1: same as Par 
Ll = 1, PI = 0.0061 
The value of this case is that in the face of a flood wave that completely washed 
away or destroyed almost every inhabitable structure it touched, a warning of about 20 
minutes was sufficient to reduce the life loss to one person. 
Bibliographies speci fic to each event 
The majority of reports available to me for various failure events were 
photocopied from files collected by Wayne Graham for the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation or by other researchers. In many cases these source files contained 
photocopies, fragments of sources, or typewritten copies that had incomplete reference 
information. In other cases, the documents consisted of surveys, notes of conversations 
with local officials, eyewitness testimonies, or staff summaries that were not formally 
published. It was not uncommon for source documents to be rare, existing today only in 
local libraries or private collections. 
In light ofthe huge quantity of material collected and the number man hours 
required to accumulate the original files, it would have been prohibitive to search for the 
original documents or to obtain the missing reference information on each. Therefore, the 
following bibliographies contain only the information that was available to me. 
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These bibliographies are not comprehensive regarding the source material that 
was available, but they are comprehensive with respect to the source material that was 
found useful. In order to support fully the characterization of each event, it was necessary 
to make thousands of references to these sources. To facilitate this, bibliographic sets 
were numbered. This numbering has been preserved (and in some cases added) here. 
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472 
States and Its Territories Previous to 1900, (Over 15 metres). USCOLD committee 
on Foundations and Underground Works. 
3. Anonymous summary data sheet (lists 60 sources). 
4. Anonymous summary sheet, Previous to 1900 Accidents and Failures Report for 
Austin Dam, Texas, most likely by USCOLD. 
5. Engineering News (1900). Vol. 43, p. 244,250,290, 308,412. 
6. Engineering News (April 19, 1900). Vol. XLIII, No. 16, p. 250-3. 
7. Engineering News (July 27, 1893). p. 78. 
8. Engineering News (June 14, 1894). p. 485 . 
9. Engineering News (June 21 , 1900). Vol. XLIII, No. 25, p. 410,412 
I 0. Engineering News (May I 0, 1900). Vol. XLIII, No. 19, p. 308-9. 
II . Freeman, G. L., and Alsop, R. B. (Jan. 30, 1941). Underpinning Austin Dam, 
Engineering News-Record. p. 52-57 (volume p. 180-185). 
12. Herse, R. R., Corps of Engineers unpublished summary sheet. 
13. Mead, D. W. (Nov. 1917). Dam and Water Power Development at Austin, Texas. 
Pub. by Daniel W. Mead and Charles V. Seastone, Madison, Wisconsin (over 203 
pgs.). 
14. Missouri River Division Office and Technical References, Summary Data on 
Failures and Accidents to Dams. (questionnaire). 
15. Texas Water Development Board, Summary Data on Failures and Accidents to 
Dams. (questionnaire). 
16. Texas Water Development Board, Summary Data on Failures and Accidents to 
Dams. (questionnaire of failures after 1915 reconstruction) . 
17. Wegmann, (date?). The Design and Construction of Dams. p.l42-144. 
Austin, Texas, Flash Floods 
I. Besaw, I. (May, 27, 1981). City's Loss from the Floods Could Hit $30 Million, Austin 
American Statesman. 
2. Moore, W. L., Cook, E. , Gooch, R. W. , Nordin, C. F. (1982). The Austin, Texas, 
Flood of May 24-25, 1981. Committee on Natural Disasters, Commission on 
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Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council; National Academy 
Press, Washington, D.C. 
3. Phillips, J. (May, 28, 1981). Losses Reached $35.5 Million, City Reports, Austin 
American Statesman. 
4. Phillips, J. (May, 28, 1981). More US. ReliefSvughtfor Flood Victims, Austin 
American Statesman, p.B2. 
5. Unpublished appendix to Dekay and McClelland (1983). 
Babii Yar Dam 
I. U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of 
the Interior, p.120. 
Baldwin Hills Dam 
I . Anderson, W. (Aug. 14, 1964). The Baldwin Hills, California Dam Disaster. The 
Disaster Research Center, Ohio State University, Research Note #5. 
2. Author unknown, (likely Dec. 15, 1963). "Body of Flood Victim Recovered From 
Chasm," p. unknown. 
3. Author unknown, (likely Dec. 16, 1963). "Police Identify Dead, Injured in Broken 
Dam," p. unknown, (identifies 3 dead). 
4. Engineering News-Record (Dec. 19, 1963). "Subsidence Blamed in Earth Dam 
Failure," Engineering News-Record. p. 50. 
5. Engineering News-Record (Dec. 24, 1964). "Oil Firms Sued," Engineering News-
Record. p. 14. 
6. Engineering News-Record (Feb. 27, 1964). "Earth Shifts Wrecked Reservoir," 
Engineering News-Record. Vol. 172, No. 9, p. 22-23. 
7. Jessup, W. E. (Feb. 1964). "Baldwin Hills Dam Failure," Civil Engineering. p.62-64. 
8. Leadabrand, R. (Feb. 1964). "The Day the Dam Broke," American Forests. Vol. 70, 
p. 30-33, 65-66. 
9. Neff, D. "2 Lose Lives; Cost Put at $10 Million in Baldwin Hills Area" (likely Dec. 
15, 1963). 
10. Paris, B. R. (May, 1964). "Aftermath of an Emergency," Public Works. p. I 03-106. 
II. Reasons, G. "Mayor Assails Chairman for 'Reckless Remarks'; 4th, S'h Bodies Found". 
12. Reasons, G. (Dec. 17, 1963). "Split Reservoir Floor Blamed for Disaster; Massive 
Crack Found Running Across Bottom; Fourth Victim Reported". 
13. Reasons, G. (Dec. 18, 1963). "Fifth person Missing, Feared Dead in Reservoir 
Disaster; Full Probe Demanded By Officials" . 
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14. Sheridan, B. and Roberts, B. (Apri11964). "There's a Break in the Darn!W~'ve Got to 
Get Out!" McCal/s. Vol. 91, p. 91-92, p. 186. 
15. Socha, M. K. (Mar. 1964). "The Desperate Fight to Save the Baldwin Hills Darn," 
Western Construction . 5 pgs. [Mr. Socha was the Department of Water and Power's 
Chief Engineer of Water Works.] 
16. The Los Angeles Times ran the following articles, the date for some of which are 
missing: 
17. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S . Department of 
the Interior, p.l21-125. 
18. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles, (Sept. 1964). Report on Flood Damage 
and Disaster Assistance; Baldwin Hills Dam Failure of 14 December 1963 in Los 
Angeles County Drainage Area, California. 
19. USGS quadrangle map of Beverly Hills California (1966). N3400-W11822.5/7.5. 
20. Water Power (Oct. 1964). "The Baldwin Hills failure," Water Power. p. 405-406. 
Bangladesh Storm Surge and Cyclone 
1. Smith, D. !., and Handmer, J. W. (1986). Flood Warning in Australia: Policies, 
Institutes and Technology. Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Canberra, 
p. 224. 
Banqiau and Shimantan Darn Failures 
l. Fu, S. ( 1998). "A Profile of Dams in China," The River Dragon Has Come! The 
Three Gorges Dam and the Fate of China's Yangtze River and Its People. Essays 
compiled by Qing, D. , ed. by Thibodeau, J. G. and Williams, P. B., and translated by 
Ming, Y. Probe International, International Rivers Network, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 
New York. p. 19-24. 
2. Si, Y. (1998). "The World's Most Catastrophic Dam Failures: The August 1975 
Collapse of the Banquiao and Shimantan Dams," The River Dragon Has Come! The 
Three Gorges Dam and the Fate of China's Yangtze River and Its People. Essays 
compiled by Qing, D. , ed. by Thibodeau, J. G. and Williams, P. B., and translated by 
Ming, Y. Probe International, International Rivers Network, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 
New York. p. 25-38. 
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3. Topping, A. R. (1998). "Foreword: The River Dragon Has Come!" The River Dragon 
Has Come! The Three Gorges Dam and the Fate of China's Yangtze River and Its 
People . Essays compiled by Qing, D., ed. by Thibodeau, J. G. and Williams, P. B. , 
and translated by Ming, Y. Probe International, International Rivers Network, M. E. 
Sharpe, Armonk, New York. p. XVff. 
4. World Rivers Review (May 1995). In I975, a Series of Dam Disasters Killed and 
Estimated 230,000 People. It Took 20 Years to Find Out About It. Are Big Dams 
Really Worth the Risk? Pub. International Rivers Network, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 1, 16. 
Bass Haven Lake Dam 
I. Questionnaire on Failures, Accidents, Damage During Construction, or Major 
Repairs, to Dams and/or Reservoirs. 
2. Samuelson, W. D. (Aug. 23, 1984). Texas Department of Water Resources Permits 
Division Impection Report on Existing Dam. 
Bat Cave and Chimney Rock Flash Flood 
I. No author listed (July 19, 1916). "Destitute in Flood Areas of Carolinas to Have 
Aid," The Knoxville Sentinel. Vol. XXX, No. 173, p. 1. 
2. No author listed (July 19, 1916). "More Deaths Reported and Rumored in Flood 
Sections of Carolinas," The Knoxville Sentinel. Vol. XXX, No. 173, p. I. 
3. No author listed (July 19, 1916). "Thirty-four Is New Death Toll of High Waters," 
The Knoxville Sentinel. Vol. XXX, No. 173, p. 2. 
Bear Wallow Dam 
I. Graham, Wayne (1981). On Jan. 23 and Aug. 17, he spoke with Richard Phillips, a 
regional engineer with the Land Quality Section, North Carolina Department of 
Natural Resources and Community Development, in Asheville (phone: 704-253-
3341), and wrote down pertinent facts surrounding the case on a single page. 
2. Storm Data and Unusual Weather Phenomena, p. I I. 
3. Taylor, M. J. (1976). "Failure and Near Failure," The Evaluation of Dam Safety. 
Asilomac Conference Grounds, Pacific Grove, California, November 28-Dec.3, 
ASCE, p. 69-71 (all pertinent information is on page 70). 
Bergeron Pond Dam, Also Known as 
Alton Dam or Meadow Pond Dam 
I. Anonymous summary. 
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2. Association of State Dam Safety Officials (Sept./Oct. 1996). ASDSO Newsletter. Vol. 
11 , No. 5,p.l8. 
3. Carbone, R. (March 14, 1996). "Alton Friends, Neighbors Remain in Shock Today," 
The Citizen. Laconia, New Hampshire, Vol. 70, No. 63, p. l, 2. 
4. Carbone, R. (March 14, ! 996). "Officials Work to Restore Power, Other Services to 
Flood Area; Drivers Get Alternate Route for Washed Out Road," The Citizen. 
Laconia, New Hampshire, Vol. 70, No. 63, p. 2. 
5. Seelig, F. (March 15 , 1996). "Alton Begins Long Task of Digging Out; Two Couples 
Flee Rising Water, One Survives Unscathed" The Citizen. Laconia, New Hampshire, 
Vol. 70, No. 64, p. 5. 
6. Seelig, F. (March 15, 1996). "Authorities Planning Road Repairs, Designating 
Alternate Route," The Citizen. Laconia, New Hampshire, Vol. 70, No. 64, p. 5. 
7. Seelig, F. (March 15, 1996). "Shock, Disbelief in Alton: Search Narrows," The 
Citizen. Laconia, New Hampshire, Vol. 70, No. 64, p. I , 5. 
8. Seelig, F. (March 16, 1996). "Alton Search Called Off: Damage Hits $5.5M; Home Is 
Condemned," The Citizen. Laconia, New Hampshire, Vol. 70, No. 65, p. I, 8. 
9. Seelig, F. (March 16, 1996). "Alton Search Called Off: FD Vows to Search River 
Later," The Citizen. Laconia, New Hampshire, Vol. 70, No. 65, p. 1, 8. 
I 0. Seelig, F. and Carbone, R. (March 15, 1996). "Dam Not Up For Review Until 1997," 
The Citizen. Laconia, New Hampshire, Vol. 70, No. 64, p. 1, 12. 
11. Seelig, F. , Carbone, R., and Doherty, R. (March 14, 1996). "Dam Breaks in Alton: 
Woman Missing; Husband Saved," The Citizen. Laconia, New Hampshire, Vol. 70, 
No. 63 , p. I, 3. 
12. Singhania, L. (Mar. 15 , 1996). "Dam Break Shreds Town; Woman Missing, property 
Damaged as 44-Acre Pond's Water Rushes Through," Rocky Mountain News . 
13. U.S. Water News Online (April 1996). Dam Break in New Hampshire Damages 
Homes, Washes Out Highway. uswatrnews@aol.com. 
14. USA Today (Mar. 21, 1996). "New Hampshire," p. 230. 
15. USGS map 43071-D2-TF-024, Alton, New Hampshire, Provisional Edition 1987. 
Big Thompson Flash Flood 
and Diversion Dam 
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l. Albertson, M. L., Poreh, M., and Hurst, G. A. (Feb. 1978). "Big Thompson Flood 
Damage Was Severe, But Some Could Have Been Prevented," Civil Engineering-
ASCE, p. 74-77. 
2. Cochrane, H. C., Gruntfest, E. C., Stokes, M., Burgess, H., Burgess, G., and 
Steinbeck, L. (Feb. 1979). Flash Flood on the Big Thompson: A Case Study. Prepared 
for the Workshop on State Management and Resource Scarcity and Natural Hazards, 
Denver, Colorado, April 24, 1978. 
3. Foster, H. D. , (1980). Disaster Planning: The Preservation of Life and Property. 
Sringer-Verlag, New York, Inc., p. 175-6. 
4. Gruntfest, E. C. (Aug. 1977). What People Did During the Big Thompson Flood. 
Working Paper 32, prepared for the Denver Urban Drainage and Flood Control 
District. 
5. Gruntfest, E. C., Downing, T. E., Wbite, G. F. (Feb. 1978). "Big Thompson Flood 
Exposes Need for Better Flood Reaction System to Save Lives," Civil Engineering-
ASCE, p. 72-73. 
6. Lane, F. W. (1986). The Violent Earth. Croom Helm Pub. 
7. U.S. Department of Commerce and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (Nov. 1976). National Disaster Survey Report 76-1, Big Thompson 
Canyon Flash Flood of July 31-August I, 1976, A Report to the Administrator. 
Rockville, Maryland. 
8. U.S. Geological Survey Water Resources Division (1977). Flood, July 31-Augustl, 
1976, Big Thompson River, Colorado; Meteorology, Hydrology, Big thompson River 
and Cache La Poudre River Basins. 
Black Hills Flash Flood and 
Canyon Lake Dam Failure 
I. Dekay, M. L. and McClelland, G. H. (1993). "Appendix, Additions and Changes to 
the Bureau of Reclamation Data." An unpublished appendix to Dekay, M.L. and 
McClelland, G. H. (1993) "Predicting Loss of Life in Cases of Dam Failure and Flash 
Flood." Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No.2, p. 193-205. 
2. Graham, W. J. (June, 1998). Estimating Loss of Life Due to Dam Failure . Prepared 
for the United States Committee on Large Dams 1998 Lecture held Aug. I 0-14, 1998 
in Buffalo, N.Y. 
3. Johnson, K. A. (Aug., 1973). "Meteorology and Hydrology of Rapid City Flood," 
Proceedings of the 21" Annual Hydraulics Division Specialty Conference . ASCE, 
Bozeman, Montana, p. 451-455. 
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4. Mumford, J. A. Summary of Selected Dam Failures During Floods. Flood Section, 
E&R Center (most likely internal departmental summary for the USBR). 
5. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Aug. , 1972). Natural Disaster 
Survey Report 72-1, Black Hills flood of June 9, 1972, A Report to the Administrator, 
Rockville, Maryland. 
6. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (May, 1977). Climatology of the 
United States No. 60: Climate of South Dakota. 
7. Natural Disaster Institute (1976). Night of Terror: The Black Hills Flood of June 9, 
1972. Rapid City, South Dakota. This is essentially a compilation of source 
documents on the flood, so it includes an evolution of reports from different periods 
following the flood. Unfortunately, many of these reports do not have a creation date 
to help identify chronological updating, and the copy used here contains only the 
most pertinent pages, so there is some risk of misattribution when intervening pages 
are missing. Some pages appear to be the work of the editors, so they will be 
referenced as source 7. Any ambiguous references in the text will include a page 
number to help mitigate the risk of misattribution. 
7.1 . Rapid City Chamber of Commerce 
7.2. Hennies, T. L. (June 28, 1972) "Investigative Report to [Police] Division 
Commander, Capt. Theunissen." 
7.3. Northwest Bell "News Release." 
7.4. "Rapid City Storm Damage Report Northwestern Bell Telephone Company." 
7.5. "Black Hills Power and Light Company Flood Notes: St. John's Hospital." 
7.6. Hydrology .. . 
7.7. Childs, C. E. (Nov. 1972). "Body Dispatch, Body Identification, Missing and 
Found Persons." 
7.8. "Summary Report, State Civil Defense, the Rapid City Flood." 
7.9. Division of Criminal Investigation (Aug. I 0, 1972). "Flood Disaster, June 9, 
1972." After Action Report, Rapid City Flood, Attachment No.3 and "Report 
of Death Certificates from the Office of the Clerk of Courts of Pennington 
County, South Dakota." 
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7.10. South Dakota Department of Highways, "Summary of Damage Estimates for 
1972 Rapid City Flood." After Action Report, Rapid City Flood, Attachment 
No. 8. 
7.11. State Radio Communications, "Report on Rapid City Flood, June 1972." After 
Action Report, Rapid City Flood, Attachment No. 15. 
7 . 12. An engineering report . 
7. 13 . National Guard (Aug. 7, 1972). "Final (After Action) Report (RCS: ARNGB-
98). 
7. 14. Fisher, F. L. (ART, Bennet Clarkson Hospital) "Disaster plan Versus the Real 
Disaster." 
7. 15. Hewitt, C. (Sept. II , 1972; Bennet Clarkson Hospital) . 
7.16. Sieler, P. G. (Station Manager at KRSD Radio and TV). 
7. 17. KIMM Gene Taylor Broadcasting Co. (Jan. 8, 1973). 
7.18. "Emotional Disturbances: The Rapid City, South Dakota flood-June 9, 1972." 
7.19. A report on military losses, losses in general, and warnings. 
7.20. A general report on the flood and losses. 
8. Schwarz, F. K., Hughes, L. A., Hansen, E. M. , Petersen, M. S., and Kelly, D. B. 
(1975). The Black Hills-Rapid City Flood of June 9-10. 1972: A Description of the 
Storm and Flood. Geological Survey Professional paper 877, U.S. Gov. printing 
office , Washington, D.C. 
9. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (Dec. 1972). Flood Report, Cheyenne River Basin, 
South Dakota Black Hills Area, Flood of9-IO June, 1972. 
I 0. U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of 
the Interior. 
Buffalo Creek Mine-Waste 
Embankment Failures 
I. "The Pittston Mentality," (June II , 1972). Sunday Gazette-Mail, Charleston, West 
Virginia, p. I Dff. 
2. Brennan, B. (Aug. 17, 1980). Sunday Gazette-Mail, Charleston, West Virginia. 
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3. Charleston Gazette, (Feb. 29, 1972). "Flood Remains Scraped Away, Toll Rises to 
67," Charleston, West Virginia, p. A I. 
4. Church, J. S. (Feb. 21 , 1997). "The Buffalo Creek disaster: Extent and Range of 
Emotional and/or Behavioral Problems," Matewan Bullet, Matewan, West Virginia, 
Vol. 3, No.8, p. 19. 
5. Davies, W. E. (July, 1973). "Buffalo Creek Dam Disaster: Why It Happened," Civil 
Engineering, ASCE, p. 69- 72. 
6. Davies, W. E., Bailey J. F., and Kelly, D. B. (1972). West Virginia's Buffalo Creek 
Flood: A Study of the Hydrology and Engineering Geology, Geological Survey 
Circular 667, 32 pages. 
7. Deitz, D. and Mowery, C. (1992). Buffalo Creek: Valley of Death. Mountain Memory 
Books, south Charleston, West Virginia, 286 pages. NOTE: This book is a 
compilation of transcripts from Senate hearings, hearing deposition summaries, and 
personal accounts by those who survived the flood . In all, there are 50 separate 
accounts and dozens of source documents and interviews from the hearings . As such, 
the text's authors are really editors. Rather than listing the many true authors 
separately, they are cited along with this text where relevant. 
8. Disaster on Buffalo Creek: A Citizens' Report on Criminal Negligence in a West 
Virginia Mining Community. 
9. Engineering News-Record (Mar. 2, 1972). "A Dam In Name Only Blamed for 
Disastrous Flood," p. I 0. 
I 0. Erikson, K. T. (1976). Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the 
Buffalo Creek Flood. Simon and Schuster, New York. 
II. Erikson, K. T. (Feb. 21, 1997). "February 26, 1972," Matewan Bullet, Matewan, West 
Virginia, Vol. 3, No.8, p. Iff. This is a reprint of Everything in Its Path. 
12. Harmon, T. (May, 6, 1972). "5 Say Danger Was Known 6 Hours Before Flood," 
Charleston Daily Mail, Charleston, West Virginia. 
13. Haught, 1. A. (April, 27, 1972). "Peril Known, Buffalo Mining Didn't Act," 
Charleston Gazette, Charleston, West Virginia. 
14. Jeter, Rusty (Mar. 23, 1999). Personal conversation with Duane McClelland. Jeter 
was working for the West Virginia National Guard at the time of the flood, and he 
observed the length of the flooded valley as he assisted in searching for bodies, 
cleaning up, and performing other post-disaster assistance. He arrived the day after 
the event. At the time of this conversation, he was working for the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers in Huntington, West Virginia. 
15 . Lambert, E. (Mon. , Feb. 28, 1972). "Concern of Man for His Brother Is Almost 
Fatal ," Logan Banner, Logan, West Virginia. 
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15b. Lambert, E. (Mon., Feb. 28, 1972). "Many Saw It Happen," Logan Banner, Logan, 
West Virginia. 
16. Lambert, E. (Mon. , Feb. 28, 1972). "Family 200 Feet from Slag Pile Barely Escaped 
Death in Flood," Logan Banner, Logan, West Virginia. 
17. Matewan Bullet (Feb. 21, 1997). "February 26, 1972 Over 125 Lives Were Lost in 
Logan County Dam Collapse at Buffalo Creek," Matewan, West Virginia, Vol. 3, No. 
8, p. l. 
18 . Runner, G. S. (1974). Hydrologic Investigations Atlas 54 7. United States Geological 
Survey. 
19. Runner, G. S. (May, 18, 81). Notes from personal conversation with Wayne Graham 
of the USBR in Denver. Runner was with the United States Geological Survey and is 
the author of the Hydrologic Investigations Atlas 547 (above). 
20. Spence, B. (Feb. 21, 1997). "The Death of Buffalo Creek," Matewan Bullet, 
Matewan, West Virginia, Vol. 3, No.8, p. 21. 
21. Steele, G. (Mar. 12, 1972). "Dam Burst Witnesses Absent from Hearings," Sunday 
Gazette-Mail, Charleston, West Virginia, p. I B. 
22. United States Bureau of Reclamation. (1983). Dams and Public Safety. A Water 
Resources Publication, U. S. Department of the Interior, p. 132- 133. 
23 . Walton, M. (April 30, 1972). "Buffalo Firm on Way to Dam When It Burst," 
Charleston Gazette-Mail, Charleston, West Virginia. 
24. Walton, M. (stamped July 3, 1972). "Every Time It Rains, It Scares Everyone to 
Death," a staff article for a local paper-probably one of those in this bibliography 
and probably published within 3 days of the date stamped. 
25. Walton, M., (????). "After the Flood," larger work unknown, p. 78ff. 
Dale Dyke Dam Failure 
(Also Called Bradfield Dam) 
I. Harrison, S. (MDCCCLXIV [ 1864 ]). A Complete History of the Great Flood at 
Sheffield on March II & 12, 1864; Being a True and Original Narrative, from 
Authenric Sources, Comprising Numerous Facts, Incidents, and Statistics Never 
Before Published . published by Harrison, S., Sheffield Times, 13, Great Sutton 
Street, England. 
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1.1. Jackson (Chief Constable of Sheffield), " List of the Dead and Missing," p. 93-97. 
This report includes the residence of each of the deceased, accurately locating 
them by subPar in almost every case since it was late at night and even those who 
worked at this hour did so close to home. 
1.2 . Jackson (Chief Constable of Sheffield) is reportedly the author (p. !04), "The 
Destruction of Property," p. 98- I 00. These are broken down by almost I 00 
separate locations (building clusters, communities, streets, islands, etc.). 
1.3. Rawlins, R. and Beardmore, N., "Mr, Rawlins Report on the Flood," p. I 0 I -
109. 
1.4. "The Inquest," p. II 0- 145. 
1.5 . " Measures of Relief," p. 146- 160. 
2. Lane, F. W. (1986) . The Violent Earth . Croom Helm Pub, p. 126 (a single sentence). 
3. Milne, A. (1986). Floods hock: the Drowning of Planet Earth. Alan Sutton Pub., p. 
123. 
4. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of 
the Interior, p. !28-132. 
Dry Creek Flash Flood 
(Train Crossing Near Eden) 
I . Morehead, J. (June 21, 1965). "Cloudburst, 'That Fiend of Foothills,' Spells disaster," 
The Denver Post. 
Eastover Mining Company 
Sludge Pond Dam 
I. Anonymous, (Dec. 24, !981 ). "Pond Collapse Called Sabotage," Engineering News 
Record, p. 5. 
El Cajoncito Dyke Failure 
!. Vazquez, T., Dominguez R., Fuentes 0 ., and Maza J. A. (1997). "Flash Floods in 
Mexico," What We Have Learned Since the Big Thompson Flood, Proceedings of a 
meeting Held in Fort collins, Colorado, July !3-15, 1996, available from the Natural 
Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado, p. 
!53- 160. This source makes reference to the following articles: 
1.1. Avante newspaper, La Paz, Baja California Sur (Oct. 7, 1976). 
! .2. £1 Hera/do newspaper (Oct. 4, !976). 
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1.3. £1 Hera/do newspaper (Oct. 6, 1976). 
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood 
I. Glancy P. A. and Harmsen, L. (1975). A Hydrologic Assessment of the September 14, 
1974, Flood in Eldorado Canyon, Nevada. United States Geological Survey Paper 
930, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C. 
2. National Park Service (NPS) file PWR-PGSO-LAME, Dam Incidents, EAP's. This 
file was a loose compilation of official NPS source documents on the Eldorado 
Canyon flash flood. Some documents were hand-written by witnesses and some were 
official reports. The report is broken down below by tabulated section (A- K). 
A. Summary 
B. More summary 
C. Fact sheet on fatalities, damages, debris deposits, recovery costs, and agencies 
involved in the post-disaster operations. 
D. NPS Supplementary Case/Incident Report-an operational record of the search, 
cleanup, damage identification, and body recovery operations. 
E. National Weather Service information (map and handwritten notes). 
F. Photographs 
G. NPS meetings and decisions 
H. Briefing sheets and summary of newspaper articles, 9/14/74-10/4/74. 
I. Statements of witnesses regarding their observation of victims (combination of 
typed and handwritten reports from eyewitnesses) 
J. Statements of witnesses about the event in general 
K. Miscellaneous NPS reports 
Evans and Lockwood Pond Dams 
(Lockwood Also Called Summertime Lake) 
I. Evans and Lockwood Dams near Fayetteville, North Carolina. This is a short, 
updated report sent to Wayne Graham by Lori Spragens of the Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials, Inc., on August 13, 1993. 
2. Failure of Lockwood and Evans Dams, Cumberland County. This is a report sent to 
Wayne Graham by James K. Leumas, dam safety engineer from the North Carolina 
Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources, Division of Land 
Resources on Aug. l , 1994. 
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3. Storm Data and Unusual Weather Phenomena, (Sept. 1989), for North Carolina (state 
31), Cumberland County. 
4. United States Bureau of Reclamation, (April, 1939). Policy and Procedures for Dam 
Safety Modification Decisionmaking [sic}, Denver. 
5. Yates, S. (Sept. 16, 1990). "Damaged Darns Beach Homeowner's Dreams," 
Fayetteville Observer-Times, p. lA. 
Hyokiri Darn 
I . U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of 
the Interior, p. 150. 
Kansas City Floods 
I . Dekay, M. L. and McClelland, G. H. (I 993). "Appendix, Additions and Changes to 
the Bureau of Reclamation Data." An unpublished appendix to Dekay, M.L. and 
McClelland, G. H. (1993) "Predicting Loss of Life in Cases of Darn Failure and Flash 
Flood," Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No.2 , p. 193-205. 
2. Hauth, L. D., Carswell , W. J. , and Chin, E. H., (1981). Floods in Kansas City, 
Missouri and Kansas, September 12-13, 1977, Geological Survey Professional Paper 
PIJ69, U.S.G.S. and NOAA, United States Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
3. Larson, L. W. and Vochatzer, J. M. , (May 2-3, 1978). "A Case Study: Kansas City 
Flood September 12-13, 1977," Conference on Flash Floods: Hydrometeorological 
Aspects of the American Meteorological Society with the American Geophysical 
Union, May 2-3, 1978, Los Angeles, California, American Meteorological Society, 
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Appendix C 
Summary Table of Assigned Variable Values 
Appendix C consists of a master table of the coded characterizations of every 
subPar in the unpublished version of Appendix B. The greatly abbreviated, published 
version of Appendix B, above, describes and illustrates the nature of the data underlyi ng 
the table. The meaning of the codes is defined at length in Chapter V and summarized in 
appendix D. The table itself, Table C. l , is located in a pocket at the back of this report. 
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Appendix D 
Tools for Researchers 
Alphabetical list of variables 
Table D.!. An alphabetical list of variables 
Variables 
A La Qb 
Ac Lcoz Qp 
Ah Lcz R 
B Ldr Ret 
Bpar Le Rf 
Bt Lh Rr 
Ch Lidr Sc 
Coh Lin Schvq 
Coz Linf Sh 
Cozd Ln Sz 
Cz Lnf Szd 
Czd Location-Deaths T 
D Lpcz Td 
Dd Ls Tpar 
De Lsw Ts 
Det Lsz Tw 
Dt M Ty 
Dv Ml v 
E 0 Vol 
Ef p w 
Eparj Par We 
FS Par; Wt 
Fd Pcz Wtavg 
Fit Pczd Wte 
Fm Pr Wti 
Fp Prcoz Wtpf 
Fpar Prcz Wtpof 
Ft Prpcz Ww 
Gf Prsz Wwr 




Summary reference table 
Table 0 .2 lists each variable alphabetically, followed by its name, categorical 
breakdown, tips for accurate coding, and appropriate units in both the SI and English 
systems. The letter p represents the unit persons, living or dead; bldg represents 
buildings, and u indicates that a variable is unitless. Under coding, wrt is shorthand for 
with respect to. Ordinal variables are coded according to a subset of the following 
sequence: N = ~one, L = !,ow, M =Medium or Moderate, H =High, V = Y:ery High, 
and E = ];;xceptionally High. 
Explanation of variables 
During event characterization, it was invaluable to have a concise, single-spaced 
summary of the definitions found in Chapter V, with tips on how to code the variables 
consistently. For the benefit of future reserachers, this working document has been 
reproduced here in its original form . Phrases have been left as incomplete sentences and 
it has not been reformated to fit the style in the body of the thesis because these changes 
would misrepresent its historic form, reduce its value as a concise working reference, and 
reduce its usefulness as a research aidthe only reasons for its inclusion in this appendix. 
Populations at risk 
Population at Risk (Par) 
Historic: "The number of people that were evacuated or the number of people that 
would have been evacuated had there been any warning." (Dekay and McClelland, 1993, 
p.l96). Or those likely to have encountered flooding that could have posed some 
reasonable threat. 
1. Cutoff at extreme edge of flooding: canyon or little flow dispersal. V > 3 fps 
at 1 ft; lateral slope> 0.0 1. 
2. Cutoff at 1.5 ft of flooding: leisurely flood/backwater. V < 0.5 fps at 2ft. 
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Table 0.2. Alphabetical reference table of variables (see Chapter V for detailed 
descriptions) 
Symbol Name 
A Area of Final Breach 
















Breadth of the Dam 
Basis of Par 




Compromised Zone Density 
Chance Zone 
Chance Zone Density 
Depth 
Damage and Destruction 




Coding units units 
Measures orthogonal to final flow m" ft 
Wrt the IMPACT Ac had on Wt~- -U----u-
E, R, L, or other variables: N, L, 
M,H 
Pocket of protection when u 
building nearly destroyed. 
Top width m 
Is Par based on Pre-evacuation or u 
Post-evacuation, regarding a 
preliminary wave prior to failure? 
N None; T - tents; Sh -shacks bldg 
or flimsy buildings; M = mobile 
homes or RV s; R = residential 
homes; C = commercial; H = 
commercial over I story; Lm = 
hospitals, nursing homes, elem. 
schools, or other buildings with 
less mobile populations. 
Tenuous refuges reached by u 
chance. 
Psh and Sh. u 
Roughly central 80% of Coh in u 
terms of severity of flooding. 
Number from Tpar, likely to be in u 
a compromised zone. 
All Ch, the open flood, and u 
underwater. 
Number from Tpar, likely to be in u 
a chance zone. 
Deepest location potentially m 
encountered by a member of Pari 
List# of buildings destroyed, bldg 
severely damaged, and slightly 
damaged by category. 
N - none, L - small town, M - u 
suburban, H =highly urbanized. 
N- no signs of trouble; L- u 
monitor wouldn't anticipate 
failure; M =alter operation, but 
don't expect failure this year; H = 
failure not unlikely if no action; V 

















Table 0.2. Continued 
SI Eng. 
Symbol Name Coding units units 
Dt Dam Type Description: N none, E u u 
earthen, R ~ rock fill , M ~ 
masonry, C =concrete gravity, A 
~ concrete gravity arch. 
Dv Destructive Ve locity (Qp • Qb)/W. Dv can be Dvmi"' m /s ft /s 
Dvmax• or Dvavg depending on the 
choice ofW. 
E Ease of Evacuation avg. See equation under the definition. min min 
surplus evacuation time 
Ef Evacuation Nonsuccess Factor Ef Tpar/ Pari. u u 
Epar; Evacuation subPar p p 
Fs Forcefulness coded using five L - (0- 0.2), M- (0.2- 0.4), H - u u 
even increments (0.4- 0.6), V ~ (0.6- 0.8), E ~ 
(0.8. 1.0) 
Fd Forcefu lness coded Based on a qualitative guess at u u 
dichotomously Fp, Fd is coded as 0 or I (I for Fp 
"0.2) 
Fit Flood Type D - dam failure, Dy - dyke u u 
fa ilure, Ff ~ flash flood, F ~ 
flood, Ts = tsunami or tidal wave, 
S = sea surge, H = hurricane 
(deaths not lim ited to fl ood 
consequences), Gb ~glacier 
burst, 0 ~other (such as water 
tower or storage tank bursting) 
Fm Fai lure Mode I internal: lp piping, Ie u u 
embankment failure: sliding, 
overturning, foundation 
fai lure, or blowout with 
normal water levels; 
F = flooding: F = flooding apart 
from dam failure, Ff ~ flash 
flood, Ff/D = dam failure 
contributes little volume to a 
flash flood, Fo = overtopping 
or spillway washout; Fe~ 
embankment failure: 
slumping, sliding, overturning, 
fou ndation failure, or blowout 
during overtopping or higher-
than·design reservoir 
elevations; 
S ~seismic failure: Sp = piping 
or other gradual development 
following an earthquake, Se = 
a rapid embankment failure 
during or shortly after an 
earthquake; 
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Table 0.2. Continued 
SI Eng. 
Symbol Name Coding units units 
G gate failure not leading to 
dam breach; 
L ~ landslide not leading to dam 
breach. 
Fp Forcefulness coded as a Fp (residences seriously u u 
proportiOn damaged or destroyed)/( all 
residences with any damage) 
Fpar Forcefulness defined in tenns 
of all habitable structures and 
Fpar - (habitable structures 
severely damaged or 
bldg/p bldg/p 
Pari destroyed)/(Par;); habitable means 
residences, not businesses 
Ft Fatality Type Quantify each, when possible: u u 
N = none; C =campers, riverside 
recreationists; W = waders and 
swimmers; 8 = boaters and 
rafters; L = boaters or swimmers 
on a lake; E ~employees working 
at the dam; Af ~ auto-related; Aa 
= auto accident; D = general 
drowning in town; Sf= slope 
failure at dam; 0 = other non-
drowning; U ~Unknown mix. 
Gf Goodness of Fit Variance in risk 7 spatial u u 
homogeneity wrt the river: L,M, 
H,V 
H Height of the Dam m ft 
Hp Height of Reservoir Pool at Measured in relation to the height m ft 
Failure of the dam, regardless of siltation. 
L Life Loss (Loss of Life, LOL) p p 
La Adjusted Life Loss p p 
Lcoz Life Loss in the Compromised p p 
Zone 
Lcz Life Loss in the Chance Zone p p 
Ldr Life Loss Given Dam Removal p p 
Le Expected Life Loss p p 
Lh Historic Life Loss p p 
Lidr Incremental Life Loss (using p p 
Ldr) 
Lin Incremental Life Loss (using p p 
Ln) 
Linr Incremental Life Loss (using p p 
Ldf) 
Ln Natural Channel Life Loss or p p 
Never a Dam Life Loss 
Lnf No Failure Life Loss p p 
Locations Locations of deaths u u 
of Deaths 
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Table 0.2. Continued 
SI Eng. 
Symbol Name Coding units units 
Lpcz Life Loss in the Chance Zone p p 
Ls Loss of Shelter Percent of buildings in each 
category: L ~ minor structural 
bldg bldg 
damage with flooding below I ft 
of first floor ceiling; M ~ major 
structural damage; H ~ complete 
submergence or destruction; Mh 
~ uncertain whether M or H. 
Lsw Weighted Loss of Shelter See Chapter V u u 
Lsz Life Loss in the Safe Zone p p 
M Magnitude of Loading Description and code: N - none varies varies 
(sunny-day failure), L (expected 
every few years), M (once every 
5-15 years), H (once every 15-50 
years), V (once every 50-100 
years), E (rarerthan 11100 years) 
Ml Magnitude of Local Loading Same as M. varies varies 
0 Outdoors I - indoors (winter, work hours, u u 
night); 0 ~outdoors (summer, 
recreationists, campgrounds) 
p Proportion of Life Loss P;- L;!Par; u u 
Par Population at Risk p p 
Par; Subpopulation at Risk p p 
Pcz Pseudo-Chance Zones Buildings for which it is uncertain u u 
whether will be destroyed, float 
away, or experience very major 
damage. 
Pczd Pseudo-Chance Zone Density Number from Tpar; likely to be in u u 
a pseudo-chance zone. 
Pr Preparedness N - unaware; L - aware, but u u 
don't think serious; M ~alert for 
or experienced in evacuation; H = 
expecting to evacuate and steps 
Prcoz Proportion of Lives Lost in the u u 
Compromised Zone 
Prcz Proportion of Lives Lost in the u u 
Chance Zone 
Prpcz Proportion of Lives Lost in the 
pseudo-Chance Zone 
u u 
Prsz Proportion of Lives Lost in the u u 
Safe Zone 
Psh Pseudo-Safe Haven A safe haven that drifts down u u 
stream less than 300 ft. 
Pt Par Type The surroundings of a Pari, u u 
tagged with percents when mixed. 
C =campers, including 
recreationists near the river. 
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Table 0.2. Continued 
SI Eng. 
Symbol Name Coding units units 
W - wade fishermen, swimmers, 
etc. B ~ boaters and rafters. L ~ 
boaters and swimmers on a lake. 
E ~ employees working at the 
dam. Note, it may be desirable to 
reclassif'y this Pt as D, W, or 
another overlapping category. Af 
~ motorists. T ~ those on trains. 
D ~ in or near buildings and 
general drowning deaths in town. 
U = unknown mix. Whenever 
possible, subPar should be broken 
down into pure Pt I 00%. 
Ptpar Proportion of the Threatened Proportion of the Threatened u u 
Population Population that dies 
Qb Bankfull Volumetric Flow Rate ems efs 
Qp Peak Volumetric Flow Rate ems efs 
R Maximum Rise Rate (of the Quantif'y numerically or: M - m/min ftlmin 
flood wave) moderate (out walk), H ~rapid 
(need rapid action), V ~ very 
rapid (hard or impossible to 
outpace), Ww ~ wall of water 
(quantif'y with Ww). 
Ret Representative Evacuation Code as 2, 15, 45, 120, 240 or min min 
Time more precisely if data permits 
(see chart above). 
Rf Rate of Failure Not truly a rate: the minutes for min min 
the most rapid 80% of the breach. 
Rr Rescue Resources N - none; L - limited (hand u u 
tools); M ~ modem (urban, post 
1950); H ~high (abundant extras) 
Se Sensory Clues Wt based on sensory detection of min min 
the flood. 
Sehvq Striking Characteristics and Insightful narrative, quotations, u u 
Valuable Quotations and a summary of distinctions. 
Wrt the overall fit of the variable 
set: L ~ low, H ~high. 
Sh Safe Haven A refuge where death is rare. u u 
Sz Safe Zone Safe havens and mildly u u 
compromised havens 
Szd Safe Zone Density Number from Tpar; likely to be in u u 
a safe zone. 
T Summary of mo/day/yr, hr, and List dates & times, narrative. u u 
day of week 
Td Time of Day N- night (most people are u u 
asleep; II :30 PM-6:00AM); 
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Table 0.2. Continued 
SI Eng. 
Symbol Name Coding units units 
S - separation (most families are 
separated by school or work; 8:00 
AM - 6:00 PM on weekdays); H 
~home (most families are 
together; 6:00- 8:00AM, 6:00-
II :30 PM; weekends, holidays, or 
Par1 dominated by recreationists 
and day hours). 
Tpar Threatened Population Par present when flood arrives. p p 
Ts Time of Season S- summer (May- October), u u 
W ~winter (November- April) 
Tw Time of Week Wend weekend; Wday- u u 
weekday 
Ty Time of Year (month) l - Jan. ; 12 - Dec. u u 
v Peak Velocity at Par; May be wave travel speed. m/s ft/s 
Vol Volume of Release m acre-ft 
w Maximum Flood Width at Par; W - Wmv. · Alternatively, one can m ft 
use Wtmi11 or Wtav 
We Warning Effectiveness N (no official warning), L (<50% u u 
get and believe timely warning), 
M (up to 90% get and believe 
timely warning), H (nearly 
complete evacuation before flood 
wave arrives). 
Wt Warning Time min min 
Wtavg Average Warning Time min min 
Wte Individual Escape Time or Not used directly. min min 
Warning Time for Escape 
Wt; Individual Warning Time Not used directly. min min 
Wtpf Pre-failure Wt Can begin prior to failure(~ Wt) min min 
Wtpof Post-failue Wt Does not begin until failure. min min 
Ww Wall of Water (Height of) lf"O", means no wall , so useR. m ft 
Wwr Wall of Water with D via R See chapter V. ft ft 
Zd Zone Density(ies) Number of people in a zone p p 
3. Cutoff at a convenient contour between 6 and 12 inches: Between the 
extremes. 
Life Loss (L) 
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Deaths of any kind and at any location that can be attributed directly or indirectly 
to flooding, without regard to whether or not the deaths would have occurred had the dam 
not failed under the same initiating hydrologic conditions. 'When victims remain on the 
list of missing in the most recent reports, they are included in L. 
Threatened Population (Tpar) 
All those present when the flood wave arrives. 
SubPar (ParJ 
Subdivided whenever there is a clear change in a major variable. 
Proportion of Life Loss (P) 
P = L!Par and P; = L;/Par;. 
Natural Channel [Never a Dam} Life Loss (Ln) 
Expected L given that the dam had never been built. Assumes less flood plain 
development and different recreational patterns. Ln is counter-historical, except in the 
case of flash floods on undarnmed rivers. 
Life Loss Given Dam Removal (Ldr) 
Assumes the dam is removed, sediment issues are resolved, and the channel 
through the reservoir is restored, using the then-current development and geomorphology. 
No Failure Life Loss (Lnj) 
Had the dam not failed given the same initiating conditions. 
Locations of Deaths 
Where an individual was overcome, in contrast to where found. Associates death 
with a Par;, or more detail when available. 
Fatality Type (Ft) 
Ideally, each symbol accompanied by an associated number of deaths. 
N none. 
C campers, including recreationists hiking/walking/standing near the river. 
W those in the river when the flood wave appears: wade fishermen, 
swimmers, rescue workers, etc. 
B those on the river when the flood wave appears: boaters and rafters. 
L those in or on a lake when the flood wave appears: boaters and swimmers. 
E employees of the dam who are at the dam for construction, repairs, 
monitoring, failure prevention, etc. 
Af = automobile occupants killed by flood waters. 
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Aa = those killed in an automobile accident during evacuation. 
D general drowning deaths in town (trapped in a building or washed away) 
apart from the previous categories. 
Sf slope fai lure at or very near the dam itself. 
0 other= non-drowning deaths other than auto-related or slope failure near 
the dam: mudslide associated with the flooding and not the dam failure 
itself, suicide, heart-attack, exposure, etc. 
U = unknown mix. 
Flood Characteristics 
Flood Type (Fit) 
D = dam failure . 
Dy = failure of a dyke, thus being similar in some respects to a long dam. 
Ff a flash flood, meaning the flood wave is sudden and fast rising or a wall of 
water. 
F flood , meaning a widespread event that can't be described according to the 
other categories. 
Ts a tsunami or tidal wave. 
S a sea surge. 
H flooding caused by a hurricane and distinguished from F or Ff in that the 
deaths are not necessarily a result of the flooding. 
Gb = a glacier burst. 
0 = other types of flooding difficult to categorize, such as when a storage tank 
or water tower bursts. 
Peak velocity a/ Par; (T1 
Approaching flood wave or post-failure flood routing. 
Maximum depth a/ Par; (D) 
Estimated using high water marks or the height of a wall of water (variable Ww). 
The datum should be the lowest point at which Par; might have originally occupied. 
Peak Volume/ric Flow Rate (Qp) 
BankfUll Volumetric Flow Rate (Qb) 
Maximum Width of Floodwaters a/ Par; (W) 
W = Wmax· Alternatively, one can use Wtmin or Wtavg. 
Destructive Velocity (Dv) 
Dv =(Discharge above bankfull)/(width of flooded region)= (Qpeak- Qbankfuu)/width. 
Not (maximum depth)*( velocity). 
Should use maximum values, even if at different times. 
Dv can be Dvmin. Dvmax. or Dvavg depending on the choice of W. 
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Maximum Rise Rate (R) 
Steepest portion of the rising edge of the outflow hydrograph (cfs/min): 
M moderate (can walk away from the flood waters if no lingering). 
H high = rapid (requires immediate, rapid action to avoid being trapped). 
V very rapid (difficult or impossible to outpace waters, even with immediate 
evacuation on foot or by automobile). 
Ww =wall of water (indicates the rise rate is instantaneous and can only be 
quantified by measuring the height of the wall of water--variable Ww). 
"Wall of Water" [height of) (Ww) 
Most credible estimates should be averaged. Ww = 0 when not a wall. 
Damage and Destruction (Dd) 
The number of structures each destroyed, seriously damaged and damaged to any 
extent, by category of structure and degree of damage. 
Forcefulness (Fp, Fd, F5, Fpar): 
(Fp) = (# residences destroyed or seriously damaged)/( all residences experiencing 
any damage). 
(Fd) = I whenever Fp?. 0.2. subjective; includes the destruction that would have 
been likely if residences were physically present. 
(F5) L = low (0 - 0.2). 
M = medium (0.2- 0.4). 
H = high (0.4 - 0.6). 
V =very high (0.6- 0.8). 
E = exceptionally high, meaning there was nearly complete destruction 
(0.8- 1.0). 
(Fpar) = (# habitable structures [D.Q! businesses] of any type, damaged severely or 
destroyed)/(Par;). 
Height of the Reservoir Pool at Failure (Hp) 
Given overtopping, the depth of overtopping is added to the height of the dam. In 
the absence of overtopping, the distance to the reservoir pool below the dam crest is 
subtracted from the height of the dam. 
Height of the dam (H) 
Ideally, this is measured from the streambed. 
Breadth of the Dam (B) 
This is the crest length, not the thickness . Hand B describe the dam prior to 
failure. 
Vo lume of Release (Vol) 
Does not include additional inflows into the reservoir after failure. 
Rate of Failure (Rj) 
The "most rapid" 80% of the failure (in minutes). 
To help standardize eye-witness accounts: 
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nearly instantaneous (i.e., "as an explosion", "quicker than you can write these 
words", etc.)= 0.5 minutes. 
very rapid erosion or slope fai lure short of near-instantaneous = 5 min. 
more or less rapidly as evidence supports. 
Area of Final Breach (A) 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships 
Between Par; and the Flood 
Summary of month/day/year, hour, and day of the week (J) 
A complete record. T is broken out below. 
Time of Day (Jd) 
N night (most people are asleep; 11 :30 PM - 6:00 AM). 
S separation (most families are separated by school or work; 8:00AM- 6:00 
PM on weekdays). 
H home (most families are together; 6:00- 8:00AM, 6:00- 11:30 PM; 
weekends, holidays, or Pari dominated by recreationists during non-night 
hours). 
Time of the Week (Jw) 
Wend= weekend. 
Wday =weekday. 
Time of the Year (Jy) 
Month, coded as 1-12. 
Time of the Season (Js) 
S summer (May - October). 
W = winter (November- April) . 
Warning Time (WI) 
From when the first official warning to when the leading edge of potentially lethal 
flood waters first arrive at the leading edge of Par;. Official warning is any warning that 
reaches a member of Par;, is intended to be received by others, and encourages 
evacuation. 
Average Warning Time (Wtavg) 
Ballpark estimate of the average individual Wt;, independent of the "official" Wt. 
It includes Sc, but excludes warnings that the population as a whole tends to discount, 
such as reports that a dam might fail following a history of false alarms. 
Building Types by Percent (Bt) 
Categories might need to be lumped together: 
N = none. 
T = tents. 
Sh = shacks or flimsy buildings. 
M mobile homes or RVs. 
R residential homes. 
C commercial. 
H commercial over 2 stories. 
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Lm = structures with less mobile populations (hospitals, nursing homes, schools). 
Development (Dev) 
Degree of urbanization: 
N none (rural, communities under 100) 
L low = small town 
M medium = suburban 
H highly urbanized; large city, densely populated, high rises 
Goodness of fit (Gj) 
Spatial variable that describes the variance in risk--that is, their spatial 
homogeneity or heterogeneity with respect to the river: 
L = low= poor (a large, urban area; multiple communities over a long reach of 
river; wide flood plain; mix of canyon and open plain; variable values 
would suggest excessive danger more often than not if applied on the 
individual level) . 
M moderate= satisfactory (a typical small town or mountain community with 
some residences near the river and some on higher ground or in the hills; a 
series of small communities with similar warning time; a wide flood plain 
with urban/suburban development among which the flood rises slowly). 
H high = good (all of Pari reside within a narrow flood path; small canyon 
community clustered along the river; campgrounds; very small Par in a 
similar location, such as a few cars at a flooded road). 
V very high= very good (a huge wave which submerges an entire community 
without warning; a wave which annihilates virtually every structure within 
the area of Pari; no basis for saying some members of Pari are safer than 
others and no time to escape before the flood arrives). 
Outdoors (0) 
Tents are considered outdoors. 
l indoors (winter, work hours, night). 
0 = outdoors (summer, recreationists, campgrounds). 
Sensory Clues (Sc) 
Using testimony, estimate this warning (min.). Sc = 0 when none. 
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Preparedness (Pr) 
Preparedness to evacuate at least half an hour before Wt begins. Considers news 
reports, false alarms, evacuation rehearsals, alerts, experience with flooding, etc. 
N none (not aware of the potential for danger 0.5 hr before Wt begins). 
L low (aware the safety of the dam is in question, but not considered serious). 
M moderate (alert to the potential for evacuation or experienced in 
evacuation). 
H high (expecting to evacuate and concrete steps toward that eventuality). 
Warning Effectiveness (We) 
How effectively a warning campaign mobilizes a community. It can be gauged 
historically by evacuation effectiveness:% of Par; receiving a warning, rate warning 
propagates, and effectiveness in mobilization (believability and urgency). 
N no official warning. 
L low (fewer than 50% receiving or believing a timely warning). 
M moderate (up to 90% receiving and believing a timely warning). 
H high (virtually complete evacuation before the flood wave arrives). 
If no numbers, guess using testimony. Note even a haphazard warning may 
propagate effectively given enough time. 
Evacuation subPar {Epar} 
A subgroup of Par; characterized by the same Ret. Epari need not have equal 
numbers, and the number of groups can be one or more depending on the degree of 
heterogeneity within Par;. 
Representative Evacuation Time (Ret) 
The number of minutes it will take to evacuate Epar;, for use in calculating E. The 
following table can provide guidance, but case-specific information should govern. 
Ease of Evacuation [Avg. Excess Evacuation Time} (E) 
E, 
t Epar1 * (Wt"'"- Ret) 
J .. l 
Par, 
When E is negative, the average evacuation time needed was greater than the time 
available. 
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Table DJ. Reference guide to aid in estimating E and Ret 
Range of 
Width Outdoor Evacuation Times Ret; 
of the Distance Dev for a Family (min) 
Flood to Safety (N, L, Sense of Mobility (min) 
(ft) (ft) M,H) Urgency (L, H)* Day Night Day Night 
1,000 300 N-M High H 0.5-3 1-6 1 2 
1,000 300 N-M High L 2-10 4-15 4 6 
2,500 1,000 N-L High H 3-6 4-10 4 7 
2,500 1,000 M-H High H 3-10 4-15 6 8 
2,500 1,000 N-H High L 3-10 5-15 6 8 
5,500 2,500 M High H 5-20 5-30 10 15 
5,500 2,500 N-M High L 10-30 10-30 15 20 
5,500 2,500 M-H High 
L-group 20-
30-180 45 60 
home 180 
*L implies one person with limited mobility living with one or more others with nonnal (H) mobility. The 
final row is an exception, where a nursing home or similar facility is in view. 
Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Failure Mode (Fm) 
l = internal 
lp =piping 
le =embankment failure: sliding, overturning, foundation failure, or blowout 
with normal water levels 
F =flooding 
F = flooding (dam failure not present or not relevant) 
Ff= flash flood (no dam failure) 
Ff!D =dam failure contributes little volume to a dominant flash flood 
Fo =failure due to overtopping or spillway washout 
Fe= embankment failure: slumping, sliding, overturning, foundation failure, 
or blowout during overtopping or reservoir elevations significantly higher 
than those for which the dam was designed to ordinarily operate. 
S = seismic failure 
Sp =piping or other gradual development following an earthquake. 
Se = a rapid embankment failure during or shortly after an earthquake. 
G = gate failure not leading to dam breach. 
L = landslide not leading to dam breach. 
Attendant Circumstances (Ac) 
Ac refers to conditions that attend a flood, the presence of which can increase the 
fatality rate of the event. Examples include an earthquake, extreme weather conditions 
such as snow or ice, hurricane-force winds, extreme prior flooding, or a downed radio 
tower. 
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It should be noted that power failures, darkness when Td = N, and rain are 
common features of many floods, and the laner two are already noted in the variables Td 
and MI. As such, they should only be included under Ac if their impact was exceptional. 
Attendant circumstances should first be described, then corporately assigned a 
subjective rank based on the impact the circumstances had on variables like Wt, E, and R. 
N none. 
L low impact. 
M moderate impact. 
H heavy impact. 
Magnitude of Loading (M) 
Narrative description: peak rainfall , representative rainfall measurements, and 
durations would be typical. 
N none (i.e. , and internal failure). 
L low = small (loading is common; could be expected every few years). 
M moderate (loading is infrequent; once every 5-15 years). 
H high = large (loading is uncommon; could be expected once every 15-50 
years). 
V very large (loading is quite rare; could be expected once every 50-100 
years). 
E exceptionall y large (loading is difficult to imagine; more rare than 1/100 
years). 
Magnitude of Local Loading (Ml) 
Narrative; coded the same way as M. 
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Dam Type (Dt) 
N none. 
E earthen. 
R rock fill. 
M masonry. 
C concrete gravity. 
A concrete gravity arch. 
Rescue Resources (Rr) 
Helicopters, National Guard, paid or volunteer firefighters, police, emergency 
management and evacuation personnel, reliable communication, earth-moving 
equipment, boats, etc. 
N = none (rescuers are prevented from assisting until the next day; victims are 
overwhelmed so quickly that no rescue attempts are feasible). 
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L low= limited (rescuers are able to help some people, but they are mostly 
limited to hand tools: ropes, rowboats, floating debris, human chains, etc.). 
M medium= modem (modem communication, transportation, and rescue 
resources are available locally, at least in moderate supply; generally 
reflects the state of development present in urban areas of the USA after 
1950). 
H high = exceptional (large numbers of military or rescue workers stationed 
nearby, immediate access to many local helicopters, an abundance of boats 
in the community; plenty of floating debris, trees, tall buildings, or hills to 
sustain victims until they can be rescued; modern wireless communication 
systems; state-of-the art early-warning and evacuation system). 
Delectability (Del) 
Signs of imminent failure more than 3 hours before failure. 
N no signs of trouble. 
L low (one or more minor changes at the dam, but would not lead the typical 
dam monitor to anticipate failure). 
M moderate (sufficient changes to consider altering the reservoir operation as 
a precaution, but would not lead a typical monitor to expect failure within 
the year). 
H high (evidence demanding immediate attention, as it suggests a dam failure 
is not unlikely if no action is taken). 
V very high (dam failure appears probable or imminent and can not be readily 
avoided). 
Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations (Schvq) 
Brief narrative summarizing those aspects that are unique or are not adequately 
described by the variables. Eyewitness descriptions of deaths can provide insight. 
L low= poor (existing variables do a poor job of fully capturing the unique 
attributes of this flood event). 
H high= good (existing variables do a good job of fully capturing the nature 
of this flood event). 
Important Variables Brought to Light 
During Characterization of Events 
Pre-Failure Warning Time (Wtpj) and 
Post-Failure Warning Time (Wtpoj) 
Wtpf indicates the full length of Wt when it begins prior to failure. Wtpof does 
not start counting until failure begins. Hence, if Wt begins an hour before failure and the 
flood travels for 30 minutes, Wtpf= Wt = 90 min and Wtpof= 30 min. 
Wall of Water Weighted by the Rise Rate (Wwr) 
See definition in Chapter V. 
Basis of Par (Bpar) 
This variable identifies cases where pre-failure jitters causes some to leave and 
Par is then based on those who choose not to leave until a subsequent 
warning mobilizes the entire population. 
Pre = pre-evacuation, meaning before any evacuations have begun. 
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Post = post-evacuation, meaning Par is based on those left behind after the first 
group leaves and Tpar is based on those who become trapped in the flood. 
Par Type (Pt) 
List each separately and tag with its percent of Par;. 
C campers, including recreationists hiking/walking/standing near the river. 
W those in the river when the flood wave appears: wade fishermen, 
swimmers, rescue workers, etc. 
B those on the river when the flood wave appars: boaters and rafters. 
L those in or on a lake when the flood wave appears: boaters and swimmers. 
E employees who are at the dam for construction, repairs, monitoring, failure 
prevention, etc. Note, it may be desirable to reclassify this Pt as D, W, or 
another overlapping category for purposes of analysis. 
Af = automobile drivers or passengers. 
T people occupying a train. 
D = those who, prior to evacuation, are in or near buildings. This corresponds to 
general drowning deaths in town. These people might encounter the flood 
while indoors, while evacuating on foot, or while evacuating in a vehicle, 
but generally speaking, they were quantified based on structural damages 
and the mode or place of death may not be known. 
U unknown mix. Whenever possible, subPar should be broken down into pure 
Pt (C, W, B, L, Af, or D) to facilitate characterization and analysis. 
Proportion of the Threatened Population (Ptpar) 
This is similar toP, except that it is the ratio LIT par. 
Evacuation Nonsuccess Factor (Ej) 
Ef= Tpar/Par. 
Tpar and "flood arrival" are defined in such a way as to ignore trivial flooding 
that does not greatly hinder free movement (generally 6-12 inches for waders close to the 
hillside and lesser depths for those evacuating by automobile). 
Safe Havens (Sh), Chance Havens (Ch), and Pseudo-Safe Havens (Psh) 
See Global Insights from the Case Studies in Chapter VI. 
Safe Havens (Sh) 
Safe havens may or may not be flooded, but they represent places of shelter in 
which deaths have historically been extremely rare. When deaths occur, they generally 
involve young children or persons of limited mobility who can't swim and are trapped in 
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an area without another person of average ability to assist them. Safe havens include the 
following: 
I . An upper story with sufficiently shallow flooding that occupants are not washed 
out a window and can float on a bed or stand freely: flow does not rise more than 
one foot above the windowsills in the highest story (about 3 ft). 
2. Quiescent flooding that does not trap people without air. Such flooding can come 
within I ft of a flat ceiling or 2ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling, whether or not 
the ceiling is elevated. 
3. An attic that is accessible from within a house or trailer. 
4. An accessible rooftop that does not depend on chance to reach. 
5. A stout tree that is easy to climb, taller than the flood, and not toppled. 
6. Any island or region that experiences shallow flooding during the flood ' s peak, 
such that depths are easy to resist while standing or clinging to convenient 
anchors such as telephone poles or lampposts (depths of l-5 ft, depending on the 
velocity). 
7. The hillside beyond the flood if a member ofTpar; can readily drive or wade to it 
while the flood is still shallow, or if they can reach it directly from the roof or an 
upper story. 
Chance Havens (Ch) 
Chance havens are refuges in the flood, including floating debris and other types 
of havens, that are reached primarily by chance or whose benefits are highly unreliable. 
They contribute significantly to the variance in fatality rates across similar events. 
Chance havens fall into at least five categories: 
I. Rafts and floatation aids: severed rooftops, mattresses, propane tanks, logs, etc. 
2. The roof of a floating buildings whenever it drifts more than l 00 yards. 
3. Any immobile structure or refuge that is reached while drifting, including 
rooftops, upper-story windows, aerated havens, treetops, overhanging branches, 
debris dams at bridges that allow victims to walk to dry land, and the shore itself. 
If people must rely heavily on chance to reach a largely inaccessible roof, this 
would also constitute a chance haven. 
4. Aquatic havens: any location from which shore can be easily reached without 
fighting high velocities, such as a lake or a quiescent backwater. 
5. Wading havens: These are rare, falling in the narrow range of depths and 
velocities that are too high to be considered safe havens and too low to 
consistently sweep people away. Due to debris, waves, and unpredictable 
turbulence, such chance havens might not last long. 
Pseudo-Safe Havens (Psh) 
Pseudo-safe havens are safe havens on or in buildings that become reclassified 
once the building begins to drift. They exist only among a subset of buildings with major 
damage. Note that rooftops are considered chance havens (Ch) rather than pseudo-safe 
havens when a building drifts more 300 ft. 
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Aerated Havens (A h) 
Aerated havens are typically found only when parts of stationary buildings are 
torn away (the upper end of Ls = M). They are those pockets of protection formed by the 
remaining walls, floor, counters, etc., that provide a place for survival if the occupants are 
fortunate enough to have been located in that portion of the building. 
Compromised Havens (Coh) 
This simply places pseudo-safe havens and aerated havens in a single category. 
Loss of Shelter (Ls) 
The goal is to define subPar such that Ls = H 100%, M I 00%, or L I 00%. 
L Low loss of shelter= no structural damage or minor structural damage 
limited to flooding on the first floor. 
M Major loss of shelter= major structural damage. 
H high (complete) loss of shelter = total destruction. 
Mh highly uncertain whether Ls = M or Ls = H. 
Ls is not equivalent to economic damages. Ls = L implies relatively safe havens 
on every floor , Ls = M implies complete loss of a safe haven on the first floor, and Ls = 
H implies complete loss of all safe havens (and aerated pockets ofless-safe shelter) 
including any accessible rooftops. Since loss of a safe haven is generally accompanied by 
structural damage, traditional categories of minor and major damage generally agree with 
Ls = L and Ls = M when they are based on structural damages and not mere water 
damage. By contrast, Ls = H only if no accessible, aerated pockets of protection remain, 
regard less of whether a building floats off its foundation or is later condemned. 
The following refinements, based on historical observations, should be kept in 
mind (see Global Insights from the Case Studies in Chapter VI): 
Ls = L 
When there is minor structural damage and the flood does not encroach within 
a foot of the first-floor ceiling or within 2 ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling. 
Ls = M 
If the flood does not crest an accessible roof. 
If walls are ripped off but portions of walls and floors or counters remain to 
shelter occupants; but if only trivial structural members remain such that all 
shelter is lost, the dwelling is destroyed. 
If a building floats off its foundation and maintains an accessible pseudo-safe 
haven for the duration of the flood. 
Ls=H 
Any time it is tom apart and submerged in the flood. 
If a rooftop is inaccessible and the top floor or accessible attic is submerged. 
!fa roof is accessible, the building is considered destroyed only if the flood or 
flood waves wash across the crest of the roof to an extent likely to wash 
people into the flood. Since the momentum of the flood riding the slant of the 
roof will cause waves to run up, this elevation is generally on the order of a 
foot or two below the roofs crest. 
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Ls = Mh 
Ls = Mh means that, based on uncertainty, analysts view Ls = M and Ls = H 
as having roughly equal probabilities. 
Weighted Loss of Shelter (Lsw) 
Ls is put on a scale from 0 to I (see Chapter V for details). 
Safe Zones (Sz), Compromised Zones (Coz) 
Chance Zones (Cz) ,and Pseudo-Chance Zones (Pcz) 
• Safe Zones (Sz). all safe havens and havens that have been only mildly 
compromised. 
Compromised Zones (Coz) : that central portion of compromised havens that have 
not been purposely classified as safe zones or pseudo-chance zones. 
Chance Zones (Cz) : places where people are submerged or face the open flood , 
and ali chance havens that might be reached while drifting. 
Pseudo-Chance Zones (Pcz) : buildings in that range of depths* velocities for 
which it is unclear whether the building is likely to be destroyed, float far 
downstream, or experience very major damage. 
Zone Density or Zone Densities (Zd), 
Safe Zone Density (Szd), 
Compromised Zone Density (Cozd) 
Chance Zone Density (Czd), and 
Pseudo-Chance Zone Density (Pczd) 
Density represents the distribution of Tpar; among flood zones based on 
topographic, structural , and hydraulic considerations as they interface with flood routing 
and the rise rate of the flood. The word "density" refers to the number of people who 
have access to a category rather than to the physical dimensions of flood zones 
themselves. Access includes the physical ability to move to a location and sufficient time 
to get there before being cut off by the flood. Accessibility is cut off if the flood rises too 
quickly, but this is rarely a concern when Ls = M, the usual case for which densities are 
widely distributed. 
Thus, Szd, Cozd, Pczd, and Czd, each represent the number of people expected to 
be in each of the corresponding flood zones. People can be expected to choose Sz, Coz, 
Pcz, and Cz in that order, as they are available. People should be assigned to the highest 
level that persists for the duration of the flood, with the understanding that they are only 
assigned to Cz if the haven they previously reached ceases to exist. 
Life Loss in Zones (Lsz, Lcoz, Lpcz, Lcz) 
These are analogous to L;, except that they are specific to the zones sz, coz, pcz, 
and cz. 
Proportion of Lives Lost in Zones (Prsz, Prcoz, Prpcz, and Prcz) 
These are analogous to Ptpar;, except that they are specific to the zones sz, coz, 
pcz, and cz. Note that "proportion" is designated with Pr instead of the traditional Pin 
order to avoid confusion between the pseudo-chance zone (Pcz) and the proportion of 
lives lost in the cz (Prcz). 
Template used to characterize 
events in Appendix B 
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To assist in characterizing every event in a consistent manner, the data for each 
characterization was recorded on a template. The template leads with a summary table 
that lists every variable ' s value for that event, along with a brief reminder of the 
variable's name or meaning, and the choices from which it can be coded. Next, each 
variable is given its own section following the pattern of presentation in Chapter V. 
During characterization, every variable assignment is fully supported with narrative and 
source citations so that researchers can judge the relative merits of the characterizations, 
make their own informed adjustments, or refine them as additional information comes to 
light. When a variable is followed by an asterisk(*) it means that the narrative supporting 
the designation is found under the same variable for Par1 or the global introductory 
characterization of the event as a whole. Three dashes ( ---) means that there is not 
currently enough information to estimate the variable. 
Because the variables under the sixth category, "Important Variables Brought to 
Light During Characterization of Events and Subsequent Analysis," were not part of the 
original analyses, they were not included in the event template. Future researchers may 
wish to update the template to reflect these important additions. In particular, they should 
add the important variables Pt, Ptpar, Ef, Ls, Szd, Czd, Pczd, and Cozd. 
NAME OF DAM/FLASH FLOOD/FLOOD 
Par: location, year= size 
Part: same as Par OR Part: description 
Lt = ##, Pt = 0.##### 
Global Event Subpopulations --c-----p--- Par Tpar l1 PI Par1 
Life Loss Proportion of Population at Threatened life Loss at Proportion at Current SubPar 
lives Lost Risk Population Current SubPar Current SubPar 
(p) (u) (p) (p) (p) (u) (p) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
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Tpar1 




Incremental Life Loss Flood Characteristics 
Ln Lnf lin lint Ft Fit v D 
Natural No Fa1lure life lncremental l lncrementall Fatality Types Flood Type Peak Velocity Maximum 
Channel life L. Loss Using Ln Using lnf (N,C,W,E,AI, (O,Dy,FI,F,Ts, Depth 
(p) (p) (p) (p) Aa,D,SI,O,U) S,H,Gb,O) (ft/s) (ft) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Qp Qb w Dv R Ww Fp Fd 
Peak Flow Rate Bankfull Flow Maximum Width Destructive Max. Rise Rate Wall of Water Proportional Dichotomous 
Rate Veloc1ty (~~%~\':}) {Height) Forcefulness Forcefulness (cfs) (cfs) (ft) (ft2/s) (ft; 0 ··> R) (0.0 ° 1.0) (0 or 1) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Flood Characteristics (Continued) 
Fs Fpar H Hp B Vol Rf A 
Incremental Forcefulness Height of Dam Height of Breadth of Dam Volume of Rate of 80% Area of Final 
Forcefulness per SubPar Reservoir (Crest Length) Release Failure Breach 
(L,M,H,V,E) (bldg/p) (ft) (ft) (ft) (acre-ft.) (min) (ft') 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Spatial and Temporal Relationships 
Td Tw Ty Ts Wt Wt.vg Bt Dev 
Time of Day Time of Week Time of Year Time of Season Warning Time Avg. Individual Bldg Types(%) Development 
(!!!ight, J:!ome, (Wend or (§ummeror WamingTime (N,T,Sh,M,R, (Urbanization) 
Separation) Wday) (1 ° 12) Winter) (min) (min) C,H,Lm) (N,L,M,H) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued) 
Gf 0 Sc Pr We E 
Goodness of Fit Outdoors Sensory Clues Preparedness Warning Ease of 
.{!ndoors or Effectiveness Evacuation 
(L,M,H,V) Outdoors) (min) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H) (min) 
--- --- --- --- --- ---
Attendant Circumstances 
Fm Ac M Ml Dt Rr Det Schvq 
Failure Mode Attendant Magmtude of Magnitude of Dam Type Rescue Delectability Striking 
(lp.le.FFI,Ff/O,Fo. Circumstances Loading Local Loading Resources (Predictor F1t) 
Fe.Sp,Se.G,L) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,E,R,M,C,A) (N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V) (L,H) 
[ntroductorv Summary 
Global Event 
Par (Population at Risk) 
L (Life Loss) 
Tpar (Threatened Population) 
Par, (Current SubPar) 
L1 (L Among SubPar) 
Tpar 1 (Tpar Among subPar) 
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities 
Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) 
Ft (Fatality Type) 
ldentificatiotr!Location of Fatalities ---
Flood Characteristics 
Fit (Flood Type) 
V (Peak Velocity) 
D (Maximum Depth) 
Qp (Peak Flow Rate) 
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate) 
W (Maximum Width) 
Dv (Destructive Velocity) 
R (Maximum Rise Rate) 
Ww (Height of Wall of Water) 
Dd (Damage and Destruction) 
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) 
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) • 
Fs (Incremental Forcefulness) 
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar) 
H (Heiglrt of the Dam) 
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool) 
B (Breadth of Dam) 
Vol (Volume of Release) 
Rf (Rate of Failure) 
A (Area of Final Breach) 
517 
Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par1 and the Flood 
T (Time Summary) 
Td (Time of Day) 
Tw (Time of Week) 
Ty (Time of Year) 
Ts (Time of Season) 
Wt (Warning Time) 
Wt.,g(Avg. Individual Wt) 
Bt (Building Types, %) 
Dev (Development/Urbanization) • 
Gf (Goodness of Fit) 
0 (Outdoors) 
Sc (Sensory Clues) 
Pr (Preparedness) 
We (Warning Effectiveness) 




(Epar 4) (Ret4) 
(Epar5) (Ret5) 
E (Ease of Evacuation) • 
Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Fm (Failure Mode) 
Ac (Attendant Circumstances) 
M (.~agnitude of Loading) 
Ml (Mag. of Loading, Locally) 
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood 
Dt (Dam Type) 
Rr (Rescue Resources) 
Del (Detectability) 




Existing Automated Tools 
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Early in the search for existing models, an emphasis was placed on identifying 
software that might be adapted for use in analyzing life loss from flood events. Major 
agencies involved in dams, hydrology, or emergency management were contacted and 
asked about case histories and their current resources for quantifying Par, modeling 
evacuations, predicting life Joss in the event of a dam failure, estimating warning times, 
and modeling with a computer. Each contact was also asked for additional contacts inside 
and outside their agency. 
Agencies contacted included each of the state departments of dam safety through 
the central office of the Association of State Dam Safety Officials; the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the National Institute of Building Sciences, 
associated with FEMA; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, operated by Battelle in 
Richland, Washington, for the U.S. Department of Energy; The Utah Division of 
Comprehensive Emergency Management and Planning; the Natural Hazards Research 
and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado; the National Weather 
Service; the U.S. Federal Highway Administration; the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation (USBR); the Information Technology Lab and the Institute of Water 
Resources in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; the Center on the Performance of Dams 
in the National Performance of Dams Program (NPDP) at Stanford University; the U.S. 
Committee on Large Dams (USCOLD); the International Committee on Large Dams 
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(!COLD); and Innovative Emergency Management, a private company in Banton Rouge, 
Louisiana, that contracted to do work initiated in FEMA and later the U.S. Army. 
It soon became apparent that existing tools were inadequate, so efforts were 
shifted elsewhere. As such, what follows is not comprehensive, but it provides an 
introduction to resources that might be adapted for use in a life-loss model for flood 
events. 
There are software designed to model specific disasters other than dam failures. 
FEMA produced a program called SLOSH to simulate a coastal storm surge generated by 
hurricane-force wind speeds (Zizil) and a program called HURRIVAC to simulate 
evacuation when roads are closed due to wind and water from a hurricane (Drury). 
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory supports CAMEO, ALOHA, EPI, CHARM, and 
MARPLOT to simulate chemical clouds. CAMEO was developed primarily for safety 
officials responding to a chemical spill or leak. It provides an emergency response plan 
and maps the release area, tracking a plume with the other programs. ALOHA includes a 
database of physical properties for about 900 common hazardous chemicals and can be 
used to predict the rate at which vapors escape from a leak and their patterns of 
dispersion in the atmosphere in a straight line downwind of an outdoor chemical spill. 
The concentration on either side of the line is based on a Guassian distribution. EPI 
appears to have been ALOHA's predecessor. CHARM simulates an isolated puff without 
an ongoing source. MARPLOT maps plume patterns (Probasco). 
None of these programs can be applied to floods directly, but they may provide 
guidance to those wishing to model floods or evacuations. There are three programs, 
however, that offer greater promise. 
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One is proprietary, called Q-world, and was developed by Innovative Emergency 
Management. In theory, in half a second it can track the movement of a chemical cloud, 
keeping track of its concentration, loss functions, and evacuation dynamics, to yield a 
central value for life loss and corresponding confidence levels. The principal of the 
company, Madhu Beriwal, thought it would be simple to customize the program to track 
a flood wave instead of a chemical plume, but, unfortunately, supporting documentation 
was never sent after repeated phone calls (Beriwal 1998). 
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, operated by Battelle, develops and 
promotes the Federal Emergency Management Information System (FEMIS)--an 
automated decision support system that allows the user to plan emergency responses in 
advance and then call them up during an emergency for execution. The program tracks 
resources, provides a task list, provides a contact list, stores event logs, displays a status 
board, and models hazards and evacuation. The first four components are most useful for 
an emergency action plan (EAP), while the final two components are relevant to life-loss 
estimation. Currently, the program can only model the spread of a toxic chemical plume 
to support the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), but 
programmers intend to expand its capabilities to model floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, 
and wildfires. The FEMIS program integrates geographic information systems (GIS via 
Arc View), a relational database management system (RDBMS), an electronic plan 
management system, and other software, all of which must be purchased commercially. It 
includes a normal mode, a planning mode, and an exercise training mode. The program is 
built on efforts encapsulated in a program called IEMIS by FEMA, The U.S. Army, state 
and local governments, and other contractors (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory). 
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FEMA is developing a software package called HAZUS (Hazards US) that is 
intended to provide damage estimates for various natural disasters. To date, it can only 
simulate damages from earthquakes, but FEMA plans to include preview models for 
floods and hurricanes in 2002. "This initial release of the two additional models will 
enable users to assess the potential for direct damage to residential, industrial, and 
commercial buildings" (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999, p. 1). In its 
present form , the supporting documentation seems to indicate that one can model 
structural damages caused by a darn failure resulting from an earthquake, but since the 
flood module has not yet been fully developed, this functionality must be limited. The 
model also includes casualty estimates in buildings with slight structural damage, 
moderate structural damage, extensive structural damage, and after collapse, but these 
loss functions follow from earth tremors rather than flooding. Significantly, one can enter 
custom casualty rates "if improved information is available" (National Institute of 
Building Sciences, 1997, p. 9-43). One can also provide custom flood mapping or rely on 
the default Flood Insurance Rate Maps. The program' s land-use classifications might 
provide a first cut at Par types. HAZUS uses TIGER files (Topologically Integrated 
Geographic Encoding and Referencing system) developed by the U.S. Census Bureau 
based on 1990 census data. The files contain data on roads, streets, railways, waterways, 
and census boundaries. 
Of these three, FE MIS appears to offer the greatest promise for making EAPs and 
HAZUS offers the greatest potential for rapidly implementing an improved life loss 
model for flood events using software that is currently in development. Most 
encouraging, the focal point of HAZUS is the estimation of structural damages to 
buildings and infrastructure, critical in estimating Ls and ultimately flood zones. 
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